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Summary
A consistent feature of clinical depression emphasised in several theories is a 
pessimistic view of one’s personal future. The literature divides future cognitions into 
positive versus negative with reduced positive future cognitions linked to depression 
and suicidal ideation. This reduction in future cognitions has been linked to impaired 
autobiographical memory and emotional avoidance. Specifically, a lack of 
willingness to access personal past experiences influences future cognitions and 
subsequently future behaviour. Attempted avoidance of painful past events can 
generalise to reduced contact with all past experiences, positive and negative. The 
current thesis had three main aims. First, it aimed to determine the differences, or as 
the emerging literature suggests, the similarities, in thinking about the future and the 
past in sub clinically depressed versus non-depressed individuals. Implicit future 
cognitions and past experiences were related to emotional avoidance in a sub clinical 
sample. The second aim of the current work was to offer an alternative to the use of 
self report measures in the future and past thinking literature. To that end, a robust 
and accurate implicit measure of positive future expectations in depression was tested 
in a sub clinical sample. This implicit methodology proved a better indicator of 
depression and hopelessness when compared to widely used explicit methodologies. 
Finally, the thesis aimed to provide analogue evidence of techniques for the 
remediation of pessimistic thinking as is characteristic in depression, namely 
mindfulness and values clarification. Mindfulness and values clarification were 
demonstrated to be useful techniques in the remediation of pessimistic cognitions 
with increased acceptance of re- or pre-living personally relevant negative 
experiences allowing for greater psychological flexibility. Taken together the 
experimental series reported herein suggests that implicit positive cognitions about 
the past and future are related to sub clinical depression. Additionally, mindfulness- 
and values-based skills can moderate the link between past and future cognitions and 
sub clinical depression.
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Chapter 1
Memory for the Future: the Valence of 
Past and Future Cognitions in Depression
1.1 General Introduction
Thinking about the future plays a vital role in many aspects of people’s lives, and 
we frequently act in accordance with future anticipations evaluated in relation to their 
positive or negative outcomes. Research in the area of thinking about ones future has 
gained increased interest in the last decade due to its link with conditions such as 
depression and anxiety (MacLeod, Pankhania, Lee, & Mitchell, 1997; MacLeod, Rose, & 
Williams, 1993). Thinking about, and planning for, the future has been referred to as 
'perhaps one o f the most fascinating features o f the human mind ’ (Szpunar, 2010, p.l; 
see also Buckner & Carroll, 2007; Hesslow, 2002; Ingvar, 1979, 1985; Schacter, Addis, 
& Buckner, 2008). Although, arguably other organisms can abstract and record survival- 
oriented patterns of information, in order to guide subsequent behaviour (e.g., food here, 
predators there), future expectancy in the human world extends beyond the survival value 
with the ability to generate vivid simulations of environments and situations that have 
never before existed. Thus, expectancies for the future serve to coordinate ongoing 
behaviour (Suddendorf & Corballis, 1997).
Wheeler, Stuss and Tulving (1997) looked at the ability to re-experience past 
events through autobiographical memories as concurrent to the ability to pre-experience 
the future and coined this ‘mental time travel’. Accordingly, expectancy has been noted 
as a special case of mental time travel capability, inherent in episodic memory and 
episodic future thinking (Tulving, 2005). In short, effective future action can be drawn 
from information based on our previous experience. Thus, expectancy can be viewed as 
where past and future meet to steer present behaviour. By anticipating future fortune or 
adversity, that is, by constructing a ‘cognitive map’ that informs methods of attainment 
and avoidance, humans inherently stand in good stead to prosper in achieving their goals 
(Bandura, 1986; Higgins, 2000; Rotter, 1954; Tolman, 1932). And as such the ability to 
‘travel in time’ is of great benefit to humans, although, intrinsic to the perception of 
future failure and sadness, this ability can also have negative consequences. The last 
three years in particular have seen improved awareness of these phenomena in clinical 
settings, and there is increasing evidence pertaining to a link between deficits in memory
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and future expectancy with psychological disorders such as depression and suicidal 
ideation (e.g., Williams & Broadbent, 1986; Williams, 1996; Williams, Bamhofer, 
Crane, Hermans, Raes, Watkins, et al., 2007). With the link between past and future 
experiences singled out as one of the scientific breakthroughs of 2007, in reference to 
studies by Schacter, Addis and colleagues (e.g., Schacter, Addis, & Buckner, 2007; 
Addis, Wong, & Schacter, 2007).
The future can be perceived as positive and negative, and such a balanced 
approach has an inherently functional advantage which has served humans well as a 
survival value by motivating future behaviour as well as presenting warnings about 
negative outcomes following continued dysfunctional behavioural approaches. However, 
a shift in the balance of personal future perception, as entirely positive or negative is less 
functional, and equally less psychologically healthy. As such it has been proposed that 
the ratio of positive to negative cognition may be essential in evaluations of 
psychological dysfunction (Schwartz & Garamoni, 1989). In this regard it has been 
suggested that an uneven balance, of slightly more positive than negative cognitions, 
holds the most advantageous function in coping with stressful events (Schwartz & 
Garamoni, 1986). That is, an increased negative outlook is linked to depression, and 
when asked about their expectancy in regards to the likely outcome of a series of future 
events, moderately depressed undergraduate students were found to predict that negative 
events were more likely and that positive events were less likely to happen relative to 
non-depressed individuals (Andersen, 1990; Andersen, Spielman, & Bargh, 1992). 
Additionally, individuals are more likely to become depressed if the occurrences of 
negative events are believed to reflect general personal incompetence and insignificance 
(Abramson, Metalsky, & Alloy, 1989). Depression in turn, is a debilitating psychological 
disorder, with serious implications in terms of human suffering, lost productivity, and 
even loss of life (Wells & Sherboume, 1999; Wulsin, Vaillant, & Wells, 1999).
As such, another uniquely human behaviour linked to future thinking, in regards
to a pessimistic future outlook, is suicide. In fact, every 40 seconds someone ends their
own life, constituting mortality rates of one million people every year, or 16 per 100,000
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worldwide (WHO, 2009). These numbers, however, do not include the number of peojle 
who attempt suicide and live, or those with suicidal ideation. In fact, two thirds of these 
who commit suicide have made at least one prior attempt to end their life (e.g., Applely, 
Shaw, Amos, et al., 1999; Isometsa & Lonnqvist, 1998). With recent reports uncoverhg 
a substantial increase in suicide rates among young people, between the ages of 15 to 14. 
In fact young people have now become the group at highest risk in most countries, 
whereas traditionally, it was found that elderly males held the highest suicide raes 
(WHO, 2009). Suicide in itself has been referred to as an extreme form of experienial 
avoidance (Baumeister, 1990; Chiles & Strosahl, 2005); that is, such avoidance maybe 
the ultimate escape from psychological pain. Baumeister (1990) found that suicide noes 
commonly refer to emotional escape as the desired function of suicides and thus ‘suicide 
can be seen as an ultimate step in the effort to escape from se lf (p. 90). Similarly tlis 
pattern is found in reports from non-fatal self-injury, for instance, self-harming collie  
students reported using emotionally avoidant coping styles more often relative to 
students who do not self-harm (Andover, 2006). In their study Chapman, Gratz & Brovn
(2006) present direct evidence that self-harm correlates with experiential avoidance, as 
such it may be that experiential avoidance doesn’t just give rise to psychological 
problems, which may lead to suicidal ideation and ultimately suicide, these cogniticns 
and the subsequent behaviour may be the ultimate expression of an avoidant coping 
strategy.
Future cognition has been noted as an important factor in understanding 
suicidality (e.g., Abramson et al., 1989; O’Connor, Fraser, Whyte, MacHale, & 
Masterson, 2008; MacLeod, Pankhania, Lee, & Mitchell, 1997). Although a lack of 
positive future thinking is significantly related to suicide risk, negative expectations 
about the future are not independently associated with suicidality (MacLeod et al., 1997; 
O’Connor, Connery, & Cheyne, 2000; O’Connor, O’Connor, O’Connor, Smallwood, & 
Miles, 2004). Indeed, recent studies have suggested that clinically depressed individuals 
are distinguished from non-depressed individuals more specifically by a propensity to 
reduced expectations of positive events occurring (Andersen & Limpert, 2001; MacLeod
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& Salaminiou, 2001). With long term follow-up studies noting reduced levels of 
hopelessness as related to the occurrence of positive life events in undergraduates who 
have a stable, global attributional style (Needles & Abramson, 1990).This is consistent 
with the hopelessness model of depression - by way of individuals believing that valued 
outcomes will not to occur, and that one is helpless to alter those outcomes (Abramson et 
al., 1989). In this regard, positive future cognitions have been found to play an important 
role in the experience of, and recovery from, psychological disorders (MacLeod & 
Moore, 2000). With hopelessness and depression more strongly related to positive future 
thinking relative to negative future thinking (MacLeod, Tata, Tyler, Schmidt, Davidson, 
& Thompson, 2005), suicidal behaviour has been conceptualised as an inability to 
generate positive future expectations (MacLeod, Tata, Evans, Tyler, Schmidt, Davidson, 
Thornton, & Catalan, 1998; MacLeod et al.,1997; MacLeod, Rose, Williams, 1993; 
Hunter & O’Connor, 2003; O'Connor, Whyte, Fraser, Masterton, Miles, MacHale, 2007; 
O’Connor et al., 2004; O’Connor et al., 2000).
The ‘Cry of Pain’ model describes suicidal behaviour as a reaction to a given 
context where the individual’s perception of the experience is one of defeat, no escape 
and no release (Williams, 2001; Williams, Crane, Bamhofer, & Duggan, 2005; 
O’Connor, 2003). With reduced positive future expectancies linked to the perceived lack 
of potential ‘rescue’ from the current situation. Thus, producing a spiraling effect of 
feelings of entrapment, with the experiences perceived as unpreventable, subsequently 
increasing the risk of suicidal ideation. O’Connor and colleagues (e.g., O’Connor, Fraser, 
Whyte, & MacHale, 2008) have argued that positive future thought, for example, of 
enjoyable and meaningful events, would serve to ‘rescue’ suicidal individuals from such 
despair. Carver and Scheier, in their self-regulation model (e.g., Carver & Scheier, 1998), 
further describe the ability to generate and engage with future expectations as analogous 
to recognition, following and attainment of personal goals and values. These findings led 
to the premise that positive future thinking predicts the degree of hopelessness. Though it 
has been argued that unlike hopelessness, positive future thinking provides more 
practical options for intervention and treatment planning, as it suggests a specific
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cognitive-behavioral mechanism in which to tailor a clinical intervention (O’Connor et 
al., 2008).
The current thesis aims to examine the link between thoughts about the past / 
expectancies for the future and depressive cognition. Chapter 1 will provide a 
background on a number of areas in order to facilitate an understanding of the empirical 
Chapters 2-7. In what follows the reader will be presented with sections on i). 
Depression; ii). Theories of depression; iii). Typically employed assessment and 
measurements of depression; iv). Research in the area of autobiographical memories and 
future expectancies; and v). Novel methods of assessing future expectancies. First, 
consideration will be given to the aetiology and detection of depression.
1.2 Depression
Depression has been documented as persistent in its course and disabling in its
form, with the intensity of functional and psychosocial impairment greater than that
associated with chronic illnesses such as diabetes and arthritis (Hays, Wells, Sherboume,
Rogers, & Spritzer, 1995). The significance of depression is evidenced by World Health
Organization data which found the illness to have affected about 121 million people
worldwide in 2004, with numbers increasing each year (WHO, 2004). As early as the
1970’s, the noticeable prevalence of clinical depression led to it being referred to as the
‘common cold’ of psychiatry (Seligman, 1975). Decade’s later prevalence rates for
depression continue to remain high, with depression emerging as the leading overall
diagnosed illness (Henderson, Andrews, & Hall, 2000). Depression has been reported as
chronic in 10-25% of sufferers and a major source of disability in normal life and at work
(Tylee, Gastpar, Lepine & Mendlewicz, 1999). The level of impairment has been found
to increase as a function of the severity of depression (Lepine, Gastpar, Mendlewicz, &
Tylee, 1997), and although it is predicted that 60-80% of sufferers of depression can be
effectively treated (WHO, 2004), it is anticipated that less than 50% of individuals seek
treatment (Andrews, Hall, Teesson, & Henderson, 1999). The World Health
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Organization (2009) measures the degree of disability associated with mental or physical 
illness with reference to a measure of disability-adjusted-life-years (DALY). The DALY 
offers a way to make comparisons between illnesses, with one year of life lost to 
disability or mortality equaling one DALY. With recent comparisons seeing depression 
as accounting for 13 percent of DALYs lost, relative to all diseases worldwide (WHO,
2004). Depression rates are forecast to be second only to ischaemic heart disease 
(coronary artery disease or CAD) as the most affected disease by 2020 (as measured by 
DALY) (WHO, 2004). Despite this morbidity, and the number of studies demonstrating 
the significant proportion of the population currently affected by depression, the disorder 
commonly goes un-recognised in clinical practice (Andrews et al., 1999). And it has been 
estimated that two-thirds of those who do seek treatment remain undiagnosed in primary 
care settings (Ani, Bazargan, Hindman, Bell, Farooq, Akhanjee, Yemofio, Bakerl, & 
Rodriguez, 2008). This suggestion is supported by a recent study which found that 
general practitioners only accurately diagnosed about 50% of presenting patients with 
depression (Kroenke, 2010).
1.2.1 The Complexity of Symptomatology
One of the complexities involved in understanding the individuals that make up 
the group of un-recognised depression sufferers pertains to the multifaceted 
symptomology of depression. Symptoms of depression are complex in that 
manifestations and grouping of symptoms can be inconsistent, interconnected and often 
nondescript (Hunt, Auriemma, & Cashaw, 2003). Classification systems, such as the 
Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders-IV-TR (APA, 2000) and the 
International Disease Classification System 10 (ICD-10; WHO, 2007), have listed a 
criteria of symptoms that must be presenting in order to determine a diagnosis of 
depression, with somatic symptoms relatively well recognized in depression (Beck, 1967; 
Tylee, Gastpar, Lepine, & Mendlewicz, 1999; Wilhelm, Parker, & Hadzi-Pavlovic, 
1997). In a study by Tylee and colleagues (1999) over 76% of participants reported a 
lack of feeling, sadness and low mood. Furthermore, 59% reported becoming
7
increasingly emotional with a desire to cry a lot. However, the current classification 
systems do not strive to identify the individual experience of depression.
Depressed individuals often find it difficult to enjoy, or to be interested in, normal 
activities (Beck, 1967), with optimism about the future somewhat affected (Outram, 
Murphy, & Cockbum, 2004). Energy is often reported as low and concurs with reports of 
tiredness and a general lack of interest (Tylee et al., 1999). The experience of such 
symptoms often results in behavioural withdrawal, refraining from engagement with 
normally followed activities. Spiraling from such withdrawal stems feelings of 
anxiousness and fear, with some individuals thoroughly incapacitated by such emotional 
experiences (Beck, 1967). In this regard, previously pleasurable events and daily tasks 
often become perceived as unattainable, due to a lack of attentiveness and fluency in 
thought processes, with such cognitions commonly accompanied by a preoccupation with 
thoughts about personal pain and a lack of solutions to anticipated events (Abramson et 
al., 1989).
Sleep patterns are commonly noted as altered in depressed individuals, with a 
variety of insomnias recognized. Indeed it has been suggested that a lack of sleep and an 
upset sleep pattern occur in the majority (around 63%) of cases presenting with 
depression (Berio, D’Hario, Ruffo, Di Virgilio, & Rizzo, 2000). Appetite is usually 
affected, often appetite declines, though some individuals report an increased appetite, 
with cravings for specific food types (Beck, 1967). Subsequently, general health is 
affected, as well as the ability to adhere to regular life activities, with romantic and 
personal friendships frequently noted as strenuous and subsequently afflicted (Tylee et 
al., 1999).
As has been noted, when an individual becomes clinically depressed, they are
prone to feelings of sadness and tearfulness (Beck, 1967), other recognised behaviours
are irritability, anxiety and tension, as well as feelings of guilt and beliefs about letting
others down (Fennell, 1993). A negative self-image (Derry & Kuiper, 1981), with
overgeneralised negative evaluations pertaining to personal worth, worry or ruminations
over past failings is commonly denoted in depressive samples (Beck, 1967). It has been
suggested that there are specific factors that increase people’s risk for developing
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repeated episodes of depression, although no set factors have been isolated, with risk 
factors for depression appearing to be multifaceted and co-dependent across social, 
biological and psychological domains (Street, Sheeran, & Orbell, 1999). In light of the 
high recurrence of depressive symptoms, with more than 75% of depressed patients 
experiencing more than one depressive episode, (Boland & Keller 2009), the personal, 
social and economic impact of depression holds extensive long-term consequences 
(McNair, Highet, Hickie, & Davenport, 2002).
1.3 Theories of Depression
It is common in psychology, as in everyday conversation, to separate actions into 
three categories, namely, behaviour, cognition, and emotion. From this perspective, 
behaviour typically refers to observable acts, usually defined by their form or topography 
(e.g., Gray, 1999). Cognition is regularly referred to as activities of the mind, or 
unobservable mental processes (e.g., Ellis & Hunt, 1993), and often indicated as a likely 
cause of behaviour. Whereas emotions are typically defined as bodily or affective states 
(e.g., Ellis, Ottoway, Varner, Becker, & Moore, 1997), and are as such often understood 
as the feelings associated with cognition and behaviour (Gray, 1999). Cognition and 
emotion has generally been referred to in the depression literature more often than 
behaviour per se. That is, the prevailing line of depression research, that is, cognitive 
theories of depression, view individual suffering as dominated by representations of self- 
referential information involving themes of loss, failure, worthlessness, rejection and 
hopelessness (Abramson et al., 1989; Beck, 1967; Ingram, Miranda, & Segal, 1998). This 
overemphasis on emotions is recurrently referred to as the reason for, or the motivation 
behind thoughts and actions. This concept of depression has arguably been seen as 
deficient in its own regard (Skinner, 1974) and a resurgence of behaviour analytic 
theories of depression have more recently emerged, proposing a functional approach in 
accounting for depression (e.g., Zettle, 2004; Zettle & Hayes, 2002). However, over the 
past few decades the most widely researched theories of depression have come from the
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cognitive literature. Therefore, in the section that follows the reader will firstly be 
provided with a background to cognitive theories of depression.
1.3.1. Cognitive Theories
There is a long history of research investigating the interaction of cognition and 
emotion in depression, with a focus on cognitive processes and on the content of 
depressive cognition (e.g., Beck, 1967; Seligman, 1975; Abramson, Metalsky, & Alloy, 
1989). This line of research has described symptoms of depression in terms of negative 
views of the self, the world, and the future, with recognition of attention and memory as 
playing a key role in the increased vulnerability for the first onset and the recurrence of 
depression. Thus cognitive theories of depression regard increased risk for the 
development and recurrence of depressive episodes as pertaining to people’s thoughts, 
expectancies, attitudes, and interpretations as well as the way in which they attend to and 
recall events (e.g., Ingram, Miranda, & Segal, 1998; Weinstein, 1983).
Within cognitive theories of depression the role of negative inferential styles has 
been highlighted, with regards to dysfunctional beliefs, rumination, and information- 
processing biases as vulnerabilities to depression (Alloy, Abramson, Walshaw, & 
Neeren, 2006). According to this view, individuals, who attribute negative life events to 
enduring and general causes, and catastrophize about the consequences of such events, 
may be more likely to experience depression than those who do not adopt these negative 
cognitive processes (Abramson, Metalsky, & Alloy, 1989). Based on early attempts by 
Seligman (1975), to map the behavioural scope of learned helplessness in animals, the 
proposal that learned helplessness plays a causal role in human depression arose. It was 
suggested that deficiencies in the relations made between the outcome of events and 
behaviour preceding such events, consequently shaped behaviour. That is, by following 
self-instructed rules such as ‘no matter how hard I try, I will never be able to [reward or 
punishment]’. Thus it was proposed that the lack of adequately established relations 
between behaviour and outcome is subsequently ensued by decreased behaviour,
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motivation and ability to learn. However, these models faced criticism for not accounting 
for cognition. In a revision of Seligman’s (1974, 1975) work, Abramson, Seligman and 
Teasdale (1978) reformulated the helplessness model with reference to consequences of 
the belief that a lack of success is due to personal stable and internal factors (i.e. a lack of 
ability). Such a belief is necessarily generalized beyond the immediate task, and is 
viewed by the individual as important in regards to the causality of their current and 
future situations.
The hopelessness theory of depression, proposed by Abramson, Metalsky and 
Alloy (1989) further extends on Seligman’s work on learned helplessness and attribution 
styles (Seligman, 1975; Seligman, Abramson, Semmel, & von Baeyer, 1979) by 
suggesting that when confronted with a negative event, people who are pessimistic in 
their outlook (i.e. someone who attributes negative experiences as a trait characteristic 
pertaining to themselves) are vulnerable to ongoing depression as they assume that a 
negative event in the present will consequently be followed by other negative events, and 
interpret such incidents of negative experiences in regards to personal attributes of being 
fundamentally flawed or worthless (Abramson et al., 1989). Thus, depressed individuals 
appear to have dysfunctional attitudes about themselves that influence their perception of 
events, processing of information, and which extends to interpretations of past and future 
experiences (Beck, 1967).
One of the most influential models of depression comes from Beck and 
colleagues, who have focused on how thoughts influence mood, which in turn leads to an 
influence on behaviour (Beck, Rush, Shaw, & Emery, 1979). In Becks’ model, depressed 
individuals are described as holding negative thoughts about the self, the environment, 
and the future. Beck and colleagues labelled these negative thoughts as ‘automatic’, in 
the sense that they may arise without warning. This conceptualisation of depression 
further proposes that depressed individuals not only lack motivation, but are resistant to 
any attempts at activation (e.g., Young, Beck, & Weinberger, 1993), with these 
behaviours manifested in a lack of willingness to engage with the world around them. 
Thus, Beck and colleagues were among the first to conceptualize depression by taking
into account both cognitive and behavioural factors.
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Following on from the view that certain cognitions, emotions and bodily states 
cause deficient behavioural outcomes, it was suggested that in order to improve 
behavioural consequences, these causes must be eliminated, or at least reduced. 
Subsequently, the treatment targets for Cognitive Behavioural Therapy (CBT), one of the 
main treatment packages to derive from these theories of depression, have been to alter 
depressive thoughts in order to change mood and subsequently behaviour, with the view 
to encourage increased engagement with affable activities (e.g., behavioural activation).
1.3.2 Behavioural Theories
While research on depression has exceeded investigation on virtually every other 
disorder by psychiatry and cognitive researchers, the behaviour analytic writings on 
clinical depression have been relatively light in comparison (e.g., Dougher & Hackbert, 
1994; 2000; Ferster, 1973; Lewinsohn, 1974; see Eifert, Beach, & Wilson, 1998). 
Skinner paid little attention to depression in his writings; and in his brief dealings with 
the issue, he emphasized overt (i.e., observed by others) behaviour rather than the 
emotional experiences involved. As such when Skinner (1953) spoke of depression he 
did so by referring to the term “depression” in quotes, to avoid giving the term any 
special status other than that of a verbal description. Skinner described depression as an 
“emotional condition,” and did not elaborate on this point; instead the focus was on 
reductions in overt behaviour. Skinner highlighted the centrality of reduced positive 
reinforcement (i.e. the provision of a consequence found to be rewarding in order to 
encourage and maintain behaviour) in depression. That is, that social behaviour depends 
on a reinforcing environment and as such behaviour may become reduced due to a 
change in the environment or pertaining to a lack of reinforcement overall to the 
produced behaviour. This postulate of reinforcement contingent behaviour underpins a 
theory brought forth by Lewinsohn (1974), which subsequently dominated the 
behavioural literature for several decades. That is to say, Lewinsohn and colleagues 
proposed that depression, to a greater extent, could be accounted for just by examining
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positive reinforcers. In their view depression was regarded as a low rate of response- 
contingent positive reinforcement (RCPR). The focus for Lewinsohn, in line with 
Skinners earlier proposal, was on the behavioural reductions often seen in depression. 
This suggestion was supported by subsequent evidence from studies where a relationship 
between rates of positive reinforcement and depression intensity was observed (e.g., 
Lewinsohn & Libet, 1972). However, Lazarus and colleagues took note of previous work 
by Skinner, who had suggested that depression may be an emotional response to aversive 
rule following, especially aversive social control (1953, pp. 360-363), and they proposed 
that depression could be accounted for by a loss of reinforcers, or by a decrease in the 
effectiveness of reinforcers (e.g., Costello & Lazarus, 1972). A similar description was 
proposed by Ferster (1973), who, in a more functional behaviour analytic account of 
depression, characterised depression as potentially resulting from both a loss of 
positively reinforcing behaviour as well as an increase in avoidance and escape 
behaviours. It has been suggested in this regard that the emotional experience of 
depression is a product of increased aversive control (e.g., withdrawal from society in an 
effort to remove oneself from any negative experiences) as well as reduced appetitive 
control (e.g., helplessness in the face of own behaviour contributing to a positive 
outcome) (Kanter, Busch, Weeks, & Landes, 2008).
Thus throughout the conceptualisation phase the behavioural view has retained a 
focus on the role of individual learning histories in regards to factors that may contribute 
to the onset of depression (e.g., changes in reinforcer availability or influence), as well as 
the factors that may contribute to its maintenance (e.g., avoidance and escape 
behaviours).
1.3.3 The Role of Verbal Behaviour in Depression
Traditional behavioural theories of depression did not attribute a strong role for
language in its development. Though, over the past few decades, cognitive researchers
have maintained the belief that cognition holds a causal role in depression, a notion
supported by the considerable line of research confirming the presence of negative
13
cognitive content during depressive episodes (Clark, Beck, & Alford, 1999). However, 
the aim to ascertain negative cognitive biases as autonomous features of depression has 
not been successful (Ingram, Miranda, & Segal, 1998), although it is apparent that 
cognitions affect behaviour on a moment-to-moment basis (Kanter et al., 2008). From a 
behaviour analytic point of view, the thinking-feeling relations put forward by cognitive 
models of depression are essentially behaviour-behaviour relations (Hayes & 
Brownstein, 1986). Thus behaviour analysts have attempted to model the environmental 
conditions responsible for such relations (Kanter, 2008).
Stimulus equivalence is an empirically demonstrable phenomenon in which, by 
training a series of unidirectional relations between arbitrary stimuli, a number of 
untrained or derived relations emerge in an overall pattern according to which the stimuli 
seem subsequently to be treated as mutually substitutable or equivalent (Sidman, Kirk, & 
Wilson-Morris, 1985; Sidman, 1994). Equivalence has been extensively looked at within 
behaviour analysis and is generally trained and tested by means of conditional 
discriminations / match-to-sample (MTS) procedures. Associated with stimulus 
equivalence is an effect known as transfer of function. Of particular interest is the 
psychological function documented following the formation of an equivalence relation, 
that is, even without precise instruction the function of a relation established for one 
member of an equivalence class may transfer to other members of that class.
A diverse range of behavioural functions have now demonstrated susceptibility to
transfer of functions, such as avoidant responses, preferences, self discrimination and
moods with others (see Dymond & Rehfeldt, 2000 for a review). An example of
particular relevance to the current research comes from Auguston and Dougher (1997),
who demonstrated the transfer of avoidance functions through equivalence. Participants
were first trained in two-four member equivalence relations. Next they were exposed to a
conditioning procedure in which shock was paired with one member of one relation only.
Participants were then trained in a differential signaled avoidance task during which they
learned to avoid shock by making a particular response in the presence of the conditioned
shock stimulus. Finally, it was demonstrated that participants also displayed the
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avoidance response in the presence of stimuli equivalent to the conditioned shock 
stimulus, but not to stimuli in the other equivalence relation.
Early behavioural theories have perhaps been limited in the lack of accounting for 
language and/or cognition per se. As has been clearly presented in the cognitive 
literature, and particularly in light of depression, cognitions (such as future expectancies) 
are important. In this regard, promise may lie in a in a relatively new behavioural account 
of language and cognition, that expands on the equivalence literature to account for 
human language and cognition from a behavioural perspective, namely Relational Frame 
Theory (RFT) (Hayes, Bames-Holmes, & Roche, 2001). RFT extends the equivalence 
findings and further lends these to verbal behaviour (including thinking) which is seen as 
the behaviour of framing events relationally, that is, responding to one stimulus in terms 
of its given or inferred relation to other stimuli.
1.3.4 Relational Frame Theory (RFT)
From the Relational Frame Theory perspective equivalence is just one of many 
types of relations (Bames-Holmes & Bames-Holmes, 2000). That is, in exploration of 
the phenomena of derived relational responding RFT research has demonstrated such 
responding in accordance with various derived relations such as relations of sameness, 
opposition, and difference (Roche & Barnes, 1996, 1997; Steele & Hayes, 1991; Whelan 
& Bames-Holmes, 2004), more than and less than (Dymond & Barnes, 1995; O’Hora, 
Roche, Bames-Holmes, & Smeets, 2002; Whelan, Bames-Holmes, & Dymond, 2006), 
and before and after (O’Hora, Bames-Holmes, Roche, & Smeets, 2004; see also Barnes 
& Roche, 1996; Hayes & Barnes, 1997). There is thus accumulating evidence supporting 
the view that, similar to the transfer of function seen with equivalence relations, other 
prevalent relations may also facilitate this transformation of functions (for a review, see 
Dymond & Rehfeldt, 2001).
According to RFT automatic negative thoughts may augment depressed feelings 
due to the ability to construct arbitrary relations in language, and that it is this capacity
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which renders human psychological suffering so common (Hayes et al., 2001). That is,
words and thoughts alone are able to evoke feelings which subsequently may determine
behaviour. For instance, in the context of future cognition, if a student worries about
failing their degree course, the very word ‘exam’, or the thought of sitting an exam, may
evoke related thoughts and feelings of anxiety and fear, as though the person was
actually sitting the exam or had truly failed the exam. These relations can even trigger
physical reactions linked to anxiety and depression. In the given example, paired with
negative thoughts of ‘not being able’ or ‘not being good enough’ these relations may
avert individuals from revising for exams, as they are having the thought that they are
likely to fail anyway -  such hopeless ideation thus inhibits behaviour and may contribute
to further depression, or even instigate frames of cognition related to suicidal ideation.
RFT refers to this potentially pathological pattern of behaviour in regards to the effects
observed with transfer of functions (Hayes et al., 2001). For example, hearing someone
talking about a relationship break-up, or about a recent bereavement, can quite
understandably be painful for someone who has just experienced something similar. The
person is only exposed to words, but the words evoke automatic (or related) thoughts and
feelings, as though a real loss were here and now, in the present. Interestingly, equivalent
automatic thoughts may be evoked by the same person hearing about someone’s
successful relationships, i.e. hearing that someone is getting married may equally bring to
mind thoughts of personal failed relationships - as the relations constructed may occur in
the context of frames of opposition as well as frames of equivalence. Skinner (1945)
offered the view that transformation of function within language means that humans
learn not only to consider emotions in relation to separate events, but also experience
some of the events as positive and some as negative (Hayes, 1984). As such, having
language involves the fact that, when in a given context a positive evaluation is made, the
very same event may at a separate point generate a negative evaluation (e.g., the absence
of the positive event, i.e. the preceding positively evaluated event is weighed against the
current context; see Hayes, Bames-Holmes, & Roche, 2001; Hayes et al., 1999). With
this it can be seen how social interactions facilitate training and strengthening of
discriminations amongst private events (Hayes, Bames-Holmes, & Roche, 2001), and as
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such how a withdrawal from contexts where one hold the opportunity to receive 
reinforcement may perpetuate the pathological construct of cognitions.
1.4 Expectancies
From the above discussion (see Sections 1.2, 1.3.1 and 1.3.2) there appears to be 
some consensus that depression is marked by negative affect, de-motivation, and reduced 
behavioural activation. With an ensuing deprivation of positive expectancies, especially 
in relation to events that are perceived as personally important to the individual, or as it 
has been denoted - an increased negative future outlook, a signature symptom of major 
depression (e.g. Beck et al., 1979 Abramson et al.,1989). As with emotion and cognition, 
the perspectives on expectancies by cognitive approaches presume that expectancies (or a 
lack thereof) are causal of behaviour. However with the advent of RFT, expectancies 
about the future can be examined from the behavioural analytical perspective as a set of 
derived rules based on experience, which can affect other behaviour through the 
transformation of function. For instance, an individual’s earlier success on a specific 
assignment will increase the expected likelihood of future success (Feather, 1966; 
Feather & Saville, 1967), as well as shape subsequent behaviour in future assignments of 
a similar fashion. The degree of influence derived from subjective expectancies further 
aids to direct subsequent behaviour, and may as such be confirmed or discontinued by 
the ensuing experience (Olson, Roese, & Zanna, 1996). The likelihood of expectancies 
being influenced in this way is reflected by the level of contact with the more general 
sources of personal beliefs, that is, information derived from past experience, social 
learning, the media, and so forth. As such, expectancies as derived relations, and the 
behaviour they may influence, can be observed as products of environmental 
contingencies, thus the link with the environmental context becomes relevant in research 
into this phenomenon. Importantly, when existing expectancies are confirmed (i.e. when 
behaviour is reinforced) their subjective likelihood may increase (i.e. behaviour will 
increase/ decrease).
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Thus in the event of such contingencies changing or diminishing, the individual 
may experience a state of deprivation, which can take shape in different forms of 
behaviour, e.g. avoidance strategies may initially lead to a lack of awareness of the 
changes (or deliberate attempts to circumvent these alterations) and as such facilitate 
increased attempts to regain the reinforcing quality, or a withdrawal from situations that 
facilitate such reinforcement may be enforced. As such, once the expectancy of access to 
reinforcers is removed, this may result in depression. As noted above (see Section 1.3.1) 
it can be argued that future expectancy is a prevalent and recurrent theme within the 
depression theories. In line with behavioural accounts, of expectancies being formed with 
a basis in past learning history, the wider literature on expectancies similarly denotes 
expectancy for future events as rooted in past events (i.e. the recollection or memory of 
past behaviour) -  where individuals make use of past experiences to shape images of 
potential future events.
With regards to anticipation of future events, increased hopelessness has arguably 
been suggested to ensue following the development of depressive predictive certainty. 
That is a certainty pertaining to the expectancy that positive future outcomes will not 
occur and that negative outcomes will occur (Andersen, 1990; Andersen & Lyon, 1987; 
Andersen, Spielman, & Bargh, 1992). As noted above, this certainty may be developed 
through an inability to recognise changes in the reinforcing environment. For example, 
through a lack of awareness of the influence such contingencies may have on the 
individuals’ experiences. With the certainty of the situation inferred from the resulting 
futile attempts at gaining control over the experience, e.g. by removing oneself from the 
situation. In this regard it has been proposed that the failure to anticipate positive 
experiences which prevent depressed individuals from experiencing positive occurrences, 
may originate in a lack of positive experiences necessitating some form o f behavioural 
approach. Jacobsen and colleagues (1996) used exposure to positive and rewarding 
experiences in an attempt to demonstrate the value of positive experience expectancies 
(or a lack thereof) in depression. Being able to recognize the extent to which hopeless 
ideation results from a reduced ability to experience and anticipate pleasure, or an
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inability to bring to mind potentially rewarding situations has clear implications for 
interventions (e.g., mood enhancement and motivational strategies, mindfulness vs. 
imagined construction to bring to mind pleasurable situations, values clarification), as 
well as helping to develop a better understanding of the phenomenon.
1.4.1 Mental Time Travel
A recent focus on past experience as an integral part of future thinking has 
emerged and has contributed to the revival of research into the phenomenon of mental 
time travel (e.g. Atance & O’Neill, 2001; Schacter & Addis, 2007; Schacter, Addis, & 
Buckner, 2007, 2008; Suddendorf & Corballis, 2007; Szpunar, 2010). The ability to 
mentally time travel into the future as a function of the episodic memory system 
originated with Tulving (1972), who was the first to propose that episodic future thinking 
reflects the individuals’ personal experiences, and as such the anticipation of future 
episodes is linked to particular autobiographical events in the personal past (Tulving, 
1972, 1983). Accordingly, it is this systematic awareness that allows humans to mentally 
represent and become aware of their existence across time, and with it, the opportunity to 
hold on to subjective experiences throughout time, a function referred to by Tulving 
(1985) as ‘autonoetic consciousness’ (Wheeler, Stuss, & Tulving, 1997). That is, the 
present moment may be perceived as both an extension of the past and a prelude to our 
future (Suddendorf & Corballis, 1997; Wheeler, Stuss, & Tulving, 1997; Buckner & 
Carroll, 2007; Hesslow, 2002; Ingvar, 1979; Schacter, Addis, & Buckner, 2008).
The recent revival of the link between autobiographical past and future 
experiences has lead to a wide range of research in several areas and evidence is 
currently available in support of mental time travel from domains such as neuroimaging 
(Addis, Wong, & Schacter, 2007; Botzung, Denkova, & Manning, 2008; Okuda et al., 
2003; Szpunar, Watson, & McDermott, 2007; Buckner & Carroll, 2007; Hassabis & 
Maguire, 2007; Schacter & Addis, 2007; Spreng, Mar, & Kim, 2009; Schacter & Addis, 
2009; Szpunar, Chan, & McDermott, 2009), neuropsychology, clinical psychology
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(D’Argembeau, Raffard, & Van der Linden, 2008; Williams et al., 1996), and 
developmental psychology (Atance & O’Neill, 2005; Busby & Suddendorf, 2005; Addis, 
Sacchetti, Ally, Budson, & Schacter, 2009). Taken together, the evidence suggests a 
close relationship between episodic autobiographical memory and episodic future 
thought.
1.4.1.1 Autobiographical Memory
With the content represented in future cognitions arguably linked to retrieval 
from episodic memory (for a discussion see Hegde, 2007 and Szpunar, 2010), by way of 
individuals sampling the contents of personal memories in order to construct novel 
scenarios conceived to occur in the future (Schacter & Addis, 2007), it is necessary to 
consider what constitutes autobiographical memory per se. ‘Autobiographical Memory’ 
is a term that easily corresponds to the daily use of the word memory, and has been 
defined as ‘memory for the events of one’s life’ (Conway & Rubin, 1993, p. 103). 
Autobiographical memory includes both personal semantic (i.e., facts about the self, such 
as knowing where one was bom) and episodic information (i.e., single events, such as 
remembering the first day at university) (cf. Baddeley, 1992 and Brewer, 1996). Tulving 
(1972; 1983) suggested that the two types of information were segregated in regards to 
the mental time travel effect, as personal semantic information pertains more to feelings 
of ‘knowing’ or of a familiarity with the content, whereas personal episodic information 
necessitates calling to mind and re-experiencing specific past events (Wheeler, Stuss, & 
Tulving, 1997), and as such incorporates details from a number of different information 
sources (e.g., sensory details, verbal content, emotion, etc.) (Rubin, 2006).
Conway and Rubin (1993) note that autobiographical memory ‘constitutes a
major crossroad in human cognition where considerations relating to the self, emotion,
goals, and personal meanings all intersect ’ (p. 103). As such, personal past experiences,
as suggested by the term autobiographical memory, has been noted as vital in regards to
self-knowledge, social-functioning and goals/values following (e.g., Brewer, 1996;
Conway & Pleydell-Pearce, 2000; Rubin, Schrauf, & Greenberg, 2003). Recent reviews
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by Bluck, (2003) and Bluck, Habermas and Rubin (2005) suggest that the wide range of 
autobiographical memory functions can be compiled into the three categories of self, 
social, and directive. The self category aids to maintain a consistent sense of self over 
time which facilitates a focus on personal advancement (see also Conway, 2005). The 
social category suggestively includes functions such as making verbal content available 
for conversation and social bonding (cf. Bluck et al. 2005). The directive category, on the 
other hand, comprises reasoning, problem solving and the direction of future behaviour 
(Pillemer, 2003). The advantage of being able to make use of information from past 
experiences becomes apparent when looking at examples in daily life where such 
strategies are implemented. For instance, following a failed job interview it is useful to 
obtain information about what went wrong at a subsequent date, so as to readjust future 
behaviour (Kahneman & Miller, 1986). In personal relationships it may also be useful to 
understand how certain behaviours led to the end of a romantic encounter (or indeed to 
appreciate that it was not personal responses that lead to the end of the relationship, but 
other contextual elements). As such the opportunity to reflect on past events and to 
construct ideals of future experiences is a unique prospect that allows us to learn from 
our mistakes (Taylor, Pham, Rivkin, & Armor, 1998; Taylor & Schneider, 1989).
However functional the mental time travel opportunity may be - it may 
inadvertently instigate behaviours where individuals attempt to generate meaning from 
past events, or even try to control their level of emotions pertaining to past events by 
piecing together optional versions of these events (Meyer & Taylor, 1986; Silver, Boon, 
& Stones, 1983; Taylor, 1983). For instance, following an episode experienced as a 
failed event, cognitions pertaining to alternate outcomes may arise such as 7 
could/should have done X  or Y \ Conflicting information in regards to a person’s self­
perception and actual behaviour in such situations may lead to negative self evaluations 
(Meyer & Taylor, 1986). In this light, what offers to be a natural and adaptive experience 
becomes disordered through aversive elicitation. That is, by considering alternate event 
outcomes individuals may be searching for a ‘better fit’ of the past event to coincide with 
their current perceived sense of self or self-schema. In this regard, focusing on the
outcome leads to attempts at ‘problem solving’, again this constitutes an inherently
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functional and adaptive approach, however, extensive problem solving, referred to as 
rumination in the literature, appears to concern worries about past outcomes more often 
than future outcomes (Papageorgiou & Wells, 2003; Watkins, Moulds & Mackintosh,
2005); and as such is a feature which is noted in depression symptomatology (e.g. Nolen- 
Hoeksema, 1991). As such depressed individuals markedly are found to ruminate over 
past events as well as demonstrating a preoccupation with the future, something which 
has been noted in the negative cognitive triad of depression, along with high rates of co­
morbidity between depression and anxiety disorders (Beck, 1967). Individuals who 
entertain such ‘ruling by emotions’ and thoughts - relative to the experience in itself, 
more often represent with depressive symptoms; and it has been proposed that 
psychological flexibility in this regard, is inhibited by a loss of present moment contact 
as the individual becomes fused with a verbally-construed past and/or future (Davis & 
Nolen-Hoeksema, 2000).
1.4.1.1.1 Depression and Deficits in Autobiographical Memory
Deficits in autobiographical memory have been linked with depression with
reference to a reduced ability to contact details of such past personal experiences, noted
as an overgeneral memory approach. Williams and Broadbent (1986) were the first to
address the phenomenon of overgeneral memory (OGM) in a sample of suicidal patients.
The authors found that those with suicidal ideation were more likely to produce
memories that were overgenral in their nature, that is, the retrieved events lacked
specificity in details pertaining to the past experiences. Subsequent research has
demonstrated that this lack of specificity is commonly denoted in samples with depressed
individuals relative to healthy controls (see Williams et al., 2007 for a review). In this
regard reduced autobiographical memory specificity (AMS) has been investigated as a
risk factor proposed to precede the onset of depression and acting as a mediating factor in
the progressive development of depression. Research into the AMS/OGM phenomenon
has mainly made use of the Autobiographical Memory Test (AMT; Williams &
Broadbent, 1986) in discriminating between high and low levels of specificity in
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autobiographical recall. The AMT, presents participants with cue words within different 
valence categories (e.g. positive and negatively affected words such as happy/sad), and 
respondents are required to produce a specific memory related to the cue word within a 
given time limit (e.g., 60 seconds). A specific memory is defined as a memory for an 
event that occurred at a particular time and place and lasted less than one day, that is 
episodic information (e.g., ‘I felt happy on the day of my university graduation’; 
Williams et al., 2007). In contrast, overgeneral memories include both categoric 
memories that refer to a class of generic events (e.g., ‘I felt happy when I used to go 
partying with my friends’) and extended memories that refer to an event lasting more 
than one day (e.g., ‘I felt happy when I was on holiday last month’).
This cue word methodology allows the analysis of the temporal distance of the 
recalled events, e.g. more proximate versus more distant events, as well as the latencies 
for recall of positive versus negative past events. More subjective features can also be 
examined, pertaining to phenomenological characteristics of the recalled experiences, 
such as affect, valence, vividness, etc (Brewer, 1996). In their seminal study Williams 
and Broadbent (1986) made use of the AMT in the presentation of 10 cue words, each 
one which was either a positive or a negative emotion. The study found reduced levels of 
AMS in response to positive and negative valence categories by the sample of suicide 
attempters, relative to a non-clinical sample. The phenomenon of overgeneral memory 
has been observed in many clinical groups and has been noted as of particular interest in 
the study of mental time travel (e.g., Croll & Bryant, 2000; Mackinger, Loschin, & 
Leibetseder, 2000; Mackinger, Pachinger, Leibetseter, & Fartacek, 2000; Scott, Stanton, 
Garland, & Ferrier, 2000; Goddard, Dritschel, & Burton, 1997; Moffitt, Singer, Nelligan, 
Carlson, & Vyse, 1994; Ramponi, Barnard, & Nimmo-Smith, 2004). However, the 
reduced AMS phenomenon has not been found to relate to all psychological disorders, 
rather it appeals more specifically to depression and suicidal ideation. Though, notably, 
links have been made for AMS and Post Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD), as well as 
acute stress disorder (e.g. Moore & Zoellner, 2007; Williams et al., 2007). Research into 
autobiographical recall has been facilitated by ratings of phenomenological
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characteristics pertaining to the past events retrieved (e.g., Johnson, Foley, Suengas, & 
Raye, 1988; Rubin, Schrauf, & Greenberg, 2003) and by reports of awareness during 
memory retrieval (e.g., Gardiner, 1988; Tulving, 1985).
In most of the research pertaining to AMS, specific (i.e. episodic) memories have 
most frequently been analyzed, although some have presented results for overgeneral 
memories more broadly (e.g., categoric and extended memories). The current thesis may 
refer interchangeably to either AMS and OGM, and subsequently either the retrieval of 
fewer specific past experiences or a more overgeneral representation of past events.
1.4.1.1.2 Emotional Avoidance
One mechanism proposed to underlie the overgeneral memory effect is that it is 
functional in regards to offering a strategy for emotional avoidance, that is, remaining at 
a general level of specificity during autobiographical retrieval allows the individual to 
circumvent recall of specific, negative and painful details (Williams et al., 2007). That is, 
continuous attempts to neglect painful past experiences may encourage a diminished 
effort in the advance to retrieve such past events, i.e. retrieval is not attempted from a 
bottom up approach but rather fluctuates across a more general level of knowledge 
pertaining to the past and self. Williams (1996) has referred to this approach as a 
‘mnemonic interlock’.
Conway and Pleydell-Pearce (2000) further propose that the functionality of 
reduced memory specificity pertains to personal goals and values. That is, memories 
which are not directly relevant to current goals will not be as easily accessible as more 
relevant past experiences. Notably, it is proposed that, irrespective of the past events 
relevance to present values, if certain past events ‘clash’ with an individual’s current self­
perception (e.g. if the memories are unpleasant or aversive), such past experiences will 
fail to be incorporated into the persons overall self image as held over time. As such it is 
believed that those presenting overgeneral memories prematurely end their search for a
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specific memory in an effort to avoid confrontation with the sensory, perceptual, and 
importantly -  the affective features of an experience, especially if this may shift their 
focus in a current goal pursuit. In this regard it holds that even neutrally toned past 
experiences may bring about negative affect, particularly in individuals who have 
experienced some form of trauma related events. Therefore, avoidance is only functional 
if it is not only applied to negative memories, but all memories, regardless of affective 
relations at the time of the event. Furthermore, the recurring avoidance of such aversive 
memories, has been argued by Williams et al. (2007) as consequently leading to a more 
automatic and general (i.e. overgeneral) retrieval style. Hence, evidence from AMT 
research has observed such a lack of specificity in recall across valence categories (e.g. 
Williams & Broadbent, 1986; Williams, 1996).
Williams et al. (2007) have put forward the CaR-FA-X theory, which is 
consistent with Conway and Pleydell-Pearce’s (2000) model of AM functionality. 
Williams et al. suggest that three different elements may contribute to overgeneral 
memory and propose these to be capture and rumination (CaR), functional avoidance 
(FA), and reduced executive control (X). The functional avoidance component is defined 
by Williams et al. as an emotion regulation strategy that reduces negative affect by 
limiting access to specific details of potentially emotional material. That is, individuals 
who are depressed or traumatized use a less specific retrieval style because it allows for 
the temporary relief of emotional suffering. Thus, in the short-term some cases of 
overgeneral memory serve a protective purpose. An experimental study consistent with 
this hypothesis, by Raes, Hermans, Decker, Eelen, and Williams (2003), found that mood 
disturbance, when completing a frustrating puzzle task, was higher in those with high 
levels of AMS. Low-specific individuals were less frustrated and scored lower on a self- 
report measure of unpleasantness. This has been taken as evidence that individuals with a 
less specific retrieval style are less emotionally aroused by a negative personal 
experience. Although OGM may be protective in the short term, and facilitate a reduction 
of negative emotions presently experienced, long term tendencies toward avoidance and 
non-acceptance of emotion can be damaging (Hayes, Strosahl, & Wilson, 1999).
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In relation to this line of research, it has been proposed that reduced AMS is 
linked with avoidant strategies pertaining to cognitions overall (Hermans, Defranc, Raes, 
Williams, & Eelen, 2005). Specifically, Hermans et al. found low-specific participants to 
report using more avoidant coping methods to deal with negative emotions, which is 
consistent with the overall literature. This particular study, however, had some 
limitations, as it did not look at the association between depression and AMS in regards 
to such avoidance strategies. The findings from Hermans et al. as such requires further 
exploration with depressed samples before any conclusions can be made about the link 
between AMS and avoidance within such populations.
1.4.1.2 Future Thinking
Given that Tulving (1985) reformulated his theory of episodic memory 25 years 
ago, by including the ability to mentally project oneself into possible future events, 
surprisingly few studies initially examined the subjective experiences associated with 
episodic future thinking (Atance & O’Neill, 2001). Wheeler, Stuss and Tulvings’ (1997), 
along with Suddendorf and Corballis’ (1997), early analyses of the links between 
episodic memory and episodic future thinking have provided a format for many of the 
new or revised theories about the origin and function of mental time travel. Presently, 
there are two prominent suggestions accounting for such a parallel. One focus has been 
on how past and future thinking both draw on the same neurocognitive resources. With 
emphasis on shared underlying capacities, ranging from a specific kind of consciousness 
(i.e. based in Tulving’s suggestion of an autonoetic consciousness) to shared processes 
required for episodic replication (e.g. Suddendorf & Corballis, 1997; Tulving, 2005; 
Buckner & Carroll, 2007; Schacter, Addis & Buckner, 2008; Hassabis, Maquire, 2007). 
However, such research has taken a separate direction in light of findings associating 
mental time travel abilities with e.g. theory of mind (Suddendorf & Corballis, 1997) and 
fiction (Hassabis, Maquire, 2007) along with other cognitive processes that exceed the 
present moment (Liberman & Trope, 2008).
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The second focus sees episodic memory as an integral part of future projection 
and planning therein. According to this view, episodic memory provides the raw material 
used to construct potential future events (e.g. Suddendorf & Busby, 2003; Suddendorf & 
Corballis, 1997; Suddendorf & Corballis, 2007, Schacter & Addis, 2007; Schacter, Addis 
& Buckner, 2009). As such it can be said that episodic memory offers the vocabulary 
necessary for future thinking. In a review of the literature, Schacter Addis and Buckner
(2007) proposed that in order for episodic memory to facilitate future projection through 
access to past experiences, the previously stored information must be flexible in its 
representation, in order for such details to be reinterpreted as future events yet to occur. 
In other words, a person’s learning history provides the content that makes up their future 
expectations, i.e. the active behaviour of remembering is combined with the process of 
re-contextualising the content. Thus, past learning becomes present moment content that 
can be used to facilitate future projection. The fact that humans can relationally combine 
and recombine basic elements into novel scenarios and evaluate these in terms of their 
likelihood, desirability and so forth, has been used to explain why episodic memory is 
sometimes inaccurate, and why it presents related neural activity, as well as similar 
effects of various experimental manipulations, as episodic future thinking; indeed, future 
thinking may not be about accuracy, but rather about ‘fitness’ for purpose (Suddendorf, 
2010). That is, the past content may be re-evaluated in relation to the current context.
As mentioned, converging evidence in the literature suggests that episodic 
remembering and episodic future thinking are supported by the same neurocognitive 
processes (e.g. Schacter et al., 2007). Thus, past and future cognition is constructed in a 
similar way. This is evident from phenomenological characteristics, such as the 
perspective taken in recall or simulation of events, as well as details and coherence. As 
such, thinking about the past as well as considerations about the future are affected by 
instructions to think of external versus internal events (Larsen, 1998), and a pattern for 
valence has been noted in both - in lieu of a positive bias (D'Argembeau & Van der 
Linden, 2004; Larsen, 1998), with temporal distance from the present being quite 
accurately predicted in one pertaining to the other (Addis, Wong, & Schacter, 2008;
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Spreng & Levine, 2006), as more distant events tend to be conceptual and de- 
contextualized relative to more detail accounted for in events closer in time 
(D'Argembeau & Van der Linden, 2004; Trobe & Liberman, 2003). It is noted that 
automatic, as well as deliberate accounts of past and future thinking occur at a similar 
rate in both regards (Bemtsen & Jacobsen, 2008).
In spite of marked similarities, a number of differences exist between episodic 
remembering and episodic future thinking. For instance, findings suggest that episodic 
future thinking is cognitively more demanding than past recall. Brain-imaging studies 
have shown more activity when subjects are generating future events, as compared with 
remembering past events (Addis et al., 2007; Szpunar et al., 2007). This is consistent 
with findings at the behavioural level, which implies a more schema associated account 
for episodic future thinking relative to episodic remembering. Support for this comes 
from studies showing reduced levels of sensory information in reports of future events 
(Addis et al., 2008; Bemtsen & Jacobsen, 2008; D'Argembeau & Van der Linden, 2004; 
Larsen, 1998); along with reduced specificity in cognitions about future experiences 
(Addis et al., 2008; Bemtsen & Jacobsen, 2008). In addition to this, future events are 
more often reported as seen from a third person perspective rather than as an event the 
individual is ‘part o f  (i.e. a pre-experience) (D'Argembeau & Van der Linden, 2004). 
These findings to some extent contrast evidence which suggest that future events are 
more personally significant than remembered past events (Addis et al., 2008; 
D'Argembeau & Van der Linden, 2004; Newby-Clark & Ross, 2003).
Furthermore, the positivity bias observed in autobiographical memory studies
(e.g. Walker, Skowronski, & Thompson, 2003) is even more pronounced for episodic
future thinking. For instance, Bemtsen and Jacobsen (2008), in a diary study of
involuntary and voluntary mental time travel into the past and future, found positive
events to be dominant relative to negative ones in all four conditions of positive and
negative past and future events, though a stronger divergence was observed for the two
future than for the two past event conditions. This is supported by Newby-Clark and
Ross (2003) who, in a sample of college students, found that future events were rated as
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significantly more positive than past events. Again it has been argued that construction of 
future events, in regards to relations with past experiences, may be guided more strongly 
by (social) schema and positive expectations than exact reconstruction of past events 
(Taylor & Brown, 1988). Bemtsen and Bohn (2010) describes this bias in regards to the 
fact that past recall is a direct account of learned experiences, and it is commonly noted 
that affect during the instance of experience will be related to contextual elements such 
as the significance of the event in its original state (e.g., Pillemer, 1998; McGaugh, 2003, 
2004). In particular, autobiographical memory research has seen that highly emotive and 
often unexpected events maintain a stable influence, for example, this has been noted in 
regards to ‘first’ experiences (Robinson, 1992), and experiences which were seen as 
‘turning points’ and significant life events (Pillemer, 1998). A similar effect is observed 
in post traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) where a highly negative event holds a constant 
influence on a person’s well-being and ways of thinking about the self and the world 
(e.g., Bemtsen & Rubin, 2006, 2007; Ehlers & Clark, 2000; Janoff-Bulman, 1989).
Despite the fact that this is a relatively new area of research, and in spite of 
certain differences, the existing data overall conform to the view that the ability to 
remember the past and the ability to project oneself into the future are intimately related 
(e.g. Suddendorf, 2010; Szpunar, 2010).
1.4.1.2.1 Depression and Deficits in Future Thinking
As research in the area of depression and the understanding of its relation to 
reduced AMS expanded it became apparent that people experiencing a lack of AMS 
would often demonstrate similar difficulty in imagining their future. That is, Williams et 
al., (1996) found that people with reduced autobiographical memory specificity 
demonstrated a parallel difficulty pertaining to future events. Early studies, by 
Baumeister (1990) and MacLeod, Williams and Linehan (1992), also demonstrated such 
corresponding difficulties in presenting specific descriptions of past and potential future 
events in samples with suicidal individuals. As aforementioned, this is supported by
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findings pertaining to the wealth of phenomenological characteristics in remembered and 
imagined events, which have been noted in their similarity, and also demonstrate 
comparable deficits in mental disorders, such as depression and schizophrenia 
(D'Argembeau, Raffard, & Van der Linden, 2008; Williams et al., 1996). As was seen in 
the previous discussion relating to expectancies (see Section 1.4) attempts at ‘problem 
solving’ may lead to a focus on particular solutions and as such an individual may 
experience the perceived (lack of) choices available as inhibiting obstructions in personal 
progress (Lyuobmirsky & Nolen-Hoeksema, 1993). Such perceived confinement has 
been linked with psychological inflexibility and an unwillingness to commit to other 
actions (Ward, Lyubomirsky, Sousa & Nolen-Hoeksema, 2003). Thus, the proposed 
function of autobiographical memory, to provide information about what is likely to 
happen in the future, may be of clinical relevance.
1.4.1.2.2 Valence of Future Expectations
In research pertaining to depression, the role of positive (future) cognitions has 
received less attention than negative (future) cognitions. However, the correspondence 
between biased negative expectancies and behavioural dysfunction (e.g., job 
performance, emotional suffering, interference in personal relationships) marked by 
depression stand in contrast to biased positive expectancies that facilitate behaviour 
among healthy individuals, thus the functionality of expectancies reasonably biased 
toward optimism may be relevant in treatment of depression (Taylor & Brown, 1988). It 
has been argued that depressed people may form maladaptive and negative self­
statements because they are unable to relate to and make use of experiences which elicit 
positive self-schemas (Ingram, Smith, & Brehm, 1983). Furthermore, it is proposed that 
the proportion of positive information accessible may be related to the presence of 
negative cognition, that is, it has been suggested that an essential quality in psychological 
dysfunction may be in regards to the quantity of positive relative to negative cognitions 
available (Kendall & Hollon, 1981; Schwartz, 1986; Schwartz & Garamoni, 1989).
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With future thinking considered as one of the core verbal aspects of depression, 
negative future outlook has been particularly held as an important feature of depression 
(e.g., Abramson, Alloy, & Metalsky, 1989; Beck, Rush, Shaw, & Emery, 1979). 
Although a negative view of the future has been seen as also incorporating the absence of 
a positive future outlook (e.g. Abramson et al., 1989), the view that positive and negative 
future thinking may best be thought of as two separate components is gaining momentum 
(MacLeod, Byrne, & Valentine, 1996). Looking at positive and negative aspects of 
experience as two, somewhat, independent components allows research to draw from 
further theories, with different levels of analysis, including affect, motivation, and 
behaviour, as well as cognition (Clark, Watson, & Mineka, 1994; MacLeod et al., 1996). 
It has been suggested that thoughts about future events are often spontaneous (referred to 
by participants as a ‘train of thought’), with the formation of such thoughts seen to occur 
in a similar fashion to the presentation of sudden memories (Bemtsen & Jacobsen, 2008). 
In terms of emotionality, there is evidence to suggest that healthy people hold an 
optimistic view of their subjective future (cf. Sedikides & Gregg, 2008; Taylor & Brown, 
1988). That is, individuals without depressive tendencies report a general expectation of 
more happiness in the future relative to the past or present (Robinson & Ryff, 1999). This 
suggestion is supported by findings of faster and extended responses by participants in 
the generation of positive relative to negative future events (Newby-Clark & Ross, 2003), 
and with positive events reported in more detail than negative events (D’Argembeau & 
Van der Linden, 2004; 2006).
MacLeod and colleagues have championed the view that depression is associated 
with reduced levels of positive future-directed cognitions, not merely with regards to an 
excess of negative cognitions, but with a deficit in relating to positive information (e.g. 
MacLeod & Byrne, 1996; MacLeod, Byrne, & Valentine, 1996; MacLeod & Cropley, 
1995; MacLeod, Tata, Kentish, & Jacobsen, 1997; MacLeod & Cropley, 1995; MacLeod, 
Rose, & Williams, 1993). Thus, it has been inferred that hopelessness in particular is 
related to a lack of expectancies for positive events, but not increased expectancies for 
negative events, whereas worry may be related to an increased expectancy for negative
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events but not reduced expectancies for positive events (e.g. MacLeod, Byrne, & 
Valentine, 1996; Mowrer, 1960; Barlow, 1988).
MacLeod, Rose and Williams (1993) introduced what is now a common approach 
to studying future-directed cognitions. They developed a test to explore people’s views 
of the future by assessing future thinking based on two separate dimensions of 
experience: one of positive affect and one of negative affect (MacLeod, Byrne, & 
Valentine, 1996). The Future Thinking Task (FTT; MacLeod, Pankhania, Lee, & 
Mitchell, 1997; MacLeod, Rose, & Williams, 1993) evaluates an individual’s ability to 
generate both positive and negative thoughts about the future through instructing the 
participant’s to generate thoughts within a set time period. Three time frames are used to 
assess the immediate future, the following 12 months, and the following 5-10 years. 
Although the Future Thinking Task was initially developed for work with paracuicidals, 
reduced generation of future positive events has also been found with depressed 
participants who do not necessarily hold suicidal ideations (MacLeod & Byrne, 1996), 
and with parasuicidal participants who were not depressed (MacLeod et al., 1997); More 
specifically, depressed participants responses on the FTT demonstrate a lower level of 
positive expectancies though a similar level of negative expectancies compared to 
healthy participants (i.e. MacLeod, Tata, Kentish & Jacobsen, 1997). Meanwhile, 
anxious participants have been found to show a higher level of negative expectancies but 
do not generate less positive future expectancy. Participants who are both anxious and 
depressed (mixed individuals) demonstrate more future negative expectancies and less 
positive expectancy (MacLeod & Byrne, 1996). This evidence further gives the FTT 
measure a wide applicability for clinical populations outside parasuicidals. In the revised 
version of the FTT (MacLeod et al., 1997), participants are further asked to rate each 
future thought generated in the time and valence instances, on how likely each event is 
to happen, and how they would feel at the time if the event was to occur in the future, on 
a seven-point scale. The FTT thus operationalise the ability to combine two important 
lines of research in the future thinking area by providing measures of fluency and 
probability.
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Future thinking, with the FTT, has as such been studied in several clinical groups, 
including depressed patients (MacLeod & Salaminiou, 2001), anxious patients 
(MacLeod, Pankhania, Lee, & Mitchell, 1997; MacLeod, Tata, Kentish, & Jacobsen, 
1997), suicide attempters (Hunter & O’Connor, 2003; O’Connor, Connery, & Cheyne, 
2000), personality disordered individuals (McLeod et al., 2004), and healthy participants 
(MacLeod & Conway, 2005; Miles, MacLeod, & Pote, 2004) to mention but a few of the 
existing research studies reporting significant findings with the FTT. One of the most 
recent studies in this area was conducted by Bjarehead, Sarkohi and Andersson (2010), 
who explored if hopelessness, as a key aspect associated with suicidal ideation, is 
relevant to how well future events are generated. They focused on a depressed, non- 
suicidal population and made use of the future-thinking index in their analysis of results, 
the index score incorporates event likelihood evaluations (probability of event occurring) 
and ratings of expected emotional responses (feelings related to event occurring). 
Bjarehead et al. saw depressed participants reporting lower index scores relating to future 
positive events, with no group differences observed in regards to future negative events. 
This result is consistent with previous research and offers new support to the view that a 
lack of positive future events is typical of depression even in the absence of suicidal 
ideation. Additionally Bjarehead et al. present a previously unaccounted for finding with 
the FTT methodology; by making use of the FTT index score a significant time effect 
was seen, with differences between groups found for more proximate future events 
relative to future events in the upcoming 5 to 10 years. That is, distant future events rated 
as less likely to occur by both groups, though most notably so for the depressed group 
and relating to negative future events; though for the depressed sample this levelling 
refers to a decrease of negative aniticipation, whereas for the non-depressed sample an 
inflated expectancy was observed at more distant time points. Temporal distance could 
thus be important, and Bjarehead et al. suggests that more distant events may be 
interpreted as more neutral or isolated from affective relations, i.e. negative connotations 
of the events are weakened due to the remoteness of the event.
33
MacLeod and Salaminiou (2001) previously accounted for the relevance of 
temporal distance of negative events in terms of avoidance. That is, emotional avoidance 
ensues in a response to reduced approach behaviours (Macleod, 1999), a suggestion that 
is supported in behavioural theories of depression which view avoidance as a 
contributing factor for depression. It has been argued that behaviour is activated or 
inhibited not automatically through the occurrence of a positive or negative event, but 
through the anticipation that such an event will occur (Andersen, 1990; Andersen, 
Spielman, & Bargh, 1992; Andersen & Limpert, 2001). For example, a depressed 
individual may avoid asking for a promotion at work based on the belief that they are not 
worthy of such an endorsement, or they may leave their degree course as they experience 
thoughts telling them that they cannot accomplish anything significant when they are 
feeling sad as literal truths, and as they can not foresee the situation changing in the 
future (i.e. lack of positive expectancy) they form a firm belief in these thoughts.
1.4.1.2.3 Future Expectancy and Personal Goals
Within the literature on future expectancy recognition of the distinction between 
having goals and not engaging with goals has emerged. That is, hopelessness has been 
referred to as a state of having goals, believing these goals to be unobtainable and feeling 
helpless due to an inability to ‘let go’ of such goals (Melges & Bowlby, 1969). Similarly 
the goals set and pursued by individuals vulnerable to depression have been noted as 
detrimental in their form and process, as it has been noted that depressed individuals 
believe that only achievement of the goal will bring them happiness and well-being (i.e. 
‘conditional goal setting’) (cf. Street, 2002). Unsurprisingly, such ‘conditional goal 
setting’ has been found to be strongly correlated with hopelessness (Hadley & MacLeod, 
2010). Danchina, MacLeod and Tata (2010) examined conditional goal setting in 
parasuicides, by comparing responses from individuals attending hospital for a recent 
episode of parasuicide with controls attending hospital for minor injuries as well as a 
psychologically disordered but non-suicidal control group. Participants generated goals
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and subsequently rated goal likelihood, i.e. the extent to which those goals were seen as 
necessary for their future well-being (conditional goal setting), and also the extent to 
which the goals were seen as sufficient for their future well-being (goal sufficiency). 
Parasuicide patients showed a higher degree of both conditional goal setting and goal 
sufficiency than did both of the other groups, supporting a view of ‘painful engagement’ 
with personal goals, relative to disengagement, as characterising parasuicidals. McIntosh 
(1996), similarly, describes goals to be strongly dependent on a hierarchy of goals. For 
example, ‘to be happy’ would be strongly dependent on another goal, for example, ‘to be 
promoted at work’ or ‘to be married’. In McIntosh’s view individuals who rely on these 
‘linked’ goals are vulnerable to depression, irrespective of goal achievement or failure. It 
is further argued that linkers ‘put their happiness on hold’ during the process of goal 
pursuit, and may ruminate about the lack goal success and a lack of happiness. McIntosh 
(1996) describes the problems of disengagement in lieu of the importance of the goal, a 
feature that has been emphasized by O’Connor et al. (2008) in the context of parasuicide. 
In this regard it seems that appreciating the link between future thinking and personal 
values and goals may be useful in understanding the apparent paradox of depressed and 
parasuicidal individuals maintaining an investment in goals they believe they are unlikely 
to attain.
1.5 Methods in Depression Research
1.5.1 Self-Report Measures
The use of self-report measures is common in research on depression (Boyle,
1985). However, self-report measures have received much criticism, particularly in
regards to their susceptibility to demand characteristics such as social desirability, self-
deception, subjectivity, and experimental demand (e.g. Cronbach, 1990; Paulhus, 1989).
Experimental demand characteristics are particularly pertinent in studies that re-
administer the same measure (Gemar, Segal, Sagrati, & Kennedy, 2001). Underreporting
of depressive symptoms may occur in order to avoid judgment by others (Eysenck, 1991;
Rudman, Greenwald, Mellott, & Schwartz, 1999). As such it has been found that many
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self-report measures pertaining to depression and anxiety are relatively highly associated 
with social desirability (Tanaka-Matsumi & Kameoka, 1986). According to Shedler, 
Mayman, and Manis, (1993), self-deception, pertaining to an illusion of mental health, 
may fail to be accounted for in self-report measures. Similarly it is argued that schema, 
or relational networks, due to their proposed automatic and non-conscious presentation, 
cannot be accurately acknowledged as even existent, nor the processes involved therein, 
with self-report measures (Gotlib & Krasnoperova, 1998). In this regard individuals may 
not be consciously aware of such automatic cognitions, even when they are motivated to 
do so and as such will not accurately report these (Higgins & King, 1981; Nisbett & 
Wilson, 1977; Wilson & Schooler, 1991; Wilson, 2009). Nisbett and Wilson (1977) 
similarly argue that there exists, in many instances, a relative lack of awareness of private 
responses to unrecognised stimuli. As such individuals may implicitly make a judgment 
without explicitly having evaluated the decision. Depressed participants may also be seen 
to offer socially learned information relative to their personal implicit beliefs about their 
symptoms and as such provide an unintentional inaccurate rationale for their symptoms.
The lack of confidence in self-reports is particularly notable in regards to 
measures of suicidal ideation as these individuals tend to be motivated to deny or conceal 
suicidal thoughts to avoid intervention or hospitalization. For instance, Busch, Fawcett 
and Jacobs (2003), found that explicit denial of any suicidal ideation was reported in the 
last verbal statements of as many as 78% of individuals before killing themselves. 
Similarly, Qin and Nordentoft (2005) found that the risk of suicide is significantly 
increased directly upon discharge from hospital care, doubtlessly the discharge had been 
evaluated in conjunction with verbal reports by the individual, pertaining to the fact that 
that they no longer consider killing themselves.
1.5.2 Accounting for Demand Characteristics
Although the future thinking literature has made a significant contribution to
research in the area of depression, the studies conducted have commonly made use of
explicit measures of fluency and probability, via self-report procedures. Despite efforts to
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increase the validity of explicit self-report measures, such as controlling for these 
tendencies by using social desirability scales (Paulhus, 1988), only limited progress has 
been made in this direction, and efforts to cope with the problem of voluntary distortion 
or controllability of questionnaire data have met with only moderate success (Holden, 
Book, Edwards, Wasylkiw & Starzyk, 2003). Deception is of particular concern in 
psychopathology as the sorts of socially undesirable attitudes people hide from others are 
the same attitudes they may be motivated to hide from themselves (Greenwald, Banaji, 
Rudman, Famham, Nosek, & Mellott, 2002). Such pretence may lead to denial, thought 
suppression, avoidance and other unhealthy strategies of coping with detrimental 
thoughts of the self and the future (Hayes, 1994; Hayes et al., 2001). Thus, implicit 
measures may come closer to assessing these processes.
1.6 Depression and Implicit Attitudes/Beliefs
The majority of theories pertaining to depression appears to concur that negative, 
or in some proposals - reduced positive self perception play an important role in 
depression. Although discrepancies arise as to how such cognitions influence behaviour. 
Some argue that the risk of depression is greater when individuals are consciously 
engaged in negative self-referential beliefs (e.g., Alloy et al., 2000; Nolen-Hoeksema, 
2000). Others argue that depression is brought on by the influence negative self-schemas 
have on automatic, subconscious cognitions to experiences (for reviews, see Ingram et 
al., 1998; Scher, Ingram, & Segal, 2005).
In an early account by Nisbett and Wilson (1977), pertaining to expectancies, it 
was proposed that most behaviour is guided by implicitly held expectancies. In their view 
expectancies that are offered explicitly most often occur due to direct questioning by 
others, or when explicit elaboration is needed in reaching personal goals. It is further 
noted that expectancies of the explicit nature are influenced by relations to external 
stimuli as well as self-promoting and self-presentational strategies, and as such may 
distort or conceal the accurate expression of expectancy. In some instances, as in the case 
of racial stereotypes, individuals may be reluctant to express their true attitudes even if
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they are aware of their nature. On other occasions it may be that someone simply is 
unable to introspect, and as such fails to identify the implicit expectations that guide their 
behaviour. Thus, cognitive models looking at vulnerability to depression have inferred 
that reasonably stable negative self-referential implicit cognitions are held by 
individual’s displaying such depression-vulnerability, and that until they are triggered by 
environmental stress such cognitions stay latent (Beck, 1967; Beevers, 2005). However, 
when stimulated, it is conceived that such cognitions influence all aspects of information 
processing (Beck, 2008; Bower, 1981; Ingram et al., 1998; Teasdale, 1988). Recent 
proposals of a dual-process in depression activation has suggested that implicit 
cognitions are triggered when they are not sufficiently regulated by explicit processing 
(Beevers, 2005; Haeffel, Abramson, Brazy, Teachman, & Nosek, 2007).
Following on from this proposed relation (or lack thereof) between implicit and
explicit cognitions, there currently exist a debate on how to best conceptualize and
measure cognitive vulnerability to depression. That is, in regards to the two views that
have been offered within the cognitive theories of depression have been offered, some
researchers focus on targeting explicit cognitions (e.g., cognitive products) whereas
others argue for the importance of targeting implicit cognitions (e.g., cognitive
processes/information-processing). To this end a dual-process framework has been
proposed within the depression literature, in order to explain how people generate
cognitive interpretations of stressful life events; this framework stems from social
psychology research where the dual-process framework has been used to explain e.g.
stereotyping, person perception, and social decision-making (e.g., Devine, 1989; Gilbert,
Pelham, & Krull, 1988; Wilson, Lindsey, & Schooler, 2000). From those favoring the
explicit side of the argument, research has aimed to examine specific categories of
negative cognitions supposed to increase vulnerability to depression (e.g., hopelessness
theory Abramson, Metalsky, & Alloy 1989). These theories have focused on attributions
and reasoning generated by individuals in response to stressful life events as
determinants of depression; with research in this domain facilitated by the use of self-
report questionnaires as measures of such cognitive vulnerability. Individual differences
are as such examined on these measures in order to predict the prospective development
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of depressive symptoms and depressive disorders (see Abramson et al., 2002 for review). 
On the other side of the debate, researchers who are interested in implicit cognitions 
argue for the relevance of negative schemas, i.e. subconscious, latent cognitive 
frameworks, which are activated by stressful events (see Scher, Ingram, & Segal, 2005 
for a review). As was discussed above (see Section 1.3.1), due to such schemas operating 
outside of the individual’s awareness, arguably self-report questionnaires would not be 
capable of detecting cognitive vulnerability, and as such other means of assessment are 
required. Empirical support has been found for both explicit and implicit theoretical 
frameworks, though few studies have tried to integrate these relatively independent lines 
of research. As such currently there is a lack of clear understanding about the exclusive 
contribution of explicit and implicit processes to cognitive vulnerability to depression 
(Haeffel et al., 2007), as it is not known whether cognitions that confer risk for 
depression are generated explicitly and deliberately or whether they are generated 
automatically from implicit schemas (i.e., without conscious control). Though, the results 
from a recent meta-analysis have found evidence consistent with Haeffel et al’s (2007) 
proposed dual-process model, which posit dysfunctional explicit processing as the 
primary determinant of depression. The predicament, in recognition of implicit versus 
explicit reports, has been noted as the “unwilling and unable” problem, and is a 
longstanding dilemma seen in research on attitudes (Eagly & Chaiken, 1993). This 
dilemma has led to an abundance of measurement techniques designed to ‘get around’ 
the reluctance, as well as the inability, to respond accurately; with a recent rise in 
available indirect measures (Fazio et al., 1995; see Fazio & Olson, 2003 for a review of 
indirect measures).
1.6.1 Implicit Attitudes
Implicit attitudes have been noted as beliefs which an individual has no conscious
access to or control over. According to Greenwald and Banaji (1995, p. 8) such implicit
beliefs are ‘introspective occurrences o f past experience that facilitate evaluative
feelings, thoughts, or actions toward ones social world’. Implicit beliefs in this regard
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are understood as representatives of past experiences, and thus implicitly influence 
attention, processing, and, ultimately emotion and behaviour (Greenwald & Banaji, 
1995). However, individuals are unable to explicitly acknowledge these without 
introspection. Some of the first developments pertaining to research on implicit attitudes 
and beliefs in general came from studies on racial prejudice. The research on implicit 
prejudice found that some individuals who did not explicitly report any racial biases 
nonetheless where found to demonstrate implicit biases towards the specific racial groups 
(for a review, see Greenwald & Banaji, 1995). Thus highlighting an explicit/implicit 
discrepancy, by recognition of such potentially conflicting attitudes, and stirring debate 
about the nature, ‘truthfulness’ and influence of explicit versus implicit accounts of 
personal attitudes and beliefs. In the context of depression, a depressed individual's 
emotions and behaviour may be prone to influence by implicitly held beliefs. For 
instance, there is ample opportunity to challenge or distract from explicitly held beliefs 
of, for example, the future as negative. On the contrary, implicit beliefs pertaining to a 
negative future outlook may serve to weaken the incentive to engage in future or goal 
oriented behaviours, as such implicit beliefs do not present the opportunity for the 
individual to challenge or distract from such beliefs, subsequently reducing goal-oriented 
behaviour and serve to maintain depressed mood.
1.6.2 Automaticity of Beliefs about the Future
It is currently uncertain if models of future thinking function at an implicit level, 
targeting automatic reactions to stimuli. Cognitive theories of depression assume that 
dysfunctional schemata, even when activated, are not always consciously accessible and 
can therefore not be reported (e.g. Beck, Rush, Shaw, & Emery, 1979; Beevers, 2005). 
Given that recent research suggests implicit and explicit measures may be assessing 
different components of cognitive processes in depression (e.g. Beevers, 2005; Haeffel, 
Abramson, Brazy, Teachman, & Nosek, 2007), given the link between future cognitions 
and depression - exploring implicit future thinking may be of importance, particularly in 
light of suggestions that implicit measures could be better predictors of distress and
psychopathology than explicit measures (e.g., Nock & Banaji, 2007).
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1.7 M ethods Targeting Im plicit Cognitions in  Depression Research
The core postulate behind implicit measures suggests that individuals are often 
unaware of the implicit beliefs which may subsequently influence their behaviour 
(Greenwald & Banaji, 1995). When asked to provide a response to questions about future 
expectations participants often engage in deliberate, propositional processes in an effort 
to provide the most ‘suitable’ and socially relevant responses, with such processing seen 
to denote people’s explicit attitudes. Contrary to such contemplative representation, 
implicit attitudes are seen as more spontaneous, automatic, and affective responses, 
resulting from individual relations derived from memory cues (Gawronski & 
Bodenhausen, 2006). As implied by the depression and future thinking literature, 
affective evaluations are important determinants of behaviour, and subsequently 
behaviour modification, as they form the basis of our emotions (e.g., Beck 1967; 
O’Connor et al. 2008; De Houwer, Thomas, & Baeyens, 2001).Thus, implicit cognitions 
rely on contextual factors contributing to certain stimuli automatically activating 
associations in memory (e.g., Fazio, 2001) and as such may represent an important 
approach-avoidance function (e.g., Wilson, Lindsey, & Schooler, 2000).
Implicit measures operate as an indicator of implicit cognitions when, for 
example, in a given context the participant is naive of the cognitions to be assessed or 
hold no control over the outcome (De Houwer, 2009). So far implicit measures have been 
able to provide predictability of impulsive behaviours which self-report measures have 
previously found it difficult to anticipate (for a review, see De Houwer, 2006; De 
Houwer, Teige-Mocigemba, Spruyt, & Moors, in press; Gawronski, in press). The 
autonomous nature of these two types of methods has been implied by Bosson, Swann, 
and Pennebaker (2000) who see the non-significant, but positive associations between 
implicit and explicit measures as supporting this postulate.
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1.7.1 The Implicit Association Test
One approach towards examining non-conscious processes in cognition that 
shows promise in investigation of implicit biases is the Implicit Association Test (IAT; 
Greenwald, McGhee, & Schwartz, 1998). Originally designed to assess implicit 
prejudicial attitudes, the IAT measures the relative strength of participants’ automatic 
associations between pairs of concepts. To that end, the IAT measures concepts that 
participants associate together (Olson & Fazio, 2001). The IAT is based on the 
assumption that a person’s responses should be faster when associating items that they 
would pre-experimentally pair together such as ‘young’ and ‘good’ as opposed to pre- 
experimentally not pair together such as ‘young’ and ‘bad’ (Nosek & Hansen, 2008). In a 
typical IAT preparation, participants are required to pair two target concepts with a 
particular attribute. Better performance, with regards to decreased reaction times and 
increased accuracy, are generally reported when associated concepts are assigned to the 
same evaluative compatible response (e.g., young-good/old-bad) as opposed to when 
associated responses are assigned to different responses (e.g., young-bad/old-good; 
Greenwald et al., 1998).
1.7.1.1 Clinical use of the IAT
Recently the IAT has been more specifically made use of in the examination of
automatic implicit attitudes with clinical populations (e.g., Egloff & Schmukle, 2002;
Gemar, Segal, Sagrati, & Kennedy, 2001; Meites, Deveny, Steele, Holmes & Pizzagalli,
2008; Risch, Buba, Birk, Morina, Steffens & Stangier, 2010). The extensive evidence
supporting a subjective ‘positivity bias’, and the application by cognitive models of this
inverse bias as a marker of depression, i.e. that depressed individuals, instead show a
negative bias toward the self (e.g., Clark et al., 1999), suggests that negative self-related
schemata may play an important role in the maintenance of depression (Williams, 1997).
These schemata have been considered to be automatically activated and as such not
representative of more deliberate processes or so called ‘logic reasoning’ which would
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include a level of social desirability. Referred to as ‘implicit self-esteem’, indirect 
measures have been increasingly applied in order to assess the self-related implicit 
pathological attitudes underlying such schemata. Gemar, Segal, Sagrati, and Kennedy 
(2001) used an IAT consisting of the target categories ‘me’ and ‘not me’, and positive 
and negative attributes in an early attempt to assess implicit self-esteem in the context of 
depression. In Gemar et al’s study the IAT was completed by formerly and never 
depressed individuals before and after a negative mood induction. Interestingly, prior to 
the mood induction, formerly depressed individuals demonstrated more positive implicit 
self-esteem than never depressed individuals, however, after the mood induction, no 
group differences were observed. The results were interpreted to suggest that, contrary to 
cognitive theory, negative implicit self-related attitudes may not be characteristic of 
formerly, nor currently depressed individuals.
Looking at healthy versus depressed participants, De Raedt, Schacht, Franck, and 
De Houwer (2006) used several implicit methods to assess implicit-self-esteem, 
including the IAT and the The Extrinsic Affective Simon Task (EAST) (De Houwer,
2003). The EAST is based on the assumption that performance is facilitated when items 
associated in memory share a response key and typically involves the classification of 
colored adjectives. In their study depressed and healthy participants demonstrated a 
similarly strong positivity bias on the IAT, whereas on the EAST the depressed 
individuals showed a significantly stronger positivity bias than the healthy controls. De 
Raedt et al. (2006) explain their findings in light of research suggesting implicit reports 
of self-esteem may be representative of previous learning/developmental history, 
whereas explicit, deliberated attitudes are under stronger contextual control with regards 
to a self-view related to more recent experiences, or indeed, current mood. The authors 
provide further explanation of their findings based on the suggestion that ‘inconsistent’ 
self-esteem, rather than positive or negative self-esteem per se, may mark depression. 
That is, pathology may incur as a result of inconsistencies stemming from high implicit 
self-esteem in combination with low explicit self-esteem. This possibility was tested by 
asking groups of depressed individuals with suicidal ideation, without suicidal ideation
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and a healthy control group, to complete a self-esteem IAT (Franck, De Raedt, & De 
Houwer, 2008). The explicit and implicit responses only diverged for the depressed 
sample with suicidal thoughts, leading the authors to conclude that such discrepancies 
between implicit and explicit assessments may pertain to one relating more strongly to 
previous experiences and as such the past learning history of individuals, whereas the 
other, i.e. explicit task, measures more recent experiences. It can be inferred that this 
inconsistency between past and present experiences likely influences thoughts of 
‘entrapment’, i.e. a state of hopelessness as past experiences are not concurring to 
expectancies of the present with escalating inferences of the future offering more of the 
same.
In an attempt to further explain their findings, Franck et al., (2008) allude to 
research suggestive of a diminished ability in processing negations relative to 
affirmations (e.g., Deutsch, Gawronski, & Strack, 2006), as at an automatic level, the 
“ not me” associative content-based element of refusal (as presented in the self-esteem 
IAT) would be subjective to an established learning history of this relation (i.e. consistent 
‘training’ of this relation based on repeated pairing of positive stimuli with ‘not me’). 
The authors propose that this is not the case for habitual, rule-based components, and as 
such the intended self-related concepts can be implied only after extended practice. This 
conception, however, may only be of limited availability in this study due to restrictions 
of the IAT procedure itself, as the relative strength of relations is not able to be 
discriminated. Thus, methods pertaining to more direct measures of implicit belief may 
be able to offer further insight to this data.
1.7.1.2 Predictive Ability o f  the IA T
Improved success for the predictive abilities of the IAT over explicit methods has
been reported in several studies (e.g. Haeffel et al., 2007). Recently, the implicit
literature has also attempted to extend this new methodology to research within clinical
groups. The Implicit Association Test has been particularly popular in such regard,
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pertaining to self-esteem and anxiety research particularly and branching in to depression 
and self-harm populations. Steinberg, Karpinki and Alloy (2007) found low positive 
implicit self-esteem interacting with recent stressful life events as predictive of 
depressive symptoms in undergraduates. Whereas depressed individuals were found to 
show increased implicit hopelessness by Friedman, Nosek, Miller, Gordon and Banaji 
(2001). The IAT test scores have been found to offer improved detection of non-suicidal 
self-injury, in samples of self-injurers and non-injurers, more so than demographic and 
clinical factors.
One of the most recent IAT studies by Nock, Park, Finn, Deliberto, Dour and 
Banaji (2010) aimed to determine a behavioural marker for suicidal behaviour via the 
IAT. Their findings suggested that IAT responses associated with death/suicide were 
greater for subsequent suicide attempters relative to psychologically distressed 
individuals who had not attempted suicide. The likelihood of a suicide attempt by those 
who showed such robust associations was reported to be six times greater than those who 
demonstrated a weaker association with self and death/suicide. The IAT effect was seen 
to be a better predictor in this instance than that of the clinician and the patients 
themselves, as well as depression levels and previous history of suicide attempts. The 
authors emphasize the implications of these findings by suggesting that implicit measures 
may be utilized in the detection in a range of clinically sensitive behaviours. Thus, it may 
be possible to address the limitations of explicit measures in dealing with participants 
concealing information (Greenwald, Poehlman, Uhlmann, & Banaji, 2009).
1.7.1.3 IAT Suitability in a Future Thinking Paradigm
Despite its widespread use and applicability for examining individuals pre-
experimental associations the IAT paradigm is limited in that it only allows the
measurement of associations between categories. Specifically, it is very useful in
measuring stimuli categorised as the same as or opposite to each other (such as young is
the same as good and old is the same as bad). However, if a researcher wants to examine
45
future expectancies (i.e., expectancy relations) merely pairing associatively “self’ with 
positive events such as “wealth” “happiness” and so forth, only affords information about 
how one directly pairs themselves with these events. Specifically, such a test only allows 
measurement of the strength of association between the self and these stimuli as 
demonstrated in the study by Franck et al. (2008); and though Meities et al. (2008) 
adequately improved on specificity - future relations remained unaccounted for by a lack 
of significant findings. Thus, measurement of associations in this way does not provide 
information about the nature or direction of the association.
With regards to pathology, and specifically here considering hopelessness in the 
anticipation of future events, as demonstrated in MacLeod et al’s., (1993, 1997) findings 
with the Future Thinking Task (i.e. the FTT) it has been demonstrated that the presence 
of negative future expectancies is not functionally equivalent to the absence of positive 
future expectancies. For example, suicidal individuals, when compared with controls or 
depressed individuals who are not suicidal, are impaired in their ability to generate 
positive thoughts for the future but do not differ in terms of the number of negative 
thoughts that they are worried about (MacLeod et al., 1997; see also O’Connor & 
Sheehy, 2000). The findings from the future thinking literature are also analogous to 
those from Clark and Watson’s (1991) seminal, tripartite model of depression. 
Specifically, Clark and Watson argue that depression (but not anxiety) is characterised by 
the presence of negative affectivity and the absence of positive affectivity, whereas 
anxiety is driven by negative affectivity, physiological tension and hyperarousal (Clark & 
Watson, 1991; Watson, Clark, Weber, Assenheimer, Strauss, & McCormick, 1995). 
Similarly, within the future thinking area, it is positive thinking (not negative future 
thinking) that distinguishes between depression and hopelessness/suicidality. The 
literature thus support the prevailing premise that the presence of negativity and the 
absence of positivity are not simply opposites, but functionally distinct.
On an operational level it has been argued that the behavioural effect inferred
from associative measures, such as the IAT, merely make the assumption that the
implicit attitudes observed are formed through associations in memory (Hughes, Bames-
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Holmes, & De Houwer, 2010). As such, stating that implicit attitudes are associative can 
imply various consequences. For instance, inferring that the behavioural effect produced 
is associative suggests that the procedural outcome stems from individuals accurately and 
confidently associating stimuli. Although, this reference would submit more to the 
outcome of an association and does not lend information to the process involved in 
generating such effects, e.g. the relational networks (Hughes et al., 2010). The 
implication of the distinctions, between positive and negative anticipation and 
probability, renders adopting the IAT procedure to measure future thinking inadequate. 
However, recent research stemming from Behavioural Psychology has extended on the 
implicit methods to allow for the inclusion of relations other than pure associations 
(Bames-Holmes Bames-Holmes, Bames-Holmes, Hayden, Milne, Power & Stewart, 
2006). In contrast to the IAT, the Implicit Relational Assessment Procedure (IRAP) 
involves presenting participants with specific relational terms (e.g., similar, opposite, 
better, worse) so that the relations between and among the chosen stimuli can be 
assessed. As such, the IRAP aims to provide a method that addresses many of the 
interpretative complications experienced by the IAT and other previous implicit 
methodologies. The IRAP facilitates this by increased experimental control, and by 
looking at the relations between stimuli rather than mere associative response biases 
(Bames-Holmes, Bames-Holmes, Stewart, & Boles, 2010; Bames-Holmes, Hayden, et 
al., 2008).
1.7.2 The Implicit Relational Assessment Procedure
The Relational Elaboration and Coherence (REC) model (Bames-Holmes, 
Bames-Holmes, Stewart, & Boles, 2010) accounts for the empirical and conceptual 
diverges noted between implicit and explicit attitudes, in particular in regards to IRAP 
effects .According to the REC model explicit measures merely capture more carefully 
considered reactions relative to the IRAP, which is able to detect spontaneous and 
automatic evaluations consistent with a pre-established learning history. The divergence
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between implicit and explicit measures of psychologically sensitive attitudes is explained 
by the REC model as pertaining to the participants’ deliberation process enabled with the 
use of explicit methods, where individuals are able to “reject” their immediate and brief 
relational responses (or automatic evaluations) if they do not cohere with more elaborate 
and extended relational responding. The REC model suggests that explicit and implicit 
procedures reflect the same behavioural functions, i.e. relational responding. That is, 
events can be related even in the absence of a direct learning history, the transformation 
of stimulus functions, through derived relations with other stimuli, may be particularly 
pertinent in evaluation of behavioural functions (as discussed in Section 1.3.2 and 1.3.3). 
As such the REC emphasizes that the procedures obtain two differing patterns of 
relational responding, i.e., brief and immediate (implicit) or extended and elaborated 
(explicit) (Hughes et al., 2010).
The Implicit Relational Assessment Procedure (IRAP) (Bames-Holmes et al., 
2006) accommodates for higher order psychological constructs to be evaluated as the 
stimuli need not be wholly equivalent or the same as each other, that is, the response 
options can be representative of other such functional relations, e.g. a ‘more or less’ 
preference. The rationale behind the IRAP is that immediate and apparent relational 
responses to the IRAP stimuli are expected to be emitted first, as such relatively fast 
responses will occur for IRAP trials that match an individual’s immediate responses, e.g. 
for healthy individuals the literature support a ‘positivity bias’ pertaining to future 
expectancy, thus based on this notion healthy persons presented with stimuli pertaining 
to positive future expectancy on the IRAP would be presumed to demonstrate a fairly fast 
relational reaction for the relation of ‘positive future event’ and ‘true’; IRAP trials 
opposing such immediate relational reactions in a healthy sample, i.e. necessitating a 
response that contest the initial positive future expectancy relation, would facilitate a 
slower reaction, e.g. a healthy individual with a positive bias would not be expected to 
show the same strength of belief for negative expectancies as these would not be as 
readily available and thus not immediate, relative to positive expectancies. Thus when 
participants are put under time pressure to respond quickly and accurately such
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immediate and brief relational responding is reported across multiple trials, resulting in 
longer average latency for inconsistent (e.g. as in the example above a negative bias of 
future expectancies would be inconsistent to that which is expected of a healthy sample) 
than for consistent blocks of trials (e.g. positive expectancy is recorded as faster due to 
stronger subjective relativity) (Bames-Holmes et al., in press; Bames-Holmes, Hayden et 
al., 2008; O’Toole & Bames-Holmes, 2009). As such, a behavioural bias will affect the 
ease of which responses to consistent relative to inconsistent trials are made (i.e. the 
IRAP effect) (Bames-Holmes et al., 2006). If no response time difference is found 
between consistent and inconsistent responses (i.e. there is no IRAP effect per se) the 
respondent’s verbal history is likely not consequential to the relations assessed; as such it 
is possible to infer prospective verbal behaviour on the basis of the relative strength of 
the IRAP effect. To that end it is proposed that similarities can be drawn between the 
IRAP effect and the original conception of attitudes as behavioural biases (cf. Fazio & 
Petty, 2008).
In the current context it is important to note that Bames-Holmes et al. (2010) 
emphasise that ‘the REC model does not predict that additional relational activity will 
always produce a positive response in a psychologically sensitive area’. For some 
individuals, additional responding may produce a negative response that coheres with the 
initial negative evaluation (e.g. with regards to the future thinking literature, a negative 
future outlook is bad and positive events do occur). Alternatively, additional responding 
may produce a relational response that allows two initially incoherent networks to come 
together (e.g., a negative future outlook is bad, positive events do occur, but I don’t 
expect positive events to occur for me).
1.7.2.1 The IRAP Effect and Predictability
This basic IRAP effect has been presented in a number of studies and across 
various domains, e.g. the IRAP has been seen to compare well with the IAT as a measure 
of individual differences (Bames-Holmes, Murtagh, Bames-Holmes & Stewart, in press;
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Bames-Holmes, Waldron, Bames-Holmes & Stewart, 2009; Roddy, Stewart & Bames- 
Holmes, in press); it has been demonstrated that the IRAP effect is not easily faked 
(McKenna, Bames-Holmes, Bames-Holmes & Stewart, 2007); the IRAP effect has been 
noted in measures of implicit self-esteem (Vahey, Bames-Holmes, Bames-Holmes 
&Stewart, 2009); the IRAP produces effects which clearly diverge from those obtained 
with explicit measures of socially sensitive attitudes (Power, Bames-Holmes, Bames- 
Holmes, & Stewart, 2009); the IRAP has been supported as demonstrating a predictive 
validity in regards to anxiety and willingness to perform a public speech (Ohtsuki, 
Kishita, Kubo, Takahashi & Shimada, 2010); implicit attitudes to work and leisure 
(Chan, Bames-Holmes, Bames-Holmes, & Stewart, 2009), implicit ageism (Cullen, 
Barnes- Holmes, Bames-Holmes Stewart, 2009); deviant implicit attitudes in child sex 
offenders (Dawson, Bames-Holmes, Gresswell, Hart & Gore, 2009).
1.8. Raising Awareness of Implicit Cognitions
As implicit cognitions are inherently automatic and not conscious to the 
individual it seems likely that in order to exert influence over such implicit beliefs it is 
necessary to alert people the nature and impact of such cognitions. Once a person is 
aware of the occurrence of such thought processes (e.g., learns to recognise thought 
patterns and functions), they can become more aware of the effect such implicit 
cognitions have on their conscious thoughts and behaviours and begin to make the 
automatic nature of these processes more controlled. Thus, by increasing awareness of 
non-conscious information processing it is inferred that it will be possible to address the 
influence these processes hold over conscious thought and behaviour (Greenwald & 
Banaji, 1995).
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1.8.1 Altering Cognitive Vulnerability
Current treatment packages for depression have, stemming from cognitive 
theories of depression, focused on altering negative beliefs and the emotional 
engagement with such beliefs (for review, see Hollon, Thase, & Markowitz, 2002); with 
Cognitive Behaviour Therapy (CBT) found to be one of the main approaches in this 
domain. CBT is based on the idea that modifying explicit negative beliefs will break 
habitual cognitive cycles associated with depression (e.g. Beck et al., 1979; Beck, 1999). 
This general approach has been supported by findings of negative interpretation and self­
beliefs serving as risk factors to depression relative to negative biases in attention, 
memory or self-esteem. However, many limitations of such treatments are surfacing and 
a renewed outlook pertaining to models of depression along with its accompanying 
treatment options are fast arising. For instance, the two year relapse/recurrence rates 
following such cognitive therapies can be as high as 73% for certain patient groups 
(Bockting, Schene, Spinhoven, Koeter, Wouters, Huyser, & Kamphuis, 2005; Tang, 
DeRubeis, Hollon, Amsterdam, & Shelton, 2007).
Recent research has suggested that the efficacy of cognitive therapies may likely 
be shaped by the indirectly increased conscious awareness of an individual (Phillips et 
al., 2010). In such a case it constitutes that low levels of awareness of more implicit 
cognitions may be instrumental in episodes of relapse (Teasdale, Moore, Hayhurst, Pope, 
Williams, & Segal, 2002). With this, the proposal that increased awareness may hold the 
key to modifying implicit cognitions (Beevers, 2005; Phillips et al., 2010) has been 
supported by the construction of more mindfulness based therapies (Segal, Williams, & 
Teasdale, 2002; Hayes et al., 1999). The focus on mindful awareness in therapy may 
serve to preserve positive conscious expectancies, by instructing individuals to observe 
their implicit reactions. In this regard, understanding of how implicit responses may 
appear as incompatible to personal values, would likely elicit corrective explicit 
processing in vulnerable individuals.
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Acceptance and Commitment Therapy is a form of third wave cognitive 
behaviour therapy which focuses on enhancing psychological flexibility in the service of 
achieving core life values. Recent studies have shown the efficacy of ACT approaches 
over more traditional CBT interventions in the treatment of depression (Zettle & Hayes, 
2002; Zettle, 2004). Perhaps the most important feature of ACT, however, is that it is 
underpinned by Relational Frame Theory (see Sections 1.3.3 and 1.3.4 for an account). 
This grounding in basic theory warrant ACT processes to be coherent and evidence 
based, but also allows for the continued improvement of the therapy at the process level, 
thus facilitating the ongoing progress of this form of therapy.
1.8.1.1 Acknowledging Implicit Cognitions - Acceptance and Commitment Therapy
From an ACT perspective depression is likely the result of experiential avoidance 
(Hayes et al., 1999; Hayes, Strosahl, Bunting, Twohig, & Wilson, 2005). Experiential 
avoidance is a process which facilitates individual attempts to change private 
experiences. For instance, an individual may try to avoid thinking about a negative past 
experience, avoid contexts which elicit such thoughts, despite the personal consequences 
suffered by such social, emotional, and behavioural withdrawal (Blackledge & Hayes, 
2001; Hayes, 2004; Hayes et al., 1999; Wilson & Murrell, 2003).
The ACT model comprises of six processes that are represented in the ACT 
Hexaflex. These processes contribute towards the reduction of emotional avoidance and 
are as follows: Acceptance, Cognitive Defusion, Contact with the Present Moment (i.e., 
mindfulness), Self as Context, Values and Committed Action. Acceptance in the ACT 
model refers the way in which clients should embrace private events, and to be willing to 
have them when attempts at changing their frequency might seem more natural. 
Cognitive Defusion techniques encourage clients to step away from, or not to buy into 
their thoughts. This attempt at de-literalisation, via a variety of metaphors (Hayes & 
Strosahl, 2004), displays how the ACT model tries to change the way in which the client 
will interact with private events, by altering the underlying function of undesirable
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thoughts. Whilst Being Present (i.e. mindfulness) encourages the client to maintain non 
judgemental contact with psychological and environmental events that occur, this is often 
accomplished through mindfulness exercises. Self as context is a critical process, as 
without it the processes of mindfulness and defusion are not fostered. Specifically, self as 
context refers to the way in which clients are encouraged to take a number of different 
perspectives, allowing them to be aware of one’s flow of experiences without becoming 
too attached to them. Values are critical to the ACT model (cf. Plumb et al., 2009) and 
through the processes of mindfulness and defusion clients are encouraged not to act on 
the basis of their thoughts but rather to act in a value consistent manner. Without the 
specification of such values, the guide to action remains unclear. Finally, Committed 
Action refers to way in which ACT encourages the development of larger patterns of 
behaviour that are consistent with the clients chosen values.
1.8.1.1.2 Mindfulness of Implicit Cognitions
A promising approach towards the increased awareness of implicit factors which 
aid to reinforce behaviour comes from mindfully paying attention to personal thoughts, 
emotions and physical sensations. That is, mindful processing has been noted as focused 
attention on present moment experiences (Brown & Ryan, 2003; Kabat-Zinn, 1990; 
Linehan, 1993a; Marlatt & Kristeller, 1999). In this regard individuals are required to 
explicitly direct their attention inwards in order to experience personal cognitions and 
external influences and accept these as they are experienced in the present moment 
(Kabat-Zinn, 1994), thus acceptance and contact with the present moment are intended to 
facilitate responding to private experiences without avoidance. Individuals are 
encouraged to actively contact internal and external stimuli, respectively, without 
attempting to change the presentation of the stimuli or the frequency of such events. As 
has been discussed, cognitions in depression likely dwell in past outcomes or worries 
about future outcomes, though mindfulness promotes a gentle shift in the appearance of 
cognitions back to the current experience. Kabat-Zinn describes mindfulness simply as,
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‘paying attention in a particular way: on purpose, in the present moment. ’ (Kabat-Zinn, 
1994, p.4).
Delusion is an important part of the mindfulness process, as this involves altering 
the psychological context of unhelpful rule following. In ACT defusion is a skill which 
can be learned, and which necessitate active rehearsal. Mastery of this ability has been 
shown to increase overall well-being (Masuda, Twohig, Stormoa, Feinsteina, Choua, & 
Wendel, 2010; Masuda, Hayes, Twohig, Drossel, Lillis, & Washio, 2009; Masuda, 
Hayes, Sackett, & Twohig, 2004; Bach & Hayes, 2002). ACT sees psychological 
suffering as related to attempts to control or avoid negative thoughts or emotions. In this 
regard ACT aims to address such experiential avoidance by behavioural tools that aid the 
ability to recognise, as well as alter, the presentation of such cognitions as well as the 
contexts in which they arise (Hayes et al., 1999, p. 58). Defusion in this regard works by 
developing awareness the self as separate from one’s thoughts. This de-contextualisation 
further promotes acceptance of ‘unwanted’ thoughts and beliefs through a loss of the 
literal meaning of such cognitions.
While long-term practice of defusion is beneficial, the use of a single, brief period 
of defusion practice have also been found to be advantageous to psychological well­
being. Previous research by Arch and Craske (2006) found a 15 minute focused breathing 
exercise to be effective in increasing willingness to approach negatively valenced images 
relative to a similarly brief unfocused attention exercise and a worry exercise. 
Participants in the Arch and Craske study were assigned at random to one of the three 
groups, and all participants viewed positively, negatively, and neutrally valenced slides 
from the International Affective Picture System (LAPS, Lang, Bradley, & Cuthbert, 
1999) before and after the laboratory induction. The authors found that, following the 
induction, the focused breathing group maintained reasonably positive responses to 
neutrally valenced slides throughout the exercise, while the unfocused attention and 
worry groups responded negatively to neutrally valenced slides. The focused breathing 
group further reported lower overall negative affect in response to the aversive images
relative to the other groups. The focused breathing group further reported overall greater
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positive affect in response to the positive slides following the induction. Thus, overall the 
focused breathing induction appeared to facilitate a greater willingness to view more 
negatively valenced images. These findings support the claim that mindfulness may 
facilitate greater awareness and subsequently control over emotions, as evident here in 
regards to reductions of negative affect. It is further implied that enhanced acceptance of 
difficult stimuli may be related to such a decrease in negative affect.
1.9 The Current Thesis
Although research has begun to investigate the link between past and future 
thinking in depression there currently remains limited knowledge about the mechanisms 
underlying these processes. Due to the link between future expectancies and suicide (that 
is, potentially the least functional anticipated future outcome) expectancy is receiving 
increasing attention in the clinical literature (e.g. O’Connor et al., 2008). However, the 
main focus within the current thesis will not be on suicidality per se, rather the focus is 
on depression and the sub feature of hopelessness about the future, which have both been 
commonly related to suicidal ideation. Watson and colleagues have argued that a 
‘fundamental continuity between normal and abnormal psychological processes’ exist 
(Watson, Gamez, & Simms, 2005, p.46); with supporting evidence arguably confirming a 
relation between both positive and negative affectivity and psychopathology. Similarly, 
Clark, Beck, and Alford (1999) argue that a dimensional, rather than categorical, view of 
depression is supported in the literature, and that cognitive deficits present in clinical 
conditions also exist as marked vulnerabilities in individuals with non-clinical dysphoria 
(for a discussion on the dimensional view see Chapter 8, Section 8.6).
Most research on depression-related cognitions has involved cross-sectional
designs to identify differences between depressed and non-depressed individuals
(Abramson et al., 2002; Ingram et al., 1998; Scher et al., 2005). However, it has been
argued that cross-sectional designs and those which include formerly- and non-depressed
groups (i.e., Remitted designs) cannot fully address vulnerability assumptions of
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cognitive models of depression (Lewinsohn, Steinmetz, Larson, & Franklin, 1981). As 
such it has been proposed that in order to offer empirical support for cognitive 
vulnerability, it is important to demonstrate that the cognition temporally precedes the 
initial onset or recurrence of depression (Ingram et al., 1998) and is not a transitory effect 
or symptom of the disorder (Riskind & Alloy, 2006). To this end, designs that measure 
cognitive vulnerability factors prior to depression onset are often considered most 
suitable for assessing vulnerability theories as they can determine both temporal 
precedence and independence from symptoms. Beevers (2005, p.22), in relation to the 
link between associative and reflective cognitions proposed in dual processing model of 
depression, has suggested that: ‘analogous research conducted with depression 
vulnerable individuals could be particularly helpful for understanding o f how cognitive 
vulnerabilities relate to interpersonal factors that also contribute vulnerability to 
depression \
The current thesis has three main aims. First, it aims to determine the differences, 
or as the emerging literature suggests, the similarities, in thinking about the future and 
the past in sub clinically depressed versus non-depressed individuals. Specifically, it is 
hypothesized that sub clinically depressed individuals will show more difficulties in 
recall of past events and that this lack of contact with autobiographical past experiences 
inform patterns of behaviour relevant to future thinking. The second aim of the current 
work is to offer an alternative to the use of self report measures in the future and past 
thinking literature. To that end, a robust and accurate implicit measure of positive future 
expectations in depression is tested in a sub clinical sample. Finally, the thesis aims to 
provide analogue evidence of techniques that may be useful in the remediation of 
pessimistic thinking as is characteristic in depression, namely mindfulness and values 
clarification.
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Chapter 2
Memory for the Future:
The Relation between Autobiographical 
Memory and Episodic Future Thinking
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2.1. General Introduction
In the last two decades research has consistently demonstrated that individuals 
who present with depressive symptoms commonly also report experiencing difficulties in 
retrieving specific autobiographical memories. Crucially, such reduced autobiographical 
memory specificity (AMS) has been recognised as a vulnerability factor for depression as 
well as a predictive feature in prolonged and more severe cases of depression. The affect- 
regulation model (Williams et al., 2007) is a widely used account of AMS. Williams’ 
model proposes that reduced specificity in autobiographical memory may be an 
avoidance strategy to reduce negative or painful cognitions. Such an avoidant memory 
style may be successful in the short term (i.e. less contact with negative events) but is 
harmful in the long term. Previous studies have focused on AMS as a vulnerability factor 
in depression (see Williams, 2007 for a review). It seems reasonable to assume, in light 
of recent research, that a reduction in overgenreal memory (OGM) is an important factor 
to target in treatment. Indeed, research in the last two years is now aiming to address 
such specificity deficits in depression by employing specific intervention procedures 
aimed at targeting the underlying cognitive processes presumed to be involved.
In recent research pertaining to the phenomenology of memory for past events it
has been demonstrated that ‘openness to feelings’, as assessed by the NEO Personality
Inventory (Costa & McCrae, 1992), was strongly related to past events, as evident by
correlations with measures of belief in the accuracy of memories, sense of recollection,
amount of sensory details, and feeling of emotions while remembering (Rubin & Siegler,
2004). In an effort to extend on their findings to emotion regulation strategies, Rubin and
Siegler (2004) propose that suppression of emotions is the opposite to openness of
feelings and as such relate their findings to those of Richards and Gross (2000) who
found that individuals noted to make use of emotion suppression strategies also reported
reduced memory for conversations and recall past episodes involving emotion regulation
relative to individuals who do not habitually make use of such emotion suppression
strategies. As such the findings by Rubin and Siegler (2004) and Richards and Gross
(2000) propose that avoidant coping strategies, in lieu of emotional suppression, affects
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the subjective experience associated with past recall. More recent evidence in this regard 
comes from D’Argembeau and Van der Linden (2006), who extend on the work by 
Rubin and Siegler (2004) and Richards and Gross (2000), by showing that individual 
differences in suppression affect not only the phenomenology of memory for past events 
but also the phenomenology associated with mental time travel into the future.
With the recent advent of a link between past and future thinking (cf. Chapter 1, 
Section 1.4.1) many of the associated deficits pertaining to AMS have been assumed to 
also be relevant for specificity of future events (e.g. Williams, 1996). Given the clinical 
relevance of autobiographical memory (AM) research, it is particularly important to 
examine the relation between past and future thinking. That is, in order to ensure 
treatment correctly targets the underlying features of depression it is necessary to 
understand how deficits in past and future thinking are manifested in depressive 
populations and, to recognise if the behaviour that needs targeting pertains to memory or 
cognitions of a more anticipatory nature.
Analogue studies of depression have the potential to inform understanding of the 
initial development of depression symptoms (Ruscio & Ruscio, 2000; Pennebaker, 
Colder & Sharp, 1990). As there have been inconsistencies in findings with non-clinical 
and dysporic samples in relation to research on past and future thinking, it may be 
relevant to explore these phenomena in a relatively homogeneous sample. An analogue 
sample of depression in a student population offers an efficient sample to further 
investigate this phenomenon.
To this end the experiments presented in Chapter 2 are designed to look at deficits 
in episodic autobiographical accounts of past and future experiences in a sample of sub- 
clinically depressed individuals relative to non-depressed individuals. The individual past 
and future experiences are explored in an effort to shed light on the use of avoidant 
coping strategies as a related function to overgenerality in such accounts. Experiments la 
and 2a aim to examine OGM, whereas Experiments lb and 2b examine specificity in 
future thinking. All experiments will involve a sub clinical sample.
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2.2 Experim ent la
The parallel between reduced AMS and depression appears not only to be limited 
to a state of mood. Indeed, it has been noted that recovering depressed individuals as well 
as those in remission from depression similarly report a sustained level of reduced AMS 
(e.g., Brittlebank, Scott, Williams, & Ferrier, 1993; Raes, Hermans, Williams, Beyers, et 
al., 2006). With individuals who have previously experienced depressive episodes 
similarly demonstrating low AMS, i.e. levels of AMS in these studies have been reported 
as similar to currently depressed patients, and in contrast to those of never depressed 
controls (e.g., Mackinger, Pachinger, Leibetseder, & Fartacek, 2000; Park, Goodyer, & 
Teasdale, 2002; Williams & Dritschel, 1988).
The predictive significance of AMS in the progressive path of depression has 
further been recognized in the level of AMS reported, i.e. the lower AMS is reported to 
be, the more prolonged the improvement in depressive symptoms have been seen to be 
(e.g., Brittlebank et al., 1993; Peeters, Wessel, Merckelbach & Boon-Vermeeren, 2002; 
Raes, Hermans, Williams, Beyers, et al., 2006). With such predictive value noted also for 
non-clinical samples, where reduced AMS denotes increased depressed symptomatology 
in response to stressful life-events (e.g., Bryant, Sutherland & Guthrie, 2007; Gibbs & 
Rude, 2004; Mackinger, Loschin & Leibetseder, 2000; Van Minnen, Wessel, Verhaak & 
Smeenk, 2005; for a review, see Raes, Hermans, Williams & Eelen, 2007).
In contrast to studies of individuals with clinical depression, there is, however, 
less consistency in findings from studies with non-clinical samples (e.g., Schacter, Addis 
& Buckner, 2007). For instance, some studies report dysphoric individuals as less 
specific in retrieval than non-dysphoric respondents (e.g., Goddard, Dritschel, & Burton, 
1997), whereas other studies fail to detect this trend in such samples (e.g., Raes, Pousset, 
& Hermans, 2004). It has been noted that this inconsistent pattern of results may be due 
to an insensitivity of the AMT as a measure of OGM in non-clinical samples rather than 
the non-existence of OGM altogether in these samples. For example, item response 
theory analyses of AMT performance, as a framework for evaluating how well the
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assessment works in non-clinical groups, suggested that the AMT might not be 
sufficiently sensitive within such samples (Griffith et al., 2009). As such it is pertinent to 
further explore the use of the AMT within such non-clinical samples.
As discussed in Chapter 1 (see Sectionl.4.1.1.1), one way in which reduced AMS 
may be seen to add to depression refers to the reduced experimental exposure to past 
negative experiences (see Hermans et al., 2005). As noted, exposure to such cognitions is 
related to good psychological health (e.g., Littrell, 1998; Pennebaker & Seagal, 1999). 
With the absence of this inherent contact with negative past experiences prevalent in 
individuals with OGM it has been suggested that the process aids deliberate effects to 
avoid such cognitions, with the assumed functional outcome of experiential avoidance 
(Hayes, Wilson, Gifford, Follette, & Strosahl, 1996). A lack of exposure may initially be 
advantageous, however, prolonged avoidance generates the risk of intensifying the 
depressive course (see e.g., Hayes et al., 1996; see also Golden, Dalgleish, & 
Mackintosh, 2007).
Although there is some evidence of individual differences in emotion regulation 
strategies affecting AMS (e.g. D’Argembeau & Van der Linden, 2006; Rubin & Siegler, 
2004; Richards & Gross, 2000), to date, only one known study has specifically looked at 
emotional avoidance in relation to AMS as measured by the AMT. The study by 
Hermans et al. (2005) tested the functional avoidance / OGM paradigm correlating AMS 
with several measures of avoidant coping strategies, including the Acceptance and 
Action Questionnaire. Findings from this work indicated that participants who 
demonstrated reduced AMS also reported use of more avoidant coping strategies. It is 
worth noting that in the Hermans et al. study they did not look at depression per se. 
Therefore, there has been no systematic test of emotional avoidance and AMS in relation 
to depression within one experiment.
Experiment la is an analogue study of depression and aims to test 
autobiographical memory specificity (AMS) as measured by the AMT in a sub-clinical 
student population. The experiment has three main aims; (1) to investigate the specificity
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of assessment for the autobiographical memory test in a sub-clinical sample. Due to 
inconsistencies in findings with non-clinical samples predicted outcomes are tentative, 
however, based on clinical findings, it is predicted that participants who display 
increased depression levels, as measured by the Beck Depression Inventory (BDI-II), 
will demonstrate differing levels of memory specificity as reported on the AMT, relative 
to a sample of participants reporting healthy levels of depression. Experiment 1 a further 
aims to (2) examine reported levels of emotional avoidance, as measured by the 
Acceptance and Action Questionnaire (AAQ-II), in relation to reported 
phenomenological characteristics of positive and negative past events specificity as 
measured by the Memory Characteristics Questionnaire (MCQ). It is predicted that there 
will be a relationship between expressions of positive and negative past event 
phenomenological characteristics and levels of emotional avoidance emotional avoidance 
as measured by the AAQ-II. Lastly, Experiment la aims to (3) examine emotional 
avoidance, as measured by the AAQ-II, in relation to positive and negative past event 
recall specificity. It is predicted that there is a relationship between AMS and level of 
avoidant emotional coping style as measured by the AAQ-II. Specifically it is sought to 
extend on Hermans et al.’s (2005) findings by inclusion of a sub-clinical sample, and to 
replicate their findings of a relationship between overgeneral memory in recall and 
emotional avoidance.
2.2.1. Method
2.2.1.1. Participants
Forty students from Swansea University volunteered to take part in the present 
experiment, though after exclusion criteria pertaining to BDI-II scores (criteria for 
inclusion is detailed in section 2.2.2.1). Only data from thirty-three participants was 
utilised in the following analysis. As such the current study reports findings from 20 
females and 13 males, who took part in return for course related subject pool credit. The
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ages of the included participants ranged from 19 to 34 years, with a mean of 24.33 years 
of age (ia =3.51).
2.2.1.2 Apparatus and Materials 
Measures
Participants completed a series of self-report questionnaires to assess 
psychological health. The measures included are reported below.
The Beck Depression Inventory, Second Edition (BDI-II; Beck, Steer & Brown, 
1996). The BDI-II is a 21-item self-report instrument intended to assess the existence and 
severity of symptoms of depression as listed in the American Psychiatric Association's 
Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders Fourth Edition (DSM-IV; 1994). 
When presented with the BDI-II, respondents are asked to consider each statement as it 
relates to the way they have felt for the past two weeks, to more accurately correspond to 
the DSM-IV criteria. Each of the 21 items corresponding to a symptom of depression is 
summed to give a single score for the BDI-II. There is a four-point scale for each item 
ranging from 0 to 3. Scores are cumulative, with higher scores indicating greater levels of 
depression.
The BDI is one of the most commonly used measures of depression and often
used to provide a clinical cutoff for depression in lieu of, or in combination with, other
diagnostic tools. Cut score guidelines for the BDI-II are given with the recommendation
that thresholds be adjusted based on the characteristics of the sample, and the purpose for
use. It is generally considered that a score of less than 9 indicates no or minimal
depression, scores in the range of 10-18 indicate mild-to-moderate depression, and
scores from 19-29 indicate more moderate-to-severe depression, whereas scores on the
BDI-II above 30 are taken to indicate severe levels of depression. However, it has been
noted that a score of 0-4 may suggest possible denial of depression and a score of 40-63
may suggest possible exaggeration of depression or a histrionic or borderline personality
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disorder. The BDI-II is based largely on the first edition of the BDI (Beck, Ward, 
Mendelson, Mock, & Erbaugh, 1961), which has indicated good reliability and strong 
validity in clinical and non-clinical samples (cf. Beck, Steer & Garbin, 1988 for a 
review). For the BDI-II the coefficient alphas have been found to be .92 for outpatients 
and .93 for undergraduate university level students (Beck et al., 1988).
The Beck Hopelessness Scale (BHS; Beck & Steer, 1988) is a self-report tool 
designed to assess the extent of positive and negative beliefs about the future during the 
past week. The BHS has been used in numerous studies involving suicide ideation or 
behaviour and is recommended for measuring the extent of negative attitudes in clinical 
and research settings (Beck et al., 1974; Beck & Steer, 1988). The BHS consists of 20 
true-false statements, with each statement scored as 0 or 1. A total score is calculated by 
summing the pessimistic responses for each of the 20 items with BHS scores ranging 
from 0 to 20. The accompanying manual contains general cutoff guidelines for use in 
research, although it is recommended that cut-off scores should be based upon clinical 
decisions; patients who score 9 or above on the BHS have been found to be around 11 
times more likely to commit suicide than patients who score 8 or below (Beck et al., 
1989). Beck and Steer (1988) have reported high internal reliability, with Kuder- 
Richardson reliabilities ranging from .87 to .93, across varied clinical and non-clinical 
samples. The BHS has been found to have sufficient one-week test-retest reliability in 
psychiatric outpatient samples (r = .69; Beck & Steer, 1988) and high three-week test- 
retest reliability with undergraduate university level students (r = .85; Holden & Fekken, 
1988).
The State Trait Anxiety Inventory (STAI; Spielberger, Gorsuch, & Lushene,
1970; Spielberger, Gorsuch, Lushene, Vagg, & Jacobs, 1983). The STAI state version is
a 20-item scale which provides information about a person’s current level of anxiety; the
scale is usually administered as a self-completion questionnaire. The STAI state scale is
scored on four levels of anxiety intensity from ‘not at all’ (1) to ‘very much’ (4) and
scores can range from 20 (no anxious symptoms) to 80 (high level of anxious
symptoms). The 20 items are divided into two groups: ten items are formed to record the
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presence of anxiety symptoms and the other ten items are scored to record the absence of 
anxiety symptoms. The latter are inverted for the purpose of calculating the sum score 
(Spielberger et al., 1983). There is no clinical cut off score for the STAI, but population 
norms are available for comparison. The instrument is widely used in research on clinical 
and student populations and good internal consistency has been reported (0.85 to 0.95; 
Smith & Lay, 1974).
The Positive and Negative Affect Schedule (PANAS; Watson, Clark, & 
Tellegen, 1988). The PANAS measures positive and negative constructs as both states 
and traits. The state version was utilized here. Ten descriptors are used for each Positive 
Affect (PA) scale and Negative Affect (NA) scale to define their meanings. Participants 
in the PANAS are thus required to respond to a 20-item test using a 5-point scale that 
ranges from ‘very slightly’ (1) to ‘extremely’ (5).
Reliability and Validity reported by Watson et al. (1988) has been noted as 
moderately good, for the Positive Affect Scale (PA), the Cronbach alpha coefficient was 
0.86 to 0.90; relative to alphas of 0.84 to 0.87 for the Negative Affect Scale (NA). Over 
an 8-week time period, the test-retest correlations have been seen to be between 0.47- 
0.68 for the PA and 0.39-0.71 for the NA (Watson et al., 1988). The PANAS has strong 
reported validity with measures of general distress, dysfunction and depression, as well 
as state anxiety.
The Life Orientation Test -  Revised (LOT-R; Scheier, Carver, & Bridges, 1994). 
The LOT-R is a 10-item scale, with four filler items and six scale items. Respondents are 
asked to indicate their level of agreement with each of the items on a 4-point scale, using 
the response format, ‘strongly agree’ (1) to ‘strongly disagree’ (4). This gives a possible 
range of scores from 6-24, with higher scores indicating more optimism. LOT-R total 
scores are calculated by summing three positively worded and three negatively worded 
items (the negative items are reverse coded). Scheier, Carver and Bridges (1994) report 
an internal reliability coefficient of .78 for an undergraduate sample with the LOT-R.
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The Acceptance and Action Questionnaire-II (AAQ-II; Bond, Hayes, Baer, 
Carpenter, Orcutt, Waltz, & Zettle (Submitted); Hayes, Strosahl, et al., 2004). The AAQ- 
II is a 10-item self report scale designed to measure experiential avoidance, that is, the 
extent to which respondents are willing to experience difficult psychological events such 
as thoughts and feelings, and the extent to which experiential avoidance is a barrier to 
functional behaviour. Items are rated on a 7-point Likert-type scale ranging from ‘never 
true’ (1) to ‘always true’ (7); the possible range of scores on the AAQ-II is 10-70, with 
higher scores indicating greater levels of psychological flexibility and as such lower 
levels of experiential avoidance. The AAQ-II has been shown to mediate outcomes in a 
wide range of areas including worksite stress, depression, diabetes management, and 
psychosis and studies have found changes in AAQ-II scores to be associated with good 
outcomes in anxious clients, polysubstance users, clients with emotional dysregulation, 
and OCD (Hayes, Luoma, Bond, Masuda, & Lillis, 2006). The AAQ-II has 
demonstrated very good internal consistency, and has adequate criterion-related, 
predictive, and convergent validities (Hayes, Strosahl, et al., 2004).
Verbal Fluency Control Task (Lezak, 1976). The verbal fluency task looks at 
general cognitive processing. The task require participants to think of, and to report out 
loud, as many words as possible beginning with certain letters from the alphabet, i.e. (and 
as for this study) the three letters F, A, S, as are commonly used. Participants are 
typically given one minute for each letter, in which to state aloud as many words as they 
can, excluding repetitions, proper nouns, names, numbers and sequences which involve 
the same basic word (i.e., swim, swimming, swimmer). The score is the mean of all the 
words generated (minus any exclusions) within the given time.
The Autobiographical Memory Task (AMT; Williams & Broadbent, 1986;
Williams et al, 1996). The AMT is a standard memory task which requires participants to
retrieve a specific autobiographical memory event from the past, in response to memory
cues. Participants are typically given one minute to think of and report out loud a specific
time and place when something happened to them in their past in relation to the cue
words presented. Participants are informed that the memory they retrieve could be an
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important or trivial event, but that the memory should be something that happened on a 
particular time on a particular day. That is, participants are told that the memories they 
report should describe an event that lasted no longer than a day, and they should try to 
think of a different memory for each word. Examples of specific and non-specific 
memories are given in the instructions. Twelve words chosen from Williams et al’s 
(1996) A&B list were used as cues to prompt participants for responses (for a full list of 
cue words cf. Williams et al., 1996). Of these cue words six were positively framed (i.e. 
success, friendship, love, happiness, wealth and enjoyment) and six were negatively 
framed (i.e. worry, loneliness, failure, stress, sadness and illness). The cues were 
presented following a standard procedure where the participants are verbally instructed 
to: ‘Try to remember an occasion in the past when you felt (e.g. successful)’.
All cue responses were recorded on a Dictaphone (Olympus VN-2100PC) and inter-rated 
for consistency in coding. The recorded memories were coded as being either specific or 
non-specific. All analyses focus on numbers of specific memories; in other words, AMS 
scores refer to number of specific memories generated to the entire set of words, or as 
split up by valence with AMS scores for positive vs. negative cues. Memories coded as 
specific refer to a particular event that lasted less than one day. Memories coded as non­
specific were coded as either categoric, referring to an event that happened on more than 
one occasion (e.g., ‘ When I  visit my parents on the weekends )  or extended, referring to 
an event that lasted for longer than a day (e.g., ‘ When I  went on holiday with my 
boyfriend for a week to Spain Additionally, ‘no memory’ was coded when participants 
either failed to report a memory or used the same memory more than once. An inter-rater 
reliability analysis using the Kappa statistic was performed to determine consistency 
among raters. A sample of 75% of the responses was rated by a second independent rater, 
and an inter-rater reliability of 95% (k = .95) was obtained.
The Memory Characteristics Questionnaire (MCQ; Johnson, Foley, Suengas &
Raye, 1988; Johnson, Nolde, & De Leonardis, 1996). Qualitative features of memories
were assessed using a modified version of the memory characteristics questionnaire. The
modified version in all consisted of twelve questions. The information sought was
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concerned with dimensions such as sensory details of the event (i.e. visual; for example, 
‘My memory for this event is’. . .’, evaluated on a scale from 1 (Dim) to 7 (Sharp/Clear); 
‘My memory for this event involves visual detail... ’ evaluated from 1 (Little or none) to 7 
(A lot of detail); information about the frequency of recall since the event (e.g. ‘Since it 
happened, I  have thought [talked] about the event... \  evaluated from 1 (not at all) to 
7(many times); emotions (e.g. ‘The overall tone o f  the memory is’. . .’, evaluated from 1 
(not clear at all) to 7 (very clear); and the general vividness of the memory (e.g. ‘My 
memory for this event is. . .’, evaluated from 1 (Sketchy) to 7 (Very detailed). All 
dimensions are rated on 7-point Likert scales. Participants are further required to indicate 
the perspective of their memory (i.e. first person versus third person observer view). The 
temporal distance of each particular memory is recorded, i.e. by participants responding 
to the question of ‘About when did the event happen? ’, by indicating if the memory was 
from: Just today (1), Yesterday (2), A Few days ago (3), Last week (4), A Few weeks ago 
(5), Last month (6), A Few months ago (7), Last year (8), In the last 5-10 years (9), or 
Longer than 10 years ago (10) (if the event is a childhood memory participants are asked 
to indicate their age at the time of the event).The individual questions pertaining to each 
dimension are summed to represent assessments of the three dimensions of clarity, 
valence and frequency of recall, along with separate variables recorded for temporal 
distance and perspective.
2.2.1.3 Experimental Overview
Experiment la used a 2 x 2 mixed participants design, with Group (Low 
Depression scores vs. High Depression scores) as the between participant variable and 
Autobiographical Memory Specificity (overgeneral vs. specific) as the within-participant 
variable. All participants received the same instructions and completed the Verbal 
Fluency Control Task, followed by both sections of the AMT, i.e. Positive and Negative 
past recall, along with the MCQ. All participants completed all questionnaires, i.e. the 
AAQ-II, the BDI-II, the BHS, the LOT-R, the PANAS and the STAI. Participant data
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was categorised and analysed based on their Beck Depression Inventory responses (see 
Section 2.2.2.1 for group allocations to the Depressed and Non-Depressed groups). 
Figure 1 summarises the experimental sequence utilised for Experiment la.
Participant Sample (N= 40)
Total sample complete the Verbal Fluency Control Task 
(randomised 1st presentation of the letters F, A, S between participants)
 £ ________________________________
Total sample complete Autobiographical Memory Task and the Memory Characteristics 
Questionnaire (randomised order of 1st presentation of positive or negative cues between
Total sample complete Questionnaires (randomised order of 1st presentation between 
participants) BDI-II, STAI, BHS, LOT-R, AAQ-II, PANAS
 ,
Post-Experimental/Pre-Analysis BDI-II Group Split (see Section 2.2.2.1 ):
Low BDI-II score (1<10): N= 18 (BDI-II = 0, excluded from analysis, N =  4)
High BDI-II score (10<30): 7V= 15 (BDI-II score >29, excluded from analysis, N =  3)
Final sample for analysis: N =  33
L _ _  —  _______________________________________ _
Figure 1. Overview of the Experimental Sequence for Experiment la.
2.2.1.4 Ethical Issues
The current experiment raised a number of ethical considerations with reference to recall 
of negative past events. Such past events could involve former traumatic events, or evoke 
a negative mood or an emotional response. In order to conduct the experiment within the 
appropriate ethical guidelines (The British Psychological Society, 2006), precautionary
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measures were taken with all participants. Prior to agreement to take part in the 
experiment each participant was presented with a written information sheet detailing the 
experiment aims and procedures. A minimum 24 hour ‘cooling off period followed the 
invitation to take part in the study and to allow volunteers to consider the written 
information detailing the experiment. All participants who subsequently expressed an 
interest in participating in the experiment received an additional verbal briefing as to the 
nature of the experiment. If, at this point, participants agreed to take part, they were 
requested to sign a consent form detailing their participant rights; i.e. all participants 
were informed that they were not required to proceed; that they could withdraw from the 
study at any point', and that they would not be contacted again. The consent form was 
counter-signed by the experimenter.
The pre-experimental briefing included details about the psychological measures 
to be utilised, and the experimental sequence. Participants were informed that the 
questionnaires contained questions that they might find personal and/or distressing. In 
order to address potential anxieties concerning questionnaires, it was emphasised that: (i) 
participants were not required to disclose any information they wanted to maintain 
private, as such questions could be left unanswered; (ii) there were no right or wrong 
answers to the questions; and (iii) that the questionnaires served merely to enable the 
experimenter to note individual differences that might influence performances related to 
the experimental procedure and it was emphasised that these would not be used in a 
diagnostic capacity.
Participants were informed that as part of the experimental procedure they would
be asked to recall a number of positive and negative past events, some of which they may
find distressing. All participants were clearly informed that, in accordance with
guidelines, all data would be kept on file at Swansea Psychology Department for
approximately 5 years. It was clarified that all aspects of their participation in the
experiment would remain confidential, their data would not be identified by name in the
final report and all data would be coded with an individual participant number. It was
emphasised that data would only be disclosed to the thesis supervisor in the event of
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exceptional circumstances (e.g. in the event of a participant becoming distressed or 
expressing a wish to see the supervisor). After their participation in the experiment all 
participants were debriefed as to the nature and rationale of the experiment. All 
participants were made aware that if any psychological issues arose directly from the 
study, they could contact the thesis supervisor, whose name and contact details appeared 
on the written debrief sheet. The written debrief restated details provided in the verbal 
debrief, such as the aims and rationale of the experiment. The debrief further included 
information of counselling services available from Swansea University, as well as 
information and contact details for other local and national agencies who specialise in 
psychological issues. As such, further arrangements, where appropriate could be made 
free of charge as a forum for the discussion of any issues which may arise. No 
participants reported recalling a traumatic past event during the Autobiographical 
Memory Task. No participants reported a deflated mood or a negative emotional 
response upon departure. At no point during the experiment did any participants 
withdraw from the experiment or express dissatisfaction or distress of any kind. Prior to 
commencement the experiment was approved by the Department of Psychology, 
Swansea University Ethics Committee.
2.2.1.5 Procedure
Prior to commencement of the experiment participants were all briefed as to the 
nature of the study and asked to sign a consent form. Due to the fact that the study 
involved the recall of negative events from the past special emphasis was put on 
reminding participants of their right to withdraw from the study at any time without 
providing a reason. The Verbal Fluency Control Task (VFCT) was firstly completed, 
with participants given 60 seconds to provide responses to the letters F, A and S 
consecutively. Upon completion of the VFCT the Autobiographical Memory Task 
(AMT) commenced, with participants instructed that the memory they recalled could be 
an important or trivial event and that the memory should be of something that happened
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at a particular time on a particular day. To ensure that participants understood the 
instructions, examples of specific and non-specific replies to two practice cues (relieved 
and tired) were presented by the experimenter. A printed version of the instructions was 
given to the participants to read, this was followed by verbal instructions from the 
researcher. Participants were given 60 seconds in each case to retrieve a specific 
autobiographical memory, that is, of a specific event at a given time and place. Words 
were presented in a separate random cue and valence order for each participant. The cues 
were stated out load by the experimenter and participant responses, in form of verbal 
presentation, was recorded on a digital Dictaphone (Olympus VN-2100PC) and 
transcribed for coding according to the criteria outlined by Williams (1992). If the type 
of memory that the participants recalled was unclear, or if participants retrieved the same 
memory to more than one cue, or offered responses that related to future events, they 
were prompted with the words ‘What is the memory that you are thinking o f there? ’ or 
‘Can you tell me a bit more about that memory? Following each AMT cue word 
retrieval participants were asked to complete the MCQ in writing, detailing 
phenomenological characteristics pertaining to that particular memory. Upon completion 
of the AMT and MCQ participants completed the set of psychometric self-report 
measures and wellbeing questionnaires after which they were suitably debriefed and 
thanked for their participation.
2.2.2 Results and Discussion
2.2.2.I. Group Allocation
The current study aimed to examine performance on the Autobiographical
Memory Test in a sample of sub-clinically depressed participants relative to healthy
controls. Group allocation was determined via discriminating scores on the Beck
Depression Inventory (BDI-II). Beck ruled out strict adhesion to cut-off points for the
BDI, preferring that they be chosen according to the type of study. Beck suggested that
total scores of less than 10 do not show depressive disorders; with scores of 10 to 18
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indicative of mild to moderate depression, whereas scores between 19 and 29 are 
suggestive of moderate to severe depression. Scores of more than 30 has been suggested 
as symptomatic of severe depression. Further suggestions, pertaining to scores below 4, 
have been that such low scores may be evident of denial of depressive symptoms. Taking 
these suggestions into account, whilst retaining an adequate sample, the current study 
opted to remove any participants with a score of 0 (N= 4) or above 29 (N= 3, M= 31) in 
order to more accurately capture healthy participants and those at a sub-clinical level of 
depression. The cut off point for inclusion in the no depression group was a score of 1< 
10, thus participants presenting scores of 1-9 (N= 18; M= 5.16, a=2.28) on the BDI-II 
were included in this group (Non-Depressed Group). For inclusion in the sub-clinical 
depression group BDI-II scores recorded where 10 < 30 (N= 15; M= 13.93, o= 3.45; 
Depressed Group).
2.2.2.2 Demographics and Psychometrics
The two groups were found to report significantly different depression levels on 
the BDI-II, with participants in the Non-Depressed group reporting significantly lower 
scores on the BDI-II than the corresponding Depressed group, f(31) = -8.736, /?< 001. 
Similar divergence between the groups were found in relation to the other well-being 
measures with the depressed group consistently reporting higher levels of anxiety (STAI, 
f(31) = -4.337,/?<.001), increased hopelessness (BHS, f(31)= -3.582,/? =.001), deflated 
life optimism (LOT-R, /(31) = 3.609, /?=.001) and reduced psychological flexibility 
(AAQ, f(31) = 3.897,/K.OOl). Mood was not found to be significantly different between 
the groups (PA: p  =.382; NA: p  =.072), though there is a clear trend indicating some 
level of mood variance. The psychometric means are presented with the participant 
demographics in Table 1. As depicted in Table 1, Depressed and Non-Depressed 
participants did not differ with respect to age, t{31) =.196, p  =.846, representation of 
gender, /2  (1) =. 609,/? =.435, or verbal fluency, /(31) =.160, p  =.874. Thus the results 
show that the two groups were well matched on age, gender and cognitive abilities with 
group differences pertaining to levels of depression, anxiety, hopelessness, optimism and
emotional avoidance commonly noted to co-occur within clinical groups.
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2.2.2.3 The Autobiographical Memory Test
To provide an idea of the content of the events that were recalled in the present 
experiment, the descriptions of events were classified into broad categories.
Table 1. Means and Standard Deviation (SD) of the reported Demographic information and Psychometric 
results for the Depressed and Non-Depressed groups in Experiment la.
Variable Depressed (SD) Non-Depressed (SD)
Gender: Females (Males) 8(7) 12(6)
Age 24.20 (3.29) 24.44 (3.76)
VFCT 13.08 (2.88) 13.25 (3.37)
BDI 13.93 (3.45) 5.16 (2.28)
BHS 6.20 (3.64) 2.77 (1.63)
STAI 45.06 (9.68) 31.33 (8.51)
LOT-R 12.46 (4.79) 17.55 (3.27)
AAQ-II 45.40 (5.05) 52.72 (5.62)
PA 31.93 (6.86) 34.11 (7.16)
NA 17.93 (4.87) 14.38 (5.86)
Note. VFCT= Verbal Fluency Control Task; BDI= Beck Depression Inventory; BHS= Beck Hopelessness 
Scale; STAI = State Anxiety Inventory; LOT-R= Life Optimism Test-Revised; AAQ-II= Acceptance and 
Action Questionnaire-H; PA = Positive Affective Scale; NA= Negative Affective Scale.
2.2.2.4 Content of Autobiographical Events
Results of the brief content review found participants to be generating levels of 
experience that were life-time appropriate, and consistent with non-traumatic life time 
events.
Old positive memories (i.e., of events that happened over a year ago) involved 
episodes at parties (25%), episodes during leisure activities (including going on holiday 
and times with friends; 35%), romantic episodes (28%), and episodes of academic
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success (6%); 6% of the events reported could not be classified in these categories. Old 
negative memories involved accidents, illnesses, or deaths of relatives (19%); arguments 
with relatives or close friends (45%); the end of a romantic relationship (13%); accidents, 
illness, or aggression involving the participants themselves (16%); and episodes of 
academic failure (7%).
Recent positive memories (i.e., of events that happened within the last month) 
involved episodes at parties (28%), episodes of academic success (17%), romantic 
episodes (23%), and episodes during leisure activities (32%). Recent negative memories 
involved accidents, illness, or deaths of relatives (5%); episodes of academic failures 
(23%); accidents or illnesses involving the participants themselves (17%); conflict within 
and/or the end of a romantic relationship (22%); and arguments with relatives or close 
friends (33%).
2.2.2.5 Autobiographical Memory Specificity
Following common practice in investigations of autobiographical memory 
specificity (AMS) (cf. Williams et al., 2006, 2007), the first response across the 12 trials, 
that is, memories that participants retrieved in response to the 12 AMT cue words that 
were specific, was used to index AMS (this variable is referred to here as memory 
specificity, with higher scores indicating increased specificity).
High positive correlations were seen between the number of specific memories
produced under each valence category with the overall number of specific recall across
valence categories (Non-Depressed group, Positive cues, r= 903, and Negative cues
r=.858; Depressed group, Positive cues r=.880 and Negative cues r=.962). On average,
retrieved memories for participants in the Non-Depressed group were specific 74.07% of
the time across the 12 trials; whereas the Depressed participants showed somewhat
diminished specificity in retrieval overall with 61.66% of the 12 trials noted as specific.
Differences in specificity were noted for positive cues, with the Non-Depressed group
retrieving marginally more specific memories relative to the Depressed group (M = 4.77,
o=  1.35 and M  = 4.00, o = .93 respectively; /(31) = 1.887 p  =.069). For negative cues
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specificity was again similar for both groups, with a marginal difference pertaining to the 
Non-Depressed group being slightly more specific in their recall (Non-Depressed group, 
M=  4.11, a = 1.13; Depressed group, M=  3.20, a=  1.61; f(31) =1.902,/? = .066). Verbal 
fluency scores did not correlate with the total number of cues for either group (Non- 
Depressed,/? =.986; Depressed,/? =.471).
Table 2 presents the AMT performance by both groups and as can be seen 
omissions were rare. It is important to acknowledge that the number of specific memories 
retrieved on the AMT (i.e., the level of AMS) is a direct reflection of the number of 
“errors” on the AMT (as the sum of number-correct scores and errors is a constant across 
participants). For instance, producing 6 specific memories to 12 word cues on the AMT 
reflects the fact that to 6 of the cue words the participant failed to generate a specific 
memory within the time limit.
Memory specificity was subjected to a 2 (Group: Depressed/Non-Depressed) x 2 
(Cue valence: Positive/Negative) mixed analyses of variance (ANOVA). A main effect 
for Valence was found, with both groups retrieving more specific positive memories 
(F(l, 31) = 12.868 p  =.001, rjp2 =.293). A main effect was also seen for group with the 
Non-Depressed individuals being more specific in recall overall (Fi(l, 31) = 4.517, p  
=.042, tjp2 =.127). No interaction effect was observed (Fl(l, 31) =.106, p  =.747, rjp2 
=.003). The results show that a group difference pertaining to AMS was present at a 
general level across valence categories.
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Table 2. Autobiographical Memory Test Performance presented as Percentage of Specificity across the 12 
cue words, with Mean number and Standard Deviation (SD), of Memory Specificity responses across the 
six cue words for each valence category as reported by the Depressed and Non-Depressed groups in 
Experiment la. T-Test score and statistical value (p) from between group comparisons are presented.
Variable Non-Depressed Depressed
Mean (SD) Mean (SD) £(31) P
Total % of specific memories 74.07(18.27) 61.66(19.11)
Total % of omissions 1.14 (2.31) 2.05 (2.11)
Total cues 8.88 (2.19) 7.20 (2.36) 2.125 0.042*
Positive cues 4.77 (1.35) 4.00 (0.93) 1.887 0.069
Negative cues 4.11 (1.13) 3.20 (1.61) 1.902 0.066
Note. * p<.05. Positive/Negative cues = Number of specific first memories relative to the detailed valence 
category on the Autobiographical Memory Test.
2.2.2.6 Memory Characteristics
Phenomenological characteristics were recorded, for each memory cued on the 
AMT, by the Memory Characteristics Questionnaire (MCQ). Participant responses to 
questions about valence, frequency and clarity of the cued memory were noted. Within 
group analysis found that clarity was greater for positive relative to negative cue recall 
for both groups (Non-Depressed group, /(17) =3.391,/? = .003; Depressed group, £( 14) = 
3.108, p  = .008). Strong congruency was seen for cue and valence within both groups, 
with positive memories being described with high affect relative to low affect recorded 
for negative memories (Non-Depressed group, £(17) = 12.146,/? <.001; Depressed group, 
£(14) = 6.200, /? <.001). However, with regards to frequency of recall -  the Non­
depressed group reported more frequent recall of positive relative to negative memories 
(£(17) = 2.561, /? =.020), whereas no significant difference in frequency of recall was 
found for the Depressed group (£(14) = -.479, /? =.639). The mean MCQ scores are 
reported in Table 3 below. As can be seen from Table 3 a trend indicating marginal 
between group differences are apparent for all the phenomenological memory 
characteristics, though a significant group difference was only observed for positive 
frequency. That is, participants in the Non-Depressed group reported recalling and
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talking about positive memories more frequently than the Depressed group (/(31) = 
2.070, p  = .047). The results demonstrate that a positive valence effect is prominent 
within the sample pertaining to the reported characteristics at large, though the groups 
diverge in response to frequency of recall, with the Non-Depressed group reporting 
greater consideration of positive past events relative to the Depressed group.
The results show that the Non-Depressed group reported more frequent recall of 
positive past events, as well as such events being from the more proximate past, relative 
to the Depressed group..
Table 3. Mean group scores and Standard Deviations (SD) of Phenomenological reports of Clarity, 
Valence and Frequency as measured by the Memory Characteristics Questionnaire for Non-Depressed and 
Depressed participants in Experiment la. T-Test score and statistical value (p) from between group 
comparisons are presented.
Memory Characteristics Non-Depressed (18) Depressed (15)
Mean (SD) Mean (SD) *(31) P
Positive Clarity 5.83 (1.01) 5.79 (0.72) 0.121 0.904
Negative Clarity 4.83 (1.26) 4.65 (1.27) 0.384 0.704
Positive Valence 6.57 (0.67) 6.63 (0.66) -0.248 0.806
Negative Valence 2.04 (1.34) 2.74 (1.92) -1.241 0.224
Positive Frequency 5.36 (1.03) 4.66 (0.82) 2.070 0.047*
Negative Frequency 4.44 (1.07) 4.91 (1.77) -0.932 0.358
Note. * p<.05
2.2.2.7. Temporal Distance o f  Recall
The MCQ further recorded the temporal distance of the memories cued. No 
participants from either group reported memories recalled as being from earlier that day 
or from longer than 5 years ago, thus these variables are not presented nor included in 
any statistical calculations.
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As can be seen from Table 4 the Non-Depressed group reported a high number of 
positive events to be from the near past, with a total of 88.8 percent of the events recalled 
occurring within the last month. The Depressed group reported 60 percent of the positive 
events recalled to have occurred within the timeframe of the last month. In regards to 
negative events the Non-Depressed group reported 55.6 percent of the events to have 
occurred within the last month relative to the Depressed group whom reported 70 percent 
of the negatively cued events to have occurred within this period. A One-way ANOVA 
found the difference in the time of event occurrence to be significant for the positively 
cued events, with the Non-Depressed group recalling significantly more positive events 
from the near past relative to the Depressed group (F(l,31) = 11.155, p  =.002). No 
statistical significance was found between the two groups pertaining to time of events in 
negatively cued recall (F(l, 31) =.595,/? =.447).
Table 4. Mean percentage of reported Temporal Distance of events recalled to Positive and Negative Cues 
for the Depressed and Non-Depressed groups in Experiment 1 a.
Time of Event
Temporal Distance of 
Positive Events (Mean %)
Temporal Distance of 
Negative Events (Mean %)
Non-Depressed Depressed Non-Depressed Depressed
Yesterday 11.1
Few days ago 11.1 5.6 6.7
Last week 33.3 16.7 20.0
Few weeks ago 22.2 26.7 22.2 26.7
Last month 11.1 33.3 11.1 13.3
Few months ago 5.6 13.3 22.2 20.0
Last year 5.6 13.3 11.1 13.3
Last 5 years 13.3 11.1
2.2.2.8. Recall Vantage Point
The vantage point from which participants re-experienced the autobiographical 
events were recorded as either from a field (first person) perspective, or as an observer
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(third person) perspective. Participants overall reported 69.46 % of recall of events to be 
from a field perspective. Of these the first person perspective was reported to be found 
for 77.77% of the positive events relative to 61.14% for the negative events. At a split 
group level of analysis the Non-Depressed group was found to recall past events form a 
first person perspective in 77.77 % of the 12 cued scenarios, whereas the Depressed 
group reported 59.47% of the cued events to be from this perspective.
Table 5. Mean Percentage of Past Events Recall observed from a First Person Perspective as reported by 
the Depressed and Non-Depressed groups in Experiment la. T-Test score and statistical value ip) from 
between group comparisons are presented.
Percentage of Recall from of a 1st Person Perspective
Variable Non-Depressed Depressed
Mean (SD) Mean (SD) *(31) P
Total for all cues 77.77 (12.45) 59.47 (10.37) 4.526 0.001***
Positive events 89.81 (11.63) 63.33 (19.10) 4.899 0.001***
Negative cues 65.74 (17.59) 55.62(15.04) 1.755 0.089
Note. ***p = .001
As can be seen from Table 5, the recall vantage point was seen to significantly 
differ between the two groups with the Non-Depressed group reporting significantly 
more past events overall to be viewed from a first person perspective relative to the 
Depression group. It was further seen that this group difference was retained for recall of 
positive events, where again the Non-Depressed group appeared to recall more positive 
past events from the field perspective relative to the Depressed sample, no differences 
were found between the groups in regards to vantage point in recall of negative past 
events.
First person perspective in negative event recall was found to correlate with 
clarity of recall of negative past events (r = .360, p  = .040). No other correlations were
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observed for vantage point and phenomenological characteristics of past events. 
Relations between recall vantage point and psychometric scores found recall of positive 
past events from a first person perspective to correlate with lower levels of depression 
(BDI-II; r =-.564, p  = .001) and reduced anxiety (STAI; r =-.365, p  = .037), though no 
significance was found in correlations with hopelessness or optimism. First person 
perspective in negative recall was not found to correlate with either of the psychometric 
measures. The recall vantage point was seen to diverge between groups in regards to 
valence of event, with the Non-Depressed group reporting greater amounts of 
observations to be from a first person perspective in recall of positive events.
2.2.2.9 Emotional Avoidance
An interesting picture emerged when looking at the AMT data in relation to 
emotional avoidance, as measured by the AAQ-2. Firstly, as expected it was seen that 
those who reported lower depression levels were also found to report a reduced use of 
avoidant coping strategies, as indicated by a higher score on the AAQ-2 (BDI-II; r =- 
.498, p  = .003). Secondly, corresponding to the AMT finding of participants in the Non- 
Depression group being more specific in positive recall, it was also seen that cue 
specificity pertaining to positive past events correlated with low emotional avoidance (r 
=.381, p  = .029). This was supported by those low in emotional avoidance reporting 
more frequent thought and consideration of past positive events (r =.394, p  = .023). Use 
of avoidant strategies was also found to correlate with the proximity of the positive past 
events, with higher levels of psychological flexibility related to positive events from the 
near past (r = -.334, p  = .058). Low levels of avoidances was found to relate to increased 
reports of positive events as recalled from a first person perspective (r =.359, p  = .040). 
Together these reports indicate that an increased use of avoidant strategies relates to 
reduced contact with, as well as reduced specificity in recall for positive past events 
specifically. Overall the findings pertaining to levels of emotional avoidance were seen 
to relate to levels of AMS.
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2.2.3 Sum m ary
In the current experiment, the relationship between overgeneral memories, sub- 
clinical levels of depression, and avoidant coping methods were examined in relation to 
phenomenological characteristics of the recalled events. In line with previous research on 
clinical samples it was found that the AMT was able to predict depression scores at a 
sub-clinical level, with Non-Depressed respondents generating more specific past events 
relative to the Depressed group. The effect was stable across the two valence categories 
with the Non-Depressed sample demonstrating greater specificity in recall of both 
positive and negative past events. The key findings from Experiment 1 a are presented in 
Table 6 and as can be seen within group valence discrepancies were observed for both 
the Non-Depressed and the Depressed groups, with recall of positive events more clearly 
detailed. Affective content pertaining to negative past events was reported as more 
intense relative to positive events within both groups. The Non-Depressed group 
additionally reported more frequent consideration of past positive events; whereas the 
Depressed group’s reported recall for positive and negative past events were of 
equivalent levels. A between group difference was observed with regards to frequency of 
recall, where the Non-Depressed group were found to report recall of positive past events 
as more frequent than was noted in the corresponding reports by the Depressed group. 
This valence discrepancy between the two groups, i.e. pertaining to frequency of positive 
events recall, was supported by proximity reports, with the Non-Depressed group 
recalling more positive events from the near past relative to the Depressed group who 
reported positive events recalled being of a greater temporal distance from the present. 
Vantage point of recall was found to relate to specificity and depression levels, with 
individuals who reported recalling positive past events from a first person perspective 
recalling a greater level of specific positive past events, as well as demonstrating lower 
levels of depression.
Emotional avoidance was further seen to correlate with recall of positive events
as well as frequency of recall for positive past events and temporal distance of positive
recall. Lower levels of emotional avoidance was seen in those who recalled positive
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events from the more recent past and negative events from the more distant past. Recall 
of positive past events from the first person perspective was seen to correlate with lower 
levels of emotional avoidance. Thus, the use of avoidant strategies appears to be related 
to deficits in contacting and elucidating positive past events in particular.
The results from Experiment la  provide evidence of reduced levels of AMS in 
sub-clinical groups as supported by phenomenological reports of decreased recall from a 
first person perspective, reduced event clarity and affect, along with frequency of 
rehearsal of such past events. Emotionally avoidant individuals also displayed higher 
levels of depression and reduced specificity in recall of positive past events. These results 
support the hypothesis that reduced autobiographical memory specificity might be used 
as a way of regulating affect. However, in contrast to previous findings, the adoption of a 
less specific memory retrieval style was found to ward off the affective impact of 
positive relative to negative past experiences.
Experiment la offers support towards the AMT as an appropriate measure of 
AMS in a sub-clinically depressed sample. In regards to theories of mental time travel it 
is of interest to see if these results extend to a future thinking paradigm, as it has been 
noted that deficits in past recall extends to deficits in future generation. For instance, 
suicidal patients who present with deficits pertaining to memory specificity have been 
reported to similarly demonstrate such deficiencies relating to future events specificity 
(e.g., Williams et al., 2007). Experiment lb employs a future thinking paradigm 
(Williams, Ellis, Tyers, & Healy, 1996) in an attempt to examine specificity of future 
events in a sub-clinical population.
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Table 6. Summary of Main Aims and Findings from Experiment la.
Research Aim Hypothesis Main Findings
1 Examine the AMT level 
of sensitivity in relation 
to sub-clinical 
depression.
Examine reported levels 
of emotional avoidance 
(AAQ-H) in relation to 
phenomenological 
characteristics of 
positive and negative 
past events specificity as 
measured by the 
Memory Characteristics 
Questionnaire (MCQ).
Examine emotional 
avoidance (AAQ-H) in 
relation to positive and 
negative past event 
recall specificity (AMS).
Sub-clinically depressed 
individuals will demonstrate 
differing levels of AMS relative 
to non-depressed individuals.
There is a relationship between 
expressions o f positive and 
negative past event 
phenomenological 
characteristics, as measured by 
the MCQ and levels of 
emotional avoidance emotional 
avoidance as measured by the 
AAQ-II.
There is a relationship between 
AMS and level o f avoidant 
emotional coping style as 
measured by the AAQ-II.
The hypothesis is supported.
The Depressed sample demonstrating 
a reduced level of overall AMS 
relative to the Non-Depressed sample 
ip<. 05).
The hypothesis is supported.
A positive relationship was found for 
emotional avoidance and frequency of 
reference to past positive events 
(p<. 05).
A negative relationship was found for 
emotional avoidance and proximity of 
positive past events (p=.058).
A positive relationship was found for 
emotional avoidance and observation 
al perspective of positive past events 
(p<. 05).
The hypothesis is partially supported.
Total past recall specificity did not 
relate to emotional avoidance. The 
relationship between AAQ-H and 
AMS was found to be valence specific 
with:
A positive relationship was found for 
emotional avoidance and positive 
AMS (p <.029).
No relationship was found in relation 
to emotional avoidance with recall and 
specificity of negative past events.
Note. Low emotional avoidance is denoted by a high score on the AAQ-n.
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2.3 Experim ent lb
The deficits observed in relation to overgeneral memory specificity have also 
been associated with similar difficulties in imagining the future, for instance, in their 
study Williams et al. (1996) found that suicidal individuals, relative to non-depressed 
controls, demonstrated reduced AMS and reduced levels of specificity in relation to the 
generation of possible future events. According to Evans et al. (1992) both the definition 
of a problem and the generation of alternative solutions rely on the ability by an 
individual to amply address their memory ‘database’, and thus the ability to contact 
specific memories. Williams et al. (1996) suggest that the reason patients with suicidal 
ideation experience an insufficiency in the solving of daily tasks may be related to an 
inability to imagine specific events in the future. As such, in a clinical setting, future 
thinking deficits may work to intensify depressive symptoms, thus increasing the feeling 
of hopelessness (Williams, Ellis, Tyers, & Healy, 1996). This suggestion can be 
appreciated in light of Conway’s cognitive model of autobiographical memory (e.g., 
Conway & Pleydell-Pearce, 2000).
As previously discussed (see Section 1.4.1.1), according to Conway’s model, 
autobiographical memory is formally structured, with more general information (e.g. 
lifetime periods, e.g. teenage years) at the top, intermediate knowledge (general or 
extended events, e.g. the first year at university) at the second level and more specific 
information (event specific knowledge, e.g. graduation day) at the lowest level. If, as 
Conway suggests, access to specific memories of how one has coped with past situations 
are interrupted and the search is made short (e.g. stagnant at the intermediate level) and 
as such not accessible, it follows that the specific (and significantly useful) information 
inherent to these events cannot be employed in dealing with present problems (Evans et 
al., 1992). It is as such inferred in the literature that deficits in autobiographical recall 
will likely influence performance on tasks pertaining to future events generation.
It has further been hypothesized, in relation to deficits in AMS, that depressed 
individuals adopt a generic retrieval style to reduce the possibility of evoking potentially
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threatening (i.e., specific) memories (Williams, 1996, 2006). Williams and his colleagues 
have argued that the general level at which the contents of memory are accessed in 
depressed individuals influences the level of specificity with which those individuals can 
construct personal future episodes. In further support for this assumption, Williams et al. 
demonstrated that inducing a generic retrieval style in control participants led them to 
later imagine future scenarios that were also lacking in specific detail. In light of these 
findings and the functional avoidance theories pertaining to reduced AMS, it is likely that 
such avoidant coping strategies are also found in generation of future events.
Similarly to its role in autobiographical memory retrieval, recent research 
suggests that subjective experiences play a significant role in projections of the future 
also. With regards to the valence effect noted in past recall, it has been argued that a 
positive bias exists with the function of sustaining a positive self-concept (Baumeister, 
1998; Taylor & Brown, 1988). Evidence in support of this bias has been taken from 
studies reporting positive experiences as incorporating more sensorial and contextual 
details relative to negative past experiences (Byrne, Hyman, & Scott, 2001; 
D’Argembeau, Comblain, & Van der Linden, 2003; Destun & Kuiper, 1999). If future 
thinking is inhibited by deficits in retrieval of past experiences, factors seen to influence 
the qualitative aspects of memory, such as the valence of an event, would likely affect 
representations of possible future events.
A relatively large body of evidence exists in regards to quantitative differences
relating to the valence of imagined future events. For instance, MacLeod and Byrne
(1996) found that healthy control participants were inclined to generate more positive
than negative experiences in a measure of future thinking relative to depressed
paracuicidal participants (see also MacLeod, Tata, Kentish, & Jacobsen, 1997). Just as
Weinstein (1980) reported that individuals consistently predicted being more likely than
their peers to experience positive events in the future (e.g., having a good job, owning
their own home) and less likely to experience negative occurrences (e.g., being fired
from a job, divorce). However, qualitative measures of the subjective experience
pertaining to future events are sparse. As such there is a need to examine whether event
86
valence similarly affects the subjective experiences of imagining the future as has been 
seen in studies pertaining to past recall.
Previous findings indicate that a temporal bias exists in the retrieval of past 
events, that is, more recent past experiences typically contain more sensorial and 
contextual details than memories of more remote experiences (Johnson et al., 1988). 
Although phenomenological characteristics in representations of future events noticeably 
cannot be forgotten, because these events have not yet occurred, temporal distance from 
the present might still be seen to affect the subjective experience associated with the 
thoughts of future happenings. In fact, Trope and Liberman (2003) have proposed that 
‘the greater the temporal distance from a future event, the more likely is the event to be 
represented abstractly in terms o f a few general features that convey the perceived 
essence o f the events rather than in terms o f concrete and more incidental details o f the 
event’ (p. 405). Projection into more proximate future events may, as such, come with 
more relative ease, as they may already have clear representations of the kinds of events 
that are likely to occur in the near future; with individuals likely to already have 
considered some kinds of projects and decisions they intend to make within a proximate 
time frame. In comparison, the distant future may be more ambiguous and undecided 
upon, thus making it more difficult to clearly construct images thereof.
A clear rationale for examining phenomenological characteristics relates to the
inherent difference between past and future cognitions, with future scenarios being
entirely imaginary. As such, if deficits in specificity of future events exist it is imperative
to understand how. Such a deficit is related to episodic memory deficits. In this regard
investigation into qualitative information relevant to the specificity of episodic future
events is needed. With recent indications from the future thinking literature suggesting
that deficits in positive future thinking is a feature of depression, it was anticipated that
participants may diverge in terms of specificity of positively cued future events relative
to negative and overall specificity. To this end Experiment lb has three main aims, first
(1) to investigate the specificity of assessment by the future cuing task in a sub-clinical
sample; it is predicted that Experiment lb would replicate findings from the future
87
thinking literature demonstrating a relationship between depression and future event 
specificity. It is predicted that expression of positive and negative future event 
phenomenological characteristics will differ between those who report higher levels of 
emotional avoidance relative to those who report low levels of emotional avoidance as 
measured by the AAQ-II. Experiment lb further sought to (2) examine reported levels of 
emotional avoidance as measured by the Acceptance and Action Questionnaire (AAQ-II) 
in relation to phenomenological characteristics of positive and negative future events 
specificity, as measured by the Future Characteristics Questionnaire (FCQ).; and (3) to 
investigate emotional avoidance (AAQ-II) in relation to positive and negative future 
event specificity (FES) as measured by the Future Cueing Task (FCT). It is predicted that 
FES and level of avoidant emotional coping (AAQ-II) will be related.
2.3.1 Method
2.3.1.1 Participants
Thirty-three adults from Swansea University volunteered to take part in the 
current study, though after exclusion criteria pertaining to BDI-II scores (the criteria for 
inclusion is detailed in section 2.3.2.1), only data from thirty participants was utilised in 
the following analysis. As such, the subsequent information pertains to the thirty 
participants included, of which 11 were male and 19 female. The ages of the participants 
ranged from 19 to 29 years, with a mean of 23.26 {a = 3.25) years of age. All participants 
were either undergraduate or postgraduate students at Swansea University recruited 
through advertisement within the Psychology Department.
2.3.1.2 Apparatus and Materials
The apparatus and materials were identical to those employed in Experiment la, 
inclusive of all psychometric and well being self-report questionnaires (BDI-II; BHS;
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STAI; AAQ-2; LOT-R; PAN AS; Verbal Fluency) with the exception of the future 
oriented materials. The shift in focus from autobiographical recall to autobiographical 
future thinking necessitated the use of future oriented materials, that is, the AMT was 
replaced here by the Future Cueing Task and the MCQ was modified to allow for 
phenomenological characteristics of future events to be assessed, by the specifically 
constructed Future Characteristics Questionnaire (FCQ).
The Autobiographical Future Cuing Task (FCT; Williams et al., 1996). The 
future cuing task was designed after the AMT, and is thus identical in regards to the 
process and procedures involved. In the FCT version, as a future thinking paradigm, 
respondents are cued by the use of positive and negatively framed cue words to imagine 
a specific moment in the future when they will experience events related to the presented 
cue. The cues are read aloud by the experimenter and typically preceded by practice 
words. Participants are given 60 seconds to generate and report the future event. Twelve 
words chosen from Williams et al’s (1996) A&B list were used as cues with which to 
prompt participants for responses (for a full list of cue words cf. Williams et al, 1996). 
The cue words where the same as those utilized for the AMT test in experiment 1 a, that 
is, six were positively framed (i.e. success, friendship, love, happiness, wealth and 
enjoyment) and six were negatively framed (i.e. worry, loneliness, failure, stress, sadness 
and illness). The cues were presented following the same standard procedure as for the 
AMT though the prefix of ‘Try to remember an occasion in the past when you felt... ’ was 
replaced with ‘Try to think o f a time in the future when you may feel... ’ (e.g., 
‘successfulr).
All cue responses were recorded on a Dictaphone (Olympus VN-2100PC) and
inter-rated for consistency in coding. As with the AMT, a specific event was defined as
an event that would happen on a particular day, and lasting no longer than a day. The
recorded future events were then coded as either specific or non-specific. Future events
coded as non-specific were coded as either categoric, referring to an event that may
happen on more than one occasion (e.g., ‘When I  have children ’) or extended, referring
to an event that may last for longer than a day (e.g., ‘When I  go on holiday with my
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family9). Additionally, experimenters coded ‘no event’ when participants either failed to 
produce a future event or used the same event more than once. An inter-rater reliability 
analysis using the Kappa statistic was performed to determine consistency among raters. 
A sample of 85% of the responses was rated by a second independent rater, and an inter­
rater reliability of 93% (k = .93) was obtained.
The Future Characteristics Questionnaire (FCQ; cf. MCQ: Johnson, Foley, 
Suengas & Raye, 1988; Johnson, Nolde, & De Leonardis, 1996). The Future 
Characteristics Questionnaire was designed after the Memory Characteristics 
Questionnaire to assess qualitative features of perceived autobiographical future events. 
The modified FCQ in all consist of twelve questions. These questions make up 
information about dimensions such as sensory details of the event (visual; for example, 
'My image for this event is9. . .’, evaluated from l(Dim) to 7 (Sharp/Clear); information 
about the frequency of recall since the event: (T  have thought about this event before/1 
have talked to someone about this event occurring ... ’, evaluated from 1 (Not at all) to 7 
(Many times); emotions (e.g. ‘The overall tone o f the event is9. . evaluated from 
1 (Negative) to 7 (Positive); and the general vividness of the future event (e.g. ‘The 
overall vividness o f this event is...9, evaluated from 1 (Vague) to 7 (Very Vivid). All 
dimensions are rated on 7-point Likert scales. Participants are required to indicate their 
subjective perspective taken when envisaging the event, i.e. first person versus third 
person observer view, or neither. Participants are also asked to indicate the temporal 
distance of the future event {'about when will the event happen?9 With participants asked 
to indicate if the event is thought to occur: Later today (1), Tomorrow (2), In a few days 
(3), Next week (4) , In a few weeks (5), Next month (6), In a few months (7), Next year 
(8), In the next 5-10 years (9), or further than 10 years away (10). Participants are further 
requested to indicate how likely they think it is that the event will occur on a 7-point 
Likert scale, evaluated from 1 (Not at all likely) to 7 (Very likely).
The individual questions pertaining to each dimension are summed to represent 
composite assessments of clarity, valence and frequency of the future events, along with
separate variables recorded for temporal distance, likelihood and subjective perspective.
90
2.3.1.3 Experim ental O verview
Experiment lb used a 2 x 2 mixed participants design, with Group (Low 
Depression scores vs. High Depression scores) as the between participant variable and 
Autobiographical Memory Specificity (overgeneral vs. specific) as the within-participant 
variable. All participants received the same instructions and completed the Verbal 
Fluency Control Task, followed by both sections of the FCT, i.e. Positive and Negative 
future event generation, along with the MCQ. All participants completed all 
questionnaires, i.e. the AAQ-II, the BDI-II, the BHS, the LOT-R, the PANAS and the 
STAI. Participant data was categorised and analysed based on their Beck Depression 
Inventory responses (see Section 2.2.2.1 for group allocations to the Depressed and Non- 
Depressed groups). Figure 2 summarises the experimental sequence utilised for 
Experiment lb.
2.3.1.4 Ethical Issues
The current experiment raised a number of ethical considerations, similarly to
recall of negative past events in Experiment la, generation of negative future events
could bring about a negative mood or an emotional response. The same ethical guidelines
(The British Psychological Society, 2006) and sequential steps were followed as in
Experiment la, with precautionary measures taken with all participants (see Section
2.2.1.4). That is, (I) prior to agreement to take part in the experiment each participant
was presented with a written information sheet detailing the experiment aims and
procedures. A minimum 24 hour cooling off period followed the invitation to take part
and deliberation of the written information. (II) All participants who subsequently
expressed an interest in participating in the experiment received an additional verbal
briefing as to the nature of the experiment. (Ill) If, at this point, participants agreed to
take part, they were requested to sign a consent form detailing their participant rights; i.e.
all participants were informed that they were not required to proceed; that they could
withdraw from the study at any point; and that they would not be contacted again. The
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consent form was counter-signed by the experimenter. The briefing included details 
about the psychological measures to be utilised in the experimental sequence and 
participants were informed that the questionnaires contained questions that they might 
find personal and/or distressing. In order to address potential anxieties concerning 
questionnaires, it was emphasised that: (i) participants were not required to disclose any 
information they wanted to maintain private, as such questions could be left unanswered; 
(ii) there were no right or wrong answers to the questions; and (iii) that the 
questionnaires served merely to enable the experimenter to note individual differences 
that might influence performances during the experimental procedure and would not be 
used in a diagnostic capacity.
(IV) Participants were informed that as part of the experimental procedure they 
would be asked to recall a number of positive and negative past events, some of which 
they may find distressing. All participants were clearly informed that, in accordance with 
guidelines, all data would be kept on file at Swansea Psychology Department for 
approximately 5 years. (V) It was clarified that all aspects of their participation in the 
experiment would remain confidential, their data would not be identified by name in the 
final report and all data would be coded with an individual participant number. It was 
emphasised that data would only be disclosed to the thesis supervisor in the event of 
exceptional circumstances (e.g. in the event of a participant becoming distressed or 
expressing a wish to see the supervisor). (VI) After their participation in the experiment 
all participants were debriefed as to the nature and rationale of the experiment. All 
participants were made aware that if any psychological issues arose directly from the 
study, they could contact the thesis supervisor, whose name and contact details was 
provided on a written debrief sheet. The written debrief restated details provided in the 
verbal debrief, such as the aims and rationale of experiment. The debrief further 
contained information of counselling services available from Swansea University, as well 
as information and contact details for other local and national agencies who specialise in 
psychological issues. As such, further arrangements, where appropriate could be made 
free of charge as a forum for the discussion of any issues which may arise. No
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participants reported feeling upset by the generation of a negative future event during the 
Future Cuing Task. At no point during the experiment did any participant withdraw from 
the experiment or express dissatisfaction or distress of any kind; no participants reported 
a deflated mood or having experienced a negative emotional response upon departure. 
The experiment was ethically approved by the Department of Psychology Ethics 
Committee prior to commencement.
Participant Sample (N= 33)
Total sample complete Questionnaires (randomised order of 1st presentation between 
participants) BDI-II, STAI, BHS, LOT-R, AAQ-II, PANAS
Total sample complete the Future Cueing Task and the Future Characteristics Questionnaire 
(randomised order of 1st presentation of positive or negative cues between participants)
Total sample complete the Verbal Fluency Control Task 
(randomised 1st presentation of the letters F, A, S between participants)
• t •• i •1 i 'I •*
J i Post-Experimental/Pre-Analysis BDI-II Group Split (see Section 2.3.2.1):
| I
! | Low BDI-n score (1<10): N= 17 (BDI-II = 0, excluded from analysis, N =  3)
L-> i
! High BDI-II score (10<30): N= 13 (BDI-II score >29, excluded from analysis, N =  0)
II
J Final sample for analysis: N  =  30
Figure 2. Overview of the Experimental Sequence for Experiment lb.
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2.3.1.5 Procedure
Participants were invited to complete the experiment in specifically designated 
psychology laboratories consisting only of a desk and chair. Prior to commencement 
participants were briefed as to the nature of the study and asked to sign a consent form. 
Due to the nature of the study concerning anticipation of negative future events, 
emphasis was put on the participants’ right to withdraw from the study at any time 
without giving a reason. The Verbal Fluency Control Task (VFCT) was firstly completed 
by requesting participants to state aloud responses to the letter cues F, A and S within the 
given time frame of 60 seconds per letter. Upon completion of the VFCT the Future 
Cueing Task (FCT) commenced. Participants were informed that for the FCT the event 
they generated could be an important or trivial event, though that the future event should 
be of something that may happen, and to be restricted to a particular time on a particular 
day. To ensure that participants understood the instructions, examples of specific and 
non-specific replies to two practice cues {relieved and tired) were presented by the 
experimenter. Verbal and printed instructions were provided. Participants were given 60 
seconds in each case to generate a specific autobiographical future event, that is, a 
specific event at a given time and place. The positive and negative cue words were 
presented in a separate and random order for each participant. The cues were stated aloud 
by the experimenter and participant responses, in form of verbal generation, were 
recorded on a digital Dictaphone and transcribed for coding according to the criteria set 
by Williams (1992). If the type of future event that the participants generated was 
unclear, or if participants produced the same event to more than one cue, or offered 
responses that related to past events, they were prompted with the words ‘What is the 
future event that you are thinking o f there? ’ or ‘Can you tell me a hit more about this 
future event?’. If the participants failed to generate an event within the time limit or 
talked about things that were not future events (e.g., an opinion that is associated with the 
cue), their responses were classed as ‘no event’. Following each FCT cue word 
participants were asked to complete the FCQ in writing, detailing phenomenological 
characteristics pertaining to that particular future event. Upon completion of the FCT and
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FCQ participants completed the set of psychometric self-report measures and wellbeing 
questionnaires after which they were suitably debriefed and tanked for their participation.
2.3.2 Results and Discussion
2.3.2.1 Group Allocation
The current study sought to examine performance on the Future Cueing Task in a 
sample of sub-clinically depressed participants relative to healthy controls. Group 
allocation was decided via discriminating scores on the Beck Depression Inventory 
(BDI-II). As in Experiment la, consideration was given to Beck’s suggestive cut-off 
criteria, thus participants with a score of 0 (iV = 3) or above 29 (N  = 0) where excluded 
from the analysis. As before the BDI-II inclusion criteria for the Non-Depressed group 
was a score of 1< 10, thus participants presenting scores of 1-9 (N = 17; M  = 5.38, a = 
2.75) whereas inclusion in the sub-clinical depression group required BDI-II scores of 10 
< 30 (N = 13; M  = 15.11, o = 2.66; Depressed Group).
2.3.2.2 Demographics and Psychometrics
The two groups were found to report significantly different depression levels on
the BDI-II, with participants in the Non-Depression group reporting significantly lower
BDI-II scores than the corresponding Depression group, £(28) = -9.767, /?<.001. Similar
divergence between the groups were found in relation to the other well-being measures
with the Depression group consistently reporting higher levels of anxiety (STAI, £(28) = -
2.009, p  =.054), increased hopelessness (BHS, £(28) = -2.304, p  =.029), deflated life
optimism (LOT-R, £(28) = 2.100,/? =.045) and reduced psychological flexibility (AAQ,
£(28) = 3.663, p  =.001). Mood was not found to be significantly different between the
groups (PA: p=.104; NA: p=.113). The psychometric means are presented with the
participant demographics in Table 7. As depicted in Table 7, Depressed and Non-
Depressed participants did not differ with respect to age, £(28) =-.498, p=.622
representation of gender,/2 (1) =. 889,/? =.346 or verbal fluency, £(28) = -.273, p  =.787.
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It can be seen that the groups were well matched for age, gender and cognitive 
abilities as well as mood level. Between group differences pertain to the psychometric 
assessments and the findings are consistent with the depression literature of which the 
co-occurrence of increased levels of depression, anxiety, hopelessness and lower levels 
of optimism and emotional avoidance is denoted within clinical groups.
2.3.2.3 Content of Autobiographical Future Events
An indication of the future events generated was noted and categorized similarly 
to the past events in Experiment la. Positive events that might happen in the near future 
(i.e., in the next few months) were such things as academic or career success (50%), 
leisure activities (18%), romantic events (10%), parties (10%); though 12% of the events 
could not be classified in these categories. Negative events that might happen in the near 
future were such things as academic failure (50%), conflict within and/or the end of a 
romantic relationship (18%), illness, accidents or deaths of relatives (8%), illness or 
accidents involving the participants themselves (12%), and arguments with relatives or 
close friends (14%). Positive events that might happen in the distant future (i.e., in the 
next 5-10 years) were such things as weddings (34%), starting a family or the birth of a 
child (25%), academic and career success (21%), and buying a house (13%); with 7% of 
the events unable to be classified in these categories. Finally, negative events that might 
happen in the distant future were such things as accidents, severe illnesses or deaths of 
relatives (50%); accidents or severe illnesses involving the participants themselves 
(15%); failure at work (10%); and relationship problems/breakdown (15%); with 10% of 
the events reported not fitting either of the categories.
The brief content overview demonstrates that the events generated to the 
presented cues are sample appropriate to socially conceived probable future outlooks, 
with the inclusion of such perceived ‘milestones’ as marriage, career development and 
family life, as well as lifetime expectancies such as illness and the inevitable event of 
death (here pertaining to relatives or other loved ones, no participants reported thoughts 
of own death).
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Table 7. Demographics and Psychometric tests Mean scores and Standard Deviations (SD) as reported by 
the Depressed and Non-Depressed groups in Experiment lb.
Variable Depressed (SD) Non-Depressed (SD)
Gender: Females (Males) 12(5) 7(6)
Age 23.53 (3.28) 22.92 (3.32)
VFCT 12.86 (1.91) 12.68 (1.49)
BDI 15.11 (2.66) 5.38 (2.75)
BHS 5.41 (3.89) 2.84 (1.06)
STAI 42.64 (11.43) 34.92 (8.92)
LOT-R 12.52(3.71) 15.31 (3.42)
AAQ-II 40.53 (10.72) 53.23 (7.31)
PA 28.88 (9.02) 34.00 (7.10)
NA 15.76 (6.64) 12.46 (3.30)
Note. VFCT= Verbal Fluency Control Task; BDI= Beck Depression Inventory; BHS= Beck Hopelessness 
Scale; STAI = State Anxiety Inventory; LOT-R= Life Optimism Test-Revised; AAQ-II= Acceptance and 
Action Questionnaire-II; PA = Positive Affective Scale; NA= Negative Affective Scale.
2.3.2.4 The Future Cueing Task
The common practice for investigations of autobiographical memory specificity 
(AMS) (see Williams et al., 2006, 2007), was adopted for use with the FCT, thus the first 
response across the 12 trials, that is, future events that participants generated in response 
to the 12 FCT cue words that were specific, were used to index Future Event Specificity 
(FES; this variable is referred to here as future event specificity, with higher scores 
indicating increased specificity).
High positive correlations were seen between the number of specific future events 
produced under each valence category with the total number of specific future events 
across the valence categories (Non-Depressed group positive cues, r=. 809, and negative 
cues r=.909; Depressed group, positive cues r=.827 and negative cues r=.922).
On average, future events generated by participants in the Non-Depressed group 
were specific 69.87% of the time across the 12 trials; whereas the Depressed participants 
showed somewhat diminished specificity in their production of future events overall,
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with 58.82% of the 12 trials noted as specific. Differences in specificity were 
predominantly noted for positive cues, with the Non-Depressed group more specific in 
relation to future events relative to the Depressed group (M = 4.84, a = .98 and M — 4.06, 
a = 1.08 respectively; /(28) =2.043 p=.051). Specificity in response to negative cues was 
similar within both groups with a marginal difference pertaining to the Non-Depressed 
group being slightly more specific in their description of events relative to the Depressed 
group (Non-Depressed group, M =  3.53, o=  1.39; Depressed group, M =  3.00, a = 1.58); 
though this difference was not found to be statistically significant, /(28) =.973, p  =.339). 
Verbal fluency scores did not correlate with the total number of cues for either group 
(Non-Depressed,/?=.750; Depressed,/? =422).
Table 8 presents performance on the FCT for both groups, and as can be seen 
omissions were rare. It is important to acknowledge, as with the AMT, that the number of 
specific events generated on the FCT (i.e., level of FES) is a direct reflection of the 
number of “errors” on the FCT (as the sum of number-correct scores and errors is a 
constant across participants). For instance, producing 8 specific future events to 12 word 
cues on the FCT reflects the fact that to 8 of the cue words the participant failed to 
generate a specific future event within the time limit.
Future event specificity was subjected to a 2 (Group: Depressed/Non-Depressed) 
x 2 (Cue valence: Positive/Negative) mixed analyses of variance (ANOVA). A main 
effect for Valence was found, with both groups producing more specific positive future 
events (F(l, 28) = 24.212,/K.001, rjp2 ~ .464). No main effect was seen for group (F(l, 
28) = 2.589,/? =.119, rjp2=.085). Nor was an interaction effect observed (F(1, 28) = .268, 
p  =.609, rjp2 =.009). These results indicate that FES as such may not be a discriminating 
factor relating to depression; however a positivity bias is observed for the healthy 
controls in line with previous research pertaining to such a self-serving optimistic 
predisposition.
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Table 8. Performance on the Future Cueing Task presented as Mean Percentage of Memory Specificity, 
Mean number and Standard Deviation of Future Event Specificity responses across the six cue words for 
each valence category within the Depressed and Non-Depressed groups in Experiment lb. T-Test score 
and statistical value ip) from between group comparisons are presented.
Variable Non-Depressed Depressed
Mean (SD) Mean (SD) ti 28) P
Total % of specific memories 69X1(17.19) 58.82 (19.64)
Total % of omissions 1.11(2.31) 2.14(1.97)
Total cues 8.88 (2.19) 7.20 (2.36) 1.609 0.119
Positive cues 4.84 (0.98) 4.06 1.08) 2.043 0.051*
Negative cues 3.54 (1.39) 3.00(1.58) 0.973 0.339
Note. *p =.051. Positive/Negative cues = number of specific future events relative to the detailed valence 
category on the Future Cueing Test.
2.3.2.5 Future Event Characteristics
Phenomenological characteristics were recorded for each future event cued on the 
FCT, by the Future Characteristics Questionnaire (FCQ). Participant responses to 
questions about valence, frequency and clarity of the cued event were recorded. Within 
group analysis found that participants in the Non-Depressed group reported greater 
clarity for positively (M  -  5.8, a =.62) relative to negatively (M = 4.7, a = 1.36; t( 12) = 
2.524, p  =. 027) cued future events. Whereas no significant valence difference was 
observed for clarity in the Depressed group (/(l6) = 1.825,/? = .087). Strong congruency 
was seen for cue and valence with positive future events being described with high affect 
ratings relative to low affect recorded for negative events within both groups (Non- 
Depressed, t{\2) = 16.528, /?<.001; Depressed group, f(16) = 24.846, /K.001). With 
regards to frequency of thoughts about the future event -  the Non-Depressed group 
reported more frequent thoughts about positive relative to negative future events (/(12) = 
2.877, p=.014), whereas no significant valence difference pertaining to frequency of 
future thinking was found for the Depressed group 0(16) = -1.330,/?=.202).
The FCQ mean scores are reported in Table 9. As can be seen from Table 9 
marginal between group differences are apparent for all the phenomenological future
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event characteristics, though a significant group difference was only observed for 
positive frequency. That is, participants in the Non-Depressed group reported thinking 
and talking about positive future events more frequently than the Depressed group (7(28) 
= 3.065,/? = 005).
Table 9. Mean scores and Standard Deviations (SD) for the three dimensions of Clarity, Valence and 
Frequency as assessed by the Future Event Characteristics Questionnaire within the Depressed and Non-
Depressed groups in Experiment lb. T-Test score 
comparisons are presented.
and statistical value (p) from between group
Memory Characteristics Non-Depressed (13) Depressed (17)
Mean (SD) Mean (SD) «28) P
Positive Clarity 5.76 (0.61) 5.28 (1.22) 1.284 0.210
Negative Clarity 4.72 (1.36) 4.70 (1.52) 0.014 0.989
Positive Valence 6.76 (0.40) 6.78 (0.49) -0.127 0.899
Negative Valence 2.03 (1.02) 1.67 (1.92) 1.123 0.271
Positive Frequency 5.31 (1.03) 3.96 (1.30) 3.065 0.005**
Negative Frequency 3.74 (1.29) 4.41 (1.10) 1.521 0.139
Note. **p<.01
2.3.2.6 Temporal Distance
The FCQ recorded the temporal distance of the future events cued. Participants 
from neither groups reported future events as generally occurring ‘later today’, 
‘tomorrow’, ‘in a few days’ or ‘further than 10 years’ (i.e. 1 person described 2 positively 
cued event as occurring in the next day, no individuals referred to events occurring that 
day or in a few days, and 3 people referred to 1 negative event occurring in further than 
10 years time), thus upon averaging the total future distance reports these variables were 
omitted, and are not presented in Table 10, nor separately included in any statistical 
calculations. As can be seen from Table 10 the Non-Depressed group reported more 
events for the near future in response to positive cues, with a total of 92.3 percent of the 
events generated occurring within the next few months. The Depressed group reported
47.1 percent of the positive events generated to be occurring within the same time-frame.
100
In regards to negative events the Non-Depressed group anticipated 77 percent of the 
events generated to take place within the next few months, relative to the Depressed 
group whom anticipated 82.2 percent of the negatively cued events to occur within this 
period. A One-way ANOVA found the difference in the time of event occurrence to be 
significant for the positively cued events, with the Non-Depressed group anticipating 
significantly more positive events to take place in the near future relative to the 
Depressed group (F(l,28) = 32.399, p  <.001). No statistical significance was found 
between the two groups pertaining to time of occurrence of negative future events 
(F(l,28)= 1.299,/? = 264).
The BDI-II and the STAI was found to correlate with positive event distance, that 
is the closer in time positive events were perceived to be the lower participants ratings of 
depression and anxiety were (BDI-II; r = .645, p  <.001; STAI, r = .370 p  =.044 ). No 
correlations were found for hopelessness, nor for optimism and temporal distance, nor 
were any correlations found for negative event distance with any of the psychometric 
measures.
Table 10. Mean Percentage of reported Temporal Distance of Events generated to Positive and Negative 
Cues as reported by the Depressed and Non-Depressed groups in Experiment lb.
Time of Event
Temporal Distance of 
Positive Events (Mean %)
Temporal Distance of 
Negative Events (Mean %)
Non-Depressed Depressed Non-Depressed Depressed
Next week 38.5 7.7 17.6
In a few weeks 23.1 5.9 15.4 23.5
Next month 30.8 5.9 15.4 17.6
In a few months 35.3 38.5 23.5
Next year 7.7 35.3 7.7 11.8
Next 5-10 years 17.6 15.4 5.9
Temporal distance of negative future events was found to correlate with FES for
positive events (r = .372, p  =.043); that is, the more distant a negative future event was
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placed to be, the more specific participants were in their generation of positive events. 
Temporal distance of negative events also approached significance in relation to FES for 
negative future events (r = .343, p  =.063), thus the more distant the negative event was 
placed to be the more likely participants were to be specific in its depiction. Temporal 
distance of positive future events was found to correlate with the frequency of thinking or 
talking about positive future events (r = -.410, p  =.025), that is, events anticipated to 
occur in the near future were reported to be recurrently considered in thought or 
conversation by the participants.
23.2.1 Likelihood of Events Occurring
The FCQ further recorded the participants’ likelihood rating of the future events 
occurring. One way ANOVA analysis found a significant difference between groups in 
relation to positive future events, with the Non-Depressed group rating these as more 
likely to occur (M = 5.54, o = .88) relative to the Depressed group (M  = 4.88, a = 91; F(1, 
28) = 3.971, p  =.056). The Depressed group reported marginally stronger belief in 
negative events occurring (M = 5.1, o = .67) relative to the Non-Depressed group (M = 
4.94, a = .93), though this difference was not found to be significant, F(1, 28) =.258, p  
=.615. No correlations were found for event specificity and likelihood ratings.
2.3.2.8 Future Event Vantage Point
The vantage point of participants pre-experience of the autobiographical future 
events were recorded as either from a field (first person) perspective, or as an observer 
(third person) perspective. Participants overall reported 68.61 % of recall of events to be 
from a field perspective. Of these the first person perspective was reported to be found 
for 69.99% of the positive events relative to 67.22% for the negative events. At a split 
group level of analysis the Non-Depressed group was found to perceive future events 
form a first person perspective for 73.07 % of the 12 cues, whereas the Depressed group 
reported 65.19% of the future events to be from this perspective.
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As can be seen from Table 11, the future event vantage point was not 
significantly different for the two groups. It was, however, found that the Non-Depressed 
group perceived a greater degree of future positive events to be observed from a first 
person perspective relative to the Depressed group.
No differences were found between the groups in regards to vantage point in 
generation of negative future events. Positive event specificity was found to correlate 
with first person perspective, that is individuals whom perceived positive future events 
from a first person perspective were more specific in their generation of positive future 
events (r = .417, p  = .022). A first person view of positive events was further related to 
increased clarity (r = .359, p  = .052) and frequency in consideration (r = .488, p  = .006) 
of positive future events. Proximity of future events generated were also seen to relate to 
use of first person perspective (r = -.520, p  = .003). Interestingly first person vantage 
point in negative projection was found to relate to reduced specificity of negative future 
events (r = -.373 p  = .042). No other correlations were observed for vantage point and 
phenomenological characteristics of future events.
Table 11. Mean Percentage of Future Events observed from a First Person Perspective within the 
Depressed and Non-Depressed groups in Experiment la. T-Test score and statistical value ip) from 
between group comparisons are presented.
Percentage of Future Events Perceived from 
1st Person Perspective
Variable Non-Depressed Depressed
Mean (SD) Mean (SD) *(28) P
Total for all Events 73.07(13.24) 65.19(11.50) 1.742 0.092
Positive Events 82.05 (14.37) 60.78 (15.52) 3.837 0.001***
Negative Events 64.11 (19.05) 69.61 (14.71) -0.894 0.379
Note. ***p=.001
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Relations between event vantage point and psychometric scores found positive 
future events from a first person perspective to correlate with lower levels of depression 
(BDI-II; r =-.533, p  = .002), though no significance was found in correlations with 
anxiety, hopelessness or optimism. First person perspective in negative future event 
generation was not found to correlate with either of the psychometric measures.
These results indicate that frequent consideration of positive events, from a self-in­
context point of view, relate to the probability given of the proximity of such positive 
future events occurring. The relation to depression levels here is evident from the 
Depressed groups’ failure to indicate the likely occurrence of such positive future events 
relative to the Non-Depressed group.
2.3.2.9. Emotional Avoidance
Given the proposed functions of deficits in specificity as pertaining to a level of 
functional avoidance it was of particular interest to explore the use of avoidant coping 
strategies in relation to future thinking. Emotional avoidance (as measured by the AAQ- 
2) was found to correlate negatively with the BDI-II (r = -.629, p  <.001), that is, those 
who reported lower depression levels correspondingly reported low levels of emotional 
avoidance (represented as higher scores on the AAQ-2).
No correlations were found in relation to emotional avoidance and future event 
specificity per se. However, those who reported lower levels of emotional avoidance 
were more likely to view positive future events from a first person perspective (r = .377, 
p  = .040), and also placed positive future events to occur in the more proximate future (r 
= -.353, p  =.055). It was also seen that increased use of avoidant coping strategies 
related to reports of reduced consideration, in form of prior thoughts or conversation, for 
negative future events (r = -.361,/? = .050).
Split group analysis found improved levels of clarity (r = .670, p  =.012) and 
increased consideration (r = .560, p  = .046) of positive future events in relation to lower 
levels of emotional avoidance reported within the Non-Depressed group. Whereas an
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interesting finding within the Depressed group was that increased use of avoidant coping 
strategies (as reflected in lower AAQ-2 scores) was related to the increased expectancy 
of negative future events occurring (r = -.629, p<  .001).
These results indicate that emotional avoidance does not relate to specificity of 
future events per se, rather it appears that belief in the event occurring, with regards to 
conceived probability, holds stronger connotations for a relation with depression. This is 
evident from the relation observed within the Depressed group whose levels of emotional 
avoidance were seen to correspond to increased expectancy of negative events occurring 
in the future.
2.3.3 Summary
A group difference in future events specificity between the Depressed and Non- 
Depressed groups was found, with this diverge seen to be valence specific. That is, 
differences in future event specificity between the two groups was only seen in regards to 
positive future events, with the Non-Depressed individuals generating future events that 
were more specific relative to the depressed sample. The key findings from Experiment 
lb are presented in Table 12 and as can be seen a clear valence effect was found within 
the Non-Depressed group. That is, the Non-Depressed respondents reported stronger 
clarity for positive future events along with increased frequency in talking and thinking 
about positive future events relative to the Depressed group. Both groups reported 
heightened intensity of affect in generation of positive future events relative to negative 
future events. Between group differences were noted for frequency of generating positive 
future events, with the Non-Depressed group reporting more frequent pre-consideration 
of the events generated in response to the cueing task. The Non-Depressed group also 
reported positive events as more likely to occur relative to the Depressed group.
The proximity of the anticipated events was found to be associated with levels of
depression and anxiety as well as emotional avoidance. With the anticipation of close
proximity for positive future events related to greater psychological well-being.
Similarly, reports of observing positive events from a first person perspective were
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related to lower levels of depression and emotional avoidance as well as increased 
specificity, clarity, frequency and proximity of future events generated. Perceiving 
negative future events from a first person perspective were related to decreased levels of 
specificity in generation of negative future events.
No correlations were found for emotional avoidance and future event specificity 
on any level of analysis, although the phenomenological characteristics reported in 
correspondence to the future events were able to provide some insight. Here it was found 
that lower levels of emotional avoidance were related to clarity of positive events and 
frequency of negative future event generation. Thus, indicating that increased emotional 
flexibility relates to better imagery of positive events and reduced focus on negative 
event occurrence. Within group analysis further found that within the Non-Depressed 
group lower levels of emotional avoidance were related to improved clarity of future 
events. Interestingly, the Depressed group reported an increased use of avoidant coping 
strategies, which was seen to relate to a decreased expectancy of negative future events 
occurring.
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Table 12. Summary of Main Aims and Findings from Experiment lb.
Research Aim Hypothesis Main Findings
1 Replicate findings 
from the clinical future 
thinking literature by 
examining
autobiographical FES 
in participants who 
report higher levels of 
depression as 
measured by the BDI- 
II relative to those 
who score low on the 
BDI-II.
2 Examine reported 
levels of emotional 
avoidance (AAQ-II) in 
relation to 
phenomenological 
characteristics of 
positive and negative 
future events 
specificity.
Sub-clinically depressed 
individuals will 
demonstrate differing 
levels of FES relative to 
non-depressed individuals.
Expression of positive and 
negative future event 
phenomenological 
characteristics will differ 
between those who report 
higher levels of emotional 
avoidance relative to those 
who report low levels of 
emotional avoidance as 
measured by the AAQ-II.
Examine emotional 
avoidance (AAQ-II) in 
relation to positive and 
negative FES.
There is a relationship 
between FES and level of 
avoidant emotional coping 
style as measured by the 
AAQ-II.
The hypothesis is partially supported. The 
AMS difference was valence specific with:
It was found that the Depressed group reported 
reduced specificity of positive future events 
relative to the Non-Depressed group (p=.051).
The FCT appears sensitive in detecting FES at 
a sub-clinical level of depression.
The hypothesis is supported. A positive 
relationship was found for emotional avoidance 
and first person perspective in generation of 
future events (p<.05).
A negative relationship was found for 
emotional avoidance and proximity of positive 
future events (p=.055).
A negative relationship was found for 
emotional avoidance and frequency of 
reference to negative future events (p=.050).
Within group relations were found, as for the 
Non-Depressed group a positive relationship 
was found for emotional avoidance and clarity 
(p<.05) and consideration (p<.05) of positive 
future events.
Within the Depressed group a negative 
relationship was found for emotional avoidance 
and expectancy of negative future events 
occurring (pc.001).
The hypothesis is not supported.
No relationship was found for emotional 
avoidance and future event specificity.
Note. Low emotional avoidance is denoted by a high score on the AAQ-II.
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2.3.3.1 Collated Summary for Experiment la  and lb
In both Experiments la and lb the subjective reports of how past and future 
events were experienced significantly added to the findings, with reported differences 
between Depressed and Non-Depressed individuals pertaining to clarity, valence and 
frequency noted in relation to both past and future events. The group differences in 
relation to phenomenological characteristics are particularly interesting given that no 
valence effect was found in relation to AMS relative to the strong positive valence effect 
found in FES. In view of the subjective experience of clarity, valence and frequency 
contributing to the overall group differences it necessitates that it is perhaps these 
qualities relative to emotional accessibility which facilitates the specificity feature. This 
suggestion is supported by the finding from Experiment lb that emotional avoidance was 
not seen to correlate with FES. As such there is a call to explore these features further in 
regards to the nature of such abilities.
The suggestion that imagery is a necessary construct in autobiographical memory 
in particular is not new, and has recently been reviewed (Holmes & Matthews, 2010; cf. 
Conway, 1990). For instance, Brewer (1996) found that individuals reported images in 
most forms of recall. When responding to questions about recent personal events (e.g. 
‘who was the last person you talked to?’) the respondents commonly describe recall of 
the event to include the presentation of an image of the event, and although not as 
prevalent, respondents frequently refer to visual presentations (i.e. imagery) in recall of 
semantic information as well (e.g. what is the capital of France?) (Holmes & Matthews, 
2010). Mansell and Lam (2004) found that bipolar individuals reported 95% of all 
specific memories as constituting mental images, subsequent to such mental images 
occurring in no more than 56% of memories coded as general. As such, in most cases, 
imagery may be important for the retrieval of autobiographical memories.
Research on imagery has mostly been conducted within the cognitive arena and 
has surrounded topics such as the nature of mental imagery (Kosslyn, 1994) relative to 
the experience of generating mental images (Bywaters, Andrade, & Turpin, 2004). 
However, there is little information available regarding mental imagery ability within
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clinical samples. Comoldi, de Beni and Cavedon (1992) suggested that vividness of 
imagery is shaped by individual shifts in the perceived characteristics of the colour, 
detail, context and outline linked to the supposed image, with vividness of images 
associated with overall performance on many cognitive and perceptual tasks (McKelvie, 
1995).
Gold, Jarvin and Teague (2006) looked at details presented in positive fantasies to 
see if success in therapy was associated with the level of details generated in such 
imagery. Specifically, Gold et al (2006) sought to observe if there was a link between 
clarity of imagery and depression reduction and found that imagery ability significantly 
correlated with depression reduction. These findings suggest that visual imagery holds a 
role in depression, although the exact nature of this relationship between depression and 
imagery cannot be drawn due to the correlational nature of the study. Conway & 
Pleydell-Pearce (2000) have noted that event-specific knowledge, as in retrieval of 
episodic memory, is related to contextual information of a sensory and perceptual nature, 
which again is a basis for vividness in visual imagery. Given that the recent focus on 
deficits pertaining to past and future thinking in mental time travel has focused on 
episodic memory and future thinking, that is event specific knowledge, related to these 
time frames, it may be inferred that visual imagery ability plays a role in such specificity 
deficits. Specifically, individuals demonstrating difficulties in imagining personal past 
and future events would likely report less vividness in general mental imagery.
Although the MCQ and FCQ collect subjective details’ about the vividness of 
personal events it would be advantageous to be able to discriminate if such a deficit 
exists more generally, separately to autobiographical accounts. If specificity is related to 
imagery abilities per se this has implications for theories linking specificity to functional 
avoidance. Further, if the production of images (imagery) is a separate ability to the 
construction of specificity in autobiographical accounts this may be one reason why 
emotional avoidance was not seen to correlate with future events specificity in 
Experiment lb. That is, specificity may relate to imagery and not as such to the 
functional suppression of painful personal content.
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To this end Experiments 2a and 2b aimed to investigate the role of mental 
imagery abilities in the construction of past and future events. Specifically, Experiment 
2a and 2b sought to investigate whether variance in specificity of past recall and future 
anticipation are related to the ability to prospectively visualize such events. Imagery was 
isolated by taking a measure of the subjective abilities to generate images for neutral 
events within both the Depressed and Non-Depressed groups.
2.4 Experiment 2a
Experiment 2a will examine the ability to generate vivid images in response to 
cued scenarios. Participants will complete the Vividness of Visual Imagery 
Questionnaire (Marks, 1989) which requests participants to form visual images using 
cues high and low in imaginability (Paivio, Yuille, & Madigan, 1968) with the 
performance on the W IQ  examined in relation to mental time travel tasks. The focus 
will be on imagery and past event recall, in an attempt to examine whether the findings 
from Experiment la might be explained in terms of visual imagery abilities.
Experiment 2a sought to (1) replicate and support the findings from Experiment 
la. It is predicted that sub clinically depressed participants will be less specific than their 
non-depressed counterparts in subjective recall relating to cue words in general. (2) 
Explore independently measured imagery abilities as measured by the Vividness for 
Visual Imagery Questionnaire (W IQ ) in relation to phenomenological characteristics of 
past recall as measured by the Memory Characteristics Questionnaire (MCQ). Given the 
fact that individuals with a higher capacity for visual imagery reportedly also experience 
more visual and other sensory details when remembering past it is predicted that 
expression of positive and negative past event phenomenological characteristics will 
differ between those who report high levels of vividness in imagery as measured by the 
W IQ  relative to those who report low levels of W IQ . Experiment 2a further aims to (3) 
examine imagery abilities as measured by the W IQ  in a sub-clinical population. It is 
predicted that sub-clinically depressed individuals, as measured by the Beck Depression
110
Inventory (BDI-II) will differ from healthy participants in their imagery abilities as 
measured by the W IQ . Experiment 2a further sought to (4) examine the relationship 
between emotional avoidance, as measured by the AAQ-II, and imagery ability, as 
measured by the W IQ . It was predicted that there would be a relationship between 
imagery ability and emotional coping style as measured by the AAQ-II.
2.4.1 Method
2.4.1.1 Participants
Undergraduate students at Swansea University (N= 34) volunteered to take part in 
this study in return for course credit, though following the exclusion criteria pertaining to 
BDI-II scores (criteria for inclusion is detailed in section 2.4.2.1.), only data from thirty- 
one participants was utilised in the following analysis. As such the current study reports 
findings from 10 males and 21 females ranging in age from 19 to 29 years, with a mean 
age of 22.48 years (er = 2.27).
2.4.1.2 Apparatus and Materials
The materials utilized in this study were identical to those of study la  (BDI-II; 
BHS; STAI; AAQ-2; LOT-R; PANAS; Verbal Fluency), inclusive of the AMT and the 
MCQ and with the addition of the Vividness of Visual Imagery Questionnaire.
In regards to the AMT specificity ratings an inter-rater reliability analysis using 
the Kappa statistic was performed to determine consistency among raters for 
Autobiographical Memory Specificity as measured by the AMT. A sample of 80% of the 
responses was rated by a second independent rater, and an inter-rater reliability of 96% 
(k = .96) was obtained.
The Vividness o f  Visual Imagery Questionnaire (W IQ ; Marks, 1973). The
W IQ  consists of 16 items in four groups of 4 items in which the participant is invited to
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consider an image and to form visual details pertaining to this image by thinking about a 
specific scene and/or situation. Participants are asked to imagine four separate images 
representing various domains, i.e. A) ‘A relative or friend’, B) ‘The rising sun’, C) ‘A 
shop which you often go to ’ and D) ‘A country scene which includes trees, mountains and 
a lake ’. Within each category, of A, B, C and D, participants are presented with four 
statements and asked to rate the vividness of imagery in regards to each statement, for 
example, when presented with domain A (a friend or relative) participants are asked to 
notice and generate an image for the following statements: 1) The exact contours o f 
[their] face, head shoulders and body. 2) Characteristic poses o f head, attitudes o f body 
etc. 3) The precise carriage, length o f step etcetera in walking. 4) The different colour 
worn in some familiar clothes. The vividness of the image is rated along 5-points. For 
example; a rating of 5 would represent finding the image generated as ‘Perfectly clear 
and as vivid as normal vision ’, a rating of 3 would indicate a ‘Moderately clear and 
vivid’ image representation, whereas a rating of 1 would represent finding their efforts to 
produce Wo image at all, [you] only “know” that you are thinking o f an object’. 
Participants rate all statements individually. The questionnaire has been widely used as a 
measure of individual differences in vividness of visual imagery and there is a large body 
of evidence confirming that the W IQ  is a valid and reliable measure of visual image 
vividness (Campos & Perez-Fabello, 2009).
2.4.1.3 Experimental Overview
Experiment 2a used a 2 x 2 mixed participants design, with Beck Depression 
Inventory Scores (Sub-clinically Depressed and Non-Depressed) as the between 
participant variable, and Autobiographical Memory Specificity (Overgenral, Specific) as 
the within-participant variable. A correlational design was further employed for 
examination of relationships between the AMT, W IQ  and AAQ-II measures. All 
participants received the same instructions and completed the Verbal Fluency Control 
Task, followed by both sections of the AMT, i.e. Positive and Negative past recall, along
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with the MCQ. All participants completed all measures and questionnaires, i.e. the AAQ- 
II, the BDI-II, the BHS, the LOT-R, the PANAS and the STAI. Participants all 
completed all items of the W IQ , with randomised order of first presentation of items A, 
B, C and D between participants. Participant data was categorised and analysed based on 
their Beck Depression Inventory responses (see Section 2.4.2.1 for group allocations to 
the Depressed and Non-Depressed groups). Figure 3 summarises the experimental 
sequence utilised for Experiment 2a.
2.4.1.4 Ethical Issues
Experiment 2a raised the same ethical considerations as noted for Experiment 1 a, 
with consideration given to recall of negative past events potentially evoking past 
traumatic events, or initiating a negative mood or emotional response. In order to conduct 
the experiment within the appropriate ethical guidelines (The British Psychological 
Society, 2006), precautionary measures were taken with all participants following the 
exact same procedures as detailed in Experiment la (see Section 2.2.1.4). No participants 
reported recalling a traumatic past event during the Autobiographical Memory Task. At 
no point during the experiment did any participant withdraw from the experiment or 
express dissatisfaction or distress of any kind. No participants reported a deflated mood 
or a negative emotional response upon completion of the experimental procedures. The 
experiment was approved prior to commencement by the Psychology Department Ethics 
Committee at Swansea University.
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Participant Sample (N= 34)
Total sample complete Questionnaires (randomised order of 1st presentation between participants) 
BDI-H, STAI, BHS, LOT-R, AAQ-II, PANAS
Total sample complete the Vividness of Visual Imagery Questionnaire 
(randomised order of 1st presentation of items A, B, C and D between participants)
Total sample complete the Autobiographical Memory Task and the Memory Characteristics 
Questionnaire (randomised 1st presentation of positive or negative cues between participants)
Total sample complete the Verbal Fluency Control Task 
(randomised 1st presentation of letters F, A, S between participants)
I I
I I
I I
Post-Experimental/Pre-Analysis BDI-II Group Split (see Section 2.4.2.1):
Low BDI-H score (1<10): N= 17 (BDI-H = 0, excluded from analysis, N =  2) 
High BDI-II score (10<30): N= 14 (BDI-II score >29, excluded from analysis, N =  1) 
Final sample for analysis: N =  31
Figure 3. Overview of the Experimental Sequence for Experiment 2a.
2.4.1.5 Procedure
The experiment took place in a specifically allocated psychology laboratory. Prior 
to commencement of the study participants were informed about the nature of the study 
and briefed about the procedures. A consent form was signed upon confirmation by
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participants that they understood the experimental process. Participants firstly completed 
the Verbal Fluency Control Task followed by the Autobiographical Memory Task 
(AMT) and the accompanying Memory Characteristics Questionnaire (MCQ), the 
procedures were all the same for these measures as detailed in Experiment la (see 
Section 2.2.1.2) and did not deviate from this previous practice. Upon completion of the 
AMT, and the accompanying MCQ, participants were presented with the Vividness of 
Visual Imagery Questionnaire (W IQ ) items A through to D; all participants completed 
all imagery categories, though the order of presentation was alternated for each 
participant. Participants were asked to complete the imagery items with their eyes open 
as this corresponds to the general performance on the AMT. The experimenter read all 
cue items and statements relating to the task out load to the participants, who were asked 
to follow instructions to the best of their ability. The ratings of ability and effort in 
generating the images were noted out loud by the participants and recorded by the 
experimenter. No time limit was enforced for imagery of the W IQ  items. Participants 
lastly completed the psychometric and wellbeing self-report questionnaires in their own 
time. Upon completion of all tasks participants were suitably debriefed and thanked for 
taking part.
2.4.2 Results and Discussion
2.4.2.1 Group Allocation
As in Experiments la  and lb participants with a score of 0 (N = 2) or above 29 (N 
= 1, M  = 30) where excluded from the analysis. As before the BDI-II inclusion criteria 
for the no depression group was a score of 1< 10, thus participants presenting scores of 
1-9 (N  = 17; M  = 3.82, o = 1.97) were allocated to this group. Inclusion in the sub- 
clinical depression group required BDI-II scores of 10 < 30 (N = 14; M  = 12.92, o = 
3.58; Depressed Group).
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2.4.2.2 Demographics and Psychometrics
The two groups were found to report significantly different depression levels on 
the BDI-II, with participants in the Non-Depressed group reporting significantly lower 
BDI-II scores than the Depressed group, 29) = -8.970, /K.001. Similar divergence 
between the groups were found in relation to the other well-being measures with the 
Depressed group consistently reporting higher levels of anxiety (STAI, /(29) = -4.043, 
/K.001), deflated life optimism (LOT-R, t{29) = 2.159, p=.02>9) and reduced 
psychological flexibility (AAQ, /(29) = 5.206, /?<.001). Hopelessness reports were also 
moderately increased for the Depressed group and approaching significance (BHS, /(29) 
= -1.931, /?=.063). Mood was not found to be significantly different between the groups 
(PA: p= 826; NA: p=127).
The psychometric means are presented with the participant demographics in 
Table 13. As depicted in Table 13, Depressed and Non-Depressed participants did not 
differ with respect to age, (t(29) = -1.491, /? =.147,1 representation of gender, ^2 (1) =. 
159, p  =.690 or verbal fluency, /(29) = -.286, p  =.777. As such the groups were found to 
be well matched on age, gender and cognitive ability with group divergence relating to 
the targeted areas of measures of psychological health. The co-occurring levels of 
depression, anxiety, hopelessness, optimism and emotional avoidance seen within the 
Depression group are consistent with previous findings within the clinical literature.
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Table 13. Mean scores and Standard Deviations (SD) for participant Demographics and reported 
Psychometric tests results for the Depressed and Non-Depressed groups in Experiment 2a.
Variable Depressed (SD) Non-Depressed (SD)
Gender: Females (Males) 10(4) 1 1 (6 )
Age 23.14 (2.71) 21.94 (1.74)
VFCT 13.93 (2.64) 13.61 (3.41)
BDI 12.92 (3.58) 3.82 (1.97)
BHS 4.42 (2.79) 2.82 (1.81)
STAI 41/78 (10.87) 28.88 (6.75)
LOT-R 13.92 (4.68) 17.05 (3.38)
AAQ-II 42.35 (7.14) 54.29 (5.63)
PA 34.07 (7.07) 33.47 (7.32)
NA 14.57 (3.43) 12.88 (2.54)
Note. VFCT= Verbal Fluency Control Task; BDI= Beck Depression Inventory; BHS= Beck Hopelessness 
Scale; STAI = State Anxiety Inventory; LOT-R= Life Optimism Test-Revised; AAQ-II= Acceptance and 
Action Questionnaire-II; PA = Positive Affective Scale; NA= Negative Affective Scale.
2.4.2.3. Content of Autobiographical Events
A brief content review was performed on the events that were recalled on the 
AMT, the descriptions of events were classified into broad categories. The categories 
found were consistent with expected life time experiences within an undergraduate 
sample, with no severe historical or traumatic occurrences reported. ‘Old’ positive 
memories (i.e., of events that happened longer than 1 month ago) involved episodes at 
parties (20%), episodes during leisure activities (including going on holiday and times 
with friends; 35%), romantic episodes (20%), and episodes of academic success (11%); 
14% of the events reported could not be classified in these categories. ‘Old’ negative 
memories involved accidents, (severe) illnesses, or deaths of relatives (19%); arguments 
with relatives or close friends (45%); the end of a romantic relationship (13%); accidents, 
illnesses, or aggression involving the participants themselves (15%); and episodes of 
academic failure (8%). Recent positive memories (i.e., of events that happened within the 
last month) involved episodes at parties (19%), episodes of academic success (22%),
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romantic episodes (23%), and episodes during leisure activities (32%). 4 % of the events 
reported could not be classified in these categories. Recent negative memories involved 
accidents, illnesses, or deaths of relatives (8%); episodes of academic failure (23%); 
accidents or illnesses involving the participants themselves (17%); the end of a romantic 
relationship (17%); and arguments with relatives or close friends (35%).
2.4.2.4. The Autobiographical Memory Test
As in Experiment la  the AMT analysis presently followed common practice in 
investigations of autobiographical memory specificity (cf. Williams et al., 2006, 2007), 
with the first response across the 12 trials used to index AMS. High positive correlations 
were seen between the number of specific memories produced under each valence 
category with the total number of specific recall (Non-Depressed group, positive cues, r 
= .668, and negative cues r = .671; Depressed group, positive cues r = .900 and negative 
cues r = .888).
On average, retrieved memories for participants in the Non-Depressed group 
were specific 81.86% of the time across the 12 trials; whereas the Depressed group 
showed somewhat diminished specificity in retrieval overall with 69.64% of the 12 trials 
noted as specific. Differences in specificity were noted for positive past experiences, with 
the Non-Depressed group retrieving marginally more specific memories relative to the 
Depressed group (M=  5.05, o= 1.02 and M  = 4.28, <7= 1.20 respectively; £(29) = 1.928 p  
=.064). For past experiences reported to negative cues specificity was again similar 
within both groups with a marginal, though not significant, difference pertaining to the 
Non-Depressed group being slightly more specific in their recall (Non-Depressed group, 
M =  4.76, (J = 1.03; Depressed group, M — 4.07, o = 1.14; £(29) = 1.774,/? =086). Table 
14 presents the AMT performance for both groups and as can be seen omissions were 
rare. As before it is recognized that the number of specific memories retrieved on the 
AMT (i.e., level of AMS) is a direct reflection of the number of “errors” on the AMT. 
Verbal fluency scores did not correlate with the total number of cues for either group 
(Non-Depressed, p=.115\ Depressed, /?= 374).
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Memory specificity was subjected to a 2 (Group: Depressed/Non-Depressed) x 2 
(Cue Valence: Positive/Negative) mixed analyses of variance (ANOVA). No main effect 
for valence was found, F(l,29) = 1.109,/? =.301, rjp2 =.037). A main effect was seen for 
group, with the Non-Depressed group being more specific in recall overall (F(l,29) = 
5.460,/? =.027, ?7/?2=.158). N o interaction effect was observed (F(1,29) = .027, p  =.870, 
rjp2= m \).
These findings are consistent with results from Experiment la, as it was found 
that AMS did differ between groups, though in the present experiment specificity in 
positive recall is approaching significance.
Table 14. Autobiographical Memory Test Performance presented as Percentage of Memory Specificity, 
Mean number and Standard Deviation (SD) of Memory Specificity responses across the six cue words in 
each valence category as reported within the Depressed and Non-Depressed groups in Experiment 2a. T- 
Test score and statistical value ip) from between group comparisons are presented.
Variable Non-Depressed Depressed
Mean (SD) Mean (SD) t( 29) P
Total % of specific memories 81.86(77.50; 69.64 (17.48)
Total % of omissions N/A 1.32 (0.81)
Total cues 9.82 (1.38) 8.35 (2.09) 1.928 0.027*
Positive cues 5.06 (1.02) 4.28 (1.20) 1.774 0.064
Negative cues 4.76 (1.03) 4.07 (1.14) 2.336 0.086
Note. *p<.05. Positive/Negative Cues = number of specific first memories relative to the detailed valence 
category on the Autobiographical Memory Test.
2.4.2.5. Memory Characteristics
Phenomenological characteristics were recorded for each memory cued on the 
AMT, by the Memory Characteristics Questionnaire (MCQ). Participant responses to 
questions about valence, frequency and clarity of the cued memory were collated to 
represent responses within these three domains. Within group analysis found that the 
Non-Depressed group reported moderately more clarity of memory in recall of positive 
relative to negative cues, £(16) = 2.047,/? =.057. No such difference in clarity of positive
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relative to negative recall was fund for the Depressed group, £(13) = -.400 p  =.695. 
Strong congruency was seen for cue and valence with positive memories being described 
with high affect relative to low affect recorded for negative memories for the Non- 
Depressed group (£(16)= 23.957/?<.001), as well as the Depressed group (£(13)= 13.255, 
/?<.001). With regards to frequency of recall the Non-Depressed group reported 
comparable occurrences of talking and thinking about positive and negative memories 
(£(16) = 1.447,/?=.167). Whereas the Depressed group reported increased occurrences of 
talking and thinking about negative relative to positive past events, (£(13) = -2.071, p  
=.059). The mean MCQ scores are reported in Table 15 below.
Table 15. Mean group scores and Standard Deviations (SD) of Phenomenological reports from the three 
domains encapsulating Clarity, Valence and Frequency as measured by the Memory Characteristics 
Questionnaire for Non-Depressed and Depressed participants in Experiment 2a. T-Test score and statistical 
value (p) from between group comparisons are presented.
Memory
Characteristics
Non-Depressed (17) Depressed (14)
Mean (SD) Mean (SD) ti 29) P
Positive Clarity 6 .0 1  (1.08) 5.7 \ (1.3 6) 0.693 0.494
Negative Clarity 5.50 (1.44) 5.81 (0.86) -0.709 0.484
Positive Valence 6.61 (0.64) 6.45 (0.85) 0.605 0.550
Negative Valence 1.82 (0.66) 2.36(0.75) -2 .1 2 0 0.043*
Positive Frequency 4.41 (1.14) 3.48 (1.35) 2.078 0.047*
Negative Frequency 3.87 (1.29) 4.04 (1.41) -0.344 0.733
Note. */?<.05
As can be seen from Table 15 significant group differences were only found for
negative valence and positive frequency. That is, participants in the Non-Depressed
group experienced the negatively cued events as more negative in affect (£(29) = -2.120,
p  =.043) and reported recalling and talking about positive memories more frequently
than the Depressed group (£(29) = 2.078,/? = .047).
The results show that group differences were present pertaining to valence, with
the Depressed group reporting higher levels of negative affect for past negative events.
Divergence was also seen in regards to frequency in recall of positive events, with the
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Non-Depressed group reporting recurrent contact with such events relative to lower 
reports of frequency of recall by the Depressed group.
2.4.2.6. Temporal Distance
The MCQ further recorded the temporal distance of the memories cued. No 
participants from either group reported memories recalled as being from earlier that day 
or from longer than 5 years ago, thus these variables are not presented here nor included 
in any statistical calculations.
As can be seen from Table 16 the Non-Depressed group reported more events 
from the near past in response to positive cues, with a total of 94.2 percent of the events 
recalled occurring within the last month. The Depressed group reported 50 percent of the 
positive events recalled to have occurred within the timeframe of the last month. In 
regards to negative events, the Non-Depressed group reported 58.8 percent of the events 
to have occurred within the last month, relative to the Depressed group who reported 
85.7 percent of the negatively cued events to have occurred within this period. A One­
way ANOVA found the difference in the time of event occurrence to be significant for 
the positively cued events, with the Non-Depressed group recalling significantly more 
positive events from the near past relative to the Depressed group (F(1,29)=19.052, 
p<.001). No statistical significance was found between the two groups pertaining to time 
of events in negatively cued recall (F(l, 29) =.798,/?=.379).
Temporal distance was associated with subjective reports on the psychometric 
measures, with close proximity of positive past events found to correlate with lower 
levels of depression (BDI-II; r=.812, /?<.001), anxiety (r=.458, /?=.010) and 
hopelessness (BHS; r=.354, /?=.050), and with higher levels of optimism (LOT-R; r= - 
.457, /?=.010). Whereas close proximity of negative past events were only found to 
correlate with increased levels of anxiety (r=-.389,/?=.031). No correlations were found 
for temporal distance of past events and specificity of recall for either of the FCQ
domains of clarity, valence or frequency within this sample.
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The findings indicate that group differences were present in regards to valence 
and temporal distance of events, with the Non-Depressed group retrieving more positive 
events from the more proximate past relative to the Depressed group. Findings pertaining 
to the psychometric reports also suggest that increased proximity of recalled positive past 
events relate to greater levels of psychological well being.
Table 16. Mean Percentage of the Temporal Distance for events recalled from Positive and Negative Cues 
as reported by the Depressed and Non-Depressed groups in Experiment 2a.
Time of Event
Temporal Distance of 
Positive Events (Mean %)
Temporal Distance of 
Negative Events (Mean %)
Non-Depressed Depressed Non-Depressed Depressed
Yesterday 5.9
Few days ago 5.9 7.1
Last week 41.2 17.6 28.6
Few weeks ago 29.4 21.4 29.4 21.4
Last month 1 1 .8 28.6 1 1 .8 28.6
Few months ago 21.4 17.6 14.3
Last year 5.9 21.4 1 1 .8
Last 5 years 7.1 1 1 .8
2.4.2.7. Recall Vantage Point
The vantage point of participants re-experience of the autobiographical events were 
recorded as either from a field (first person) perspective, or as an observer (third person) 
perspective. Participants overall reported 70.98 % of events recalled to be from a field 
perspective. Of these the first person perspective was reported to be found for 76.34% of 
the positive events relative to 65.62% for the negative events. At a split group level of 
analysis the Non-Depressed group was found to recall past events form a first person 
perspective for 79.41 % of the 12 cues, whereas the Depressed group reported 60.75% 
events to be from this perspective. As can be seen from Table 17, the recall vantage point 
was seen to significantly differ between the two groups with the Non-Depressed group
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reporting significantly more past events overall as viewed from a first person perspective 
relative to the Depression group. It was further seen that this group difference was 
consistent for recall of positive events, where again the Non-Depressed group appeared 
to recall more positive past events from the first person perspective relative to the 
Depressed sample. No differences were found between the groups in regards to vantage 
point in recall of negative past events. First person perspective in negative event recall 
was found to correlate with negative event specificity (r = .380, p  = .035). Whereas first 
person perspective in positive recall was found to correlate with the proximity of positive 
events (r = -.432, p  = .015). No other correlations were observed for vantage point and 
phenomenological characteristics of past events.
Relations between recall vantage point and psychometric scores found recall of 
positive past events from a first person perspective to correlate with lower levels of 
depression (BDI-II; r = -.712, p  < .001) and anxiety (STAI; r = -.464,/? = .009), though 
no significance was found in correlations with hopelessness or optimism. First person 
perspective in negative recall was also found to correlate with reduced levels of anxiety 
(STAI; r = -.508, p  = .004), though it was not found to correlate with any of the other 
psychometric measures. The results suggest that group differences pertaining to vantage 
point in recall of past events are related to psychological well being, with reports of self- 
in-context view relating to increased levels of well being.
Table 17. Mean Percentage of Past Events recall observed from a First Person Perspective within the 
Depressed and Non-Depressed groups in Experiment 2a. T-Test score and statistical value ip) from 
between group comparisons are presented.
Percentage of Recall from of 1st Person Perspective
Variable Non-Depressed Depressed
Mean % (SD) Mean % (SD) <(29) P
Total for all Events 79.41 (10.25) 60.75 (6.03) 5.995 0.001***
Positive Events 89.21 (11.69) 60.71 (10.55) 7.050 0.001***
Negative Events 69.60(16.90) 60.79 (12.45) 1.622 0.116
Note. ***p = .001.
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2.4.2.8. Vividness o f Visual Imagery Questionnaire
Participants in both groups completed the four imagery categories of the W IQ . 
Initial results saw that overall participants found it easier to generate images of a ‘relative 
or friend’ (M= 15.74, a = 3.56) and a ‘sun rise’ (M=15.45, o = 3.15) relative to ‘a shop 
frequently visited’ (M= 15.00, a = 2.96) and ‘a country scene’ (Af=14.22, a = 2.84). No 
significant group differences were found pertaining to visual imagery of a friend/relative 
(t(29) =-.663, p=.513), a sun rise (t(29) = 1.437, p=. 162), a familiar shop (/(29) =-.120 
p=.906) or a country scene (t(29) =.905, p=.373).
A total W IQ  score was compiled by collating the scores across the four W IQ  
categories for further analysis. No group differences were found on the total imagery 
score (t(29) =.531,/?=. 600). The W IQ  total score was not found to correlate with AMT 
recall specificity, nor was any of the individual imagery domains. Interestingly, only one 
correlation was found when imagery was compared with the MCQ characteristics, that is, 
imagery correlated positively with clarity of recall reported to positive cues (r=365, 
p=. 043). Imagery was not found to correlate with any of the psychometric measures 
pertaining to depression, hopelessness, anxiety and optimism. Nor did imagery correlate 
with temporal distance of past events recalled.
The W IQ  scores were dichotomised to allow for analysis of those high and low 
in imagery independently of BDI-II categories. The mean score of 60 was used to create 
the high vs. low imagery categories; the low imagery category (7V=12) averaging a score 
of 52.00 (o =3.62) relative to the high imagery group (N= 19) whose group mean score 
was 65.74 (<r =4.56). The scores were found to be significantly different between the two 
groups (7(29) = -8.800 /?<.001). A One-way ANOVA found no significant difference 
between the high and low imagery groups pertaining to specificity of negatively cued 
recall (F(l, 29) = -.729, p=.435). Nor was any such difference observed in relation to 
positive event recall (F(l, 29) = -.161,/? = 873). The results suggest that depression levels 
are related to imagery abilities, though this is not reflected in representation of specificity 
in recall.
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2.4.2.9. Emotional Avoidance
Lower levels of emotional avoidance (as represented by higher scores on the AAQ-2) 
were found to correlate with the BDI-II (r = -.662, p  <.001). The AAQ-2 was found to 
correlate negatively with the temporal distance of positive past events (r = -.543, p  = 
.002), that is, those who reported less use of avoidant strategies were more likely to 
report positive events from the more recent past. The perception of recall of positive past 
events from a first person vantage point was found to relate to lower levels of emotional 
avoidance (r = .510,/? = .003). At a group split level of analysis the AAQ-2 was found to 
correlate with overall cue specificity within the Non-Depressed group (r = .498, p  = 
.042), thus a reduced use of avoidant strategies was seen to be related to overall memory 
specificity. Positive valence was also found to correlate with emotional avoidance within 
the Non-Depressed group (r = -.579, p  = .015), thus indicating that lower levels of 
emotional avoidance relate to greater positive affect in the recall of positive memories. 
Only two correlations with the AAQ-2 where found within the Depressed group, these 
were for frequency of recall of positive (r = -.610,/? = .020), and negative (r = -.564,/? = 
.036) past events, with low emotional avoidance relating to high frequency of recall of 
both positive and negative past events. No correlations were found for the AAQ-2 and 
either of the imagery domains from the W IQ , neither at a general nor at a split level of 
analysis. The results indicate that emotional avoidance is related to vantage point and 
temporal distance in recall of positive past events. Lower levels of emotional avoidance 
were seen to allow for reports of greater valence effects and specificity of in positive 
recall.
2.4.3 Summary
It has long been established that people with depression tend to have difficulties 
in providing specific autobiographical memories (Williams & Broadbent, 1986) and that 
there is also an association between visual imagery activates other than sensory 
information, thus giving more details about a specific event (Greenberg & Rubin, 2003). 
Experiment 2a aimed specifically to (3) investigate whether variable imagery abilities
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can explain the level of specificity of autobiographical memories in a sub-clinically 
depressed group. However, in this experiment no group differences were found in terms 
of vividness of visual imagery and specificity in autobiographical recall, with both the 
Non-Depressed and Depressed groups reporting similar levels of detail and depiction in 
response to the W IQ  dimensions. Imagery was not found to relate to level of specificity 
reported on the AMT, although interestingly, (2) imagery was found to positively 
correlate with clarity in recall of past positive events. Emotional avoidance was not found 
to relate to imagery abilities overall nor at a group level for this sample. Table 18 
summarises key findings from Experiment 2a.
In line with Experiment 1 a, a group difference was noted for specificity of recall 
with the Non-Depressed group retrieving more specific autobiographical events relative 
to the Depressed group. Group differences were pronounced in terms of 
phenomenological characteristics, with the Non-Depressed group more likely to report 
memories to be viewed from a first person perspective overall. A valance bias was 
observed in this regard with first person perspective emerging for recall of positive past 
events in particular, relative to reports by the Depressed group.
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Table 18. Summary of Main Aims and Findings from Experiment 2a.
Research Aim Hypothesis Main Findings
1 Replicating and Sub-clinically depressed The hypothesis is supported.
supporting the individuals will demonstrate
findings from differing levels of AMS relative Findings from Experiment la were
Experiment la. to non-depressed individuals. supported by observed group difference
for overall AMS (p<.05).
2 Explore independently Expression of positive and The hypothesis is partially supported. The
measured imagery negative past event relationship was found to be valence
abilities (W IQ) in phenomenological specific:
relation to characteristics will differ
phenomenological between those who report high A positive relationship was found for
characteristics of past levels of vividness in imagery as imagery abilities and clarity in recall of
recall. measured by the WIQ relative positive past events (p<.05).
to those who report low levels of
WIQ.
3 Examine W IQ  levels Sub-clinically depressed The hypothesis is not supported.
in sub-clinical individuals will differ from
population. healthy participants in their No group differences were found for the
imagery abilities as measured W IQ.
by the WIQ.
4 Examine the There is a relationship between The hypothesis is not supported.
relationship between imagery ability and emotional
emotional avoidance, avoidance as measured by the No relationship was found for emotional
as measured by the AAQ-II. avoidance and imagery ability.
AAQ-II, and imagery
ability, as measured by
the W IQ.
Note. Low emotional avoidance is denoted by a high score on the AAQ-II.
Memory vantage point for negative events was found to correlate with specificity 
in recall of negative events, with participants who reported the events from a first person 
perspective found to be more specific in negative recall. Marginal within group 
differences pertaining to valence of recall specificity was found with positive past events 
vaguely more specific in recall by the Non-Depressed group. Further, within group 
assessment of the phenomenological characteristics related to the past events indicated
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that the Non-Depressed group reported greater clarity in recall of past positive events, 
whereas the Depressed group reported thinking and talking about past negative events 
more readily. Between groups analysis saw the Depressed group reporting negative affect 
as more intensely experienced in relation to past negative experiences relative to the 
Non-Depressed group. With the Non-Depressed group indicating that they had thought 
and talked about positive past events more readily than the Depressed group. The 
temporal distance of such past positive events diverged for the two groups, with the 
Depressed group recalling more distant positive events that were at least one year post 
occurrence, relative to the Non-Depressed group, who retrieved more positive events 
from the last month.
As in Experiment la, those who were less avoidant were more likely to report 
positive events to be from the more recent past. Positive valence was also found to 
correlate with emotional avoidance within the Non-Depressed group, thus indicating that 
lower levels of emotional avoidance relate to a greater experience of positive affect in 
recall of positive memories. Lower levels of emotional avoidance were seen to be related 
to overall increased memory specificity within the Non-Depressed group. Within the 
Depressed group frequency of recall of positive and negative past events were found to 
correlate with emotional avoidance, that is, low emotional avoidance was seen to 
correspond with more frequent recall of both positive and negative past events. The 
current findings are in contrast with previous literature looking at imagery abilities in 
recall (cf. Bywaters, Andrade & Turpin, 2004). However, the memory specificity 
findings are in line with previous research (e.g. Williams et al., 1986; 1996). The 
findings support the proposed role of reduced AMS as an emotion regulation strategy 
pertaining to functional avoidance of content which hold emotional impact.
According to the phenomenological data, it is the contextual details of the events,
such as feelings at the time, that are seen to fully restore the impression of such past
events and link with current emotions. In this regard imagery may play a provisional role
in the progression of depressive symptomatology. This suggestion would fit with the
automaticity of recall with individual recall often prompted by smells, sounds and other
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visual cues (e.g., Willander & Larsson, 2006; Rusted, Marsh, Bledski, & Sheppard, 1997; 
Johnson, 1988; Larsen, 1998). As such the common recurrence of depression can be 
viewed in light of the equally recurrent exposure to such cues, inevitable in day to day 
settings. This is particularly evident in the withdrawal from social contexts that is 
characteristic of depression. As engagement with such settings would inadvertently lead 
to exposure to certain sets of cues which, in regards to sensory and visual impact, would 
likely trigger recall of past events to some extent.
In light of these findings it is particularly interesting to look at specificity in 
future thinking, as it has been found that using visual imagery can increase the perceived 
probability that an imagined event will occur (Sherman, Cialdini, Schwarztman & 
Reynolds, 1985), and increase the likelihood of action (Libby et al., 2007; Pham & 
Taylor, 1999). In fact, it has been noted that the more vivid the imagery, the greater the 
effect (Gonsalves et al., 2004; Johnson, 2006). Hence, more vivid future emotional 
images would be evaluated as being more likely to occur.
2.5 Experiment 2b
The impact of mental imagery ability may be a critical and confounding variable
in tests assessing the generation of future events. Thinking about the future necessitates a
greater use of imagery due to the nature of such events being, in the present, merely
confabulated probabilities of future experiences (Markman, Gavanski, Sherman, &
McMullen, 1993). As such the ability to simulate the future through imagination has
been found to be adaptive for evaluating future outcomes, ascertaining the likelihood of
such events, and planning subsequent behaviour in this regard (e.g. Markman et al.,
1993; Schacter, Addis, & Buckner, 2007). Notably, Sharot, Riccardi, Raio, and Phelps
(2007) report that dysphoric individuals appear to be lacking in their ability to imagine
(or can only vaguely ‘see’) positive future events, despite images of negative future
outcomes presenting themselves as ‘crystal clear’. In this regard such an inconsistency in
imagery abilities may consequently bias future outlook and affect the dysphoric
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individuals’ capacity to be optimistic about future outcomes (Sharot, Riccardi, Raio, & 
Phelps, 2007). Typically, such individuals may consider future positive events as less 
likely to occur, as well as finding such considerations to be less believable, thus resulting 
in reduced action in response to positive images, relative to more vivid negative future 
descriptions.
In this regard MacLeod and colleagues have argued that depression is associated 
with a deficit in processing positive information per se, relative to merely increased 
negative thoughts (MacLeod & Byrne, 1996; MacLeod, Byrne, & Valentine, 1996; 
MacLeod & Cropley, 1995; MacLeod, Tata, Kentish, & Jacobsen, 1997). In particular, 
they have proposed that depression is more specifically associated with reduced levels of 
positive future-directed cognitions. In support of this proposal suicidal depressed patients 
have been reported to demonstrate more abstract (i.e., less imagery based) 
representations of the future relative to non-depressed controls (Williams et al., 1996). 
The inability to be specific about the future is also central in Williams’ model of 
suicidality (Williams, 2001). In relation to Sharot et al’s findings, it has also been noted 
that suicidal individuals sometimes experience intrusive and vivid negative future 
imagery of committing suicide (Holmes, Crane, Fennell, & Williams, 2007).
Although at present there is a lack of complete understanding about the role of
positive imagery in the context of depression, some research exists that offers some
insight. For instance, in an effort to examine the relationship between imagery and
psychopathology, Stober (2000) asked healthy volunteers to imagine positive (e.g., ‘you
will make good lasting friendships’) or negative (e.g., ‘you will fall badly behind in your
work’) future events. Participants were then asked to rate the subjective characteristics of
their experienced images, e.g. the perceived vividness of the event. As predicted,
depressed mood (but not anxiety) was correlated with reduced imagery of positive, but
not negative, future events. Similarly, in another non-clinical sample, Bywaters, Andrade
and Turpin (2004) found that depressed mood correlated with increased vividness of
imagery in picture recall. Although, in the study by Bywaters et al., no valence
discrepancies were observed, with depressed mood found to relate to improved vividness
in recall for both negatively and positively valenced stimuli. In this regard it has been
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argued that methodological differences may account for the observed discrepancy in 
findings pertaining to imagery vividness. Specifically, it is possible that the recall of 
vivid imagery from pictures (e.g., Bywaters et al., 2004) differs from the vividness seen 
in generation as a response to short verbal scenarios. The relationship between imagery 
and depression therefore remains unclear, and Stober’s results require replication and 
methodological extension
Experiment 2b aims to (1) replicate and support the findings from Experiment lb. 
It is predicted that sub-clinically depressed individuals, as measured by the BDI-II, will 
differ in FES relative to non-depressed individuals. It was further sought to (2) replicate 
Stobers findings from a healthy population with a sub-clinical population. It is predicted 
that sub-clinically depressed individuals, as measured by the BDI-II, will differ from 
healthy participants in their imagery abilities as measured by the W IQ . Experiment 2b 
also aim to (3) explore independently measured imagery abilities (W IQ ) in relation to 
phenomenological characteristics of future events. It is predicted that expression of 
positive and negative future event phenomenological characteristics will differ between 
those who report high levels of vividness in imagery as measured by the W IQ  relative 
to those who report low levels of W IQ . Experiment 2b further sought to (4) examine the 
relationship between emotional avoidance, as measured by the AAQ-II, and imagery 
ability, as measured by the W IQ . It was predicted that there would be a relationship 
between imagery ability and emotional coping style as measured by the AAQ-II.
2.5.1 Method
2.5.1.1 Participants
Thirty-six students from Swansea University volunteered to take part in the 
experiment, though following the exclusion criteria pertaining to BDI-II scores (criteria 
for inclusion is detailed in section 2.5.2.1) only data from thirty-two participants was 
utilised in the following analysis. All the included participants were undergraduate 
students (19 female and 13 male) whom received course credits in return for their
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participation. The participant ages ranged from 18 to 27 years of age with a mean age of 
20.96 (a = 2.34).
2.5.1.2 Apparatus and Materials
The material used was identical to that in Experiment lb (i.e. the BDI-II; BHS; 
STAI; LOT-R; PANAS; AAQ-2; and verbal fluency task), inclusive of the Future Cuing 
Task and the Future Event Characteristics Questionnaire, with the addition of the 
Vividness of Visual Images Questionnaire utilized in Experiment 2a. The presentation 
and process related to materials from Experiment lb were adhered with for the FCT and 
FCQ, whereas the W IQ  representation and method was identical to that of Experiment 
2a.
2.5.1.3 Experimental Overview
Experiment 2b used a 2 x 2 mixed participants design, with Beck Depression 
Inventory Scores (Sub-clinically Depressed and Non-Depressed) as the between 
participant variable, and Autobiographical Future Event Specificity (Positive Future 
Event Specificity, Negative Future Event Specificity) as the as within-participant 
variable. A correlational design was further employed for examination of relationships 
between the FCT, W IQ  and AAQ-II measures. All participants completed all measures 
and questionnaires, i.e. the Verbal Fluency Control Task, the AAQ-II, the BDI-II, the 
BHS, the LOT-R, the PANAS and the STAI. All participants received the same 
instructions and completed both sections of the FCT, i.e. Positive and Negative future 
events along with the FCQ. Participants all completed the W IQ , all items were 
completed, with randomised order of first presentation of items A, B, C and D between 
participants. Participant data was categorised and analysed based on their Beck 
Depression Inventory responses (see Section 2.5.2.1 for group allocations to the
132
Depressed and Non-Depressed groups). Figure 4 summarises the experimental sequence
utilised for Experiment 2b.
2.5.1.4 Ethical Issues
The current experiment raised the same ethical considerations as noted for 
Experiment lb, with consideration given to generation of negative future events 
potentially evoking an emotional response or a negative mood. In order to conduct the 
experiment within the appropriate ethical guidelines (The British Psychological Society, 
2006), precautionary measures were taken with all participants following the exact same 
procedures as detailed in Section 2.3.1.4. None of the participants reported feeling upset 
by the generation of a negative future event during the Future Cuing Task. At no point 
during the experiment did any participant withdraw from the experiment or express 
dissatisfaction or distress of any kind; no participants reported a deflated mood or having 
experienced a negative emotional response upon departure. The experiment was 
approved by the Psychology Department Ethics Committee at Swansea University.
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Participant Sample (N= 36)
Total sample complete the Verbal Fluency Control Task 
(randomised 1st presentation of the letters F, A, S between participants)
Total sample complete the Future Cueing Task and the Future Characteristics Questionnaire 
(randomised 1st presentation of positive or negative cues between participants)
Total sample complete the Vividness of Visual Imagery Questionnaire 
(randomised 1st presentation of items A, B, C or D between participants)
Total sample complete Questionnaires (randomised order of 1st presentation between 
participants) BDI-II, STAI, BHS, LOT-R, AAQ-II, PANAS
Post-Experimental/Pre-Analysis BDI-II Group Split (see Section 2.5.2.1):
Low BDI-H score (1<10): N= 17 (BDI-II = 0, excluded from analysis, N - 2) 
High BDI-H score (10<30): N= 15 (BDI-H score >29, excluded from analysis, N =  2) 
Final samnle for analysis: N  =  .32
Figure 4. Overview of the Experimental Sequence for Experiment 2b.
2.5.1.5 Procedure
Participants were invited to complete the experiment in specifically allocated 
psychology laboratories which consisted of a small room inhabiting only a plain desk and 
chair. Prior to commencement participants were briefed about the nature of the study and 
were asked to complete a consent form to acknowledge their willingness to participate. 
Due to the nature of the study with regards to emotional content of future negative events
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participants were specifically reminded of their right to withdraw from the study at any 
time without providing any reason. The study commenced with the Verbal Fluency 
Control Task (VFCT) subsequently followed by the Future Cueing Task (FCT) and 
accompanying Future Cueing Questionnaire (FCQ); participants were provided with 
verbal and written instructions as to the process of this task as in Experiment lb. FCT 
responses were recorded by the use of a Dictaphone as in the previous experiments. 
Upon completion of the FCT and FCQ participants were cycled in to the visual imagery 
session where they were presented with the Vividness of Visual Images Questionnaire 
(W IQ ). Written and verbal instructions were provided and participants were presented 
with the W IQ  items A through to D in the same procedural fashion as utilised for 
Experiment 2a (see Section 2.4.1.2). Participants lastly completed the psychometric and 
wellbeing self-report questionnaires in their own time. Upon completion of all tasks 
participants were suitably debriefed and thanked for their participation in the study.
2.5.2 Results and Discussion
2.5.2.1. Group Allocation
In line with the foregoing experiments participants with a score of 0 (N = 2) or above 29 
(N= 2, M =  30) were excluded from the analysis. As before the BDI-II inclusion criteria 
for the No-Depression group was a score of 1< 10, thus participants presenting scores of 
1-9 (N  = 17; M  = 3.23, a = 1.92); whereas inclusion in the sub-clinical depression group 
required BDI-II scores of 10 < 30 (N= 15; M=  14.86, a = 5.50; Depressed Group).
2.5.2.2. Demographics and Psychometrics
The two groups were found to report significantly different depression levels on
the BDI-II, with participants in the Non-Depressed group reporting lower BDI-II scores
relative to the corresponding Depressed group, /(30) = -8.185, /K.OOl. Similar
divergence between the groups were found in relation to the other well-being measures
with the Depressed group consistently reporting higher levels of anxiety (STAI, /(30) = -
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3.533, p=.001), increased hopelessness (BHS, 7(30) = -2.487, p  =.019), deflated life 
optimism (LOT-R, 7(30) = 2.828, p  =.008) and reduced psychological flexibility (AAQ, 
7(30) = 2.608, p  =.014). Mood was not found to be significantly different between the 
groups (PA: p=.760; NA: p=.106). The psychometric means are presented with the 
participant demographics in Table 19. As depicted in Table 19, Depressed and Non- 
Depressed participants did not differ with respect to age, 7(30) =.377, p  =.709 
representation of gender, (1) =. 005, p  =.946 or verbal fluency, 7(30) = -.315, p  =.755.
The groups were well matched for age, gender and cognitive abilities with 
between group differences pertaining to psychometric measures and demonstrating co­
occurring levels of depression, anxiety, hopelessness, optimism and emotional avoidance 
corresponding with previous research in clinical groups.
Table 19. BDI-H group split differences on Demographics and Psychometric tests with Mean scores and 
Standard Deviations (SD) for the Depressed and Non-Depressed groups in Experiment 2b.
Variable Depressed (SD) Non-Depressed (SD)
Gender: Females (Males) 9(6) 10(7)
Age 20.80 (1.93) 21.11 (2.71)
VFCT 13.81 (2.92) 13.48 (2.94)
BDI 14.86 (5.50) 3.23 (1.92)
BHS 5.67 (4.40) 2.71 (2.05)
STAI 44.80 (9.92) 32.54 (9.67)
LOT-R 12.80 (4.37) 17.52 (5.00)
AAQ-II 44.13 (8.08) 50.88 (6.54)
PA 32.06 (8.92) 31.23 (6.25)
NA 15.20 (5.28) 12.71 (2.99)
Note. VFCT= Verbal Fluency Control Task; BDI= Beck Depression Inventory; BHS= Beck Hopelessness 
Scale; STAI = State Anxiety Inventory; LOT-R= Life Optimism Test-Revised; AAQ-H= Acceptance and 
Action Questionnaire-H; PA = Positive Affective Scale; NA= Negative Affective Scale.
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2.5.2.3 Autobiographical Future Event Content
As in Experiment lb the content of the future events generated in the present 
study, i.e. descriptions of events were classified into broad categories to present an 
outline of the content of the events generated. Consistent with findings from experiment 
lb participants were found to produce events in line with common life developments. 
That is, positive events that might happen in the future were such things as episodes of 
academic or career success (40%), episodes during leisure activities (13%), romantic 
episodes (10%), parties (10%), and the birth of a child or episodes involving a child 
(5%); weddings (7% ); buying a house (7%); 8% of the events could not be classified in 
these categories. Whereas, negative events that might happen in the future included 
episodes of academic and/or career failure (50%), relationship problems and/or the end 
of a romantic relationship (13%), accidents, severe illness or deaths of friends and/or 
relatives (13%), accidents or severe illness involving the participants themselves (10%), 
and arguments with relatives or close friends (8%); 6% of the events could not be 
classified in these categories.
2.5.2.4 The Future Cueing Task
As in Experiment lb common AMT practice was adopted for the FCT, that is, the 
first cued response across the 12 trials was used to index Future Event Specificity (FES), 
with higher scores indicating increased levels of FES. High positive correlations were 
seen between the number of specific future events produced under each valence category 
with the total number of specific generated events (Non-Depressed group positive cues, 
r=. 787, and negative cues r=.882; Depressed group, positive cues r=.896 and negative 
cues r—.926).
On average, future events for participants in the Non-Depressed group were 
specific 75.48% of the time across the 12 trials; whereas the depressed participants 
showed somewhat diminished specificity in generation of future events overall with 
58.89% of the 12 trials noted as specific. Differences in specificity were predominantly 
noted for positive cues, with the Non-Depressed group marginally more specific in
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relation to future events relative to the Depressed group (M  = 4.94, a= 1.03 and M  = 
4.00, <7=1.69 respectively; t{30) = 1.928, p  =.063). For negative cues, specificity was 
again similar for both groups, with a marginal difference pertaining to the Non- 
Depressed group being slightly more specific in their description of events (Non- 
Depressed group, M =  3.94, a = 1.34; Depressed group, M =  3.07, a = 1.98); though this 
difference was not found to be statistically significant, 7(30) = 1.476,/? =.150). Table 20 
presents the FCT performance for both groups, and as can be seen omissions were rare. 
The number of specific events generated on the FCT (i.e., level of FES) is a direct 
reflection of the number of “errors” on the FCT (as the sum of number-correct scores and 
errors is a constant across participants). Verbal fluency scores did not correlate with the 
total number of specific events for either group (Non-Depressed, p=.512; Depressed,
p=180).
Future event specificity was subjected to a 2 (Group: Depressed/Non-Depressed) 
x 2 (Cue valence: Positive/Negative) mixed analyses of variance (ANOVA). A main 
effect for valence was found, with both groups producing more specific positive future 
events (F(l,30) = 14.665,/?=.001, tjp2=.328). A marginal main effect was seen for group 
(F(l, 30) = 3.571,/?=.068, rjp2=. 106), with the Non-Depressed group being more specific 
overall relative to the Depressed group. No interaction effect was observed (F(l,30) 
=.017,/? =.896, rip2=.001).
These results correspond to findings from study lb and show that on a general level 
specificity pertaining to future events was not found to vary between groups.
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Table 20. Future Cueing Test Performance presented as Mean Percentage of Specificity, Mean number and 
Standard Deviation of Future Event Specificity responses across the six cue words for each valence 
category as reported by the Depressed and Non-Depressed groups in Experiment 2b. T-Test score and 
statistical value (p) from between group comparisons are presented.
Variable Non-Depressed Depressed
Mean (SD) Mean (SD) *(30) P
Total % of specific memories 75 A%(15.44) 58.89(27.89)
Total % of omissions 1.20(1.30) 2.34(1.58)
Total cues 8 .8 8  (1.99) 7.06 (3.34) 1.890 0.068
Positive cues 4.94(1.02) 4.00 (1.69) 1.928 0.063
Negative cues 3.94 (1.34) 3.07(1.98) 1.476 0.150
Note. Positive/Negative cues = number of specific future events relative to the detailed valence category on 
the Future Cueing Test.
2 .5 .2 .5 . Future Event Characteristics
Phenomenological characteristics, for each future event cued on the FCT, were 
assessed by the Future Characteristics Questionnaire (FCQ). Participant responses to 
questions about valence, frequency and clarity of the cued event were recorded and 
collated within these three domains. Within group analysis found that participants in the 
Non-Depressed group reported greater clarity for positively relative to negatively cued 
future events, t{ 16) = 5.081, p <.001. Moderate significant valence differences were also 
observed for clarity in the Depressed group (f(14) = 2.102,/?=.054). Strong congruency 
was seen for cue and valence with positive future events being described with high affect 
ratings relative to low affect recorded for negative events within both groups (Non- 
Depressed, *(16)= 10.570,/?<.001; Depressed group, t(14)= 7.387,/?<.001). With regards 
to frequency of thoughts about future events the Non-Depressed group reported more 
frequent thoughts about positive relative to negative future events (f(16)= 2.888, /?=.011), 
whereas no significant valence difference pertaining to frequency of future thinking was 
found for the Depressed group (/(l4)= -1.038, /?=.317). The FCQ mean scores are 
reported in Table 21 below. As can be seen from Table 21a significant group difference 
was only observed for positive frequency. That is, participants in the Non-Depressed
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group reported thinking and talking about positive future events more frequently than the 
Depressed group (t(30) = 2.086,/? =.046).
Table 21. Mean scores and Standard Deviations (SD) for the three dimensions of Clarity, Valence and 
Frequency as assessed by the Future Event Characteristics Questionnaire for the Depressed and Non- 
Depressed groups in Experiment 2b. T-Test score and statistical value ip) from between group 
comparisons are presented.
Memory
Characteristics
Non-Depressed (18) Depressed (15)
Mean (SD) Mean (SD) *(30) P
Positive Clarity 5.80(0.77/ 5.48 (1.18) 0.889 0.381
Negative Clarity 4.61 0.89) 4.90(1.61) -0.632 0.532
Positive Valence 6.64 (0.62) 6.53 (0.72) 0.480 0.635
Negative Valence 1.95(1.43) 2.72 (1.95) -1.279 0.211
Positive Frequency 5.28 (1.19) 4.45 (1.04) 2.086 0.046*
Negative Frequency 4.08 (1.10) 4.99 (1.66) -1.847 0.075
Note. *p<.05
2.5.2.6. Likelihood Ratings
The FCQ further recorded the participants’ likelihood rating of the future events 
occurring. One way ANOVA analysis found a significant difference between groups in 
relation to positive future events, with the Non-Depressed group rating these as more 
likely to occur (M = 5.59, o = .731) relative to the Depressed group (M = 4.94, o = 1.03; 
F(l, 30)= 2.079, p=.046). Similarly the Non-Depressed group reported somewhat 
stronger belief in negative events occurring (M  = 5.06, a = .832) relative to the 
Depressed group (M = 4.77, o =.972) though this difference was not found to be 
significant, F(1, 30) =.893,/?=.379. No correlations were found for event specificity and 
likelihood ratings. These results show that group differences were present in regards to 
positive future vents generation, with the Non-Depressed group demonstrating greater 
clarity, frequency of consideration and expectancy of occurrence pertaining to such 
events relative to the Depressed group.
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2.5.2.7 Temporal Distance
Analysis of the reported temporal distance of future events found participants 
from neither the Non-Depression nor the Depression group to report the anticipated 
future events as generally occurring ‘later today’, ‘tomorrow’, ‘in a few days’ or ‘in 
further than 10 years’ (i.e. no individuals referred to positive events occurring that day, 
the next day or in the next few days, 1 person reported 2 positive events occurring in 
further than 10 years time; 1 person referred to 1 negative event occurring in the next few 
days), thus upon averaging, the total future distance reports these variables were omitted, 
and are not individually presented in Table 22, nor included independently in any 
statistical calculations. As can be seen from Table 22 the Non-Depressed group reported 
more events from the near past in response to positive cues, with a total of 88.1 percent 
of the events generated occurring within the next few months. The Depressed group 
reported only 6.7 percent of the positive events generated to be occurring within the same 
time-frame. In regards to negative events the Non-Depressed group anticipated 76.5 
percent of the events generated to take place within the next few months, relative to the 
Depressed group whom anticipated 73.3 percent of the negatively cued events to occur 
within this period. A One-way ANOVA found the difference in the time of event 
occurrence to be significant for the positively cued events, with the Non-Depressed 
group anticipating significantly more positive events to take place in the near future 
relative to the Depressed group (F(l,30) = 42.374, p  <.001). No statistical significance 
was found between the two groups pertaining to time of negative future events (F(l, 30) 
= 106,/? = 747).
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Table 22. Mean Percentage of reported Temporal Distance of Future Events generated to Positive and 
Negative Cues as reported by the Depressed and Non-Depressed groups in Experiment 2b.
Time of Event
Temporal Distance of 
Positive Events (Mean %)
Temporal Distance of 
Negative Events (Mean %)
Non-Depressed Depressed Non-Depressed Depressed
Next week 23.5 1 1 .8 13.3
In a few weeks 17.6 1 1 .8 26.7
Next month 29.4 17.6 13.3
In a few months 17.6 6.7 35.3 2 0 .0
Next year 1 1 .8 66.7 1 1 .8 6.7
Next 5-10 years 26.7 11 .8 2 0 .0
The psychometric measures were all seen to correlate with the temporal distance 
of positive future events. Lower levels of depression (BDI-II, r — .710 p<.001), 
hopelessness (BHS, r = .370, p=.037) and anxiety (STAI, r = .488 p=.005), were 
associated with positive future events anticipated as occurring in the near future (in the 
next few months). Higher levels of optimism (LOT-R, r = -.467 /?=. 007) were also 
associated with closer proximity of positive future events. Temporal distance of positive 
events was found to correlate with specificity in the generation of negative future events 
(r = -.345 /?=.053), that is, closer proximity of positive anticipated events were 
associated with greater specificity of negative future events. Proximity of negative events 
was not found to relate to the psychometric measures nor FES; nor was there any 
association found between negative event proximity and clarity, valence or frequency of 
future events.
The findings here further demonstrates the overall positivity bias held by the 
Non-Depressed group, with positive future events found to be of closer proximity 
relative to negative events and in contrast to reports by the Depressed group. Proximity 
of positive events also related to increased specificity in anticipation of negative events.
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2.5.2.8 Future Event Vantage Point
The vantage point of participants pre-experience of the autobiographical future 
events were recorded as either from a field (first person) perspective, or as an observer 
(third person) perspective. Participants overall reported 62.24 % of the future events 
generated to be from a field perspective. Of these the first person perspective was 
reported to be found for 65.62% of the positive events relative to 58.85% for the negative 
events. At a split group level of analysis the Non-Depressed group was found to generate 
future events form a first person perspective to 67.64 % of the 12 cues, whereas the 
Depressed group reported 56.11% of the events to be from this perspective. As can be 
seen from Table 23, the recall vantage point was found to differ significantly between the 
two groups, with the Non-Depressed group reporting the field perspective significantly 
more in future generation relative to the Depression group. It can be seen that this group 
difference was consistent for generation of positive events, where again the Non- 
Depressed group appeared to perceive more positive past events from the field 
perspective relative to the Depressed sample. No differences were found between the 
groups in regards to vantage point in the generation of negative future events.
Overall, the first person perspective was found to correlate with specificity of 
positive (r = .540, p  <.001) and negative future events (r = .553, p  < .001). Proximity of 
positive future events were also found to correlate with increased reports of the first 
person perspective view overall (r = -.385, p  = .030). No other correlations were 
observed for vantage point and phenomenological characteristics of future events. 
Relations between vantage point and psychometric scores found generation of positive 
future events from a first person perspective to correlate with lower levels of depression 
(BDI-II; r =-.545,p  = .001), hopelessness (BHS; r = -.462, p  = .008) and anxiety (STAI; 
r =-.381, p  = .032) and higher levels of optimism (LOT-R; r = .387, p  = .029). First 
person perspective in negative future generation was not found to correlate with either of 
the psychometric measures. These findings show that a self-in-context perspective was 
related to increased specificity of anticipated future events across valence categories, and
specifically for positive future events within the Non-Depressed group.
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Table 23. Mean Percentage of Future Events observed from a First Person Perspective within the 
Depressed and Non-Depressed groups in Experiment 2b. T-Test score and statistical value (p) from 
between group comparisons are presented.
Percentage of Future events Perceived from 1st 
Person Perspective
Variable Non-Depressed Depressed
Mean (SD) Mean (SD) t( 30) P
Total for all cues 72.54 (22.78) 57.12(12.38) 2.247 0.032*
Positive events 62.74(17.21) 5 4 .4 4  (9.89) 2.234 0.033*
Negative cues 67.64 (17.65) 56.11 (9.69) 1.642 0.111
Note. *p<.05.
2.5.2.9 Vividness o f  Visual Imagery Questionnaire
Participants in both groups completed the four imagery categories of the W IQ . 
Initial results showed that on the whole participants found it easier to generate images of 
a ‘relative or friend’ (M = 16.06, o = 2.57) and a ‘sun rise’ (M = 15.56, o = 3.08) relative 
to ‘a shop frequently visited’ (M  = 14.56, o = 3.07) and ‘a country scene’ (M= 14.62, o 
=2.83). No significant group differences were found pertaining to visual imagery of a 
friend/relative (/(30) =-.829,/?=.414), a sun rise (7(30) = .966, p  = .342), a familiar shop 
(f(30) =.970p  = 340) or a country scene (f(30) =.046,/? = 964).
A total W IQ  score was compiled by collating the scores across the four W IQ  
categories for further analysis. No group differences was found on the collated score 
(/(30) =.428, /?= 672). The W IQ  total score was found to correlate negatively with 
specificity of negatively cued future events (r= -.362, p=.042), though no correlation 
was observed for positive specificity (p=. 520) nor for total future event specificity 
(p=. 123). Interestingly only one correlation was found when compared with the FCQ 
characteristics, that is, imagery ability correlated positively with frequency of negative
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thought (r= 362, p=.042). Imagery was not found to correlate with either of the 
psychometric measures of depression, hopelessness, anxiety, or optimism.
The W IQ  scores were dichotomised to allow for analysis of those high and low 
in imagery independently of BDI-II categories. The total mean score of 60 was used to 
create the high vs. low imagery categories, with the low imagery category averaging a 
score of 53.31 (er = 3.77) relative to the high imagery group whose average score was 
68.31 (a = 6.19). The scores were found to be significantly different between the two 
groups (/(30) = -8.274/?<.001).
A One-way ANOVA found a significant difference between the high and low 
imagery groups pertaining to negatively cued future thinking (F(l, 30)= 6.753, /?=.014), 
with the low imagery group being more specific in their generation of negative future 
events (M=4.25, a = 1.57) relative to the high imagery group (M= 2.81, a = 1.60). No 
such difference was observed in relation to positive future thinking (p=.630). These 
results show high imagery abilities as related to decreased specificity in generation of 
negative relative to positive future events. This ability was further qualified by those high 
in imagery reporting increased frequency of consideration for such negative events. No 
relation was observed pertaining to depression levels, though the Depression group was 
seen to consider negative events more frequently than the Non-Depression group.
2.5.2.10 Emotional Avoidance
The AAQ-2 was found to correlate negatively with the BDI-II (r = -.369, p  =
.037), that is, those displaying low levels of emotional avoidance (as represented by a
high score on the AAQ-2) were found to report low levels of depression. Though, no
correlations were found for the AAQ-2 scores and future event specificity on any level of
analysis. A marginal negative correlation was observed for the AAQ-2 and increased
reports of previous recall of negative future events (r = -.348, p  = .061). The near
proximity of positive future events was found to be related to reduced emotional
avoidance {r = -.341, p  = .056). Similarly, vantage point in future events experienced
from a first person perspective was found to relate to low emotional avoidance (r = .376,
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p = .034). A split group analysis found an approaching correlation for the AAQ-2 and 
positive frequency (r = .456, p  = .078) within the Non-Depressed group. For the 
Depressed group the only correlation found with the AAQ-2 was a marginal relation with 
the reported level of expectancy for negative events occurring (r = -.471,/? < .070).
Emotional avoidance was found to correlate with category D of the W IQ  (r = -
.333, p  -  .062), namely ‘a country scene which involves trees, mountains and a lake’. 
Here, less emotional avoidance corresponded to higher reports of visual imagery of the 
described occurrence. No such correlation was found at the split level of analysis for the 
Non-Depressed group, however, within the Depression group a negative correlation was 
found for the AAQ-2 and category D of the W IQ  (r = -.636, p  = .011). These findings 
show that, as in Experiment lb, emotional avoidance did not relate to FES per se. 
Though, proximity and positive valence of future events, along with first person 
perspective was related to lower levels of emotional avoidance.
2.5.3 Summary
No group differences were found for mental imagery as assessed by the W IQ . 
These findings are in contrast to those of Stober (2000), who found depressed mood to 
pertain to decreased imagery of positive future events. Nor are the findings from 
Bywaters, Andrade and Turpin (2004) supported in regards to improved vividness of 
imagery for either valence category. Interestingly, a relationship was observed for 
imagery and level of specificity to negatively cued future events. By dichotomising the 
imagery scores high and low imagery groups were compared on their level of specificity; 
and a significant difference between these groups was found for negatively cued future 
thinking, with the high imagery group being less specific in their generation of negative 
future events. Imagery ability also correlated with rate of previous consideration of 
negative future events. Table 24 summarises key findings from Experiment 2b.
As in Experiment lb FES differences emerged for positive future events, with the
Non-Depressed group demonstrating a greater ability to generate such events relative to
the Depressed group. The subjective characteristics further informed this finding with a
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group difference observed in relation to vantage point of the future event generated, as 
the Non-Depressed group reported a first person perspective in their perception of future 
events overall. A valence bias was observed in this regard with positive future events 
more notably experienced from the first person vantage point. Both groups demonstrated 
a valence discrepancy in terms of reports of more clarity of detail and stronger affect 
related to positive future events. However, only the Non-Depressed group reported 
increased episodes of thinking about positive future events relative to negative future 
events. This positivity bias in the Non-Depressed group was further extended by reports 
of a stronger belief in the likelihood of such positive events occurring relative to the 
Depressed group. Thus, the Non-Depressed group anticipated significantly more positive 
events to take place in the near future relative to the Depressed group.
No correlations were found for emotional avoidance and future event specificity 
on any level of analysis. However, from phenomenological characteristics, in form of 
reports based on the subjective experience of the prospective events, it was seen that low 
emotional avoidance related to events experienced from a first person perspective, as 
well as increased cognitions pertaining to negative future experiences. Similarly, low 
emotional avoidance correlated with the increased proximity of positive events. Within 
the Non-Depressed group it was also seen that low emotional avoidance related to 
increased consideration of positive events. For the Depressed group, it was again found 
that reported use of avoidant strategies were associated with increased expectancy of 
negative events occurring. Within the Depressed group a negative relationship for 
emotional avoidance and imagery ability was found, however this was limited to 
correlations with category D of the W IQ  specifically.
Overall, these findings may serve some purpose in explaining the relative lack of
correlation between emotional avoidance and specificity in future thinking as seen in
Experiment lb and 2b, as it appears here that constructing images of future experiences
may pertain more to an overall ability to assemble such images rather than the emotional
content of such events. It may be that future events are more schema based and omit any
painful personal material and thus lack subjective experiential content which is found in
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personal recall. That is, as future events are inherently fictional, fusion with such content 
may as such occur to a lesser degree than events from the past, that entail a ‘true’ quality. 
These findings are particularly relevant in regards to the development of hopelessness 
about the future, which is a recognised feature in depression. As hopelessness has been 
noted to occur in relation to the predictive certainty of future events occurring it appears 
that specificity of future events may be measuring a different quality to such expected 
likelihood of events occurring. As such the FCT may not be able to detect the features 
associated with the development of this predictive certainty.
148
Table 24. Summary of Main Aims and Findings from Experiment 2b.
Research Aim Hypothesis Main Findings
1 Replicating and 
supporting the 
findings from 
Experiment lb.
Examine W IQ  
levels in a sub- 
clinical population.
Sub-clinically depressed 
individuals will demonstrate 
differing levels of FES 
relative to non-depressed 
individuals.
Sub-clinically depressed 
individuals will differ from 
healthy participants in their 
imagery abilities as 
measured by the WIQ.
The hypothesis is partially supported.
Marginal group differences were found for total 
FES (p=.068) and Positive FES (p=.063), with 
the Depressed group demonstrating reduced FES 
relative to the Non-Depressed group.
The hypothesis is not supported.
No group differences were found for WIQ.
3 Explore
independently 
measured imagery 
abilities (W IQ) in 
relation to 
phenomenological 
characteristics of 
future events.
4 Examine the 
relationship 
between emotional 
avoidance, as 
measured by the 
AAQ-II, and 
imagery ability, as 
measured by the 
W IQ.
Expression of positive and 
negative future event 
phenomenological 
characteristics will differ 
between those who report 
high levels of vividness in 
imagery as measured by the 
WIQ relative to those who 
report low levels of WIQ.
There is a relationship 
between imagery ability and 
emotional avoidance as 
measured by the AAQ-II.
The hypothesis is partially supported.
The relationship was found to be valence 
specific:
A negative relationship was found between 
W IQ  total scores and specificity of negatively 
cued future events (p<.05).
The W IQ  was not found to relate to positive 
specificity or total future event specificity.
A positive relationship was found for imagery 
ability and frequency of negative thought 
(p=. 05).
A significant difference was found between the 
high and low imagery groups with the low 
imagery group being more specific in their 
generation of negative future events (p=.05).
No such difference was observed in relation to 
positive future events.
The hypothesis is supported.
A negative relationship approached significance 
for emotional avoidance and category D of the 
W IQ  (p=.062).
Within group analysis found a negative 
relationship for emotional avoidance and 
category D of the W IQ  (p<.05) within the 
Depressed group.
Note. Low emotional avoidance is denoted by a high score on the AAQ-II.
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2.6. General Discussion
Experiment la and lb had three main aims: (1) to examine the AMT level of 
sensitivity in relation to sub-clinical depression; (2) to examine reported levels of 
emotional avoidance (AAQ-II) in relation to phenomenological characteristics of positive 
and negative past events specificity as measured by the Memory Characteristics 
Questionnaire (MCQ) in relation to the valence of thoughts about the past (Experiment 
la) and for the future (Experiment lb); and (3) to examine emotional avoidance (AAQ- 
II) in relation to past and future positive and negative event specificity. The results for 
memory specificity in sub-clinically depressed persons were similar to previous research 
with depressed individuals (cf. Williams, 2007 for a review). Although, the present 
findings suggest there may be an event valence effect interacting with specificity of 
recall. However, findings in relation to specificity in future episodic thinking were more 
ambiguous and not in line with previous findings in the literature (e.g. Williams, 1996). 
A possible confounding variable in Experiments la and lb was individual differences in 
mental imagery ability. In order to control for such individual differences Experiments 2a 
and 2b aimed to examine the role of imagery in the construction of past and future 
events. The main aim for Experiment 2a and 2b was to (1) independently account for 
imagery abilities by use of an independent imagery ability measure, the W IQ , and to 
explore the W IQ  responses in regards to specificity of past recall and future thinking as 
measured by the AMT and FCT respectively.
The findings from Experiment 2b indicated no differences between sub-clinically
Depressed and Non-Depressed individuals in the ability to generate visual images.
However, looking at imagery as separate from depression it was observed that some
differences emerged in terms of imagery ability and the specificity of future events
generated. Specifically, the results showed low imagery abilities to be related to
increased specificity in generation of negative relative to positive future events. A brief
content analysis of the future events generated revealed that participants reported future
experiences pertaining to typical of events socially expected to occur within a lifetime.
This may indicate that the constructed images were schema-consistent relative to more
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elaborative personal accounts of future events. In such a case, those who were low in 
imagery abilities may likely have made more extensive use of such commonly expected 
life events, relative to more personal content, in their reports of future scenarios. In 
particular, increased specificity may come from the contextual information and repeated 
rehearsal through presentation of such socially expected events in common 
conversations, media and other vicarious circumstances. In comparison, those high in 
imagery may have been more hesitant in their description of future negative events due to 
the connotations associated with such more personal descriptions, that is, mood 
regulation strategies may have been induced in an attempt to diffuse the emerging picture 
so as to restore the commonly denoted positivity bias individuals hold in regards to future 
expectations (Taylor & Brown, 1988). A commonly denoted problem with explicit tasks 
is that they allow participants to elaborate on responses rather than provide the more 
instant responses, as such demand characteristics pertaining to social desirability is a 
common problem in research on socially sensitive issues. Specifically the suppression on 
ratings for phenomenal characteristics associated with mental time travel may be 
influenced by self-presentation or self-disclosure, which have notably been found to 
correlate with suppression (see Gross & John, 2003).
On a related note, it may be suggested here that more specific negative events 
emerged for the low imagery compared to the high imagery group as the latter were less 
able to focus on negative events as they ‘automatically’ conjure up positive alternatives 
and find it easier to imagine a wider range of outcomes. It may also be that no such 
difference was found for generated positive events, because there is a stronger tendency 
to engage in problem solving strategies, and as such imagine various alternatives, in 
response to negative outcomes. This suggestion is supported by the finding that those 
high in imagery were also seen to previously have talked or thought about negative future 
events more frequently than those low in imagery. Raes et al. (2005) have shown that 
rumination is negatively correlated with problem-solving effectiveness and that OGM has 
been seen to mediate the relationship between rumination and effective problem solving. 
Secondly, imagery ability was not found to affect past recall, debatably as past content is
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more personal. Thus it can be argued that imagery would be seen to affect such 
previously experienced descriptions to a lesser extent than future events.
The degree of AMS in the current series of experiments was notably restricted by 
emotional avoidance as pertaining to experiential avoidance and suppression of personal 
past experiences. However, the reduction of specificity in regards to positive events 
relative to negative events was unexpected in regards to the literature (e.g. Williams, 
2007 for a review). This may be a relevant finding for the future thinking literature where 
it has been suggested that reduced positive expectations is a prominent feature of 
depression (e.g. Macleod et al., 1997). In this respect it may be inferred that reduced 
future expectancy arises from an initial obstruction of positive event details in memory 
and as such inhibits the capacity to form future event scenarios, as access to the 
knowledge of such scenarios is limited. This finding fits with theories suggesting that the 
core feature of autobiographical memory is to instruct future thinking (e.g. Addis, Wong, 
& Schacter, 2007; Schacter & Addis, 2007).
However, the question as to why positive event specificity is reduced, relative to
negative events, still remains. One potential explanation may come from theories on
mood congruence in memory (e.g. Bower, 1981). According to Bower (1981) current
levels of mood bias the retrieval of memories consistent with current mood. Teasdale
(1988) has suggested that mood state is linked to depression vulnerability and serves as
an attentional bias towards negative memories. This bias subsequently works to enhance
and prolong such depressive mood. As such depressed mood would be seen to facilitate
the retrieval of negative events prior to retrieval of positive events. This is linked to
theories which suggest that across time people prefer to maintain a coherent sense of self,
be it positive or negative, and any past recall or future scenario would be adopted that
incorporates such coherence, particularly pertaining to goal-directed behaviours (e.g.
Conway & Pleydell-Pearce, 2000). In this regard Conway (2001), suggest that episodic
memory serve the function of keeping track of ongoing goal processing, whereof mental
images, with reference to visual imagery, play an important role in representing
information about such personal goals (Conway, Meares, & Standart, 2004). As such
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episodic future thinking is also closely related to personal goals, as thinking about the 
future involves generating future states of the self related to current goals, that is, 
perceived success or failure to attain personal goals, which are believable in relation to 
the self image the individual perceived in the current context (Atance & O’Neill, 2001).
One characteristic noted in depression is reduced engagement in a social context, 
the potential development of this (lack of) behaviour may be noted in terms of a lack of 
exposure to positive cues as seen for the Depression group in Experiment 2a who were 
noted to be less specific in positive event recall. Overall, the findings from the AMT 
experiments (i.e. la and 2a) were somewhat consistent with the existing literature that 
emphasizes the use of past experiences in construction of future experiences. That is, if 
someone is suppressing details of past experiences this likely expands to future thinking, 
and positive as well as negative emotional content as these are relationally framed in an 
‘if - then’ comparison, i.e. ‘if negative now it will be negative then [in the future]’. This 
extends to the relation between valence categories as it can be denoted that if something 
is seen as negative it is also seen as not positive, as such it may be that the way this is 
manifested in verbal behaviour is through rule governed behaviour, that is, pessimism 
per se is not commonly reinforced, thus the expression of such thoughts become re­
framed as less positive rather than more negative per se.
Across all four experiments an emotion regulation strategy (i.e. high versus low 
avoidant) and visual imagery ability (high versus low) affected the phenomenological 
characteristics associated with past and future cognition in a similar way. These results 
extend previous studies (e.g. D’Argembeau & Van der Linden, 2006; Richards & Gross, 
2000; Rubin & Siegler, 2004) by showing that individual differences in adopted 
avoidance coping strategies, in form of emotional inhibition, affect not only the
I subjective experience of memory for past events but also the phenomenology associated
|
with mental time travel into the future.
I
I The content of the past and future events generated by the participants were seen
j  to relate to similar domains (e.g. education or work, parties, exchanges with relatives or|
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friends, romantic relationships, illness), with the exception of the birth of a child or
episodes with a child, which were only noted in response to cues for the future thinking
paradigm. Overall, it can be said that the past and future events formed a fairly typical
sample of events that characterize general life experiences (D’Argembeau & Van der
Linden, 2006). Further investigation of the phenomenological characteristics pertaining
to the generated events found that for both future thinking experiments a clear valence
bias was observed, with apparent group differences. That is, the Non-Depressed
participants reported more clarity, greater affect and more frequent consideration of
positive future events. Additionally, the Non-Depressed group reported viewing these
positive events from a first person perspective to a greater degree, as well as perceiving
positive events to be more likely to occur, and for such events to be occurring in the near
future. A similar pattern was observed in regards to the two memory experiments, that is,
the positivity effect was again clearly notable within the Non-Depressed group. With
positive memories reported to be of events within the recent past and having retrieved
positive past events more frequently than negative events. While Depressed individuals
were seen to respond to these characteristics by an inverse pattern relative to the Non-
Depressed individuals, in parallel across past and future measures. Overall these results
are consistent with previous findings which have reported subjective phenomenological
characteristics related to remembering past events to similarly affect the experience
associated with future thinking (e.g. D’Argembeau & Van der Linden, 2006); thus
supporting the suggestion that mental time travel into the past and into the future are
related (e.g. Atance & O’Neill, 2001; Suddendorf & Corballis, 1997). However two
notable points from the investigation of the subjective experience of past and future
events relates to the perceived vantage point and frequency of thought. That is, whereas
in normal perception events are more often viewed from the field perspective, i.e., from a
person’s own standpoint (Nigro & Neisser, 1983), it is argued that perceptual alteration is
adopted as an initially adaptive strategy to detach oneself from stress and negative
emotions evoked by the event (Spiegel & Cardeiia, 1991), as such a variation in
perspective to an observer point of view, i.e., experienced as if the person is watching the
event from an outsiders point of view (Yuille & Daylen, 1998) was noted in the
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Depression group relative to the Non-Depressed group in relation to both past and future 
events. This postulate is supported across experiments as it was consistently found that 
emotional avoidance correlated with perceived perceptual vantage point, with those high 
in emotional avoidance more likely to report observing past and future events from an 
observer perspective.
Second, in reference to past events, the frequency of recall (e.g. previous 
consideration of events by discussion or private thought) is known to influence the 
strength of memory of events, and as such can improve representation of that event 
(Read & Connolly, 2005). Such persistent thoughts, or rumination over events, may act 
as a type of rehearsal which infers greater retention of past event details (Scrivner & 
Safer, 1988; Yuille & Daylen, 1998). However, the adoption of avoidant strategies where 
events are consciously suppressed may lead to reduced details in relation to recall 
(Cooper, 2004). Although, Wegner (1989, 1994) has argued for the opposite result, 
where thought avoidance could lead to a ‘rebound’ effect, where such attempts of 
cognitive avoidance may in fact lead to increased thoughts about the event. Rumination 
has been noted in depressive samples and as such one may have expected there to be a 
group difference in relation to consideration of negative events between the sub clinically 
Depressed and Non-Depressed samples within the foregoing experiments (e.g. 
Experiments la  and 2a), however, it was seen that no differences were observed in 
regards to negative frequency of thought between groups, however, positive frequency 
markedly differed between groups in relation to past and future events; with the Non- 
Depressed group reporting more frequent consideration of positive past and future 
events. As such it appears that emotional avoidance as a mediating factor may be able to 
explain some of the variance between groups in regards to the subjective experience of 
past and future events.
In general the findings from Experiments la, lb, 2a and 2b offer new evidence
consistent with the suggestion that mental time travel into the past and into the future is
related (Atance & O’Neill, 2001; Suddendorf & Corballis, 1997), by demonstrating that
remembering past events is affected in a similar manner to projecting oneself into the
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future by individual difference dimensions that influence such subjective experiences. 
Overall the discrepancies observed in these experiments pertain mainly to the 
inconsistent findings from the FCT in relation to future cognitions. The experiments 
reported herein involved the experimentally cued projection of thoughts rather than 
personally cued future thoughts. However, future research should examine whether the 
use of personally constructed accounts of future events would provide more information 
about the link between future cognitions, depression and emotional avoidance.
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Chapter 3
Positive vs. Negative Cognitions and 
Expectancy for the Future
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3.1 General Introduction
The ability to anticipate future events in order to plan and organise ones actions is 
vital in many aspects of people’s lives and in the past few years, future-oriented 
cognition has received a great deal of attention in various areas of psychology (for 
reviews, see e.g. Atance & O’Neill, 2001; Schacter, Addis, & Buckner, 2008; 
Suddendorf & Corballis, 2007; Szpunar, 2010). One of the major reasons for this 
research interest has been the emerging link between perceptions of future thinking and 
psychological disorders such as depression and anxiety (MacLeod, Pankhania, Lee, & 
Mitchell, 1997). Specifically, perceptions of the future are one aspect of the concept 
hopelessness, which, in turn, is a prominent feature in many psychological disorders and 
is also linked to suicidal ideation (e.g. MacLeod, et al., 1997; MacLeod, Rose, & 
Williams, 1993; O’Connor & Sheehy, 2000). That is, a pessimistic and negative view of 
one’s personal future is commonly observed in people suffering from depression, 
something that has been emphasised in several efforts to formulate depression (e.g. 
Abramson, Alloy, & Metalsky, 1989; Beck, Rush, Shaw, & Emery, 1979).
As with autobiographical knowledge regarding the past, knowledge relating to 
personal futures (e.g. thoughts of anticipated lifetime events) can be accessed without 
necessarily generating mental representations of specific events. That is, people may 
generate a positive or negative general view of the future, in terms of an optimistic or 
pessimistic outlook based on abstract knowledge regarding personal future experiences in 
relation to their awareness of goals and expected lifetime periods. Research show that 
people reportedly spend almost twice as much time thinking about the future as they do 
the past (38% vs. 21% of their time; Jason, Schade, Furo, Reichler & Brickman, 1989). 
As seen in Chapter 2 (see Section 2.3) laboratory studies of episodic future thought have 
also borrowed from the autobiographical memory literature, but have been more 
concerned with examining the specific content of experimenter cued future scenarios. 
However it is likely that many future-oriented thoughts consist of more abstract 
representations (D’Argembeau, Renaud, & Van der Linden, 2009). Though, recent 
research have for the most part focused on episodic forms of future thinking (i.e. the
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mental simulation of specific future events) (e.g. Addis, Wong, & Schacter, 2008; 
D’Argembeau & Van der Linden, 2006; Hunter & O’Connor, 2003; MacLeod, 
Pankhania, Lee, & Mitchell, 1997; MacLeod, Rose, & Williams, 1993; MacLeod et al., 
1998; O’Connor, Connery, & Cheyne, 2000; Szpunar & McDermott, 2008).
A wealth of research looking into optimism versus pessimism in relation to future 
thinking originated with MacLeod and colleagues, who were interested in determining 
whether hopelessness, characterised by negative future expectancies, was functionally 
equivalent, to the lack of positive future expectations, beyond its original formulation by 
Beck and colleagues (Beck, Weissman, Lester, & Trexler, 1974; Conway & Pleydell- 
Pearce, 2000). That is, MacLeod and colleagues were interested in understanding if 
worry about the future (i.e. negative expectations) denoted a different experience than 
foreseeing no positive events occurring in the future. MacLeod and colleagues found that 
reduced positive future expectancy is related to hopelessness and depression whereas 
increased negative future expectancy is related to worry and anxiety. According to these 
authors the experiences are functionally different, something which may have 
implications for understanding how to target such behaviours in intervention and 
treatment approaches.
Researchers in the area of future-thinking have followed two lines of
investigation in the exploration of its links with pathology and psychological disorders,
namely specificity and fluency of episodic future events (e.g. Williams et al., 1996;
MacLeod et al., 1993, 1997) with the fluency literature increasingly also attending to the
belief in such anticipated events occurring (e.g. MacLeod et al., 1997; O’Connor et al.,
2000, 2008). More specifically, several studies have been looking at subjective abilities
in the generation of positive and negative future events with a given time limit. Findings
from this work have suggested that fluency for positive future events is reduced in
depressed and suicidal individuals, whereas fluency for negative future events appears to
be increased for anxious individuals (e.g. MacLeod et al. 1997; Conaghan & Davidson,
2002; Hunter & O’Connor, 2003). In this work hopelessness has been termed a
‘characteristic orientation to the future in depression’ (Beck, Riskind, Brown, & Steer,
1988) whereas worry is seen as a characteristic of anxiety (Barlow, 1988; Molina &
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Borkovec, 1994). Although a negative view of the future has been seen as also 
incorporating the absence of a positive future outlook (e.g., Abramson, Alloy, & 
Metalsky, 1989), and a negative view of the future is believed to be an important feature 
of depression (e.g., Abramson et al., 1989; Beck, Rush, Shaw, & Emery, 1979); there is 
increasing evidence to suggest that positive and negative cognitions concerning the 
future may best be thought of as two separate dimensions of experience (MacLeod, 
Byrne, & Valentine, 1996). Furthermore, attention has been directed to accounts of the 
belief in future events occurring, i.e. individual expectancies have been investigated in 
the future thinking field. By employing a method that asks participants to rate how likely 
they believe particular hypothetical events are to happen in their personal future, an 
individual future probability measure is obtained. For example, research has shown that 
healthy individuals believe good things are more likely to happen to them than bad things 
(Sedikides & Gregg, 2008; Taylor & Brown, 1988; Robinson & Ryff, 1999; Weinstein, 
1980); though the same is seemingly not true for dysphoric groups (e.g. MacLeod & 
Cropley, 1995). That is to say, mixed findings were reported in some early studies 
looking to compare clinical and non-clinical groups in their estimates of negative future 
event likelihood, with individuals with dysphoric mood giving higher likelihood 
estimates than controls with regards to negative future events (depressed patients: Butler 
& Mathews, 1983; MacLeod et al., 1997; dysphoric students: Anderson, Spielman, & 
Bargh, 1992; Pietromonaco & Markus, 1985). However, more recent samples from the 
literature have demonstrated reports of individuals with mood disturbance as offering 
lower estimates of positive future events than controls (depressed patients; MacLeod & 
Cropley, 1995; Pysczcynski & Greenberg, 1987; dysphoric students: Andersen, et al. 
1992).
Experiment lb and 2b in Chapter 2 present interesting results with regards to the 
additional inclusion of the FCQ, that is, likelihood ratings (i.e. the belief in events 
actually occurring) were seen to correlate with emotional avoidance and levels of 
depression, relative to future specificity. Results from the FCT utilised in Experiments lb 
and 2b follows the line of investigations looking at specificity, and in its own regard is
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unable to account for fluency per se, nor expectancy. Furthermore, the literature 
pertaining to fluency has paid more close attention to the valence of events, something 
which arose as a relevant factor in the foregoing experiments (lb and 2b). These findings 
are in line with MacLeod and colleagues who designed a task that would specifically 
target valence differences in participant samples, i.e. the ’Future Thinking Task (FTT: 
see Sections 1.4.1.2.2 and 3.2.1.2) (MacLeod, Rose & Williams, 1993; MacLeod et al., 
1997). The valence diverge was initially noted in work with suicidal samples, where it 
was found that reduced generation of positive future events may be characteristic of 
depressed and suicidal ideation, whereas fluency for negative future events appear to be 
related more notably to anxiety (e.g. MacLeod et al. 1997; Conaghan & Davidson, 2002; 
Hunter & O’Connor, 2003). Initial findings with the Future Thinking Task (e.g. 
MacLeod, Byrne, & Valentine, 1996) have supported the postulate that positive and 
negative cognitions concerning the future represent two separate aspects of experience. 
As such, the Future Thinking Task may be able to more clearly address one other finding 
within the foregoing experiments, that is, in relation to the strength of belief in events 
occurring. The findings from both Experiment lb and 2b indicated that emotional 
avoidance was linked to an increased expectancy of negative events occurring amongst 
the sub clinically depressed samples. As the FTT incorporates an event probability rating 
pertaining to the personal events generated and this task may be able to offer greater 
insight in to the relation between emotional avoidance and future thinking. Thus, the FTT 
offers an account of individual expectancies, by asking participants to rate how likely 
they believe privately primed and generated events are to happen in their personal future, 
thus obtaining individual future probability measures. As noted, discrepancies have been 
observed between studies of healthy and dysphoric participants reported future 
expectancies, with an increased positive bias in the healthy population (e.g. MacLeod et 
al., 1996 and MacLeod & Cropley, 1995). There are two reasons why the FTT may 
address apparent shortcomings of the FCT in facilitating and accounting for contact with 
more personally relevant content for two reasons; first, the FTT addresses privately 
primed and not experimentally cued events. Second, the FTT captures reports of fluency 
and probability.
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To this end, the series of experiments reported herein aim to evaluate a research 
method of future thinking, namely the Future Thinking Task (MacLeod et al. 1993; 
1997) which allows one to more clearly obtain a measure of future expectancy in relation 
to depression.
3.2 Experiment 3
Given the inconsistencies in findings within the future thinking literature 
regarding dysphoric participants, Experiment 3 aims to investigate the application of the 
Future Thinking Task (MacLeod et al. 1993; 1997) across a sub-clinical sample of 
depressed and healthy control undergraduate students. More specifically Experiment 3 
has four main aims, (1) to examine if the FTT is an efficient measure in its employment 
within a sub-clinical population; it is predicted that future thinking levels, as measured by 
the FTT, will differ between sub-clinically depressed individuals relative to non- 
depressed individuals, as measured by the BDI-II. If was further sought to (2) examine if 
the valence and group interaction found in previous clinical samples is present in a sub- 
clinical population. It is predicted, in line with previous clinical research on the Future 
Thinking Task, that there will be an interaction between valence (Positive/Negative) as 
measured by the FTT and group (Depressed/Non-Depressed) as measured by the BDI-II, 
in relation to future positive thinking. A further aim (3) is to determine if future 
expectancy, relative to fluency in generation of future events, would offer further insight 
to the role of cognitions about the future in relation to depression; It is predicted that 
positive future expectancy, as measured by the FTT, will differ between sub-clinically 
depressed individuals relative to non-depressed individuals as measured by the BDI-II. 
Lastly (4), it was sought to examine the relationship between emotional avoidance 
(AAQ-II) and future expectancy (FTT). It is predicted that there will be a relationship 
between emotional avoidance and future expectancy.
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3.2.1 M ethod
3.2.1.1 Participants
Thirty-one adults from Swansea University volunteered to take part in the current 
experiment in return for course credit, though after exclusion criteria pertaining to BDI-II 
scores (the criteria for inclusion is detailed in section 3.2.2.1) data from five participants 
was removed, thus only data from twenty-six participants was utilised in the following 
analysis. As such, the subsequent information pertains to the included twenty six 
undergraduate students (18 female; 8 male) from Swansea University. The participants 
ages ranged from 18 to 26 years of age with a mean age of 20.57 (a = 1.96).
3.2.1.2 Apparatus and Materials
Participants were requested to complete a set of psychological measures. These 
measures were the same as employed throughout the experimental series presented in 
Chapter 2, that is the Beck Depression Inventory 2nd version (BDI-II; Beck, Steer & 
Brown, 1996), The Beck Hopelessness Scale (BHS; Beck & Steer, 1988), The State Trait 
Inventory, (STAI-S; Spielberger, Gorsuch, & Lushene ,1970; Spielberger et al., 1983) , 
the Life-Orientation Scale (LOT-R; Scheier, Carver, & Bridges, 1994), The Acceptance 
and Action Questionaire-2 (AAQ-2; Bond, Hayes, Baer, Carpenter, Orcutt, Waltz & 
Zettle (Submitted); Hayes, Strosahl, et al., 2004), The Positive and Negative Affective 
Scale (PANAS; Watson, Clark, & Tellegen, 1988) and a verbal fluency measure (Lezak, 
1976).
The Future Thinking Task (FTT; MacLeod et al. 1993; 1997). The FTT is an
experimenter led task which requires participants to think of potential future experiences
that they are looking forward to (i.e. positive future experiences; e.g., ‘Please try to think
of as many things as you can that you’re looking forward to (things that you enjoy) over
the next year’) and not looking forward to (negative future experiences); with this request
made in the context of three separate time periods, i.e. the next week (including ‘today’),
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the next year and the next five to ten years). Thus participants have to promptly state out 
loud examples of events evaluated as good or bad that might occur in their own personal 
future (future event fluency). The order of completion of positive and negative conditions 
(Valence) is commonly counterbalanced, with half of the participants completing the 
positive condition first while the other half complete the negative condition first. The 
order of presentation of time periods within each condition is invariable (i.e., the next 
week, year, 5-10 years; Figure 5 presents the cycle of items as presented during the FTT). 
On each occasion, participants have 60 seconds to generate thoughts of future 
experiences for the set time period; this is repeated until all six Valence and Time 
Periods are assessed. Participants are informed that the responses can be trivial or 
important, and that they should report whatever comes to mind, though emphasis is put 
on considering events that are going to happen, or are reasonably likely to happen. 
Participants are told to persist in their attempts to generate responses until the time-limit 
elapse.
i) Evaluation o f  Future Events
In the revised version of the FTT (MacLeod et al., 1997), participants are further 
asked to rate each future experience generated, in the valence and time instances, on how 
likely each event is to happen (Likelihood rating), with response options of ‘not at all’ (1) 
to ‘extremely’ likely (7). The experimenter reads back to each participant the events they 
generated in the fluency task and make a note of the participant responses. Lastly, 
participants are again re-read the future events generated and asked to nominate how they 
would feel at the time if the described event was to occur in the future (Feeling value), on 
a seven-point scale ranging from ‘extremely unhappy’ (-3) to ‘extremely happy’ (+3). 
For both evaluation tasks participants first rate all events for positivity (negativity), and 
then all events for negativity (positivity), to ensure that they do not merely rate an event’s 
negativity (positivity) by giving the inverse of its positivity (negativity) score. The 
constructs are measured separately; as research suggests that positive and negative affect 
are not uni-dimensional (MacLeod & Byrne, 1996; Watson, Clark, & Carey, 1988).
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Verbal Fluency Control Task, In line with previous FTT studies (cf. MacLeod & 
Byrne, 1996; MacLeod et al., 1993; MacLeod, Tata et al., 1998; O’Connor et al., 2007; 
Bjarhead et al., 2010) prior to the FTT participants perform a standard Verbal Fluency 
Task (Lezak, 1976) in order to bring to light any likely differences between groups in 
general cognitive processing. The task requires the participants to think of, and to report 
out loud, as many words as possible beginning with certain letters from the alphabet, e.g. 
the three letters F, A, S are commonly used. Participants are typically given 60 seconds, 
for each letter, in which to state aloud as many words as they can, excluding repetitions, 
proper nouns, numbers and sequences which involve the same basic word (i.e., swim, 
swimming, swimmer). The score is the mean of all the words generated (minus any 
exclusions) within the given time frame.
How w ould you FEEL 
if it did happen?
In th e  Next W eek 
(including today)
In th e  Next 5-10 Years
How LIKELY do you 
think it is for this to  
happen?
In th e  Next Year
Please think of as many 
things you can which you 
are (not) looking forward 
to:
Figure 5. The Future Thinking Task: The cycle depicts the order of sequence for each of the Three Time 
Periods and the presentation of the Valence, Likelihood and Feeling Questions employed in Experiment 3.
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3.2.1.3 Experim ental Overview
The current study used a 2 x 2 x 3 mixed design, with Group (Depression: Low 
BDI-II, High BDI-II) as the between participant variable and Valence (Future 
Cognitions: Positive/Negative) and Period (Week, Year, 5-10 years) as the within 
participant variables. All participants completed all tasks and measures; the experimental 
sequence is depicted in Figure 6.
3.2.1.4 Ethical Issues
In order to conduct the experiment according to the appropriate ethical guidelines 
as identified by the British Psychological Society (2006), precautionary measures were 
explicitly employed in Experiment 3. The steps taken were consistent with those 
employed in previous experiments (i.e., Experiment la, lb, 2a and 2b, see Section 2.2.1.4 
for full details). The only variation implemented for Experiment 3 relate to the specific 
experiment information, i.e. the nature and procedural details of Experiment 3 as detailed 
in the written and verbal experimental briefs. A ‘cooling off period of a minimum 24 
hours was implemented between receiving information about the experiment and 
participation commencement, as in the previous experiments. Emphasis was again given 
in the brief and debrief to any psychological distress that may arise following the 
experimental procedures. At no point during the experiment did any participant withdraw 
from the study or express dissatisfaction or distress of any kind. No participants reported 
emotional upset in relation to the future events generated. The experiment was approved 
by the Psychology Department Ethics Committee at Swansea University prior to 
commencement of the study.
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Participant Sample (N= 31)
Total sample complete Questionnaires (randomised order of 1st presentation between 
participants) BDI-II, STAI, BHS, LOT-R, AAQ-II, PANAS
Total sample complete the Verbal Fluency Control Task 
(randomised 1st presentation of letters F, A, S between participants)
Step 1: Generation of Positive/Negative future events for next week/next year/next 5-10years
Total sample complete the Future Thinking Task (randomised 1st presentation of positive or 
negative future events between participants)
Step 3: Feeling rating of Positive/Negative future event upon occurrence.
Step 2: Likelihood rating of Positive/Negative future event occurrence.
• i
■ i
■ i
• * j
Post-Experimental/Pre-Analysis BDI-II Group Split (see Section 3.2.2.1):
Low BDI-B score (1<10): N= 16 (BDI-II = 0, excluded from analysis, N = 4) 
High BDI-II score (10<30): N= 10 (BDI-II score >29, excluded from analysis, N =  1) 
Final sample for analysis: N - 2 6
Figure 6 . Overview of the Experimental Sequence for Experiment 3.
3.2.1.5 Procedure
Participants were welcomed and seated in a specifically utilized psychology lab 
consisting of only a table and chairs. Participants were informed as to the nature of the
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study and requested to complete a consent form prior to commencement of the study. All 
instructions were provided in writing and verbally.
Upon commencement of the study participants firstly completed the Verbal 
Fluency Control Task (VFCT) followed by the Future Thinking Task (FTT); participants 
were informed about the procedural sequence of the Future Thinking Task (MacLeod et 
al., 1998) and were presented with the three set time periods in which to generate future 
events: the next week, the next year, and the next 5-10 years, at separate intervals. The 
measure included positive (looking forward to/would like to happen) and negative (not 
looking forward to/would not like to happen) conditions, presented consecutively, such 
that the entire task was made up of six trials, three positive and three negative, across 
each of the three time periods. In accordance with previous research with the FTT each 
trial was completed in 60 seconds. Upon completion of the initial part of the FTT, that is 
after having generated future events for each of the three time frames across both valence 
categories, participants were firstly asked to rate how likely each event was to happen, 
using a scale of 1 (not at all) to 7 (extremely) and subsequently, upon rating events 
within both valence categories, participants were asked to rate how they would feel at the 
time of the event occurring, on a scale from -3 (very unhappy) to +3 (very happy). The 
events generated during the first phase of the experiment were read back to the 
participants in order for them to be able to conduct the likelihood and feeling ratings for 
each individual event generated, for instance if in the positive condition, in response to 
the time period of the next year, a participant responded: 7 look forward to getting my 
driver’s license in the next year’, this reply was noted down by the experimenter and 
rephrased by the experimenter in phase two to provide for the evaluation of the 
anticipated events, e.g. ‘How likely do you think it is that you will get your driver’s 
license in the next year?’ and ‘Ifyou did get your license - How will you feel at the time 
when you know you have passed the test?.
Following the FTT participants were asked to complete the set of questionnaires
(BDI-II, BHS, AAQ-II, STAI, PANAS & LOT-R). The questionnaires were given out in
a randomised order with no time restrictions set for completion. On completion of all
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tests, participants were thanked and suitably debriefed with additional reference to a 
written debriefing sheet provided for the participant to retain.
3.2.2 Results and Discussion
3.2.2.1 Group Allocation
As in Chapter 2 (see Section 2.2.2.1), in order to more accurately capture healthy 
participants and those at a sub-clinical level of depression, set cut off points were utilised 
in group categorisation. The cut off point for inclusion in the no depression group was a 
score of 1< 10, thus participants presenting scores of 1-9 (N = 16; M  — 3.87) on the BDI- 
II were included in this group (Non-Depressed Group). For inclusion in the sub-clinical 
depression group BDI-II scores recorded where 10 < 30 (N= 10; M= 14.60; Depressed 
Group). Data from five participants were excluded from the statistical analysis as they 
were found to report a BDI-II score of 0 (N= 4) or above 29 (N= \ \ M=  30).
Group differences were observed with respect to BDI-II scores, with participants 
in the Non-Depressed group reporting significantly lower BDI scores than the 
corresponding depressed group, £(24)=-8.482, p<.001. The two groups further diverged 
in their responses to measures of hopelessness (BHS; £(24) = -3.833, p  =.001), life 
optimism (LOT-R; £(24) = 2.573, p  =.017), experiential avoidance (AAQ-II; £(24) = 
2.043, p  =.052) and anxiety (STAI; £(24) = -2.847,/? =.009). No mood differences were 
found between the two groups (PA: p=.691; NA: p=.284). The psychometric means are 
presented with the participant demographics in Table 25. As can be observed from Table 
25, the two groups did not differ with respect to age, £(24) =.357,/?=.724, representation 
of gender, %2 (2) =.650,/? =.420, or verbal fluency, £(24) =.216, p=.831.
Overall the two groups were well matched on age, gender and cognitive abilities. 
The group differences pertaining to psychometric measures are in line with common co­
occurrences of depression, anxiety, hopelessness and emotional avoidance seen in the 
clinical literature.
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Table 25. BDI group split presentation of Demographics and Psychometric tests, with Mean scores and 
Standard Deviations (SD) for the Depressed and Non-Depressed groups in Experiment 3.
Variable Non-Depressed (SD) Depressed (SD)
Gender: Females (Males) 12(4) 6(4)
Age 20.68 (2.27) 20.40 (1.42)
VFCT 11.04 (2.15) 10.83 (2.69)
BDI 3.87 (2.94) 14.60 (3.4)
BHS 2.37 (1.02) 5.10 (2.55)
STAI 33.06 (8.65) 43.90 (10.62)
LOT-R 11.50(3.89) 12.70 (5.64)
AAQ-II 55.81 (7.29) 48.90 (9.12)
PA 32.50 (5.97) 31.50 (6.46)
NA 12.93 (5.09) 15.20 (5.15)
Note. VFCT= Verbal Fluency Control Task; BDI= Beck Depression Inventory; BHS= Beck Hopelessness 
Scale; STAI = State Anxiety Inventory; LOT-R= Life Optimism Test-Revised; AAQ-II= Acceptance and 
Action Questionnaire-II; PA = Positive Affective Scale; NA= Negative Affective Scale.
3.2.2.2 The Future Thinking Task
Analysis of the Future thinking scores were performed following the standards set
by MacLeod et al. (1998), with composite scores calculated for each period in each
condition, by multiplying the number of responses generated in a period by the mean
likelihood ratings given for those responses and by the mean feelings ratings given for
those responses. For example, an individual who could think of eight things that they
were looking forward to over the next year and who gave a mean likelihood rating of 6
(out of 7) and a mean feelings rating of 2 (out of 3) for those responses would have a
composite score of 96 for positive expectancies over the next year. To allow comparisons
to be carried out directly between the positive and negative scores, and for interactions to
be examined meaningfully, in conjunction with previous studies (e.g. MacLeod et al
1998; Bjarehed et al., 2010) the mean feeling ratings for the negative valence conditions
were changed to positive scores (i.e. a mean feelings rating of -2 for a negative condition
became a mean rating of +2). Therefore, an individual who gave the same responses as in
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the example above in the negative condition, although with a mean feeling rating of -2, 
would have a composite score of 96 for negative expectancies over the next year, rather 
than a score of -  96. The composite scores from both groups of the overall positive and 
negative conditions are shown in Table 26.
3.2.2.3 FTT Index Scores
Analysis of the composite scores with a Group (Depression: Low BDI-II, High 
BDI-II) x Valence (Future Expectancy Index: Positive/Negative) x Period (Week, Year, 
5-10 years) mixed model ANOVA produced only one significant effect. There was a 
significant main effect of Valence, with participants showing higher levels of future 
positive relative to negative expectancy (F(l,24) = 75.779, p  < .001, rjp2 =.759). No 
significant main effect was found for Period (F(2, 24) = 1.675, p  = .198, rjp2 =.065). 
Further no significant interaction effect was found for Period x Valence (F(2, 24) = .039, 
p  =.962, rjp =.002). The predicted effect of a Group x Valence interaction was not found 
to be significant (F(l, 242) =2.402 p=.134, rjp2 =.091), nor was there a main effect for 
Group (F(l, 24) =1.061 p=.313, rjp =.042).The three-way interaction involving Group, 
Valence and Period did not approach significance (F(2, 24) - \ . \1 5 ,p=.318, rjp2 =.047).
Thus, the FTT index scores suggest that the Depressed and Non-Depressed 
individuals held similar expectations with regards to their subjective future expectancies, 
with positive and negative expectancies consistently diverging across the three different 
periods for both groups.
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Table 26. Means and Standard Deviations (SD) for Positive and Negative Future Thinking Task Index 
Scores; incorporating Fluency, Likelihood and Feeling Values for each Time Period for the Depressed and 
Non-Depressed groups in Experiment 3. T-Test score and statistical value ip) from between group 
comparisons are presented.
Variable Non-Depressed Depressed
Positive Responses
Mean (SD) Mean (SD) t(24) P
Next Week 65.81 (25.89) 54.67 (28.19) 1.032 0.312
Next Year 76.34 (32.52) 56.86 (30.77) 1.516 0.143
Next 5-10 Years 68.10 (23.66) 62.11 (24.71) 0.618 0.542
Negative Responses
Next Week 26.42 (13.33) 27.49 (14.34) -0.193 0.849
Next Year 32.40 (18.25) 35.30 (17.98) -0.396 0.696
Next 5-10 Years 32.86 (18.22) 28.11 (16.97) 0.663 0.514
3.2.2.4 FTT Raw Scores
It has proven common practice in the future thinking literature to make use of the 
raw FTT scores in presentation of data. Thus, raw scores of number of events generated, 
likelihood values, and feeling ratings were calculated and are presented in Table 27. The 
FTT data is most frequently presented in the literature with reference to fluency of 
number (N) of future thoughts produced (i.e. how many positive or negative events were 
generated over the different time periods) as such fluency was firstly examined.
A Group (Depression: Low BDI-II/High BDI-II) x Valence (Number of future 
events: Positive/Negative ) x Period (Week, Year, 5-10 years) mixed-model ANOVA 
found a significant main effect for Valence, F (l, 24)=46.611, p<.001, r\p2 =.634); that 
is, participants generated significantly more positive events (M  = 5.06, o=  1.34) for the 
future relative to events they did not look forward to (M = 3.71, a = 1.04; the mean 
number of future thoughts by time period and valence for the Depressed and Non- 
Depressed group are displayed in Table 27). Period did not produce a significant main 
effect (F(2,24) = .172,p=.842, rjp2 =.007). Nor was a main effect for Group produced by
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the ANOVA (F(l, 24) =2.771, p=.1092, r\p2 = .104).The Valence x Group interaction
•y #
was observed to approach significance (F(2, 24) = 3.571, p=.071, rjp =.130) with the 
Non-Depressed group generating a greater number of positive future events relative to 
negative events, /(24) = 2.129, p  =.044. In line with the literature the Depressed group 
did not produce more negative events than the Non-Depressed group t(24) =.784, p  
=.441). No interaction effect was observed between Valence x Period (F(2, 24) =1.399, p  
=.257, rjp2 =.055) nor was there a three way interaction for Group x Valence x Period 
(F(2,24) =1.466,p=.241, t}p2 =.058).
The results from the raw data show that the expected two-way interaction 
between valence and group was found to approach significance with the Non-Depressed 
group generating significantly more positive future vents relative to the Depressed group.
3.2.2.5 Future Thinking Task measures o f  Expectancy Likelihood
The most commonly denoted variable separately drawn from the FTT data looks 
at fluency, however the FTT also offers an independent measure of likelihood -  that is, a 
measure indicating the subjective strength of belief of a specific positive/negative event 
occurring. In light of the diverge in the future thinking literature relating to fluency and 
probability it was of interest to explore the associated variable of likelihood with regards 
to these analyses. As the Likelihood measure focus on the participants’ belief in the 
assured occurrence of the specific event generated during the fluency task, it is a more 
likely candidate in the context of reflecting subjective expectancies towards specific 
future events, as opposed to merely producing a number of potential events for the future. 
This independent measure is, however, a largely neglected component in the existing 
literature utilising the FTT, though in light of the current study it was explored to see if 
likelihood ratings may lend itself as a feature component in the measure of future 
expectancy.
As with the fluency data an analysis of variance (ANOVA) was conducted. The
mixed-model ANOVA, Valence (Events likelihood: Positive/Negative) x Period (week,
year, 5-10 years) x Group (Depression: Low BDI-II/High BDI-II), found a significant
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main effect for Valence, F(l, 24) = 19.103,/? <.001, rjp2 =.443); that is, across all time 
periods participants generated significantly more positive expectations (M = 5.45, o = 
0.53) for the future relative to the events that they did not look forward to (M = 4.56, o — 
0.93). A significant main effect was found for Period (F(2,24)=5.182, /?= .009, rjp2 
=.178), that is participants rated future events for the more proximate future (i.e. in the 
next week and the next year) as more likely to occur relative to the more distant future 
events (in the next 5-10 years). No main effect was found for Group (F( 1,24)=. 151,/? = 
.701, rjp2 =.006), further, no interaction effects were seen for Valence and Group 
(F(2,24)=.002, /?= .969, rjp2 =.000), for Period and Group (F(2,24)=.086, p=.918, rjp2 
=.004), nor for Valence and Period (F(2,24)=1.998, /?= .147, rj2 =.077). The three way 
interaction of Valence x Period x Group (F(2, 24) =.795, /?= .458, rjp2 =.032), further 
failed to produce any significant interaction effects.
The results show that the two groups did not diverge with regards to expectancy 
of positive of negative events occurring.
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Table 27. Means and Standard Deviations (SD) for Positive and Negative Future Thinking Task Raw 
Scores for Fluency (number of events generated), Likelihood ratings (summed for all events) and Feeling 
ratings (summed for all events) for each Time Period within the Depressed and Non-Depressed groups in 
Experiment 3.
Variable Non-Depressed Depressed
Mean (SD) Mean (SD)
Positive Responses, Next Week
Fluency (no. of events) 5.62 (1.14) 4.40 (1.57)
Likelihood 5.68 (0.91) 5.85 (1.02)
Feeling 2.01 (0.46) 2.1 (0.66)
Positive Responses, Next Year
Fluency (no. of events) 5.50 (1.67) 4.2 (1.39)
Likelihood 5.16(0.70) 5.25 (1.15)
Feeling 2.36 (0.42) 2.50 (0.40)
Positive Responses, Next 5-10 years
Fluency (no. of events) 5.31 (1.49) 4.60 (1.57)
Likelihood 5.01 (0.84) 5.05 (1.11)
Feeling 2.55 (0.47) 2.70 (0.28)
Negative Responses, Next Week
Fluency (no. of events) 3.50 (1.15) 3.40 (1.51)
Likelihood 5.19(1.59) 5.06 (1.63)
Feeling 1.55 (0.62) 1.65 (0.56)
Negative Responses, Next Year
Fluency (no. of events) 3.93 (1.12) 3.60 (1.42)
Likelihood 4.69(1.78) 4.31 (1.25)
Feeling 1.82(0.63) 2.33 (0.55)
Negative Responses, Next 5-10 years
Fluency (no. of events) 4.06 (1.57) 3.50 (1.26)
Likelihood 3.90 (1.49) 4.16 (1.30)
Feeling 2.06 (0.59) 2.00 (0.79)
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3.2.2.6 Future Thinking Task measures o f  Event Affect
The feeling values were explored in a similar fashion to the fluency and 
likelihood data, with an analysis of variance (ANOVA) completed with positive and 
negative future feeling raw scores (i.e., the mean total rating of positive and negative 
feeling per participant across the three time periods). A Valence (Feeling: 
Positive/Negative) x Period (week, year, 5-10 years) x Group (Depression: Low BDI- 
II/High BDI-II) mixed-model ANOVA found a significant main effect for Valence, F (l, 
24) = 35.666, p  <.001, rjp =.598); that is, across all time periods participants foresaw 
feeling more positive of future events they were looking forward to (M = 2.35, o =.28) 
relative to reports of negative anticipation relating to events that they were worried about 
(M  = 1.88, o =.37). A significant main effect was also found for Period (F(l, 24) 
=11.675, p  <.001, rjp = .327) with participants reporting stronger affect related to events 
anticipated to occur in the next year and next 5-10 years vs. the next week. However, no 
main effect was seen for Group (F(l, 24) =.169, p=. 169, rjp =.077). No interaction 
effects were found for Valence and Group (F(2, 24) =.121, p  =.731, rjp2 =.731), nor did 
the Valence and Period interaction produce significant results (F(2, 24) =.610, p= .548, 
rjp2 =.025). No interaction was seen for Period and Group (F(2, 24) = .922, p=.405, 
rjp =.037), nor was there a three way interaction for Valence x Period x Group (F(2, 24) 
=.969, p  =.387, rjp2 =.039) as produced by the ANOVA. The results show that there were 
no group differences pertaining to levels of affect pertaining to in the likelihood of 
positive or negative events occurring.
3.2.2.1 Emotional Avoidance
Of all the FTT components, including index and raw scores, the AAQ-2 was only 
found to correlate with the FTT index score for negative likelihood (r = -.389, p  = .049). 
That is, participants whom reported low levels of emotional avoidance (as indicated by a 
higher score on the AAQ-2) were seen to rate negative future events as less likely to 
occur. Following a split level analysis it was found that this effect was only true within
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the Non-Depressed group (r = -.498, p  = .050) as no correlations with either of the FTT 
variables was observed in a within group analysis for the Depressed group.
3.2.3 Summary
In relation to the four main aims of Experiment 3 it was found overall (1) that the 
FTT does not appear sensitive in a measure of future expectancy within a sub-clinical 
sample. (2) Group differences were found to approach significance pertaining to the 
number of events generated, however no such differences were found in relation to 
expectancies of how likely these events were to occur, or the anticipated emotional 
valence related to the events at the time of occurrence. The data further demonstrates 
that across groups an inflated number of events were generated for more distant future 
time periods. Although participants did not expect these more distant events to be more 
likely to occur, relative to events in closer proximity, they did expect to feel more/less 
happy in the more distant future relative to the things they were looking forward to or 
worried about respectively. These results are somewhat consistent with the existing 
literature in terms of group differences in the reported fluency of future events. However, 
(3) this was not supported by the expectancy ratings and as such the findings are 
inconsistent with the general view that those experiencing depressed mood states hold 
deflated positive future expectancies. This finding is in line with previous research that 
suggests that expectancy is a sub component of future thinking. However, it may also be 
that there are discrepancies pertaining to the measure generally, with mood effects 
accounting for the variance in fluency, relative to depression levels per se. (4) Emotional 
avoidance was not found to relate to fluency or feeling values, but did relate to 
expectancy of negative future events as more likely to occur. To this end, future 
expectancy may serve as a more reliant measure in relation to future thinking as a feature 
of depression. In this regard further assessment is required in relation to such potentially 
latent mood effects.
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Table 28. Summary of Main Aims and Findings from Experiment 3.
Research Aim Hypothesis Main Findings
1 Examine the FTT 
level of 
sensitivity in 
relation to sub- 
clinical 
depression as 
measured by the 
BDI-H.
Future thinking, as 
measured by the FTT, will 
differ between sub- 
clinically depressed 
individuals relative to 
non-depressed individuals 
as measured by the BDI- 
II.
The hypothesis is not supported.
Depressed and Non-Depressed individuals held 
similar expectations with regards to their 
subjective future expectancies, with positive and 
negative expectancies consistently diverging 
across the three different periods for both groups.
Examine if the 
valence and 
group interaction 
found with 
clinical samples 
is present in a 
sub-clinically 
depressed sample.
There will be an 
interaction between 
valence
(Positive/Negative) and 
group (Depress ed/Non- 
Depressed) in relation to 
future positive thinking.
The hypothesis is partially supported.
The expected two-way interaction between valence 
and group was found to approach significance for 
fluency for number of future events (p=.071), with 
the Non-Depressed group generating more positive 
future events relative to the Depressed group.
3 Examine future 
expectancy as 
measured by the 
FTT likelihood 
variable in 
relation to 
depression levels.
4 Examine the 
relationship 
between 
emotional 
avoidance (AAQ- 
II) and future 
expectancy 
(FTT).
Positive future 
expectancy, as measured 
by the FTT, will differ 
between sub-clinically 
depressed individuals 
relative to non-depressed 
individuals as measured 
by the BDI-II.
There will be an 
interaction between 
valence and group in 
relation to future positive 
expectancy.
There will be a 
relationship between 
emotional avoidance and 
future expectancy.
The hypothesis is not supported.
The two groups did not diverge with regards to 
expectancy of positive or negative events 
occurring.
The hypothesis is not supported.
No interaction was found for valence and group in 
relation to future expectancy.
The hypothesis is supported.
It was found that individuals whom reported low 
levels of emotional avoidance (AAQ-H) rated 
negative future events as less likely to occur 
(p<. 05).
A split level analysis found that this relationship 
was only observed within the Non-Depressed 
group (p=.050).
No relationship with either of the FTT variables 
was found in a within group analysis for the 
Depressed group.
Note. Low emotional avoidance is denoted by a high score on the AAQ-II.
3.3 Experim ent 4
Experiment 3 found that the ability to generate positive future events approached 
significance, with the Non-Depressed group producing marginally more positive events 
relative to the Depressed group. However, no differences were observed between 
Depressed and Non-Depressed samples with regards to expectancy, in terms of the likely 
occurrence of future events. Recent research has suggested that mood effects are 
common in such tasks (e.g. Johnson & Tversky, 1983; Hepburn, Bamhofer & Williams, 
2006). Indeed in Chapter 2 affect regulation strategies were also discussed in relation to 
the FCT and FES (see Section 2.6). Given the recent focus on the role of future thinking 
in clinical settings it seems prudent to measure the impact of current mood on future 
thinking.
Johnson and Tversky (1983) have shown that manipulating people’s mood affects 
their perception of the risk of negative future events. Subsequently, in a recent study by 
Hepburn, Bamhofer and Williams (2006), current mood was shown to affect 
participants’ performance on future thinking tasks such as the FTT. Hepbum et al (2006) 
examined the effects of mood on cognitive processes that underlie future thinking using a 
mood induction procedure with non-depressed volunteers. In this instance, fluency for 
generating future events was affected by both positive and negative mood inductions, 
with each group showing reduced fluency for mood-incongruent events under induced 
mood compared to baseline. Hepbum et al. (2006), however, did not report participants’ 
ratings pertaining to the likelihood of self-generated events occurring, and looked only at 
fluency for generation of events. Thus, the observed effects of mood were on fluency for 
generating positive and negative future events. While this indicates an effect of mood on 
fluency for future thinking, there is no evidence from this study that mood affects future 
expectations. Similarly, de Jong-Meyer et al. (2007), while reporting differences in 
generating positive and negative events between participants induced into positive and 
negative moods, report no findings pertaining to the likelihood or pleasure ratings made 
by a sample of dysphoric inpatient adolescents.
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Results from future thinking studies with non-clinical samples have, however, 
compared participants’ likelihood ratings of personal and illustrative future events with 
findings indicating that mood did not affect such expectancy ratings (Hepbum, Bamhofer 
& Williams, 2008). Hepbum et al. (2008) explain this lack of effect for likelihood 
ratings in terms of contextual detail and real life context. This suggests that likelihood 
ratings for positive events would be lower in clinically depressed participants who have a 
more pessimistic outlook and as such fewer positive expectations for the future. In non- 
depressed participants, real life context, due to more active involvement is more likely to 
be positive and optimistic merely due to exposure to more experiences. It was thus 
argued that likelihood ratings would not be affected by a negative mood state per se in 
healthy participants. General optimism, as is thought to exist in samples of non-depressed 
participants (MacLeod et al, 2006), has been considered as a stable trait and relevant to 
the context in which non-depressed participants make their judgments of likelihood. The 
results of these studies suggest that the FTT fluency component is relatively more 
susceptible to mood influence compared with likelihood. In this regard any effects of 
current mood on participants’ performance would suggest that the FTT provides a 
measure of present mood state rather than stable, trait optimism (see Section 1.4.1.2.2).
Although previous research has found differences in perceived likelihood of 
future events between depressed and non-depressed individuals, such samples also 
differed in mood state, which was not controlled for by these studies. Hence the 
possibility remains that distinctions made in the existing literature are driven by 
differences in current mood (i.e. dysphoric in the depressed group, euthymic in controls). 
Therefore, Experiment 4 aims to (1) examine the potential role of mood in biasing future- 
oriented cognitions, as measured by the FTT Index score and Fluency variable; It is 
predicted that positive and negative induced mood will relate to differences in reported 
positive and negative future cognitions within and between groups. (2) Examine the 
potential role of mood in biasing future-oriented expectancy as measured by the FTT 
likelihood variable; It is predicted that positive and negative induced mood will relate to 
differences in reported positive and negative future expectations within and between
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groups. (3) Examine the relation between induced mood, emotional avoidance (AAQ-II) 
and future cognitions (FTT); it is predicted that there will be a relationship between 
emotional avoidance, mood and future expectancy.
3.3.1 Method
3.3.1.1 Participants
Thirty-one adults volunteered to take part in the current experiment though after 
exclusion criteria pertaining to BDI-II scores (the criteria for inclusion is detailed in 
section 3.3.2.1) nine participants data was removed, thus only data from twenty-two 
participants was utilised in the following analysis. As such, the subsequent information 
pertains to the included twenty-two participants. Of the included participants there were 
13 female and 9 male volunteers. Participants were young adults ranging in age from 19 
to 28 years of age (M = 23.31, o=  1.41) and recruited on a convenience base.
3.3.1.2 Apparatus and Materials
Participants were requested to complete a set of pre-experimental measures of 
psychological well being. These measures were the same as employed in Experiment 3, 
that is, the Beck Depression Inventory 2nd version (BDI-II; Beck, Steer & Brown, 1996), 
The Beck Hopelessness Scale (BHS; Beck & Steer, 1988), The State Trait Anxiety 
Inventory, (STAI-S; Spielberger, Gorsuch, & Lushene ,1970; Spielberger et al., 1983) , 
the Life-Orientation Scale (LOT-R; Scheier, Carver, & Bridges, 1994), The Acceptance 
and Action Questionaire-2 (AAQ-2; Bond, Hayes, Baer, Carpenter, Orcutt, Waltz & 
Zettle (Submitted); Hayes, Strosahl, et al., 2004), The Positive and Negative Affective 
Scale (PANAS; Watson, Clark, & Tellegen, 1988) and a Verbal Fluency Task (Lezak, 
1976).
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Mood induction. The Autobiographical Recall Task (Brewer, Doughtie & Lubin, 
1980) was used to induce happy or unhappy mood in the participants. For this task 
participants are required to think about an event in their lives that made them either very 
happy or very sad and then to write about the event, giving a clear description of the 
event as vividly as they can, including all of the (subjectively) important details. Brewer, 
Doughtie and Lubin (1980) developed the autobiographical recall task in an effort to 
induce moods other than simply “positive” and “negative” mood, and found that this was 
facilitated following directed recall of events. In this regard participants have been found 
to report feeling lonely, defeated or hurt following instructions utilized with this 
procedure. The method has proven to be effective in 75% of cases, and successful in 
inducing happy and unhappy moods.
A common criticism, pertaining to the range of mood induction techniques 
available, is that the induced mood is relatively short lived. Though in the current context 
this is viewed as an advantage due to a short-lived mood state being what is required to 
complete the tasks. It would be not only inappropriate, but also unethical in the present 
context to induce a mood state that prevailed for an extensive period of time when the 
duration of the experiment is no longer than 30 minutes. This is also an advantage in 
research generally since it eradicates the necessity to spend time re-establishing a neutral 
mood state in participants following completion of the experimental tasks.
The Future Thinking Task (FTT; MacLeod et al. 1993; 1997).The FTT was the 
same in presentation and method as utilised in Experiment 3 (see Section 3.2.1.2).
Verbal Fluency Control Task (Lezak, 1976). As in Experiment 3 (see Section 
3.2.1.3), and in line with previous FTT studies (cf. MacLeod & Byrne, 1996; MacLeod et 
al., 1993; MacLeod, Tata et al., 1998; O’Connor et al., 2007; Bjarhead et al., 2010) prior 
to the FTT participants completed a standard Verbal Fluency Control Task in order to 
account for any likely differences between groups in general cognitive processing. The 
process and method for the Verbal Fluency Control Task was the same as previously 
utilized, e.g. Experiment 3 (See Sections 3.2.1.2 and 3.2.1.3).
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The Visual Analogue Scale (VAS; Wewers & Lowe, 1990) measures a 
characteristic believed to range across a continuum of values that cannot easily be 
directly measured. The VAS is a 100mm long horizontal line with word descriptors at 
each end, as illustrated in Figure 7. The word descriptors are dependent on the variable 
that is being assessed; in this case “Unhappy” and “Happy” were chosen. Participants 
mark on the line the point that they feel represents their perception of their current state.
How are you feeling at the moment? Place a vertical mark on the line below to indicate your mood at this 
present moment.
Unhappy Happy
Figure 7. Visual Analogue Scale (VAS) used to indicate participants’ perception of their current mood. The 
VAS utilised in Experiment 4 measured exactly 100mm.
The VAS score is determined by measuring in millimetres from the left hand end 
of the line to the point that the participant marks, with 0 representing extremely unhappy 
and 100 representing extremely happy.
3.3.1.3 Experimental Overview
The current study used a 2 x 2 x 3 mixed design, with Group (Mood Induced: 
Positive, Negative) as the between participant variable and Valence (Future Cognitions: 
Positive/Negative) and Period (Week, Year, 5-10 years) as the within participant 
variables. All participants completed all tasks and measures; the experimental sequence 
is depicted in Figure 8.
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Exclusion Criteria
Participants who score 0 (N=  4) or >10 (N=  5) on the BDI-II are excluded from further
experimental participation.
Positive Mood Induction (N= 11) Negative Mood Induction (N= 11)
Total sample complete the Time 3 Visual Analogue Scale (VAS)
Total sample (N=22) complete the Time 2 Visual Analogue Scale (VAS)
Participants are randomly assigned to complete a Positive or Negative Mood Induction.
Total sample complete the Time 1 Visual Analogue Scale (VAS)
Participant Sample (N= 31)
Total sample complete Verbal Fluency Control Task 
(randomised 1st presentation of letters F, A, S between participants)
All sample complete Questionnaires (randomised order of 1st presentation between participants) 
BDI-H, STAI, BHS, LOT-R, AAQ-II, PANAS
Total sample (both groups) complete the Future Thinking Task (randomised 1st presentation of 
positive or negative future events between participants)
Step 1: Generation of Positive/Negative future events for next week/next year/next 5-10years
Step 3: Feeling rating of Positive/Negative future event upon occurrence.
Step 2: Likelihood rating of Positive/Negative future event occurrence.
Figure 8. Overview of the Experimental Sequence for Experiment 4.
184
3.3.1.4 Ethical Issues
As in the previous experiments precautionary measures were explicitly employed 
in Experiment 4 to facilitate conducting the experiment according to the appropriate 
ethical guidelines as identified by the British Psychological Society (2006). The steps 
taken were consistent with those employed in Experiment 3 (see Section 3.2.1.4). There 
are several ethical considerations when applying a mood induction paradigm, especially 
with individuals that are at risk of depression, or currently depressed. This study took 
several recommendations into account (British Psychological Society, 2006). Firstly, 
participants were screened for depression by use of the Beck Depression Inventory (BDI- 
II) with the decision not to accept contribution to the experiment by anyone who reported 
depression levels of 10 or above as reported on the BDI-II. A ‘cooling off period of a 
minimum 24 hours was again implemented between receiving information about the 
experiment and participation commencement, as in the previous experiments. Due to the 
nature of Experiment 4 and the use of a mood induction paradigm particular emphasis 
was given in the brief and debrief to any psychological distress that may arise 
particularly following the mood induced, along with other experimental procedures. 
Notably, the nature of the mood induction was not formulated in the brief; here the mood 
induction task was introduced as a memory task with emphasis on the emotions related to 
the past event they recalled. The task aim, to bring out a happy or unhappy mood, was 
discussed during the post experimental debrief. None of the participants recalled 
traumatic events when describing a past event. At no point during the experiment did any 
participant withdraw from the study or express dissatisfaction or distress of any kind. No 
participants reported emotional upset in relation to the mood induction procedure or to 
the future events generated. As in the previous experiments the written debrief sheet 
included contact details of the thesis supervisor, counseling services related to Swansea 
University along with local and national such service providers. The study was ethically 
approved by the Psychology Department Ethics Committee at Swansea University prior 
to commencement of the experimental process.
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3.3.1.5 Procedure
The experiment was conducted in a small conference room in Century Wharf 
Apartments in Cardiff Bay. Prior to commencement all participants were briefed as to the 
nature of the study and asked to complete a consent form. The study commenced with 
participants completing the psychometric tests and well being questionnaires. This was 
followed by completion of Visual Analog Scale (VAS) to indicate how happy/sad they 
perceived themselves to be at the present moment. The Verbal Fluency Control Task 
(VFCT) subsequently commenced. The Verbal Fluency Control Task procedure was the 
same as reported in previous studies in Chapter 2 and in Experiment 3, where 
participants were instructed to state out loud as many words beginning with the letters F, 
A and S as they could at individual intervals and with a time frame of one minute for 
each letter. Following the VFCT participants BDI-II scores were examined and 
participants who were found to score above 10 on the BDI-II did not commence the 
mood induction task. These participants were thanked for their participation and 
debriefed by stating that the second part of the experiment was no longer being 
conducted and that data from the first section was all that was required in this instance. 
The BDI-II scores were not revealed to, nor discussed with, the participants.
For the include participants the mood induction procedure followed, with
participants randomly assigned to a ‘happy’ or an ‘unhappy’ condition. Participants were
asked to think of an event in their life that had made them extremely happy/unhappy for
seven minutes and then write a description of the event as vividly and accurately as
possible, including all of the important details, and focusing on their thoughts and
feelings. Participants were provided a set of white A4 paper entitled “Personal
Experience” on which to write about the event. Participants were naive as to the purpose
of the mood induction and were told this was one phase of the overall task that pertained
to memory as opposed to future thinking. Immediately upon completion of the mood
induction, participants were asked to respond to another VAS, indicating how happy or
unhappy they perceived themselves to be at that time. Participants then commenced the
Future Thinking Task, the procedure for the FTT where the same as in Experiment 3
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without any amendments. Upon completion of the FTT participants were again asked to 
rate their mood on the VAS. At the end of the experiment participants were thanked and 
fully debriefed.
3.3.2 Results and Discussion
3.3.2.1 Exclusion Criteria
As in the previous experiments herein, the current experiment opted to remove 
any participants with a score of 0 (N = 4). Due to the nature of the study, additionally it 
was also sought here not to include any participant displaying depression levels of 10 or 
above as reported on the BDI-II (N = 5, M  =10J) in light of ethical recommendations 
and consequently to more accurately capture a sample of non-depressed participants. All 
the included participants reported a score of 9 or less (M= 5.31) on the BDI-II.
No group differences were observed with respect to pre-mood induction 
psychometric scores. Overall, the reported scores on the psychometric measures were 
consistent with those of a positive view of the future for each participant. The 
participants psychometric reports can be observed in Table 29 below, and as can be seen 
the two groups appeared well matched on all measures. No mood differences were found 
between the two groups pre-experimentally (PA: p=.435; NA: /?= 333). The two groups 
did not differ with respect to age, 7(20) =.080, /?=.937; nor was there a significant 
difference between the two groups in regards to representation of gender, y2 (2) =.188, 
p=.665, or verbal fluency, 7(20) =-.555,/?=.558.
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Table 29. Demographics and Psychometric tests, presented as Mean scores and Standard Deviation (SD) 
for the Positive and Negative Mood Induction groups in Experiment 4. T-Test score and statistical value 
(p) from between group comparisons are presented.
Variable Positive Mood Negative Mood
Mean (SD) Mean (SD) K 20) P
Gender: Females (Males) 7(4) 6(5)
Age 23.27 (1.67) 23.36 (3.35) 0.080 0.937
VFCT 16.48 (5.02) 15.39 (4.16) -0.555 0.585
BDI-II 5.21 (2.64) 5.36 (2.24) 0.087 0.932
BHS 1.90(7.86) 2.36 (1.43) 0.640 0.529
STAI 36.54 (7.77) 36.63 (5.14) 0.032 0.975
LOT-R 17.36 (4.24) 16.81 (3.48) -0.329 0.746
AAQ-II 51.36 (5.61) 51.40 (4.22) 0.001 0.999
PA 33.09 (6.42) 35.09 (5.30) 0.796 0.435
NA 16.48 (5.02) 15.39 (4.16) -0.992 0.333
Note. VFCT= Verbal Fluency Control Task; BDI= Beck Depression Inventory-II; BHS= Beck 
Hopelessness Scale; STAI = State Anxiety Inventory; LOT-R= Life Optimism Test-Revised; AAQ-H= 
Acceptance and Action Questionnaire-II; PA = Positive Affective Scale; NA= Negative Affective Scale.
3.3.2.2 Mood Induction
Mood ratings were reported on the Visual Analogue Scale at 3 separate time 
points, i.e. pre-experimentally (Time 1), immediately following the mood induction 
(Time 2) and post experimentally upon completion of the FTT (Time 3). Content of 
recall was fond to be congruent to the task, i.e. participants asked to recall positive 
(negative) events wrote reports of events to this aim. No exceptionally traumatic events 
were recalled, that is the events reported in the negative, unhappy, condition reflected 
expected life time events of arguments, academic failures, romantic let downs, illness 
and un-dramatic deaths - with focus on the grief not the event of death.
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One way Analysis of Variance (ANOVA), with mood induction as the between 
subjects variable and mood ratings as the dependent variable, found no group differences 
at Time 1, F(l, 20) = 1.016, p=.325. The mean mood reported by participants in the 
Positive group was 72.45 (with a higher score reflecting more positive mood), while the 
mean for participants in the Negative group was 64.72. Following the mood induction 
procedure a significant difference was found between groups at Time 2, F (l, 20)=53.356, 
/?<.001, with the Negative mood induction group reporting lowered mood with a mean of 
34.09 relative to the Positive mood induction group, who demonstrated an increase mood 
reported with a mean of 80.45. At Time 3, this mood difference was still present (F(l, 
20)=5.923, /?=.024) though it was evident that the moods were reverting back to baseline 
levels with the Positive mood group reporting a mean mood level of 74.09 and the 
Negative mood group an increased mood level from time 2, with a mean of 58.63.
Split plot paired sample t-tests revealed within group differences for the three 
time periods, with significant differences in mood reported for Time 1 and 2 in both 
groups (Positive mood induction, /(20)=-2.995, p=.014; Negative mood induction, 
f(20)=4.650, /?= 001). Significant mood differences were also found between for the 
group whom received a positive mood induction (7(20) =2.654, p=.024), as well as for 
the negative mood induction group, t(20) =-6.958, /?< 001). However no mood 
differences were observed for Time 1 and 3 within either of the two groups (Positive 
mood induction, t(20) = -.703, /?=.498); Negative mood induction, /(20) = 1.075, 
p - .308). This implies that the mood induction procedure was successful in inducing a 
state mood which was apparent at the time of the experiment and returned to baseline 
post-experimentally. Specifically, the negative mood induction procedure resulted in 
significantly more negative ratings of mood compared with pre-mood induction ratings. 
The positive mood induction resulted in significantly more positive mood rating being 
made, the mood ratings are presented in Figure 9.
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Figure 9. Mean Mood Ratings for participants completing the FTT task in Experiment 4. T1 indicates Pre- 
Experimental Mood. T2 indicates Mood Rating Immediately Following the Mood Induction procedure. T3 
indicates Post-Experimental Mood Ratings.
3.3.2.3 The Future Thinking Task
As in Experiment 3 analysis of the Future Thinking Task scores were performed 
following the standards set by MacLeod et al. (1998), with composite scores calculated 
for each period in each condition, by multiplying the number of responses generated in a 
period by the mean likelihood ratings given for those responses and by the mean feelings 
ratings given for those responses. In conjunction with previous studies (e.g. MacLeod et 
al 1998; Godley et al, 2001; Bjarehed et al., 2010) the mean feeling ratings for the 
negative valence conditions were altered to reflect positive scores (i.e. a mean feelings 
rating of -2 for a negative condition became a mean rating of +2). The composite scores 
from both groups of the overall positive and negative conditions are shown in Table 30.
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Table 30. Means and Standard Deviations (SD) for Positive and Negative Future Thinking Task Index 
Scores, incorporating Fluency, Likelihood and Feeling Values for each Time Period as reported by the 
Positive and Negative Mood Induction groups in Experiment 4. T-Test score and statistical value (p) from 
between group comparisons are presented.
Variable Positive Mood Negative Mood
Positive Responses
Mean (SD) Mean (SD) t(20) P
Next Week 127.06 (52.04) 72.34 (28.58) -3.056 0.006**
Next Year 111 .49(56.15) 67.79 (30.31) -2.271 0.034*
Next 5-10 Years 62.41 (29.93) 43.64 (24.67) -1.605 0.124
Negative Responses
Next Week 19.64 (15.51) 43.45 (23.98) 2.817 0.011*
Next Year 27.44 (18.47) 39.52 (18.05) 1.551 0.137
Next 5-10 Years 37.05 (13.51) 58.98 (23.02) 2.724 0.013*
Note. *p<.05; **p<.01.
3.3.2.4 FTT Index Scores
Analysis of the composite scores with a Group (Mood induced: Positive, 
Negative) x Valence (Future expectancy: Positive/Negative) x Period (Week, Year, 5-10 
years) mixed model ANOVA produced four significant effects. There was a significant 
main effect of Valence, with all participants reporting greater levels of future positive 
relative to negative future thinking (F(l,20) = 26.771, p  < .001, rjp2 =.57), as well as a 
significant main effect of Period, reflecting lower expectancies for the next 5-10 years 
vs. the next year and week (F(2,20) = 4.435, p  =.018, rjp2 =.18). There was also a 
significant interaction effect found for Group x Valence (F(l, 20) = 12.257,/? =.002, rjp2 
=.38), with those in the positive mood group reporting greater positive future 
expectancies relative to negative expectancies (7(10) =5.298, p  <.001); whereas no such 
within differences were found for the negative mood group (7(10) = 1.457, p=.176). An
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interaction effect was seen for Period x Valence (F(2, 20) = 27.350, p < 001, rjp2 =.581), 
with more positive events expected in the near future, i.e. the next week. No main effect 
was observed for Group (F (l, 20) =2.634, p=. 116, rjp' =.001), nor was there an 
interaction effect for Period and Group (F (l, 20) =1.793, /?=. 180, rjp2 =.082).The three- 
way interaction involving Group, Valence and Period did not reach significance (F(2, 20) 
=2.204,/?=. 124, tjp2=.099).
Thus, the FTT index scores suggest that there was an interaction effect for mood 
induced with valence o f future expectancies, with participants in the positive mood group 
reporting significantly greater levels o f positive future expectancies relative to negative 
future expectancies; whereas those in the negative mood induction group reported 
comparable expectancies for positive and negative future events. These findings diverge 
from the results observed in Experiment 3 where no such interaction effect was apparent. 
The results are graphically depicted in Figure 10.
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3.3.2.5 FTT Raw Scores
The raw FTT scores pertaining to separate measures of number of events 
generated, likelihood values, and feeling ratings were further considered and are 
presented in Table 31 below. As mentioned in Experiment 3, the FTT data is most 
frequently presented in the literature with reference to the number of future thoughts. As 
such, more in depth analysis was conducted to explore this level of evidence. The same 
analytic strategy was utilised with the raw data as for the FTT index scores.
A Group (Mood Induction: Positive, Negative) x Valence (Number of future 
thoughts: Positive/Negative ) x Period (Week, Year, 5-10 years) mixed-model ANOVA 
found a significant main effect for Valence, F (l, 20)=15.650,/?=. 001, rjp2 =.444), that is, 
across groups positive events were generated more readily (M  = 5.83, a =2.07) for the 
future relative to events that they were not looking forward to (M  = 4.28, a =1.19; the 
mean number of future thoughts by time period and valence for the Positive and Negative 
Mood Induction group are displayed in Table 31). A significant main effect was also 
found for Period (F(2, 20) = 11.107, /?<.001, rjp2 =.362) reflecting a greater number of 
events generated for the next week and the next year vs. the next 5-10 years. A main 
effect for Group was produced by the ANOVA (F (l, 20) =4.459, /?= 048, rjp2 = .181), 
with the Positive Mood group generating more future events overall. Interaction effects 
were observed for Valence x Group (F(2,20)=27.822, p<.001, rjp2 =.584), with the 
positive mood group generating significantly more positive than negative future events 
(/(10)= 5.719, /?<.001); whereas the Negative Mood group generated marginally more 
negative relative to positive future events this difference was not statistically significant 
(f(10)= -1.117, /?=.290). An interaction effect was observed between Valence x Period
<y
(F(2,20)=9.003, /?= 001, rjp =.314), with a greater number of positive future events 
generated for the near future relative to negative events and the more distant future. No 
three way interaction for Group x Valence x Period (F(2, 20) = 1.938,/?=. 157, rjp2 =.095) 
was observed.
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The results show that at this level o f analysis it is apparent that the two mood 
groups differ significantly in regards to their attempts to generate positive events for the 
future. The results also demonstrate within group differences, with the positive mood 
induction leading to an increase in positive future generation relative to decreased 
negative event generation; whereas the negative mood induction sees a decreased 
generation o f positive future events relative to an increased generation of negative 
events.
Figure 11 depicts the mean number o f events generated across the two valence 
categories by the two mood induction groups. As can be seen there is a difference in 
number o f positive events envisaged by the two groups, with the positive mood group 
generating a significantly larger number o f positive events for the future relative to the 
negative mood group, though between group analyses o f negative future generation was 
not found to be significant. The within group differences can also be observed from 
Figure 11, with a clear positive bias in the positive mood group relative to a negative bias 
within the negative mood group.
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Figure 11. M ean num ber o f  Positive and N egative Future E vents (fluency) w ith Standard E rror Bars (S .E ) 
as reported by the Positive and N egative M ood Induction groups in Experim ent 4.
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Table 31. Means and Standard Deviations (SD) for Positive and Negative Future Thinking Task Raw 
Scores for Fluency, Likelihood and Feeling ratings by Time Period as reported by the Positive and 
Negative Mood Induction groups in Experiment 4.
Variable Positive Mood Negative Mood
Mean (SD) Mean (SD)
Positive Responses, Next Week
Fluency (no. of events) 9.00 (1.67) 5.09 (1.64)
Likelihood 6.26 (0.38) 6.38 (0.55)
Feeling 2.13 (0.57) 2.03 (0.51)
Positive Responses, Next Year
Fluency (no. of events) 8.09 (3.53) 4.63 (1.50)
Likelihood 6.36 (0.42) 5.66 (1.25)
Feeling 2.13 (0.54) 2.54 (0.43)
Positive Responses, Next 5-10 years
Fluency (no. of events) 4.72 (1.95) 3.45 (1.63)
Likelihood 6.00 (0.59) 4.69 (1.15)
Feeling 2.23 (0.61) 2.59 (0.45)
Negative Responses, Next Week
Fluency (no. of events) 3.72 (1.65) 5.45 (1.12)
Likelihood 5.06 (1.65) 5.37 (1.23)
Feeling 1.33 (0.94) 1.42 (0.43)
Negative Responses, Next Year
Fluency (no. of events) 3.81 (1.33) 4.18 (1.94)
Likelihood 5.41 (1.34) 4.94 (1.08)
Feeling 1.33(0.94) 2.08 (0.54)
Negative Responses, Next 5-10 years
Fluency (no. of events) 3.45 (1.36) 5.09 (1.37)
Likelihood 5.59 (0.99) 4.67 (0.94)
Feeling 2.04 (0.62) 2.45 (0.52)
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3.3.2.6 Future Thinking Task measures o f  Event Likelihood
As in Experiment 3 the current study sought to explore the associated variable of 
likelihood with regards to current analyses. The Likelihood of events occurring was not 
seen to differ between groups in Experiment 3 and may be taken as a more stable 
characteristic of future expectancy. As with the fluency data the present analysis made 
use of a mixed model approach. The Valence (Events likelihood: Positive/Negative) x 
Period (week, year, 5-10 years) x Group (Mood Induced: Positive, Negative) mixed- 
model ANOVA found a significant main effect for Valence, F (l, 20) = 9.701, p=.005, 
rjp =.333); that is, across all time periods participants generated significantly more 
positive expectations (M -5.89, a =9.60) for the future relative to the events that they 
were worried about (M=5.17, o =.811). Significant main effects were found for Period 
(F(l, 20) = 3.971,p=  .027, r/p2 =.166), and Group (F(l, 20) = 8.139, p=.010, ijp2 =.289), 
with participants in the Positive Mood induction group reporting greater expectancy of 
events occurring overall and with all participants reporting events in the next week 
relative to the next 5 to 10 years as more likely to occur. No interaction effects were 
seen for Valence and Group (F(l, 20) = .335, p= .569, rjp2 =.016) nor for Valence and 
Period (F(2, 20) = 2.100,/?= .136, rjp2 =.095). A significant interaction was observed for 
Period and Group (F(2,20)= 6.066, p=  005, rjp2 =.233), with the Positive Mood 
induction group reporting more distant future events as likely to occur relative to the 
Negative Mood induction group whom rated more proximate events as more likely to 
take place. The three way interaction of Valence x Period x Group (F(2, 20) =.028, p= 
.972, rjp2 =.001), failed to produce any significant interaction effects.
The results present somewhat differing findings from Experiment 3, with group
differences prevalent at the more general future expectancy level, though no specific
divergence pertaining to valence was observed. Thus it is clear that the positive mood
induction did lead to an increased positivity bias, however, the negative mood induction,
although prevalent in the fluency data, did not influence the expectancy variable. It can
be seen from Figure 12 that the likelihood ratings of future events presents a rather
different picture than the fluency data as seen in Figure 12, where a distinctive pattern
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could be observed between the two groups, such a pattern or any distinction is not 
apparent in Figure 12, nor can it be found in data analysis o f likelihood ratings.
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Figure 12. M ean L ikelihod R atings w ith Standard E rror Bars (S .E) for Positive and N egative Future Events 
as reported by the Positive and N egative M ood Induction groups in E xperim ent 4.
3.3.2.7 Future Thinking Task measures o f Event Affect
The feeling values were explored in a similar fashion to the fluency and 
likelihood data, with an analysis of variance (ANOVA) completed with positive and 
negative future feeling raw scores’. A Valence (Feeling: Positive/Negative) x Period 
(week, year, 5-10 years) x Group (Mood Induced: Positive, Negative) mixed-model 
ANOVA found a significant main effect for Valence, F ( l, 20) =20.585, p<.001, rjp~ =. 
507); that is, across all time periods participants foresaw feeling more positive o f future 
events they were looking forward to (M = 2.27, <r=.382) relative to reports o f negative 
anticipation relating to events that they were worried about (M= 1.78, o  =.453). A 
significant main effect was found for Period (F (l, 20) =12.208, p< .001, tjp2 =.379.) with
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participants reporting higher levels of affect in generation of more distant future events 
of the next year and next 5-10 years vs. the next week. A main effect was also seen for 
Group (F(l, 20) =5.223, /?=. 033, rjp2 =.207), with the negative mood induction group 
reporting greater intensity of affect pertaining to future events in general. No interaction 
effects were seen for Valence and Group (F(l, 20) =.644, /?=.432, rjp2 =.031). Though 
Valence and Period saw an interaction effect (F(2, 20) =3.571,/?= .037, rjp2 =.151), with 
greater positive affect reported for more distant future events. No interaction was seen for 
Period and Group (F(2, 20) = 2.763,/?=.075, rjp2 =.121), nor was a three way interaction 
for Valence x Period x Group found (F(2, 20) =.166,/?=. 848, rjp2 =.008) as produced by 
the ANOVA.
The interesting finding here is that the Negative Mood group report greater levels 
of perceived affect in future experiences, relative to the Positive Mood group. Although, 
it is seen that for both groups there is a valence bias, with the positive events perceived 
with more intense affect relative to the negative events. Figure 13 show that the feeling 
ratings of future events, similar to the likelihood ratings, present a rather different picture 
to that of the fluency data. By referring back to Figure 1 1a  distinctive pattern can be 
observed between the two groups, such a pattern of responding is not apparent in Figure 
13, nor is it found in data analysis of likelihood ratings. As in Experiment 3, the raw data 
analysis for the FTT was able to offer further insight to the future thinking phenomena by 
way of independently examining the variables comprising the FTT. The split periods 
revealed that an inflated number of events was generated for more distant future time 
periods, and although participants did not report to be expecting these more distant 
events to me more likely to occur, they did expect to feel better/worse in the more distant 
future relative to the things they were looking forward to or not respectively.
3.3.2.8 Emotional Avoidance
An interesting finding was observed in regards to correlations with pre- 
experimental reports of emotional avoidance and the FTT variables. Split level analysis 
found that within the Positive Mood group emotional avoidance correlated negatively
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with negative future expectancy (r = -.826, p  = .002); this is consistent with the findings 
from Experiment 3 where within the Non-Depressed group it was similarly found that 
high levels of emotional avoidance (as indexed by a low score on the AAQ-2) was 
related to increased negative future expectancy. However, within the Negative Mood 
group, in the present experiment, an inverse relationship was observed, with emotional 
avoidance negatively correlated with positive future expectancy (r = -.656,/? = .028); that 
is, those who pre-experimentally reported higher levels o f emotional avoidance, 
following the negative mood induction rated positive expectancies as more likely to 
occur.
■ Positive Event Feeling 
» Negative Event Feeling
Positive Negative
Mood Induced
Figure 13. M ean Feeling R atings for Positive and N egative Future E vents and Standard E rror B ars (S.E) 
as reported by the Positive and N egative M ood Induction groups in Experim ent 4.
3.3.3 Summary
In relation to the experimental aims it was seen in these analyses that (1) the
mood inductions did have diverse effects on the reporting o f future experiences. An
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interaction effect for mood induced with valence of future expectancies was observed 
with the FTT index data, with the positive mood induction increasing the level of 
positive future expectancies reported and comparatively reducing the degree of negative 
future expectancies reported. Whereas the negative mood induction raised negative 
future expectancies and reduced positive expectancies, although this was not statistically 
significant. The results from the raw data found that the two mood groups differed 
significantly in regards to generation of positive and negative events for the future.
A further aim of Experiment 4 was to look at the expectancy variable in relation 
to potential mood resistance (2); as such, it was apparent that, at a within sample level of 
analysis, the positive mood induction produced an increased positivity bias, however, the 
negative mood induction, although prevalent in the fluency data, did not influence the 
expectancy variables. That is, the reported expectancies of positive and negative future 
events occurring were comparable within and between the two groups. One notable 
finding here is that the Negative Mood group reported greater levels of perceived affect 
in future experiences, relative to the Positive Mood group. Although, it is seen that for 
both groups there is a valence bias, with the positive events perceived with more intense 
affect relative to the negative events.
One interesting finding in relation to the experimental aim of investigating (3) the
relationship between mood, emotional avoidance and future expectancy, was that
following a negative mood induction those who had reported high levels of emotional
avoidance at baseline were found to report increased expectancy of positive future
events. There is extensive literature pertaining to mood effects on information processing
and attitudes. One view is that a negative mood may have a positive effect in certain
situations as it functions as a warning that something is wrong and as such instigates a
more analytical approach to the present situation where individuals may even be more
motivated to take action to avoid erroneous decisions and judgments (e.g. Schwarz,
1990). In this regard it may be that the participants in the negative mood group became
more aware of their present situation and as such the mood induction may be argued to
have increased defusion (see Sections 1.8.1.1 and 6.1for a definition of defusion). This
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suggestion may be supported by evidence that positive mood leads to an avoidance of 
cognitive effort in order to maintain the positive mood (Isen, 1984; Isen et al., 1982). As 
such mood is taken as information and applied in relation to the currently presenting 
situation, relative to a more analytical approach. Thus, those in a positive mood merely 
rejected negative expectancies, whereas those in a negative mood considered positive 
events and upon a possible deliberation found them to be likely to occur. In regards to 
affect regulation theories it may be inferred that as there were no correlations with 
negative expectancies in the negative mood group there may have been some attempt to 
control the perceived impact of such future events and in order to reinstate a positive 
mood the focus was on positive future expectancies. These findings may further lend 
some support to the postulate that positive and negative future expectations are 
functionally different. In this regard it appears that the mood effect found with the FTT 
index score is affected by the mood effect pertaining to fluency specifically, as this effect 
is not observed for likelihood nor feeling values. This has implications for previous 
findings based on fluency alone and also for studies that make use of the FTT index score 
as a compiled future thinking measure. The results demonstrate that the strength of belief 
in positive/negative outcomes is a more stable characteristic to measure in relation to 
frequency of positive/negative events generated and that emotional avoidance is 
implicated in this belief. Thus, indicating that the underlying features of 
optimism/pessimism may be a more stable behavioural characteristic. A summary of the 
key findings from Experiment 4 is depicted in Table 32.
Findings within the learned helplessness literature have proposed that depression 
arises from a perception that important environmental events cannot be controlled, and 
much success has been seen in inducing such depression levels within a laboratory 
setting (e.g. Maldonado, Martos, & Ramirez, 1991). Experiment 5 will follow on from 
these initial findings by employing a learned helplessness paradigm in order to 
systematically examine the expectancy component relative to more general future 
thinking and fluency for future events.
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Table 32. Summary of Main Aims and Findings from Experiment 4.
Research Aim Hypothesis Main Findings
Positive and negative 
induced mood will relate 
to differences in reported 
positive and negative 
future cognitions within 
and between groups.
Examine the 
potential role of 
mood in biasing 
future-oriented 
cognitions as 
measured by the 
FTT Index score 
and Fluency 
variable.
2 Examine the 
potential role of 
mood in biasing 
future-oriented 
expectancy, as 
measured by the 
FTT likelihood 
variable.
3 Examine the 
relationship 
between induced 
mood, emotional 
avoidance (AAQ- 
II) and future 
cognitions (FTT).
Positive and negative 
induced mood will relate 
to differences in reported 
positive and negative 
future expectations within 
and between groups.
There will be a 
relationship between 
emotional avoidance, 
mood and future 
expectancy.
The hypothesis is partially supported.
Within group differences were found for 
participants in the Positive Mood group, who 
reported significantly greater levels of positive 
future expectancy relative to negative future 
expectancy, as measured by the FTT index score 
(p<05).
The Positive Mood group generated more positive 
future events relative to the Negative Mood group 
(pc.001).
The hypothesis is partially supported.
Between group differences were found with the 
Positive Mood induction group reporting increased 
expectancy of overall future events occurring 
relative to the Negative Mood induction group 
<p=.01).
The hypothesis is supported.
Within the Negative Mood group an inverse 
relationship was observed, with emotional 
avoidance negatively correlated with positive future 
expectancy (p<.05).
No relationship was found for Positive mood, 
emotional avoidance and future expectancy.
Note. Low emotional avoidance is denoted by a high score on the AAQ-H.
3.4 Experiment 5
Experiment 5 aims to induce a depressed like state in a group of healthy
participants in order to determine whether this induction (i.e., learned helplessness
procedure) would impact on participant responding on the Future Thinking Task. To this
end, seemingly successful experimental methods for use in the induction of a depressed-
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like state have been shown to involve exposing participants to an unsolvable task, or the 
experience of an uncontrollable relationship between an action and its outcome (Teasdale 
& Fogarty, 1979). Prior experience with uncontrollable events has been demonstrated to 
retard the acquisition of subsequent new responses (Overmier & Seligman, 1967; 
Seligman, 1975), such as response times to completion on a maze task (Reed, Frasquillo, 
Colkin, Liemann & Colbert, 2001), performance on discrimination tasks (Hiroto & 
Seligman, 1975), and judgment of control tasks (Maldonado, Martos, & Ramirez, 1991). 
In attempting to measure the effects of positive and negative future thinking in a sub 
clinical sample inducing a depressed like state at the analogue level seems like a 
worthwhile endeavor. If the learned helplessness induction really is an analogue of 
depression it would be expected that patterns would emerge in relation to the FTT similar 
to that of depressed participants. However, if the learned helplessness procedure is 
merely a mood altering tool it would be expected that participants patterns of responding 
would be similar to those observed in Experiment 4.
Experiment 5 has four main aims (1) to examine the potential role of analogue 
depressed mood, by use of a learned helplessness task (Solvable vs. Unsolvable Tasks), 
on future-oriented cognitions by looking at the FTT Index score and Fluency variable; It 
is predicted that Solvable and Unsolvable Task completion will relate to differences in 
reported positive and negative future cognitions within and between groups. A further 
aim is (2) to examine if the valence and group interaction found in previous clinical 
samples is demonstrable by an analogue depressed state; it is predicted that there will be 
an interaction between valence (Positive/Negative) and group (Solvable/Unsolvable 
Task) in relation to future positive thinking. (3) to explore if future expectancy, as 
measured by the FTT likelihood variable, is affected by the depressed mood induction. It 
is predicted that there will be a difference in levels of positive future expectancy, as 
measured by the FTT, for those who completed the Solvable Task relative to those who 
completed the Unsolvable Task and that there will be an interaction relating valence of 
future expectancy and group. Experiment 5 further aims to (4) examine the relationship 
between induced depressed mood, emotional avoidance (AAQ-II) and future expectancy
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(FTT). It is predicted that there will be a relationship between emotional avoidance, 
induced depressed mood and future expectancy.
3.4.1 Method
3.4.1.1 Participants
Thirty-five adults volunteered to take part in the current experiment though 
following the established exclusion criteria, pertaining to the BDI-II scores (the criteria 
for exclusion is detailed in section 3.4.2.1) data from six participants was removed, thus 
data from the included twenty-nine participants was utilised in the following analysis. 
Participants were recruited through advertisement within the Psychology Department at 
Swansea University. In all sixteen females and thirteen males, ranging in age from 19 to 
27 years of age (M =21.89, a = 2.25) were included in the experimental analysis.
3.4.1.2 Apparatus and Materials
Participants were requested to complete a set of measures of psychological well 
being. These measures were the same as utilized in Experiments 3 and 5, that is, the Beck 
Depression Inventory 2nd version (BDI-II; Beck, Steer & Brown, 1996), The Beck 
Hopelessness Scale (BHS; Beck & Steer, 1988), The State Trait Anxiety Inventory 
(STAI-S; Spielberger, Gorsuch, & Lushene ,1970; Spielberger et al., 1983) , the Life- 
Orientation Scale (LOT-R; Scheier, Carver, & Bridges, 1994), The Acceptance and 
Action Questionaire-2 (AAQ-2; Bond, Hayes, Baer, Carpenter, Orcutt, Waltz & Zettle 
(Submitted); Hayes, Strosahl, et al., 2004) ,the Positive and Negative Affective Scale 
(PANAS; Watson, Clark, & Tellegen, 1988) and a Verbal Fluency Control Task (Lezak, 
1976).
The Learned Helplessness Task (Maldonado, Martos, & Ramirez, 1991). The
learned helplessness task is a computerized program which includes a solvable and
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unsolvable task paradigm.The solvable and unsolvable discrimination tasks used the 
same stimuli. These consisted of four pattern pairs, which could vary along four 
dimensions, and which were similar to those used by Hiroto and Seligman (1975; based 
on a discrimination task designed by Levine, 1971). Each pattern consisted of a letter (A 
or T), which was coloured (black or red), of a particular type (capital or lower case), and 
had a border (circle or square). The borders were drawn in white, and the background 
was light grey throughout the pre-treatment condition. Each pattern measured 
approximately 5 cm high and 5 cm wide. The two patterns were displayed in pairs, in the 
central portion of the monitor, one on the left of the screen and the other on the right of 
the screen, separated by 7.5 cm. The pairs consisted of one “base” pattern (composed of 
one setting value for each of the four dimensions), and a complementary pattern 
(containing the other dimensional settings). Each pair, therefore, contained mutually 
exclusive, and jointly exhaustive, dimensional settings. The solvable and unsolvable task 
procedures were each composed of three sets of 10 problem trials (pairs of patterns), 
making a total of 30 stimulus displays (all had the same solution). Display pairs were 
allocated to each problem on a random basis. This procedure was adopted to allow 
systematic replication of the Maldonado et al. (1991) study, which also adopted this 
procedure. Feedback on the discrimination task was presented on the screen by the 
sounding of either a pleasant tone for “correct” selections, or an aversive tone for 
“incorrect” selections. The nature of the feedback given to the subject was determined in 
relation to whether the task was solvable or unsolvable.
The Maze Task (Boakes, 1984). The maze task was included as a measure of the 
implementation of the learned helplessness mood characteristics following the learned 
helplessness induction task. The maze is presented in printed format and participants’ 
complete the task by marking a route with a pencil (See Figure 14 for a schematic plan of 
the maze, which measured 8cm by 12 cm). The time taken to complete the maze is 
typically recorded by a handheld stopwatch. The number of errors (defined as entering an 
incorrect, dead-end arm) is recorded.
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C. Small's Hampton Court maze
Figure 14. Schem atic representation o f  the M aze em ployed in Experim ent 5 for the M aze Task to be 
com pleted follow ing both o f  the M aldonado Task (originally  printed in Boakes, 1984, copied with 
perm ission).
3.4.1.3 Experimental Overview
The current study used a 2 x 2 x 3 mixed design, with Group (Solvable Task, 
Unsolvable Task) as the between participant variable and Valence (Future Cognitions: 
Positive/Negative) and Period (Week, Year, 5-10 years) as the within participant 
variables. All participants completed all tasks and measures; the experimental sequence 
is depicted in Figure 15.
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Exclusion Criteria
Participants who score 0 (N= 2) or >10 (N= 4) on the BDI-II are excluded from further
experimental participation.
Solvable Task (AM 5) Unsolvable Task (AM 4)
Participant Sample (N= 35)
Participants are randomly assigned to complete the Solvable or the Unsolvable Task (the 
completion time is recorded for both tasks)
Total sample complete Questionnaires (randomised order of 1st presentation between participants) 
BDI-H, STAI, BHS, LOT-R, AAQ-II, PANAS
Total sample complete Verbal Fluency Control Task 
(randomised 1st presentation of letters F, A, S between participants)
Total sample (both groups) complete the Future Thinking Task (randomised 1st presentation of 
positive or negative future events between participants)
Step 1: Generation of Positive/Negative future events for next week/next year/next 5-10years
Step 3: Feeling rating of Positive/Negative future event upon occurrence.
Step 2: Likelihood rating of Positive/Negative future event occurrence.
Figure 15. Overview of the Experimental Sequence for Experiment 5.
3.4.1.4 Ethical Issues
As in Experiment 4 precautionary measures were explicitly employed in 
Experiment 5 to facilitate conducting the experiment according to the appropriate ethical 
guidelines as identified by the British Psychological Society (2006). The steps taken
207
were consistent with those employed in Experiment 4 (see Section 3.3.1.4). The ethical 
considerations identified in Experiment 4 as related to the application of a mood 
induction paradigm with individuals at risk of, or currently depressed, were adopted in 
Experiment 5 in relation to the induction of an analogue depressed mood. 
Recommendations by the British Psychological Society (2006) were explicitly taken into 
account. Firstly, participants were screened for depression by use of the Beck Depression 
Inventory (BDI-II) with the decision not to include anyone who reported depression 
levels of 10 or above as reported on the BDI-II. A ‘cooling off period of a minimum 24 
hours was again implemented between receiving information about the experiment and 
participation commencement as in the previous experiments. Due to the nature of 
Experiment 5 and the use of a depressed mood induction paradigm particular emphasis 
was given in the brief and debrief to any psychological distress that may arise. The mood 
induction task was introduced as a cognitive ability (i.e. intelligence) test, and a thorough 
debrief, with particular focus on those participants who were assigned to the unsolvable 
task condition, emphasized that one of the task conditions in fact aimed to induce a 
learned helpless feeling in form of a depressed mood. No participants reported feeling 
undue stress as a result of attempting the unsolvable task. At no point during the 
experiment did any participant withdraw from the study or express dissatisfaction or 
distress of any kind. No participants reported emotional upset in relation to the depressed 
mood induction procedure or to the future events generated. As in the previous 
experiments the written debrief sheet included details of the thesis supervisor, counseling 
services related to Swansea University and local and national such service providers. 
Prior to commencement the experiment was approved by the Ethics Committee at 
Swansea University Psychology Department.
3.4.1.5 Procedure
Prior to commencement of the study participants were instructed as to the nature 
of the task, omitting the expected effects of the Learned Helplessness induction. Upon
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consenting to take part participants completed the set of psychometrics questionnaires 
along with the verbal fluency task. Following the VFCT participants BDI-II scores were 
examined and participants who were found to score above 10 on the BDI-II did not 
commence the mood induction task. These participants were thanked for their 
participation and debriefed by stating that the second part of the experiment was no 
longer being conducted and that data from the first section was all that was required in 
this instance. The BDI-II scores were not revealed to, nor discussed with the participants.
The included participants were randomly allocated to complete either the 
Unsolvable or Solvable tasks as presented by the Maldonado computer based program. 
Instructions were presented on the computer screen (the preparation was a direct 
replication of that employed by Maldonado, Martos, & Ramirez, 1991) and read as 
follows:
‘In this experiment you will be looking at a series of computer presented 
images. Each image will involve two stimulus patterns on it. One to the 
left, and another to the right. The stimulus patterns are composed of four 
different dimensions, with two values associated with each dimension. For 
each group of the ten images I have chosen one of the eight values as 
being correct. For each image I want you to choose which side contains 
this value. To do this, you must click on one of the buttons presented 
underneath the image (left or right). If your choice is incorrect, a noise 
comes out through the speakers, but if you choose the correct side there 
will be no noise. Your task is to learn the predetermined value by your 
response according to whether or not the noise is heard. The current 
experiment is adapted from a standard intelligence test. Most people learn 
to respond appropriately to the task with relative ease’.
In the unsolvable condition participants then completed four sets of ten trials, 
where there were 8 possible values to choose from (i.e., square, circle, red, black, the 
letter ‘A’, the letter ‘T’). For each set of ten trials, a new value was assumed to be 
nominated as the ‘correct’ stimulus. Thus the task was to identify the ‘correct’ value for 
each block of ten trials; this was done under no further instruction but via trial and error. 
If participants chose the ‘correct’ value no noise occurred, however upon choosing an 
‘incorrect’ value, a noise was played through the speakers of the computer. Participants
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were naive to the fact that they had no control over the exercise; in this regard the 
‘incorrect’ noise was presented on 50% of the trials regardless of the buttons they pressed 
in an effort to induce a state of learned helplessness.
In the solvable condition the same format and procedure was presented, however 
in this case it was actually possible for the participants to respond in the correct manner 
and positive feedback in regards to a pleasant tone was frequently provided. Overall the 
task was of an unproblematic manner. Thus participants found it undemanding and 
straightforward to respond to the stimuli presented.
Upon completion of the learned helplessness task a printed maze task was 
presented to participants with instructions to complete the maze. Participants were told 
that their completion time would be recorded. Instructions on how to complete the maze 
were presented only in regards to start and finishing points. The instructions were 
presented verbally and in writing as follows:
‘Please complete the maze on the table in front of you in the quickest 
time possible, your time will be recorded. In order to complete the maze 
task you have to begin at the X marked on the perimeter of the maze and 
work your way to the centre. As soon as you begin I will start the stop 
watch’.
The time it took each participant to complete the maze was recorded by a hand 
held stop watch. The maze task was directly observed by the researcher to provide a 
precise and accurate response time, and for those in the unsolvable task group, to further 
induce levels of stress associated with the learned helplessness state previously 
completed. Participants were immediately cycled in to completion of the verbal fluency 
task followed directly by the Future Thinking Task. The Verbal Fluency Control Task 
and the FTT were completed in the same manner as detailed in Experiment 3. Upon 
completion of all tasks participants were thanked and suitably debriefed as to the nature 
of the study. Participants whom had completed the unsolvable Maldonado task were 
informed about the actual characteristics of the task and of its intended use to induce a 
state of learned helplessness. Participants were further reassured that the performance on
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this task was not taken as a measure of intelligence, as instructed prior to the task 
commencements.
3.4.2 Results and Discussion
3.4.2.1 Group Allocation
As in the mood induction experiment, i.e. Experiment 4 (see Section 3.3.2.1), the 
current study opted to remove any participants with a score of 0 (N = 2) or above 10 (N= 
4, M  = 10.75) in order to more accurately capture a sample of non-depressed participants 
(remaining sample BDI-II: M=  4.62, o =2.48). No group differences were observed with 
respect to pre-induction reports on psychometric or well-being questionnaires. Overall 
reports from the psychometric measures were consistent with those of a healthy future 
outlook for all participants. The participant demographics and pre-experimental 
psychometric reports can be observed in Table 33 below, as can be seen the two 
experimental groups were well matched on all measures. No mood differences where 
found between the two groups pre-experimentally (PA: p —.222; NA: /?=.473). The two 
groups did not differ with respect to age, t i l l )  =.894, p  =.379; nor was there a significant 
difference between the two groups in regards to representation of gender, /2  (1) =.293 
p=.588, or verbal fluency, f(27) =-.881, p=.386.
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Table 33. Mean scores and Standard Deviations (SD) for the Demographics and Psychometric test results 
reported by the Solvable and Unsolvable Task groups in Experiment 5. T-Test score and statistical value 
ip) from between group comparisons are presented.
Variable Solvable Task Unsolvable Task
Mean (SD) Mean (SD) P
Gender: Females (Males) 9(6) 7(7)
Age 21.53 (2.06) 22.28 (2.46) 0.894 0.379
VFCT 11.28 (1.95) 11.93(2.02) 0.881 0.386
BDI 5.26 (2.63) 3.92(2.20) -1.480 0.150
BHS 3.13 (1.30) 3.21(1.12) 0.179 0.859
STAI 17.8 (5.53) 16.21 (3.44) -0.918 0.366
LOT-R 14.53 (2.13) 16.21 (3.23) 1.662 0.108
AAQ-II 56.60 (4.71) 59.28(4.21) 1.612 0.119
PA 33.00 (3.13) 34.64(3.91) 1.251 0.222
NA 13.66 (1.34) 13.21 (1.96) -0.727 0.473
Note. VFCT= Verbal Fluency Control Task; BDI= Beck Depression Inventory; BHS= Beck Hopelessness 
Scale; STAI = State Anxiety Inventory; LOT-R= Life Optimism Test-Revised; AAQ-II= Acceptance and 
Action Questionnaire-II; PA = Positive Affective Scale; NA= Negative Affective Scale.
3.4.2.2 Maze Task - measure of Learned Helplessness Induction
The amount of time taken to complete the maze task was recorded and is 
presented in Figure 16. From Figure 16 it can be seen that the group completing the 
Solvable Task took less time (M  = 44.06 seconds) to complete the maze relative to the 
Unsolvable Task group (M = 49.42 seconds). This was further confirmed by statistical 
analysis via a One way ANOVA, F  (1, 27) = 6.902, p  = .014. These results can be taken 
to suggest that the differences displayed in maze completion were experienced due to 
successful induction of learned helplessness, i.e. a depressed mood state.
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Unsolvable Task Solvable Task
Group Allocation
Figure 16. The am ount o f  tim e (in seconds) taken by each task group to com plete the m aze in E xperim ent 
5. E rror Bars show  M ean Standard Error (S.E).
3.4.2.3 The Future Thinking Task
Analysis o f the Future thinking scores were performed following the standards set 
by MacLeod et al. (1998), and in correspondence with Experiments 3 and 4. The 
composite index scores from both groups, o f the overall positive and negative conditions, 
are shown in Table 34. As can be seen from Table 34, with the exception o f negative 
events occurring in the next 5-10 years, and positive events for the next year, the 
participants who completed the solvable task foresaw more positive and negative events 
to occur in the future relative to participants whom attempted the unsolvable task.
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Table 34. Means and Standard Deviations (SD) for Positive and Negative Future Thinking Task Index 
Scores, incorporating Fluency, Likelihood and Feeling Values, for each Time Period as reported by the 
Solvable and Unsolvable Task groups in Experiment 5. T-Test score and statistical value (p) from between 
group comparisons are presented.
Variable Solvable Task Unsolvable Task
Positive Responses
Mean (SD) Mean (SD) t(27) P
Next Week 56.06 (22.64) 37.34 (18.89) -2.408 0.023*
Next Year 43.95 (11.55) 42.11 (14.21) -0.384 0.704
Next 5-10 Years 51.76 (9.29) 40.04 (15.42) -2.498 0.019*
Negative Responses
Next Week 20.58 (14.91) 11.20 (4.44) -2.260 0.032*
Next Year 22.95 (9.15) 15.22 (7.15) -2.520 0.018*
Next 5-10 Years 14.54 (6.61) 15.38 (10.02) 0.267 0.791
Note. *p<.05
3.4.2.4 FTT Index Scores
Analysis of the composite scores with a Group (Depression induction; Solvable, 
Unsolvable) x Valence (Future expectancy: Positive/Negative) x Period (Week, Year, 5- 
10 years) mixed model ANOVA produced two significant effects. There was a 
significant main effect of Valence, with participants reporting higher levels of future 
positive than negative expectancy overall (F(l, 27) = 303.245, p  < .001, rjp2 =.918). No 
significant main effect was seen for Period, F(2, 27) = .065, p  =.937, rjp2 =.002). No 
significant interaction effect was found for Group x Valence (F(l, 27) = 2.644,/? =.116, 
rjp2 =.089), or for Period x Valence (F(2, 27) = 1.677, p=A91, rjp2 =.058), nor was there 
an interaction effect for period and group (F’O, 27) =2.176, /?=. 123, rjp2 =.075). A main
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effect was observed for group (F (l, 27) =10.253, p= .003, tjp2 =.275). The three-way 
interaction involving Group, Valence and Period did not reach significance (F(2, 27) 
=2.538,/7=.088, ///72= 086).
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Solvable Task Unsolvable Task 
Experimental Group Allocation
Positive Index Score 
Negative Index Score
Figure 17. The FT T  Index Scores collapsed across the Three T im e Periods dem onstrating overall Future 
E xpectations for both groups in E xperim ent 5. E rror Bars show  M ean S tandard E rror (S.E).
Thus, it can be determined from the FTT index scores that though participants in 
both groups held more positive (Solvable, M  = 50.95; Unsolvable, M  = 39.83) relative to 
negative future expectations (Solvable, M  = 19.36; Unsolvable, M  = 13.93), the group 
whom completed the Solvable task were significantly more optimistic in their future 
outlook relative to the Unsolvable task group. FTT responses simulated those expected 
from a clinical sample, indicative o f an induced helplessness effect. Figure 17 depicts the 
data graphically and it is evident from this figure that, although the response pattern was
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similar within both groups, the Unsolvable task group demonstrate somewhat deflated 
reports pertaining to future event occurrences relative to the Solvable task group.
3.4.2.5 FTT Raw Scores
Analysis of the raw FTT scores for number of events generated, likelihood 
values, and feeling ratings were calculated and are presented in Table 35. The same 
analytic strategy was employed with the raw data as for the FTT index scores. The 
analysis of the raw scores commenced with regards to number of events generated 
(fluency) with a Group (Depression Induction: Solvable vs. Unsolvable Task) x Valence 
(Number of future thoughts: Positive/Negative) x Period (Week, Year, 5-10 years) 
mixed-model ANOVA. A significant main effect for Valence was found, F( 1, 27) 
=304.538, p<.001, rjp2 =.919), that is, across groups participants generated significantly 
more positive events (M=3.64, a  =0.45) for the future relative to events that they were not 
looking forward to (M= 2.40, o = 0.51; the mean number of future thoughts by time 
period and valence split by group are displayed in Table 35). No significant main effect 
was found for Period (F(2, 27) = 1.088,/?=.344, rjp2 =.039). A main effect for Group was 
produced by the ANOVA (F(l, 27) =24.439, /?<.001, rjp2 = .475), with the groups 
differing in their reporting of positive and negative future events. Participants who 
completed the Solvable Task generated significantly more positive future events (M  = 
3.97, o= 0.34) relative to those who attempted the Unsolvable Task (M = 3.28, o= 0.22; 
t(27) = -6.389, /?<.001). Similarly, the participants who completed the Solvable Task 
generated significantly less negative future events (Af=2.14, o = 0.50) relative to the 
Unsolvable Task group (M= 2.64, o= 0.38; t(27) = -3.026,/?=.005).
No interaction effects were observed for Valence x Group (F(l, 27) = 1.802, 
/?=. 191, rjp =.063), nor was any interaction effect observed between Valence x Period 
(F(2, 27) =.293, /?=.747, rjp2 =.011). Though a three way interaction was found for 
Group x Valence x Period (F(2,27)= 5.929, /?=.005, rjp2 =.180), with participants who 
attempted the Unsolvable Task generating significantly less positive events for the more 
distant future of the next 5-10 years relative to the more proximate future of the next
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week as compared to the Solvable Task group. Figure 18 depicts the mean number of 
events generated by the two groups.
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Figure 18. M ean num ber o f  Positive and N egative Future Events (fluency) reported by both the Solvable 
and U nsolvable Task groups in Experim ent 5. E rror Bars show  M ean Standard E rror (S.E).
3.6.2.6 Future Thinking Task measures o f Expectancy Likelihood
The Future Thinking Likelihood values were similarly analysed to the Future 
thinking Number (and as described in Experiments 3 and 4), with regards to Valence 
(Positive/Negative) and across time Periods (week/year/5-10 years). A Valence (Events 
likelihood: Positive and Negative) x Period (week, year, 5-10 years) x Group (Depression 
Induction: Solvable vs. Unsolvable Task) mixed-model ANOVA found a significant 
main effect for Valence, F( 1, 27) = 65.782, p< .001, t]p2 =.703); that is, across all time 
periods participants reported greater expectations o f positive future events occurring (M 
= 5.72, a=  0.43) relative to the events that they were worried about (M  = 4.52, a=  0.73). 
A significant main effect was found for Period (F (l, 27) =73.981, /?<001, r]p~ =.733),
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with participants rating near future events, in the next week, as more likely to occur than 
those in the more distant future, of the next year and the next 5-10 years. No significant 
main effect was found for Group (F(l,27)=1.978,/?=. 171, rjp2 =.068).
Further, no interaction effects were seen for Valence and Group (F( 1,27)=.214, 
p= .648, rjp2 =.008) or for Period and Group (F(2,27)=.087, p=.916, rjp2 =.003). 
Though a significant interaction was found for Valence and Period (F(2, 27) = 12.446, 
/>=<.001, rjp2 =.316). A significant interaction was observed for the three way interaction 
of Valence x Period x Group (F(2,27)=.6.529, p= .003, rjp2 =.195), with participants in 
the Solvable Task group reporting significantly lower expectations pertaining to more 
distant negative events occurring relative to positive events. Figure 19 presents the mean 
scores for the overall future expectancy ratings by each of the two groups. As can be seen 
the pattern of responses is less distinct relative to the results presented in Figure 18 
pertaining to the fluency reports. Overall the results indicate that the learned helplessness 
effect is less evident when looking at expectancy ratings relative to fluency for future 
events.
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■ Negative Event Likelihood
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Figure 19. M ean L ikelihod R atings for Positive and N egative Future E vents as reported by both the 
Solvable and U nsolvable Task groups in E xperim ent 5. E rror Bars show  M ean Standard E rror (S.E).
3.4.2.7 Future Thinking Task measures o f Event Affect
The feeling values were explored in a similar fashion to the fluency and 
likelihood data. A Valence (Feeling: Positive/Negative) x Period (week, year, 5-10 years) 
x Group (Depression Induction: Solvable vs. Unsolvable Task) mixed-model ANOVA 
found a significant main effect for Valence, F( 1, 27) =24.681, p<  001, rjp2 =. 478); that 
is, across all time periods participants foresaw feeling more positive o f future events they 
were looking forward to. A significant main effect was also found for Period (F (l, 27) = 
45.200, p<.001, rjp =.626) with participants reporting greater levels o f affect pertaining 
to the next year and next 5-10 years vs. the next week. No main effect was seen for 
Group (F( 1, 27) = 2.495, p=. 126, rjp2 =.085). Nor was an interaction effects found for 
Valence and Group (F (l, 27) = .195,p=.662, tjp~ =.007). Valence and Period were found 
to interact (F(2, 27) = 7.849, p= .001, rjp2 =.225) with greater positive affect reported to
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events occurring in the next year relative to the two other time periods and negative 
feeling reports.
An interaction was seen for Period and Group (F(2, 27) = 10.800, p<  001, rjp2 
=.286), with the Solvable task group reporting greater affect for events occurring in the 
next year relative to the other time periods and those who attempted the Unsolvable 
Task. No three way interaction for Valence x Period x Group was found (F(2, 27) 
=2.052, p=.138, rjp' =.071) as produced by the ANOVA. As can be seen in Figure 20 
responses pertaining to feeling at the time o f event occurring was similar in pattern to the 
likelihood reports. It appears that the helplessness induction did not influence ratings of 
such values between groups.
■ PositiveEvent Feeling
■ Negative Event Feeling
Group Allocation
Solvable Task Unsolvable Task
Figure 20. M ean Feeling R atings for Positive and N egative Future Events, with Standard E rror Bars (S .E), 
as reported by both the Solvable and U nsolvable T ask groups in Experim ent 5.
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Table 35. Means and Standard Deviations (SD) for Positive and Negative Future Thinking Task Raw 
Scores for Fluency (number of events generated), Likelihood and Feeling Ratings for each Time Period as 
reported by the Solvable and Unsolvable Task groups in Experiment 5.
Variable Solvable Task Unsolvable Task
Mean (SD) Mean (SD)
Positive Responses, Next Week
Fluency (no. of events) 4.06 (1.09) 3.57 (0.51)
Likelihood 6.58(0.39) 6.28 (0.54)
Feeling 2.02(0.47) \.61 (0.83)
Positive Responses, Next Year
Fluency (no. of events) 3.60(0.73) 3.64 (1.01)
Likelihood 5.21 (0.69) 5.88 (0.72)
Feeling 2.37 (0.40) 2.04 (0.68)
Positive Responses, Next 5-10 years
Fluency (no. of events) 4.26 (0.70) 32.64 (0.74)
Likelihood 4.93 (0.63) 5.47 (0.58)
Feeling 2.48 (0.29) 2.10(0.66)
Negative Responses, Next Week
Fluency (no. of events) 2.13(0.79) 2.21 (0.69)
Likelihood 5.69 (1.21) 6.43 (0.86)
Feeling 4.00 (3.20) 1.14 (1.17)
Negative Responses, Next Year
Fluency (no. of events) 2.67 (0.81) 2.14 (0.66)
Likelihood 4.02 (0.54) 3.10 (1.38)
Feeling 5.66(1.98) 4.42 (1.91)
Negative Responses, Next 5-10 years
Fluency (no. of events) 2.53 (0.52) 2.01 (0.91)
Likelihood 3.63 (1.11) 3.71 (1.38)
Feeling 4.46 (2.32) 4.42 (2.53)
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3.4.2.8 Emotional Avoidance
Split level analysis found that within the Unsolvable Task group emotional 
avoidance correlated negatively with positive future expectancy (r = -.565, p  = .035); this 
is consistent with the findings from Experiment 4 where similar correlations were found 
within the Negative Mood group. However, no correlations were found within the 
Solvable Task group for either of the FTT variables.
3.4.3 Summary
In relation to the main aims of Experiment 5 it was found that (1) the depressed 
mood induction effectively influenced the overall responses to the FTT index score as a 
main group difference was observed, with the participants in the Unsolvable Task group 
demonstrating a reduced rate of responding overall, relative to increased representation 
by the Solvable Task group. However, this finding (2) did not extend to the group and 
valence interaction and as such no valence specific effect was observed. This finding 
stands in contrast to what has previously been presented in clinical data sets, where the 
valence specific representation has been noted in support of the proposal of a reduced 
positive future outlook as significant to depressed patients. The present finding was 
supported by a general non-valence specific significant finding for the fluency raw 
scores. However, neither main group, nor interaction effects were observed with regards 
to the future expectations of events occurring, nor ratings pertaining to the anticipated 
affect at the time of events occurring. (3) Participant responses on the expectancy and 
feeling components of the FTT did in their own right not differ between groups nor in 
terms of the emergent pattern shown by the index and fluency data; therefore, the 
compiled index data, as was seen in Experiment 4, appears highly influenced by the 
fluency reports in its composition. Thus, overall the results indicate that the learned 
helplessness effect is not evident when looking at expectancy ratings relative to fluency 
for future events. Additionally, it was found that (4) following the Learned Helplessness 
induction, those high in emotional avoidance reported increased expectancy of positive 
future experiences, whereas those high in emotional avoidance that completed the
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Table 36. Summary of Main Aims and Findings from Experiment 5.
Research Aim Hypothesis Main Findings
1 Examine the potential role 
of analogue depressed 
mood, by use of a learned 
helplessness task 
(Solvable vs. Unsolvable 
Tasks), on future-oriented 
cognitions by looking at 
the FTT Index score and 
Fluency variable.
Examine if the valence 
and group interaction 
found in previous clinical 
samples is demonstrable 
by an analogue depressed 
state.
Examine future 
expectancy as measured 
by the FTT likelihood 
variable in relation to an 
induced depressed mood 
state.
Solvable and Unsolvable Task 
completion will relate to 
differences in reported positive 
and negative future cognitions 
within and between groups.
There will be an interaction 
between valence 
(Positive/Negative) and group 
(Solvable/Unsolvable Task) in 
relation to future positive 
thinking.
There will be a difference in 
levels ofpositive future 
expectancy, as measured by the 
FTT, fo r  those who completed 
the Solvable Task relative to 
those who completed the 
Unsolvable Task.
The hypothesis is partially supported.
Within group differences were found for the Solvable 
Task group who reported greater expectancy of 
positive future events (p<.05).
No within group differences were found for those who 
completed the Unsolvable Task.
A between group difference was found, with 
participants who completed the Unsolvable Task 
demonstrating reduced FTT index score for positive 
future events relative to those who completed the 
Solvable Task (p<.01).
A between group difference was found with the 
Solvable Task group generating a reduced number of 
positive future events relative to those in the Solvable 
Task group (p<.05).
The hypothesis is not supported. No significant 
interaction effect was found for Valence x Group in 
relation to the FTT index score.
No interaction effects were observed for Valence x 
Group in relation to the FTT Fluency variable.
The hypothesis is not supported. No significant main 
effect was found for Group.
Examine group 
differences in relation to 
emotional avoidance 
(AAQ-II) and future 
expectancy (FTT).
There will be an interaction 
between valence o f future 
expectancy and group.
There will be a relationship 
between emotional avoidance, 
induced depressed mood and 
future expectancy.
The hypothesis is not supported. No interaction 
effects were seen for Valence x Group.
The hypothesis is supported.
A positive relationship between emotional avoidance 
and positive future expectancy was found within the 
Unsolvable Task group (p<.05).
No relationship was found for those in the Solvable 
Task group, emotional avoidance and future 
expectancy.
Note. Low emotional avoidance is denoted by a high score on the AAQ-II.
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Solvable Task did not demonstrate any such biases in relation to future expectancy. Table 
36 summarise the main findings from Experiment 5.
3.5 General Discussion
Together Experiments 3, 4 and 5 aimed to test the stability of the FTT as a 
measure of future thinking in a sub clinically depressed population. The findings indicate 
that the FTT lacks specificity in its detection of sub clinical levels of depression 
(Experiment 3), is susceptible to current mood effects (Experiment 4) and a short 
depression induction produced false positives (Experiment 5). Indeed the contamination 
of the FTT fluency variable by a mood induction may indicate that it is a measure of 
current mood state rather than depression per se. These findings are consistent with 
those of de Jong-Meyer et al (2007) who investigated the accessibility of positive and 
negative future events in dysphoric adolescent in-patients and revealed that a mood 
induction procedure had significant effects on the accessibility of events. This was 
particularly evident in the negative mood induction where the pattern of responses 
demonstrated an increased fluency for negative events. Such mood congruency is noted 
in the literature pertaining to attitudes and decision making, where mood has consistently 
been noted to influence subsequent task performance (e.g. Schwarts, 1990). Interestingly, 
in the depressed mood induction those who completed the Unsolvable Task, and as such 
were exposed to the learned helplessness influence, did not respond with increased 
negative fluency, rather an overall reduced fluency rate was seen in relation to the 
Unsolvable Task group. Thus, it appears that the learned helplessness task affected 
participant responses in a different manner to the negative mood induction; as such the 
depressed mood induction likely mimics a depressed mood state. Likelihood ratings 
across all three experiments were the most stable component of the Future Thinking 
Task. This is surprising given that in previous studies the focus has been on number of 
reported positive and negative events (e.g. de Jong-Meyer et al., 2007; O’Connor, 
Connery & Cheyne, 2000; MacLeod et al., 2006) with likelihood ratings often not even
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reported in the findings. MacLeod & Salminiou (2001) suggest that there is a lack of 
availability of positive anticipated experiences in depression. This same general lack of 
availability would not exist in non-depressed samples, however does appear to be 
affected by mood state. It appears from the current study, and from previous research, 
that mood impacts on the availability of positive anticipated experiences, however this 
effect has been argued in clinical samples to be indicative of a depressed state.
This effect of mood on the availability of positive experiences suggests that 
fluency for generating future events is not a robust measure of depression levels. It 
indicates that fluency for positive future events cannot accurately distinguish between 
depressed and non-depressed samples if mood is not taken into account. This also 
suggests the importance and the utility of the likelihood ratings in the assessment of 
clinical depression, since evidence to date suggest that these are resistant to mood effects 
and therefore a better indicator of a negative thinking style. Therefore, further research 
into likelihood ratings appears to be an important focus for research into mental time 
travel.
Interpretation of the current findings relating to emotional avoidance may suggest
that high levels of emotional avoidance emerged as a mediating factor in relation how
future cognitions are constructed under distress, i.e. as influenced by negative recall or a
learned helplessness task. A relationship between positive future thinking and emotional
avoidance was only fund within the negative mood group (Experiment 4) and the
Unsolvable task group (Experiment 5), with those reporting high emotional avoidance
seen to report an increased level of positive future events. It may be inferred from this
that emotional avoidance renders an individual susceptible to perceived distress in
situations which challenge their positive future outlook. The increased expectancies of
positive future experiences seen within these two groups, may be indicative of the mood
regulation effect that has been proposed, where in the short term individuals may
successfully suppress any negative future connotations and focus on expectancies that
elicit a more immediate positive affect. As such what is observed in Experiments 4 and 5
is a direct result of application of such emotionally avoidant coping strategies, where an
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negative emotional content is avoided and positive evaluations are exaggerated .This 
suggestion is supported by a similar sample of healthy participants in Experiment 3, who 
reported higher levels of emotional avoidance though was not exposed to any mood 
altering inductions and as such no relationship was found with future thinking. Similarly, 
those who reported high emotional avoidance but received a positive mood induction and 
completed a solvable task (Experiments 4 and 5) were found to relate to negative future 
expectancies. That is no mood regulation strategies were implements here in regards to 
avoidance of valenced content; thus it may be inferred that for those high in emotional 
avoidance an increased risk of reduced positive future thinking emerge following 
exposure to a stressful event (i.e. recalling a negative past experience or completing an 
unsolvable task). It is evident from the present experiments that the role of emotional 
avoidance in depression and cognitions about the future warrant further exploration.
It is important to make note of one potentially confounding variable pertaining to 
Experiment 4, where the mood induction method used was that of recalling an affective 
autobiographical episode. This is a widely used and highly successful method, as seen 
from Experiment 4 itself, and was considered for use in this experiment due to its ease of 
use and good rate of effect. However, given recent findings in the mental time travel 
literature, and specifically a very recent article by Szpunar (2010) it may be that the 
personal recall implicitly influenced the directionality of the subsequent future thoughts 
as recorded by the FTT. Szpunar specifically notes how the last or most recent instance 
of recall may serve to influence the subsequent future thoughts. It is further suggested 
that the nature of this influence is implicit, as the individual holds no conscious 
awareness of utilizing the past experience in any strategic manner. As such Szpunar 
argues that there is a separate case for considering implicit memory in research 
pertaining to future thinking, as implicit memory appears to be operationalised in a 
separate approach to the link that has previously been suggested by autobiographical and 
episodic memory functions. These have been consciously accessed in order to facilitate 
planning, problem solving or the like, in an effort to work towards personal goals, for 
example. Szpunar’s findings are in its infancy and as such not elaborated on greatly, the
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suggestion is more to raise awareness of such implicit functions, and to spur further 
research of this phenomenon in the ongoing mental time travel debate. It should be noted 
that in terms of the link between past and future thinking, the valence congruency found 
between past recall and subsequent increase in future cognitions presented in Experiment 
4 may provide further support to the existence of a direct relationship of cognitions about 
the past / future.
One potential weakness of the current experimental series pertains to the use of 
explicit self report measures. Given Szpunar’s (2010) recent suggestion that future 
thinking may be influenced implicitly, and that a number of researchers have argued that 
the study of implicit cognition could be important in the analysis and treatment of 
psychopathology (e.g. Wiers, Teachman, & De Houwer, 2007). That is, early detection 
of depression may be available via implicit methodologies which may not become overt 
until prolonged suffering has been endures, i.e. when sufficient cognitive resources are 
available vulnerable individuals may successfully suppress implicit negative biases, but 
the ability to self-regulate may be impaired when cognitive resources are depleted (e.g., 
by life stress or as induced by learned helplessness tasks in a lab setting). Evidence 
suggests that the dispositional tendency to suppress unwanted thoughts may perform a 
protective function at low levels of life stress, but may present an increased risk for 
depression as life stress increases (Beevers & Meyer, 2004). Future research on implicit 
measures of future thinking in depression would be advantageous as the self report nature 
of tests such as the FTT and the FCT render it easy for participants to conceal 
information from assessors thus limiting their value as clinical tools.
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Chapter 4
Designing an Implicit Measure of Future
Expectancies
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4.1 G eneral Introduction
There is a burgeoning literature on future thinking in depression (cf. Szpunar, 
2010). However, the common use of self-report measures may limit this body of work. 
Attempts have been made in order to account for many of the shortcomings associated 
with use of such direct measures (see Sections 1.5.1 and 1.5.2); although at best these 
efforts have offered limited improvements (Holden, Book, Edwards, Wasylkiw, & 
Starzyk, 2003). This is particularly of concern in clinical research, pertaining to the 
motivation behind self-report responses, as the thoughts and beliefs people tend to 
conceal in such measures may be reflections of the cognitions they attempt to screen at a 
more personal level (Greenwald, Banaji, Rudman, Famham, Nosek, & Mellott, 2002). 
‘Pretence’ at this level, even if subconscious (Beck, Rush, Shaw, & Emery, 1979; 
Beevers, 2005), may lead to the adoption of unhealthy coping strategies, and act to 
accumulate and endorse negative thoughts of the self and the future (Hayes, 1994; Hayes 
et al., 2001).
Given the recent advancement of implicit methodologies (see Section 1.7) and the 
advantages of their use in the analysis of psychological disorders (e.g., Wiers, Teachman, 
& De Houwer, 2007), it may be that implicit measures could provide a more accurate and 
sensitive measure of future cognition in depression. In addition to this they may improve 
assessment and detection of depression (e.g., Nock & Banaji, 2007). Indeed, as noted in 
Chapter 1, the Implicit Association Test (IAT) has out preformed explicit methods in 
terms of predictive power across several studies, for example, self-esteem (Haeffel et al., 
2007; Steinberg, Karpinki, & Alloy, 2007); hopelessness (Meites, Deveney, Steele, 
Holmes, & Pizzagalli, 2008; Friedman, Nosek, Miller, Gordon, & Banaji, 2001); self- 
injurious thoughts (Nock & Banaji, 2007); and death/suicide (Nock, Park, Finn, 
Deliberto, Dour, & Banaji, 2010) (see Section 1.7.1).
Previous IAT research of particular relevance to the current work, applied the 
IAT as an implicit measure of future expectations and hopelessness (Meites, Deveney, 
Steele, Holmes, & Pizzagalli, 2008). In this study Meites et al. compared a sample of
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remitted depressed (RD) and healthy participants on two separate IAT’s. First, a 
‘depression IAT’ aimed to assess associations between the self and mood state, whereas 
the second task, the ‘hopelessness IAT’, aimed to obtain a measure of future thought and 
mood state. These tests were reviewed prior to and following a negative mood induction. 
The ‘depression IAT’ was found to show between group differences, with the RD 
participants demonstrating weaker associations between self with happiness relative to 
the healthy controls prior to the mood induction. Whereas following the negative mood 
induction no such differences remained. However, the ‘hopelessness IAT’ did not 
manage to produce any significant findings as both participant groups showed an implicit 
bias towards associating the future with happiness. That is, RD individuals did not 
demonstrate decreased positive future expectancies relative to control participants, even 
after a negative mood induction. Thus, these findings contradict previous research by 
Friedman et al., (2001) where implicit hopelessness biases were observed in a sample of 
currently depressed individuals. Meites et al.’s findings are also in contrast to a study by 
Hepburn, Bamhofer and Williams (2006) who found greater levels of explicit 
hopelessness in healthy controls after a negative mood induction, with overall increased 
implicit depression in the same population. However, there are some limitations to the 
IAT as an implicit measure (see Section 1.7.1.2 for a description of such limitations). 
Bames-Holmes et al. (2006) have extended the IAT paradigm, in a novel procedure 
referred to as the Implicit Relations Assessment Procedure (IRAP), which involves the 
presentation of specific relational terms (e.g., similar, opposite, better, worse) that allow 
for the relations between and among stimuli to be considered in their own right rather 
than just associations between stimuli (see Sections 1.7.2, 1.7.2.1 and 4.2.1.4 for a 
description of the IRAP construction and effect).
The measurement of specific relations rather than merely associations between 
the self and future events is of particular relevance to the current work. Imagine for 
example, in the examination of future expectancies (i.e., expectancy relations) 
associatively pairing “future expectations” with positive events such as “wealth” or 
“happiness” and so forth, only informs the researcher about the direct pairing of
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expectations with these events. Specifically, information is only gained pertaining to the 
strength of association between the personal future and these stimuli. As such an 
understanding about the nature or direction of the association is lacking. However, by 
directly targeting the relations between stimuli, other than associations, the IRAP offers a 
direct examination of the relational nature of an individual’s pre-existing beliefs. The 
basic IRAP effect has been replicated across a number of studies (cf. Section 1.7.2.1 for a 
presentation of such IRAP studies) and is regarded as a stable measure of individual 
differences. As such the IRAP appears a more suited implicit measure for the 
investigation of future expectancies. The current chapter reports on a series of 
experiments that aim to design and evaluate an IRAP task to measure positive and 
negative future experiences across a sub clinical sample of depressed and healthy control 
undergraduate students.
4.2 Experiment 6
Experiment 6 aims to adopt the IRAP in order to construct an implicit future 
thinking task, more specifically, an implicit version of the FTT (MacLeod et al., 1998) 
with an emphasis on the expectancy component. Therefore, the implicit future thinking 
measure, the Future Thinking IRAP (FT IRAP), will be designed specifically to measure 
future positive and negative expectancies. To this end Experiment 6 has two main aims, 
(1) examine implicit future thinking by use of the FT-IRAP in relation to sub-clinical 
depression. It is predicted that implicit future thinking, as measured by the FT-IRAP, will 
differ between sub-clinically depressed individuals relative to non-depressed individuals, 
as measured by the BDI-II. A further aim of Experiment 6 is (2) to examine implicit 
future expectancy as measured by the FT-IRAP in relation to the role of emotional 
avoidance, as measured by the AAQ-II, in future thinking; it is predicted that there will 
be a relationship between emotional avoidance and implicit future expectancy.
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4.2.1 M ethod
4.2.1.1 Participants
Thirty-eight adults from Swansea University volunteered to take part in the 
current experiment in return for course credit, though after exclusion criteria pertaining 
to BDI-II scores (the criteria for inclusion is detailed in Section 4.2.2.1) data from eight 
participants was removed, thus only data from thirty participants was utilised in the 
following analysis. As such, the subsequent information pertains to the included 23 
females and 7 males who were recruited via advertisements within the Psychology 
Department at Swansea University. The participants ranged in age from 18 to 28 years 
(M= 21.1, <7 = 2.56).
4.2.1.2 Apparatus and Materials
Participants were requested to complete a set of experimental measures of 
psychological well being. These measures were the same as utilized in Experiment la 
(see Section 2.2.1.2, and subsequently all the foregoing experiments to Experiment 6), 
that is the Beck Depression Inventory 2nd version (BDI-II; Beck, Steer & Brown, 1996), 
The Beck Hopelessness Scale (BHS; Beck & Steer, 1988), The State Trait Anxiety 
Inventory, (STAI-S; Spielberger, Gorsuch, & Lushene ,1970; Spielberger et al., 1983), 
the Life-Orientation Scale (LOT-R; Scheier, Carver, & Bridges, 1994), The Acceptance 
and Action Questionaire-2 (AAQ-2; Bond et al., (Submitted); Hayes, Strosahl, et al., 
2004), The Positive and Negative Affective Scale (PANAS; Watson, Clark, & Tellegen, 
1988) and the Verbal Fluency Control Task (Lezak, 1976).
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4.2.1.3 Im plicit Relational Assessm ent Procedure: Piloting o f Stimuli
Pilot Study
Original data, in form of participant responses, from previous studies with the 
Future Thinking Task was acquired following private correspondence with Andrew 
MacLeod (February, 2006). A number of commonly generated positive and negative 
future experiences were pooled and assessed for general probability. The collated data 
was compiled and presented in a survey, comprising a total of 92 future events for 
evaluation. Respondents were asked to state whether the event ‘could possibly happen to 
them in the future’ and rate this as very unlikely (1) to very likely (7); and also rate ‘how 
negative (1) or positive (7) they deemed the event to be’. Based on these survey ratings, 
from 120 participants, the six positive and six negative future events with the highest 
likelihood of occurrence were selected as stimuli for use in an implicit measure targeting 
future expectancies, namely the specifically composed Future Thinking-Implicit 
Relational Assessment Procedure (FT-IRAP; see Table 37 for an illustration of the 
selected FT-IRAP stimuli).
Table 37. FT-IRAP stimuli words derived from the FTT stimuli Pilot Study and employed in Experiment 6.
Positive Future Events Negative Future Events
Friendship Worry
Enjoyment Loneliness
Happiness Failure
Wealth Stress
Success Sadness
Love Illness
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4.2.1.4 Future Thinking-Implicit Relational Assessment Procedure
The IRAP (Bames-Holmes et al., 2006) aims to target implicit cognitions, (i.e. 
thoughts, feelings, and beliefs) which may be underreported due to an attempt to conceal 
such cognitions or due to a lack of conscious awareness of such beliefs by the 
participants themselves. The IRAP is a computer based measure and the participant 
responses to the tasks and stimuli presented on a computer screen are automatically 
recorded. The IRAP trial types are created by presenting relationally opposing labels in 
conjunction with sets of target words deemed as consistent or inconsistent in relation to 
the verbal function of these labels. The IRAP has been designed to allow for the use of 
labels and target words that are specific to each experimental investigation, and as such a 
multitude of relational targets can be utilized. For the composition of the Future Thinking 
IRAP (FT-IRAP) the FT-IRAP labels were intentionally designed to promote relational 
responding consistent with personal future optimism. The stimuli selected for the FT- 
IRAP consist entirely of words. The sample stimuli consist of two phrases presented as ‘I 
expect’ (sample 1 label) and ‘I don’t expect’ (sample 2 label). The pilot data based on the 
FTT event ratings was converted and employed to develop the specific FT-IRAP target 
words; i.e. the target stimuli were all single nouns. Six had positive connotations, that is 
the six positive future expectancies (sample 1 target words) were ‘Friendship’, 
‘Enjoyment’, ‘Happiness’, ‘Wealth’, ‘Success’ and ‘Love’; and six had negative 
connotations, i.e. the six negative future expectancies (sample 2 target words) were 
‘Worry’, ‘Loneliness’, ‘Failure’, ‘Stress’, ‘Sadness’ and ‘Illness’ The two response 
options consisted of the relational terms TRUE and FALSE. The stimulus arrangements 
for the IRAP are presented in Table 30 (i.e. the positive and negative FT-IRAP target 
words presented with the sample labels).
The Implicit Relational Assessment Procedure typically consists of a minimum of
two practice blocks and a fixed set of six test blocks. Each block presents the same
number of trials, comprised of what are defined as four different trial types (Bames-
Holmes et al, 2006; see Figure 21 for an example of the four FT-IRAP trial types). In
order to complete the FT-IRAP participants are required to choose between two response
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options (i.e. ‘true’ and ‘false’), by pressing either the ‘D’ or ‘K’ key. The response 
options appear at the bottom left and right of the screen and switch randomly from trial- 
to-trial. Consistent with previous IRAP presentations, a block of consistent trials, which 
reflects an optimistic future outlook on the FT-IRAP, requires the following pattern of 
responses: I expect- Positive -  True; I expect-Negative- False; I don’t expect -  Positive 
-  False; I don’t expect -  Negative -  True. A block of inconsistent trials requires the 
reverse response pattern (denoting a pessimistic future outlook; I expect -  Positive -  
False; I expect -  Negative -  True, etc). Participants are put through an alternating series 
of consistent and inconsistent blocks as the IRAP program reverses the feedback 
contingencies across the repeated blocks. The order of sequence, consistent followed by 
inconsistent or inconsistent followed by consistent, is further counterbalanced across 
participants.
Table 38. The Stimulus Arrangements Employed in Experiment 6 . The Positive and Negative FT-IRAP 
Target Words presented with the Sample Labels ‘I expect’ and ‘I don’t expect’ along with the 
corresponding Response Options of ‘true’ and ‘false’; i.e. the Four Stimulus-response Combinations 
deemed Consistent in the Future Thinking-IRAP.
Sample
1
Positive
Targets
Sample 2 Negative 
Targets
Sample Negative 
1 Targets
Sample 2 Positive
Targets
I expect Love I don’t Worry 
expect
I expect Worry I don’t 
expect
Love
Friendship Loneliness Loneliness Friendship
Enjoyment Failure Failure Enjoyment
Happiness Stress Stress Happiness
Wealth Sadness Sadness Wealth
Success Dlness Illness Success
Response option 1 Response option 1 Response option 2 Response option 2
True True False False
Note. By implication 
inconsistent.
all of the other four possible stimulus-response combinations are deemed
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Participants are informed that they will complete a practice phase and errors are 
expected for these practice blocks. Onscreen feedback is provided after each block, 
presenting the participant with a statement of their percentage of correct responses and 
median response latency for that block. Subsequent to each block of the IRAP, 
participants are informed that the previously correct and wrong answers will be reversed 
in the next block, thus removing any need for trial-and-error learning after the first block. 
The trials are presented quasi-randomly with the typical constraint that none of the four 
trial types are offered twice in succession. The positioning of the two response options is 
also quasi-random in that typically they cannot appear in the same left-right position 
three times in succession.
The procedure for the test blocks is similar to the practice blocks, except that 
onscreen instructions inform participants that each block is a test and to "go quickly, ” 
although making “a few errors are okay. ” The same alternating sequence employed with 
the practice blocks is also used with the test blocks. Thus, if a participant is exposed to a 
consistent-inconsistent sequence during practice, test blocks 1,3, and 5 are consistent 
and test blocks 2, 4, and 6 are inconsistent; If practice involved an inconsistent-consistent 
sequence, then test blocks 1,3, and 5 are inconsistent and 2, 4, and 6 are consistent.
The FT-IRAP requires participants to reach a standard of 80% correct responses,
and a median response time of less than 3000ms. These criteria ensure that participants
understand and comply with the IRAP instructions. If participants fail to achieve the
criteria for either of the two practice blocks, the required standard, along with the
standard of responding they have achieved, are presented on the screen, and they are
invited to try again. Participants are allowed three attempts to achieve the practice criteria
(a total of six practice blocks); if they fail to do so any data are discarded. Only
participants who achieve the practice criteria proceed to the six test blocks. No
performance criteria are applied during the test blocks in order to proceed, but if a
participant’s performance falls below the practice accuracy criterion (e.g., 80%) across
the test blocks the data for that participant are normally discarded. When all six test
blocks have been presented the IRAP is complete. The primary data from the IRAP is
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response latency, defined as the time in milliseconds (ms) that elapses between the onset 
of the trial and a correct response emitted by a participant. The FT-IRAP was written in 
Microsoft Visual Basic 6.0 and administered to participants on a Toshiba portable 
computer with a colour monitor, Intel Pentium 1500MHz processor, and Windows XP 
operating system (software available from http:/
/psychology.nuim.ie/IRAP/IRAP l.shtml; cf. Barnes-Holmes et al, 2006).
Consistent Tasks -  "Optimistic Outlook”
I expect
(True) (False)
I don't expect
B
Sadness
(True) (False)
Inconsistent Tasks -  "Pessimistic Outlook”
I expect
Sadness
(True) (False)
I don't expect
Figure 21. The Four FT-IR A P Trial Types em ployed in E xperim ent 6. The Trial T ype distinctions are 
based on the requested R esponse O ptions.
4.2.1.5 Experimental Overview
The current study used a 2 x 2 mixed design, with Group (Depression: High BDI- 
II, Low BDI-II) as the between participant variable and Valence (Implicit Future
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Cognitions: Positive/Negative) as the within participant variable. All participants 
completed all tasks and measures; the experimental sequence is depicted in Figure 22.
■ . -  — ■■■  ----------- —  —  — .................-d
Participant Sample (N= 38)
Total sample complete the Future Thinking IRAP (randomised presentation of consistent or 
inconsistent first trials between participants)
Step 1. Participants complete a minimum of 2 practice trials.
Step 2. The 3 test trials commence upon successful completion of practice trials.
Total sample complete Verbal Fluency Control Task 
(randomised 1st presentation of letters F, A, S between participants)
Total sample complete Questionnaires (randomised 1st order of presentation between 
participants) BDI-II, STAI, BHS, LOT-R, AAQ-II, PANAS
• i• *• i
Post-Experimental/Pre-Analysis BDI-II Group Split (see Section 4.2.2.1):
Low BDI-II score (1<10): N- 17 (BDI-II = 0, excluded from analysis, N= 4) 
High BDI-II score (10<30): N= 13 (BDI-II score >29, excluded from analysis, N= 4) 
Final sample for analysis: N  = 30
Figure 22. Overview of the Experimental Sequence for Experiment 6 .
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4.2.1.6 Ethical Issues
In order to conduct the study according to all of the appropriate ethical guidelines 
as identified by the British Psychological Society (2006), a number of specific measures 
were put in place. These measures were consistent with those outlined previously for 
Experiment 3 and Experiment la  specifically (see Section 2.2.1.4), with only minor 
adjustments made in order to facilitate the change in methodologies to tailor instructions 
to the current experiment. Emphasis was put on assuring participants that the computer 
task was not a measure of how quick they were at responding but that the focus was on 
the responses made. This emphasis was made to deter distress related to feelings of inept 
computer skills.
4.2.1.7 Procedure
Participation took place in a controlled environment in the form of a standard 
psychology research laboratory with the provision of a table, chair and portable 
computer. Prior to commencing the FT-IRAP participants were provided with automated 
visual explanations supplemented by verbal instructions relating to the task. The IRAP 
program commenced with a series of automated ethical guidelines and instructions as 
follows (adapted from standard guidelines provided by Bames-Holmes for use with the 
IRAP procedure):
Our research investigates cognitive processes that are used in decisions 
that involve memory. We are seeking to develop and test theories of 
cognitive processes that occur inside and outside of awareness in the 
routine use of memory.
Stimuli will be presented on this display screen and your responses will be 
entered on the keyboard.
The research assumes that you can read English fluently and that your 
vision is normal or corrected-to-normal. If you do not consider yourself 
fluent in English, or if your vision is not normal or corrected-to-normal 
and ESPECIALLY IF YOU ARE HAVING SOME DIFFICULTY
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READING THIS DESCRIPTION, please ask the Experimenter now 
whether or not you should continue.
Your identity as a participant is confidential. Further, you are free to 
discontinue participation at any time, without penalty. In keeping with 
standard practice, your data may be retained for 5 years or so, during 
which time only the investigators on this or successor projects will have 
access to them.
PLEASE NOW READ THE STATEMENT BELOW, WHERE YOU 
WILL BE ASKED TO RESPOND TO A STANDARD INFORMED 
CONSENT QUESTION.
I have read the description of the procedure. I understand that the 
questions I may have about this research will be answered by Liv Kosnes 
or one of the other researchers working on this project.
If you consent to participate in the research that has been described on the 
preceding display pages you should now read the Instructions for the 
sorting tasks below.
[INSTRUCTION: If you wish to ask any questions first, alert the 
experimenter now. IF YOU WISH NOT TO PROCEED, you should 
inform the experimenter].
Once participants had read this information and consented to continue with 
the experiment, further instructions for task completion were presented with 
illustrated on-screen examples as follows:
Shown below are illustrations of the four different types of task that will 
be presented repeatedly in this part of the experiment. To help you 
understand the tasks, each of the four illustrations is explained 
immediately underneath. Please examine each illustration and then read 
carefully the explanation attached to it. Please make sure that you 
understand each task before continuing with the experiment.
IMPORTANT: From trial to trial the positioning of the 
response options (True and False) will vary randomly 
between left and right. NOTE: During the experiment a 
range of other words apart from “Happiness” and 
“Sadness” will also be presented.
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REMEMBER: From trial to trial the positioning of the 
response options (True and False) will vary randomly 
between left and right.
Participants were presented with the onscreen example of the four IRAP trial 
types with corresponding instructions detailing the response options and their concurrent 
relations. For illustrative purposes, on-screen examples are presented in Figure 23a, b, c 
& d. An explanation accompanied each of the four illustrations in order to ensure that 
participants understood the appropriate responses that were required. I.e. for Sample-1 
with Target-1, as presented in Figure 23a), the instructions read: “Ifyou select 'True’ by 
pressing the ‘D ’ key, you are stating that 7 expect happiness. ’ I f  you select ‘False’ by 
pressing the ‘K ’ key, you are stating that there is ‘No expectancy o f happiness’. ” Figure 
23b) shows Sample-2 with Target-1 as it would have been presented to participants with 
the corresponding instructions: “I f  you select ‘True’ by pressing the ‘D ’ key, you are 
stating that 7 don’t expect happiness ’. I f  you select ‘False ’ by pressing the ‘K ’ key, you 
are stating that 7 DO expect happiness ’. ” Similarly, as can be seen in Figure 23c), 
Sample-1 with Target-2 incurred the instructions: “I f  you select ‘True’ by pressing the 
‘D ’ key, you are stating 7 do expect sadness’. I f  you select ‘False’ by pressing the ‘K ’ 
key, you are stating 7 do not expect sadness ’. ” And for the fourth trial type explanation, 
as depicted in Figure 23d), participants were presented with an example of Sample-2 
with Target-2 encountering the following instructions: “I f  you select ‘True’ by pressing 
the ‘D ’ key, you are stating that 7 do not expect sadness’. I f  you select ‘False’ by 
pressing the ‘K ’ key, you are stating that 7 do expect sadness ’. ”
Immediately after this, the following automated instructions were presented:
During the experiment you will be asked to respond as quickly and 
accurately as you can across all trials.
The relating tasks will be presented in short sessions that are separated by 
the appearance of instructions on the computer screen. You can take a 
short break if you like while the instructions are on on-screen.
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During each short session the relating task follows one general rule. An 
incorrect response on any trial is signalled by the appearance of a red ‘X’ 
in the centre of the screen. To remove the red ‘X’ and move on to the next 
trial please press the correct response key quickly.
After each session, further instructions will appear and they will tell you 
that the general rule that applied in the previous session is now completely 
reversed. Please pay close attention to these instructions and do your best 
to follow them.
So, just to clarify, there will be only two general relating rules and so the 
first thing you should do at the beginning of each session is to discover 
the rule by using the feedback you get in the form of the red ‘X’. It is very 
important to understand that sometimes you will be required to respond to 
the tasks in a way that agrees with what you believe and at other times 
you will be required to respond in a way that disagrees with what you 
believe. This is part of the experiment.
The first two sessions are for practice only and these are repeated until 
you respond accurately on at least 80% of the relating trials and respond 
faster, on average, than 3000 milliseconds (i.e. 3 seconds). When you 
complete the practice phase, the test-phase will then start. Remember, you 
should try to make your responses as accurately and quickly as possible.
This point in the procedure marked the beginning of the automated practice FT- 
IRAP trials. Each trial was presented as a single screen and the format of all trials was 
identical. On each trial, one sample label, one target stimulus and the two response 
options were presented simultaneously on-screen. The FT-IRAP program consisted of a 
minimum of one practice block followed by three test blocks. Each block comprised of 
one consistent and one inconsistent trial. Participants were required to achieve at least 
80% accuracy for both trials within 3000ms in the practice block. Before each test trial 
began, participants were presented with a screen that read:
IF YOU MAKE AN ERROR YOU WILL SEE A RED ‘X’
BELOW THE STIMULUS -  WHEN THIS HAPPENS,
YOU HAVE TO MAKE THE CORRECT RESPONSE TO PROCEED 
THIS IS PRACTICE -  ERRORS ARE EXPECTED
242
23a) Sample 1 with Target 1 23b) Sample 2 with Target 1
1 expect/Positive______________   I don’t expect/Positive
1 expect 1 don’t expect
Positive target (e.g. Positive target (e.g.
\ V
[ Consistent J 2 Inconsist j J Inconsist j J Consistent J
“ Z ............................ ‘ " 7 ----------  ----------
> • '  X
Select ‘d’ Select ‘k’ 
True False
/
X
Select ‘d’ Select ‘k’ 
True False
1 expect/Negative 1 don’t expect/Negative
1 expect 1 don’t
Negative target (e.g. Negative target (e.g.
.................... 4  r\ __________ _________ s*  ___________ _
J Inconsist j [ Consistent j— --------  -------- j Consisten J 2 Inconsist 2
Select ‘d’ Select ‘k’ 
True False
a - "
Select ‘d’ Select ‘k’ 
True False
23c) Sample 1 with Target 2 23d) Sample 2 with Target 2
Figure 23 a-d. The four FT-IRAP Trial-Types as presented to participants on screen to accompany verbal 
instructions in Experiment 6 . The attribute (I expect, I don’t expect), target word (love, illness, happiness, 
sadness etc.), and response options (True and False) appeared simultaneously on each trial. Arrows with 
superimposed text boxes indicate which responses were deemed consistent or inconsistent (the boxes and 
arrows did not appear on screen). Selecting the consistent response option during a consistent block, or the 
inconsistent option during an inconsistent block, cleared the screen for 400 ms before the next trial was 
presented; if the inconsistent option was chosen during a consistent block, or the consistent option during 
an inconsistent block, a red X appeared on screen until the participant emitted the alternative response.
During the consistent trials the participants were required to relate future
expectancies with positive events (i.e. I expect positive -  true etc), whereas for
inconsistent trials participants were required to relate future self with negative events
(e.g., I expect positive -  false etc). In compliance with standard IRAP procedures
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participants in the Consistent-Relations-First condition commenced with a block of 
consistent trials and thereafter alternated between inconsistent and consistent blocks; 
participants in the Inconsistent-Relations-First condition were exposed to the blocks in 
the opposite sequence (i.e., Inconsistent followed by Consistent). Before the first trial 
commenced, a screen was presented that read:
IF YOU MAKE AN ERROR YOU WILL SEE A RED ‘X’
BELOW THE STIMILUS -  WHEN THIS HAPPENS,
YOU HAVE TO MAKE THE CORRECT REPOSNSE TO PROCEED 
THIS IS A TEST -  GO FAST, MAKING A FEW ERRORS IS OK
In each block the trials were presented in a quasi-random order with the 
constraint that each of the 2 sample stimuli appeared once with each of the 12 target 
stimuli (6 positive and 6 negative target words; see Table 38). On each trial, all stimuli 
appeared simultaneously on screen. Throughout the IRAP, feedback on incorrect 
responding was presented in the form of a red ‘X’ that appeared in the centre of the 
screen under the target word. Participants were prevented from continuing to the next 
trial until they provided a correct response and the ‘X’ remained on-screen until this 
occurred. Correct responding was not followed by feedback, but by a clear screen for 
400ms before the next trial appeared. I.e. during consistent blocks, a consistent response 
cleared the screen for 400 ms and then the next trial was presented. If an inconsistent 
response was emitted, or any other key was pressed, a red X appeared immediately under 
the target stimulus. To remove the red X and continue to the 400 ms inter-trial interval, 
the participant was required to emit the consistent response. When the participant had 
completed all 24 IRAP responses within one set of trials the screen cleared and two types 
of feedback were presented for that block: the percent of correct responses, and the 
median response latency. When participants pressed the space bar to proceed, a screen 
was presented that read:
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IMPORTANT: DURING THE NEXT PHASE THE 
PREVIOUSLY CORRECT AND WRONG ANSWERS ARE 
REVERSED. THIS IS PART OF THE EXPERIMENT. PLEASE 
TRY TO MAKE AS FEW ERRORS AS POSSIBLE -  IN OTHER 
WORDS, AVOID THE RED X
At the end of each block of trials, participants were presented with a summary of 
their performances during the previous block in terms of accuracy percentage and mean 
response latency. Participants were permitted to pause between blocks and pressed the 
space bar when they were ready to proceed to the next block. Following completion of 
the last test block, participants were presented with the following instruction:
"Thank you. This is the end o f  the sorting task. Please report to the experimenter. ”
Following the IRAP participants were requested to complete the Verbal Fluency 
Control Task and the set of psychometric and well being questionnaires. Participants 
were thanked for their co-operation and time and appropriately debriefed about the 
research and invited to ask any questions. Although made available to them, no 
participants opted for short breaks at any point. All participants completed the study in a 
single experimental session that lasted between 20 and 30 minutes in total.
4.2.2 Results and Discussion
4.2.2.1. Group Allocation
As in previous experiments from Chapter 2 and 3, the current study opted to remove any
participants with a BDI-II score of 0 (.N= 4) or above 29 (N = 4, M  = 30.75) in order to
more accurately capture healthy participants and those at a sub-clinical level of
depression. The cut off point for inclusion in the no depression group was a score of 1<
10, thus participants presenting scores of 1-9 (N = 17; M  = 4.76) on the BDI-II were
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included in this group (Non-Depressed Group). For inclusion in the sub-clinical 
depression group BDI-II scores recorded where 10 < 30 (N=  13; M  — 14.53; Depressed 
Group).
Group differences were observed with respect to BDI-II grouping, with 
participants in the Non-Depressed group reporting significantly lower BDI-II scores than 
the corresponding Depressed group, t(28) = -9.093, p  <.001. The two groups further 
diverged on their responses to measures of hopelessness (BHS; /(28) =.-5.279, /?<.001), 
life optimism (LOT-R; t(28) = 3.287, p=.003), experiential avoidance (AAQ-II; t(28) = 
2.285 p=.030) and anxiety (STAI; t(28) = -2.732, p=.0l 1). No mood differences where 
found between the two groups (PA: p=.125; NA: p=.348). The psychometric means are 
presented with the participant demographics in Table 39. As can be observed from Table 
39, the two groups did not differ with respect to age, t(28) =.658,/? =.516, representation 
of g e n d e r , (2) =.00\,p=.977, or verbal fluency, t(2S)=.46S, p  =.644.
Table 39. BDI group split presentation of Demographics and Psychometric tests, presented as mean scores, 
with Standard deviations (SD), for the Depressed and Non-Depressed groups in Experiment 6 .
Variable Non-Depressed (SD) Depressed (SD)
Gender: Females (Males) 13(4) 10(3)
Age 21.29 (2.66) 20.84 (2.51)
VFCT \ \  21  (2.92) 10.16(2.99)
BDI 4.16(2.70) 14.53 (3.17)
BHS 2.35 (1.36) 5.53 (1.94)
STAI 32.41 (8.13) 39.46 (5.12)
LOT-R 17.82(3.66) 13.31 (3.81)
AAQ-II 50.71 (9.26) 43.61 (7.14)
PA 32.00 (4.58) 29.38 (4.36)
NA 14.64 (4.89) 16.31 (4.47)
Note. VFCT= Verbal Fluency Control Task; BDI= Beck Depression Inventory; BHS= Beck Hopelessness 
Scale; STAI = State Anxiety Inventory; LOT-R= Life Optimism Test-Revised; AAQ-H= Acceptance and 
Action Questionnaire-II; PA = Positive Affective Scale; NA= Negative Affective Scale.
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4.2.2.2. The Future Thinking Implicit Relational Assessment Procedure
The response latency data from the FT-IRAP is presented as the time in 
milliseconds from the onset of a trial to the participant’s first response for that trial. A 
group split based on high and low scores on the Beck Depression Inventory (as described 
above) were conducted in order to compare healthy and sub-clinically depressed 
participant responses. As can be seen from Figure 24 the overall mean response latencies, 
averaged across the three test-blocks, were shorter for the Non-Depressed group on the 
consistent (C) relative to the inconsistent (I) trials (C = 1837 ms, o — 293, I = 2061 ms, o 
= 356), opposing responses were found for the Depressed group relative to the Non- 
Depressed group, whom on average produced longer latencies for the consistent (C) 
proportionate to responses on the inconsistent (I) trials (C = 2055 ms, a = 253, I = 1925 
ms, o  = 263). Both groups produced patterns o f accuracy concordant with the response 
latencies for the consistent and inconsistent test-blocks: that is, where latencies were 
shorter, accuracy scores tended to be higher (Non-Depressed, C = 94.9%, I = 89.9%; 
Depressed, C = 92.3%, I = 92.8%) indicating that the IRAP responses were consistent 
with previous learning history.
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F igure 24. T he FT-IR A P M ean R esponse Latencies across the C onsistent and Inconsistent T rials, w ith 
S tandard E rror B ars (S .E), fo r the D epressed and N on-D epressed groups in E xperim ent 6.
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4.2.2.3. DjRAp-algorithm
The response latency data for each participant are typically transformed into 
D ir a p  scores using the D ir a p  -algorithm, derived from the D aigorithm developed by Greenwald, 
Nosek, and Banaji (2003) for the IAT (Dawson et al., 2009; see also Back, Schmukle, 
Egloff, & Gutenberg, 2005; Cai, Sriram, Greenwald, & McFarland, 2004; Mierke & 
Klauer, 2003). The steps involved in calculating the Dirap scores are denoted by Bames- 
Holmes et al. (2010, pp. 10-11) as the following:
(i) only response latency data from test blocks are used; (ii) latencies 
above 10,000 ms from the dataset are eliminated; (iii) all data for a 
participant are removed if he or she produces more than 10% of test block 
trials with latencies less than 300 ms; (iv) 12 standard deviations for the 
four trial-types are computed: four for the response latencies from test 
blocks 1 and 2, four from the latencies from test blocks 3 and 4, and a 
further four from test blocks 5 and 6; (v) 24 mean latencies for the four 
trial-types in each test block are calculated; (vi) difference scores are 
calculated for each of the four trial-types, for each pair of test blocks, by 
subtracting the mean latency of the consistent block from the mean 
latency of the corresponding inconsistent block; (vii) each difference 
score is divided by its corresponding standard deviation from step 4, 
yielding 12 Dirap scores; one score for each trial-type for each pair of test 
blocks; (viii) four overall trial-type Dirap scores, or IRAP effects, are 
calculated by averaging the scores for each trial-type across the three pairs 
of test blocks.
Thus the IRAP effects were derived for each trial-type from the raw response 
latencies using a technique based on the ‘improved scoring algorithm’ developed for use 
with the IAT by Greenwald, Nosek, and Banaji (2003; Table 4, p. 214). The D measure 
is an established way of addressing the general finding that participants with longer 
average latencies tend to show larger raw effects than those who respond more quickly. 
O’Toole and Bames-Holmes (2009) found that their raw IRAP effect (the response 
latency differences between consistent and inconsistent trials) correlated significantly 
with various measures of intelligence; yet when the D-transformation was performed on 
the data (not reported in the article) no significant correlations with intelligence were
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observed. Because the D algorithm largely removes the influence of extraneous factors, 
Nosek, Greenwald, and Banaji (2007) recommended it for making group comparisons 
when latencies are variable between groups.
In a typical IAT design, D is computed for data cumulated across all trials 
including practice trials. In contrast, the IRAP’s design allow for its Dirap effects to be 
calculated at the more detailed level, that is, the IRAP allows a Dirap score to be 
calculated for each trial-type (i.e., the four possible stimulus combinations of sample- 
with target-type; see Figure 23 a-d), on each of the three pairs of consistent and 
inconsistent test-blocks. In calculating the D-transformation with the IRAP’s response 
latency data, only the response latency data from test-blocks were used (i.e., blocks 3-8 
of the FT-IRAP), and trials with latencies greater than 10,000 milliseconds were 
dropped. The mean latencies calculated, of consistent (C) and inconsistent (I) trials for 
each trial-type, found the combined standard deviation (SD) among the C and I trials for 
each trial-type; and allowing for the calculation of the Dirap = (Mean.I - Mean.C)/SD for 
each trial-type (see Vahey, Bames-Holmes, Bames-Holmes, & Stewart, 2009).
The larger the D i r a p  score the greater the difference in response latencies between 
the consistent and inconsistent trials. Positive D i r a p  scores denote responding in 
accordance with the pre-experimentally defined biases (i.e., within the current study, 
with expectancies for the future as concordant to positive relative to negative future 
experiences) and negative scores indicate the opposite (i.e., the future as concurring to 
negative relative to positive experiences). A zero score indicates that the participant was 
unable to discriminate between positive and negative future experiences (i.e. the 
responses showed no difference in relation to subjective expectations of either positive or 
negative experiences).
4.2.2.4. Participant-type analyses
Composite positive and negative Dirap scores were calculated for the four trial-
types, with a positive marker including the two trial-types confirming positive future and
denying negative future relations (i.e. consistent trials; D i r a p - p o s )  and respectively, a
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negative marker combining the two trial-types analogous to the confirmation of negative 
future and denial of positive relations (i.e. inconsistent trials; D i r a p - n e g ) .  That is, in each 
case the magnitude of the resulting trial-typed Dirap indicates the degree to which the 
participant is inclined, based on their particular behavioural history, to provide the 
particular relational responses deemed consistent for that trial-type’s specific 
sample/target-type combination. In the specific case of the current study, the trial-type 
D i r a p  scores computed for the FT-IRAP indicated the degree to which the participant is 
more fluent at providing the relational response “True” for the two trial-types “I expect -  
Positive Target Descriptors” and “I don’t expect -  Negative Target Descriptors,” and the 
relational response “False” for the remaining two trial-types (“I expect -  Negative Target 
Descriptors” and “I don’t expect -  Positive Target Descriptors). In other words, the sign 
of the FT-IRAP’s D i r a p  score for each trial-type indicates whether the participant is 
biased towards the response relation associated with consistent trials (+; expect 
positive/don’t expect negative; D i r a p - p o s )  versus inconsistent trials (-; don’t expect 
positive/expect negative; D i r a p - n e g  ) •
The mean D i r a p - p o s  and D i r a p - n e g  scores calculated for both groups of 
participants are presented in Figure 25. The data show the mean FT-IRAP effect for the 
Non-Depression group ( D i r a p - p o s  = -52, a =.34; D i r a p - n e g  = -24, a =.21) to differ on both 
means from the Depression group ( D i r a p - p o s  = -.14, a =.69; D i r a p - n e g  = --23, a =.61). In 
other words, this further denotes that the Non-Depression group, relative to the 
Depression group, responded more rapidly on trials that required confirmation of future- 
positive and denial of future-negative relations (i.e. consistent trials) over tasks requiring 
confirmation of future-negative and denial of future-positive relations (i.e. inconsistent 
trials). In short, the IRAP data indicate that the Non-Depression group convey a greater 
level of positive future expectations compared with the Depression group. Thus it is 
evident from the preliminary data that an inverse pattern of responding to the FT-IRAP 
stimuli occurred for individuals in the Depression group proportionate to their Non- 
Depressed counterparts.
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A mixed model ANOVA found a main effect for Valence (F( 1, 28) = 4.533, p
y • •=.042, rjp~ =.139) with participant responses discriminating between positive and
negative future expectancies. No interaction effect was found for Valence and Group
(F(\, 28)= 1.293 p  =.265, rjp2 =.044), though a main effect for Group was found (F (l,
28)= 12.535, p=.001, rjp =.309) with the Non-Depressed group responding in line with
the consistent FT-IRAP effect, that is, relating to positive future expectancies, whereas
the Depression group did not show this effect (see Figure 25 for an illustration of the two
groups D i r a p - p o s  and D i r a p - n e g  scores).
0.8
0.6
a>
o
U 0.4
Pn
3M 0.2
P
s
(Za> 0
-0.2
-0.4
IRAP-POS IRAP-NEG
Positive Future Expectancy
Non-Depressed 
i Depressed
Negative Future Expectancy
FT-IRAP Trial Type
Figure 25. M ean Positive and N egative D|RAp scores, with S tandard E rror Bars (S .E), for the D epressed and 
N on-D epressed groups in Experim ent 6.
4.2.2.5 FT-IRAP Trial-Type Analysis
If, however, as is suggested by MacLeod et al., anticipation of future positive and 
not of negative experiences are indeed functionally different constructs then this would 
potentially be a confound o f the combined D iRAp.pos and D i r a p - n e g  type analysis. Due to 
the nature o f the IRAP construct it allows for analysis of the individual trial types and as
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such it was sought to explore these separately. Thus, in order to explore the FT-IRAP 
data further, and gain an indication of the relational responses within the groups, we 
calculated Dirap scores for each of the four trial-types (I expect - Positive Targets 
(S1T1), I expect - Negative Targets (S1T2), I don’t expect - Positive Targets (S2T1), I 
don’t expect - Negative Targets (S2T2)) and performed planned One-Sample T-tests. 
This analysis was employed to determine if the mean Dirap scores for the four trial types 
would differ significantly from zero. Figure 26 shows the differences between Depressed 
and Non-Depressed participants in terms of their trial-typed Dirap effects. As can be seen 
Figure 26 indicates that there was a difference in the implicit responses by the two 
groups. The Non-Depressed participants were found to show an optimistic bias, and 
analysis of their responses was represented in the trial-type data by a positive value, in 
regards to the trial type that make up the consistent block (i.e. D i r a p - p o s )  both of which 
were significantly different from zero (S1T1, t{\6)= 6.180,/? <.001, and S2T2, t{ 16)= 
3.532, /?=.003). Denial of negative expectancies were also found to be significantly 
different from zero, i.e. the trial types that make up the inconsistent block (i.e. Dirap-neg; 
S1T2, t(16) = 2.836, /?=.012) and S2T1, t(16) = 3.045, /?=.008).
An ambiguous pattern of responses was observed for the Depressed group, with 
no bias found pertaining to confirmation of positive expectancies, neither of which were 
significantly different from zero (S1T1, /(12)= -.450,/? =.661 and S2T2, t{\2)= -1.108,/? 
=.289). Nor were the trials necessitating denial of negative expectancies found to be 
significantly different from zero (S1T2, t{\2) = -1.509,/? =.157 and S2T1, t(12) = -.980, 
/? =.346). From these results it can be taken that the expectancy patterns were not 
valence specific nor does there appear to be a specific pattern of responding by the sub- 
clinical group in regards to type of relation per se. However, what is observed is that the 
directionality of responding pertains to a lack of optimistic future outlook relative to a 
strong directionality towards a positive future outlook as demonstrated by the healthy 
group. Figure 26 depicts the two groups’ responses for each of the four trial types, and as 
can be seen here, a clear optimistic bias is observed for the Non-Depressed group with an 
analogous pessimistic pattern found for the Depressed group.
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Figure 26. M ean D IRAP scores (w ith S.E bars) for the D epressed and N on-D epressed groups across the Four 
FT-IR A P T rial-T ypes in E xperim ent 6. Trial T ypes are represented by sam ple and target distribution o f  
positive (T l)  and negative (T2) target w ords presented w ith the sam ples T expect’ (S I )  and ‘I don’t 
expect’ (S2).
4.2.2.6 Emotional Avoidance
O f all the FT-IRAP components the AAQ-II was found to moderately correlate 
with the overall D irap O' =  .3 4 9 ,/?  =  .0 5 9 ) . Significant correlations were also seen for the 
trial type specific components, for the positive trials (D iRAp-pos, f  ~  .9 0 4 , p  < .0 0 1 )  as 
well as the negative trials (D irap-neg, r = .8 6 8 , p  < .0 0 1 ). That is, participants whom 
reported lower levels o f emotional avoidance (as reflected in a higher score on the AAQ- 
2) were seen to be responding in line with the consistent FT-IRAP trials and as such 
demonstrating a greater positive future outlook.
4.2.3 Summary
The FT-IRAP data at split and combined levels o f analysis all suggest that there is 
a distinct inverse pattern of responding between the sub-clinically Depressed and Non- 
Depressed groups. In relation to the first aim (1) the FT-IRAP was seen to be an adequate
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measure of future expectancy with clear group differences observed. By examining 
individual trial-type responses it was possible to discern relational patterns, such as 
greater expectancy of positive relative to reduced expectancy of negative future 
experiences, within the two groups. Depressed participants Dirap scores were close to 
zero, indicating that they made consistent (‘I expect-positive’ or ‘I don’t expect 
negative’) and inconsistent (I don’t expect positive’ or ‘I expect negative’) responses 
with similar fluency on all four relational stimulus classes assessed by the FT-IRAP. 
Such ambivalence among the sub clinically depressed sample may be indicative of 
susceptibility to more increased levels of depression. That is, the IRAP effects are 
designed to measure the differential fluency of consistent versus inconsistent relational 
responding as a reflection of their relative frequencies in the participant’s behavioural 
history; and so, when both consistent and inconsistent response classes are infrequent in 
that behavioural history, it implies that these opposing response classes will not differ in 
terms of their response fluency, and therefore not produce an IRAP effect. In other 
words, the REC model predicts that even if a depressed person is used to thinking about 
their personal future in an unfavourable way, so that they are biased toward “False” 
rather than “True” when asked whether “I expect happiness”, they would nevertheless 
show no bias between “True” and “False” responses to the statement “I don’t expect 
sadness”, if they were not used to thinking in positive terms about their personal future 
(i.e. in terms of denying positive descriptors). Importantly, these findings demonstrate 
that the FT-IRAP is sensitive to whether a person is biased toward cognizing more about 
a particular sample stimulus in negative versus positive terms (e.g., “sadness” vs. 
“happiness”). In relation to the second aim of Experiment 6, (2) future expectancy and 
emotional avoidance were found to correlate, indicating that low emotional avoidance is 
related to increased positive future expectancies. Table 40 summarizes the main findings 
from Experiment 6.
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Table 40. Summary of Main Aims and Findings from Experiment 6.
Research Aim Hypothesis Main Findings
1 Examine implicit 
future thinking by 
use of the FT-IRAP 
in relation to sub- 
clinical depression.
Implicit future thinking, 
as measured by the FT- 
IRAP, m il differ 
between sub-clinically 
depressed individuals 
relative to non­
depressed individuals as 
measured by the BDI-II.
The hypothesis is supported.
Group differences were found with the Non- 
Depressed group responses indicating greater 
expectancy of positive future events relative to the 
Depressed group (p=.001).
2 Examine implicit 
future expectancy 
(FT-IRAP) in 
relation to the role 
of emotional 
avoidance (AAQ- 
II) in future 
thinking.
There will be a 
relationship between 
emotional avoidance 
and implicit future 
expectancy.
The hypothesis is supported.
A positive relationship between emotional avoidance 
and overall implicit future expectancy was found (p 
= .059).
A positive relationship was further found for 
emotional avoidance and positive implicit future 
expectancy (p<.0 0 1 ) as well as negative future 
expectancy (p<.0 0 1 ).
Note. Low emotional avoidance is denoted by a high score on the AAQ-II.
4.3 Experiment 7
Experiment 6 demonstrated rather encouraging findings regarding the use of 
implicit methods (i.e. the FT-IRAP) in the measurement of future thinking. Although 
implicit measures are known to be more resistant to mood effects than explicit measures, 
the findings from Experiment 4 (Chapter 3) demonstrated that the Future Thinking Task 
at the sub clinical level is susceptible to current mood state. Given the fact that 
Experiment 6 also involved a sub clinical sample and an affective state (depression) it 
seems pertinent to test for any mood effects to ensure the measures stability. 
Systematically, testing the effect of current mood state will ensure that the group 
differences in Experiment 6 were a due to sub-clinical levels of depression and not a 
result of fluctuating mood. To date, no other study has looked at mood effects on the 
IRAP. To this end Experiment 7 has 1 main aim, (1) to examine if a positive or negative
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induced mood state will affect implicit cognitions as measured by the FT-IRAP effect. 
As it is expected that the FT-IRAP is a robust measure the predictions pertaining to the 
mood induction are relatively different to those in Experiment 4. That is, it is predicted 
that FT-IRAP responses will not differ between those who undertook the positive mood 
induction relative to those who undertook the negative mood induction
4.3.1 Method
4.3.1.1 Participants
Thirty-three adults volunteered to take part in the current experiment though 
following employment of the exclusion criteria pertaining to BDI-II scores (the criteria 
for inclusion is detailed in section 4.3.2.1) data from three participants was removed thus 
only data from thirty participants was utilised in the following analysis. As such, the 
subsequent information pertains to the included sample of thirty young adults (19 female, 
11 male) who took part in this study. The participants volunteered to take part in return 
of no monetary or course based credits. And the experiment took place in a small 
conference room in Century Wharf Apartments in Cardiff Bay. The participants age 
varied from 19 to 27 years with a mean of 22.33 years of age (a  = 2.20).
4.3.1.2 Apparatus and Materials
Participants were requested to complete a set of pre-experimental measures of 
psychological well being. These measures were the same as utilized in study 5, that is, 
the Beck Depression Inventory 2nd version (BDI-II; Beck, Steer & Brown, 1996), The 
Beck Hopelessness Scale (BHS; Beck & Steer, 1988), The State Trait Anxiety Inventory, 
(STAI-S; Spielberger, Gorsuch, & Lushene ,1970; Spielberger et al., 1983), the Life- 
Orientation Scale (LOT-R; Scheier, Carver, & Bridges, 1994), The Acceptance and 
Action Questionaire-2 (AAQ-2; Bond et al., (Submitted); Hayes, Strosahl, et al., 2004),
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the Positive and Negative Affective Scale (PANAS; Watson, Clark, & Tellegen, 1988) 
and the Verbal Fluency Control Task (Lezak, 1976).
Mood induction. The autobiographical recall task (Brewer, Doughtie, & Lubin, 
1980) was used to induce happy or unhappy mood in the participants; the presentation 
and procedure utilized were the same as for Experiment 4 (see Section 3.3.1.2).
The Visual Analogue Scale (VAS; Wewers & Lowe, 1990) was presented and 
utilised in the same manner as described in Experiment 4 (see Section 3.3.1.2).
The Future Thinking IRAP  was the same as the one presented in Experiment 4, 
the method and presentation remained the same for the current study, without exceptions 
(see Sections 4.2.1.4 and 4.2.1.5).
4.3.1.3 Experimental Overview
The current study used a 2 x 2 mixed design, with Group (Induced Mood: 
Positive, Negative) as the between participant variable and Valence (Implicit Future 
Cognitions: Positive/Negative) as the within participant variable. All participants 
completed all tasks and measures; the experimental sequence is depicted in Figure 27.
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Participant Sam ple (N= 33)
U
Total sam ple com plete Q uestionnaires (random ised l sl order o f  presen tation  betw een 
participants) BD I-II, STAI, B H S, LO T-R , A A Q -II, PA N A S
IT
Total sam ple com plete the Tim e 1 V isual A nalogue Scale (V A S)
Total sam ple com plete V erbal Fluency C ontrol T ask 
(random ised I s1 presentation o f  letters F, A, S betw een partic ipan ts)
r  • •i ' i •
E xclusion C riteria
Participants w ho score 0 ( N =  3) or >10 ( N =  0) on the B DI-II are  excluded  from further
experim ental participation.
— ► Participants are random ly assigned to com plete a Positive or N egative  M ood Induction. 4---
Positive M ood Induction (N==16)
n :
N egative M ood Induction (V =14)
n
Total sam ple com plete the Tim e 2 Visual A nalogue Scale (V A S) 
»
Total sam ple com plete the Future Thinking IRA P (random ised p resen tation  o f  consistent or 
inconsistent first trials betw een participants)
Step 1. Participants com plete a m inim um  o f  2 practice trials.
Step 2. The 3 test trials com m ence upon successful com pletion o f  p ractice trials.
J□ L
Total sam ple com plete the Tim e 3 V isual A nalogue Scale (V A S)
Figure 27. O verview  o f  the Experim ental Sequence for E xperim ent 7.
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4.3.1.4 Ethical Issues
Experiment 7 was conduct according to all of the appropriate ethical guidelines as 
identified by the British Psychological Society (2006) and followed the measures and 
procedures outlined in Experiment 4 (see Section 3.3.1.4) with only minor adjustments 
necessary to facilitate the change in methodologies to tailor instructions to the current 
experiment. Emphasis was put in to assuring participants that the computer task was not 
a measure of how quick they were at responding but that the focus was on the responses 
made. This emphasis was made to deter distress related to feelings of inept computer 
skills. As in Experiment 4, participants were screened for depression by use of the Beck 
Depression Inventory (BDI-II) with the decision not to accept contribution to the 
experiment by anyone who reported depression levels of 10 or above as reported on the 
BDI-II. The experiment was approved by the Ethics Committee at Swansea University 
Psychology Department prior to commencement.
4.3.1.5 Procedure
Prior to commencement all participants were briefed as to the nature of the study, 
although omitting the expected mood influence induced by the memory task, and asked 
to complete a consent form. The study was identical in nature as Experiment 4, with the 
exception of the Future Thinking Task and the inclusion of the FT-IRAP as the main 
experimental task. The study commenced with participants completing the Visual 
Analogue Scale (VAS) to indicate how (un)happy they perceived themselves to be at the 
present moment. This was followed by completion of the psychometric tests and the 
Verbal Fluency Control Task. Following the VFCT participants BDI-II scores were 
examined and participants who were found to score above 10 on the BDI-II did not 
commence the mood induction task. As in Experiment 4, these participants were thanked 
for their participation and debriefed by stating that the second part of the experiment was 
no longer being conducted and that data from the first section was all that was required in
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this instance. The BDI-II scores were not revealed to, nor discussed with, the 
participants.
For the included participants a mood induction procedure followed the VFCT, 
with participants randomly assigned to a ‘happy’ or an ‘unhappy’ condition. The mood 
induction procedure was followed in point to that of Experiment 4 (see Section 3.3.1.3). 
As in Experiment 4 the participants were naive as to the purpose of the mood induction 
and were informed that is was only one part of several tasks they needed to complete in 
this experiment. Immediately upon completion of the mood induction, participants were 
asked to respond to the second VAS, indicating how happy or unhappy they perceived 
themselves to be at that time. Participants then commenced the Future Thinking IRAP. 
The presentation and procedure of the FT-IRAP were equal to that of Experiment 6, 
without any amendments. Upon completion of the FT-IRAP participants were again 
asked to rate their mood on a VAS. At the end of the experiment participants were fully 
debriefed as to the nature of the mood induction and thanked for their participation.
4.3.2 Results and Discussion
4.3.2.1. Exclusion Criteria and Descriptive Data
A BDI-II cut off criteria was utilised in the current study as in Experiment 4, 
which was looking at mood effects on the Future Thinking Task. Therefore data from 
any participants with a BDI-II score of 0 (N = 3) or above 10 (N = 0) were removed prior 
to any statistical analysis in order to more accurately capture a sample of non-depressed 
participants. The included participants all reported BDI-II scores of 9 or less (M = 5.03).
No group differences were observed with respect to pre-induction psychometric
scores. Overall, the reported findings from the psychometric measures were consistent
with those of a presently healthy state of mind for each participant. The pre-experimental
psychometric reports can be observed in Table 41. No mood differences where found
between the two groups pre-experimentally (PA: p=.320; NA: p=.489). The two groups
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were not found to differ with respect to age, £(28) =.382, /?=.705; nor was there a 
significant difference between the two groups in regards to representation of gender, %2
(2) =.010, p=.919, or verbal fluency, £(28) =-.536, p=.557. Table 41 presents participant 
demographics and responses to the psychometric and well-being measures. As can be 
seen no significant differences were found between the two mood induction groups 
pertaining to any of these measures.
Table 41. Demographics and Psychometric tests, Mean scores and Standard deviations (SD) for the 
Positive and Negative Mood Induction groups in Experiment 7. T-Test score and statistical value (p) from 
between group comparisons are presented.
Variable Positive Mood Negative Mood
Mean (SD) Mean (SD) £(28) P
Gender: Females (Males) 10(6) 9(5)
Age 22.18 (2.16) 22.5 (2.31) 0.382 0.705
VFCT 14.38 (4.89) 14.16 (4.36) -0.536 0.557
BDI 5.12 (2.33) 4.92(2.49) -0.223 0.825
BHS 2.56 (1.21) 2.21(1.05) -0.836 0.410
STAI 35.68 (5.26) 35.64(6.03) -0.022 0.983
LOT-R 17.31 (4.41) 15.92 (4.06) -0.889 0.381
AAQ-n 52.18 (3.81) 53.00 (5.05) 0.501 0.620
PA 36.62 (6.28) 38.64 (4.28) 1.012 0.320
NA 14.50 (2.25) 15.14 (2.76) 0.701 0.489
Note. VFCT= Verbal Fluency Control Task; BDI= Beck Depression Inventory; BHS= Beck Hopelessness 
Scale; STAI = State Anxiety Inventory; LOT-R= Life Optimism Test-Revised; AAQ-II= Acceptance and 
Action Questionnaire-II; PA = Positive Affective Scale; NA= Negative Affective Scale.
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4.3.2.2 Mood Induction
Mood ratings were reported on a Visual Analogue Scale at 3 separate time points, 
i.e. pre-experimentally (Time 1), immediately following the mood induction (Time 2) 
and post experimentally upon completion of the FT-IRAP (Time 3). One way Analysis of 
Variance (ANOVA), with mood induction as the between subjects variable and mood 
ratings as the dependent variable, found no group differences at Time 1, F (l, 28)= .057, 
p=. 812. The mean mood reported at Time 1 by participants in the Positive Mood 
Induction group was 68.37 (a = 12.73) (with a higher score reflecting a more positive 
mood) while the mean for participants in the Negative Mood Induction group was 67.07 
(er =16.99). Following the mood induction procedure a significant difference was found 
between groups at Time 2, F(l, 28)=92.609, /?<.001, with the Negative Mood Induction 
group reporting low mood with a mean of 29.57 {a =18.41) relative to increased mood 
scores, with a mean of 82.18 (<r =11.07), in the Positive Mood Induction group. At Time 
3, this mood difference was still present (F(l, 28) =32.773, /?<.001) though it was 
evident that the moods were reverting back to baseline levels with the positive mood 
group reporting a mean mood level of 70.25 (a =9.44) and the negative mood group an 
increased mood level from time 2 with a mean of 53.21 (a =6.27).
Split plot paired sample t-tests revealed within group differences for the three
time periods, with significant differences in mood reported for Time 1 and 2 in both
groups (Positive Mood induction, £(15)=-7.417, p<.001 Negative Mood induction,
£(13)=7.764,/?<001). Significant mood differences were also found between times 2 and
3 for the group whom received a Positive Mood induction (7(15) =4.920, p<. 001), as well
as for the Negative Mood induction group, £(13) =—5.828, p<.001). However no mood
differences were observed for Time 1 and 3 for the positive group, £(15) =-.831,/?=.419);
though a significant mood difference for times 1 and 3 was still present post
experimentally for the negative mood induction group, £(13) =-5.828, /?<.001). This
implies that the mood induction procedure was successful in inducing a state mood
which was apparent at the time of the experiment and approached baseline mood states
post-experimentally. Specifically, the negative mood induction procedure resulted in
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significantly more negative ratings of mood compared with pre-mood induction ratings 
and the positive mood induction resulted in significantly more positive mood rating being 
made, the mood ratings are presented in figure below. Figure 28 depicts the effects of the 
positive and negative mood induction. T1 indicates mean pre-experimental mood rating. 
T2 indicates mean mood ratings made immediately following being exposed to the mood 
induction procedure. T3 indicates the mean mood ratings given at the end of the 
experiment.
8>
90
80
70
60
50
40
30
20
10
Time 2Time 1 Time3
•Positive Mood Induction 
•Negative Mood Induction
Mood Report Time Line
Figure 28. Mean Mood Ratings for participants completing the FT-IRAP in Experiment 7. T1 indicates 
Pre-Experimental Mood. T2 indicates Mood Rating Immediately Following the Mood Induction procedure. 
T3 indicates Post-Experimental Mood Ratings.
4.3.2.3 IRAP DiRAP-algorithm
The response latency data from the IRAP is presented as the time in milliseconds
from the onset of a trial to the participant’s first response for that trial. The response
latency data for each participant were transformed into D ir a p  scores as in Experiment 6,
using the DiRAp-aigorithm, derived from the Daig0rithm developed by Greenwald, Nosek, and
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Banaji (2003) for the IAT. The steps involved in calculating the Dirap scores were 
denoted in Experiment 6 (see Section 4.2.2.2) and were followed without exception in 
the current study. As before, the latency data from the IRAP was transformed into the 
Dirap measure (Dawson et al., 2008). The larger the Dirap score the greater difference in 
response latencies between the consistent and inconsistent trials. Positive Dirap scores 
denote responding in accordance with the pre-experimentally defined biases (i.e., within 
the current study, with the future expectancies as concordant to positive relative to 
negative future experiences and negative scores indicate the opposite (i.e., future 
expectancies as concurring to negative relative to positive experiences). A zero score 
indicates that the participant was unable to discriminate between positive and negative 
future events (i.e. the responses showed no difference in relation to subjective 
expectations of either positive or negative experiences).
4.3.2.4 Dirap Analysis
The D ir a p  scores for both mood induction groups were found to be concordant 
with expectancies of positive relative to negative future experiences and significantly 
different from zero in a positive direction (Positive mood, /(15)= 5.168,/?<.001; Negative 
mood, f(13)= 5.409, /K.001).
Between group comparisons were made with a one-way ANOVA on the overall 
D ir a p  scores, revealing no significant difference between groups in their responses to the 
FT-IRAP trials following a mood induced state, F(l,28)= 1.585,/?=. 125. Though, as can 
be seen from Figure 29, there appeared to be some difference in the level of responding, 
with the Negative mood group showing somewhat stronger positive future relations.
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P o s i t i v e  N e g a t i v e
Mood Induced
Figure 29. M ean D IRAP scores with Standard E rror Bars (S.E) for the Positive and the N egative M ood 
Induction  groups in Experim ent 7.
4.3.2.5 Participant-type analyses
Composite positive and negative Dirap scores were calculated for the four trial-
types, with a positive marker indicative o f the two trial-types confirming positive future
and d e n y in g  n e g a tiv e  future re la tion s ( i.e . c o n s is te n t trials; D iRAp-p os) and r e sp e c tiv e ly , a
negative marker combining the two trial-types analogous to the confirmation o f negative
future and denial o f positive relations (i.e. inconsistent trials; D i r a p -n e g ) .  The mean
D irap-pos and D irap-neg scores calculated for both groups o f participants are presented in
Figure 30. The data show the mean FT-IRAP effect for the positive mood induction
grou p  (D irap-pos =  -409 , a = .301  D irap-neg =  -289 , a = .3 3 4 )  to b e  s im ila r  on  b o th  m ean s
relative to the negative mood induction group ( D i r a p -p o s  = -.603, o =.354; D i r a p -n e g  =
.471, o  =.428). In short, the descriptive FT-IRAP data indicate that the two groups
convey similar levels o f positive future expectations. A 2 (Mood Induced: Positive &
Negative) x 2 (Valence: Positive & Negative) mixed model ANOVA found a significant
main effect for Valence (F (l, 28)=5.141, p=.031, ifp~ =.152) with overall participant
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responses relating to greater expectations of positive future experiences. No interaction 
effect was found for Valence and Group (F (l, 28) =.013,/?=.911, rjp2 <.0001), nor a main 
effect for Group (F( 1, 28) = 2.536, p=. 122, rjp' =.083). These results suggest that mood 
did not influence the FT-IRAP effect. That is, the responses by the two mood groups 
similarly represented expectancy o f positive future experiences relative to negative 
experiences; this is in line with the predicted responses by a healthy sample of 
participants. However it is notable that the Negative Mood group demonstrated increased 
response latencies on all trials relative to the Positive Mood group.
IRAP-POS
iR A P-N E G
Positive Negative
Mood Induced
Figure 30. M ean Positive and N egative D IRAP scores w ith S tandard E rror Bars (S.E) for the Positive and 
N egative M ood Induction groups in Experim ent 7.
4.3.2.6 Emotional Avoidance
None of the FT-IRAP components were found to correlate with the AAQ-2 for either 
group.
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4.3.3 Sum m ary
In relation to the main aim of Experiment 7, (1) the analyses reveal that mood did 
not have a significant effect on the FT-IRAP performance as the FT-IRAP effect 
remained stable across the two groups. Regardless of mood condition, all participants 
completing the FT-IRAP confirmed expectancies of positive future experiences and 
denied negative future expectancies. Response latencies were significantly faster across 
trials that were consistent with participants’ attitudes compared with trials that were 
inconsistent, demonstrating the expected FT-IRAP effect. Slightly inflated response 
times were found by the negative mood induction group and this may pertain to findings 
from the mood literature, where it has been noted that negative mood likely leads to an 
increased focus and promotes more realistic and weighed decisions (Schwarz, 1990). In 
light of the participant population being healthy individuals, with no known history of 
depression, it may be inferred that the negative mood induction lead to such a more 
analytical and focused strategy in attempting the task, thus these participant may have 
been paying more attention to instructions, stimuli and procedural information, with the 
increased response time as an outcome of such raised awareness. Thus unlike the FTT 
the FT-IRAP appears to be resistant to the influences of current mood states. The focus 
on measuring expectancies again appears more resistant to such fluctuating mood relative 
to assessments of fluency for future cognition. The main findings from Experiment 7 are 
depicted in Table 42. In order to further explore the FT-IRAP effect it would be 
advantageous to look at the specificity in its division by simulation of depressed mood as 
was seen in Experiment 5 with the FTT. Therefore Experiment 8 will look the FT-IRAP 
response pattern as presented by participants influenced by a Learned Helplessness 
paradigm.
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Table 42. Summary of Main Aims and Findings from Experiment 7.
Research Aim Hypothesis Main Findings
1 Examine mood 
influences of 
implicit future- 
oriented cognitions 
and sensitivity of the 
FT-IRAP.
FT-IRAP responses will not 
differ between those who 
undertook the positive  
mood induction relative to 
those who undertook the 
negative mood induction.
The hypothesis is supported.
No significant difference was found between 
groups in their responses to the FT-IRAP trials 
following a mood induced state.
However, it is notable that the Negative M ood  
group demonstrated increased response 
latencies on all trials relative to the Positive 
M ood group.
4.4 Experiment 8
In line with Experiment 5, in Chapter 3, the experimental method of inducing a 
depressed-like state of Learned Helplessness via an unsolvable task was employed in 
order to determine whether this induction of a depressed state (i.e., learned helplessness 
procedure) would impact on participants responding on the FT-IRAP. The Learned 
helplessness paradigm was seen to offer the induction of an analogous depressed state, 
relative to a mere mood state, in Experiment 5. To this end Experiment 8 has one main 
aim (1) to examine the effect of an induced analogue depressed mood, by use of a 
learned helplessness task (Solvable vs. Unsolvable Tasks), on implicit future oriented 
cognitions as measured by the FT-IRAP. It is predicted implicit future cognitions, as 
measured by the FT-IRAP responses, will differ for those who completed the Solvable 
Task relative to those who completed the Unsolvable Task due to the nature of the FT- 
IRAP’ s sensitivity in recognizing depressive response patterns.
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4.4.1 M ethod
4.4.1.1 Participants
Forty-one adults volunteered to take part in the current experiment although 
following the exclusion criteria pertaining to BDI-II scores (the criteria for inclusion is 
detailed in section 4.4.2.1) data from one participant was removed, thus data from forty 
participants was utilised in the following analysis. As such, the subsequent information 
pertains to the included sample of 26 females and 14 males who were all undergraduate 
students at Swansea University and who agreed to take part in return for course credits. 
The participant ages ranged from 18 to 26 years of age (M  = 20.92, o = 1.99). The study 
was approved by the Psychology Department Ethics Committee at Swansea University.
4.4.1.2 Apparatus and Materials
Participants were requested to complete a set of pre-experimental measures of 
psychological well being. These measures were the same as utilized in study 4, that is, 
the Beck Depression Inventory 2nd version (BDI-II; Beck, Steer & Brown, 1996), The 
Beck Hopelessness Scale (BHS; Beck & Steer, 1988), The State Trait Anxiety Inventory, 
(STAI-S; Spielberger, Gorsuch, & Lushene ,1970; Spielberger et al., 1983), the Life- 
Orientation Scale (LOT-R; Scheier, Carver, & Bridges, 1994), The Acceptance and 
Action Questionaire-2 (AAQ-2; Bond et al., (Submitted); Hayes, Strosahl, et al., 2004), 
The Positive and Negative Affective Scale (PANAS; Watson, Clark, & Tellegen, 1988) 
and the Verbal Fluency Control Task (Lezak, 1976). Participants further completed the 
learned helplessness and maze task as in Experiment 5. The main measure was the FT- 
IRAP.
The Learned Helplessness Task (Maldonado, Martos, & Ramirez, 1991) the task 
was presented as detailed in Experiment 5 (see Section 3.4.1.2).
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The Maze Task was utilized in the same manner as detailed in Experiment 5 (see 
Section 3.4.1.2).
The FT-IRAP was identical in presentation and procedural manner as reported in 
Experiments 6 and 7 (see Sections 4.2.1.4 and 4.2.1.5 for complete details and 
instructions of the FT-IRAP).
4.4.1.3 Experimental Overview
The current study used a 2 x 2 mixed design, with Group (Solvable Task, 
Unsolvable Task) as the between participant variable and Valence (Implicit Future 
Cognitions: Positive/Negative) as the within participant variable. All participants 
completed all tasks and measures; the experimental sequence is depicted in Figure 31.
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Exclusion C riteria
Participants w ho score 0 (N=  1) or >10 (N= 0) on the BD I-II are excluded from further
experim ental participation.
Solvable Task (V=20) U nsolvable Task (7V=20)
Participant Sample (N=  41)
P articipants are random ly assigned to com plete the Solvable or the U nsolvable Task (the 
com pletion tim e is recorded for both tasks)
Total sam ple com plete Verbal F luency C ontrol Task 
(random ised 1st presentation  o f  letters F, A, S betw een participants)
Total sam ple com plete Q uestionnaires (random ised order o f  1st presentation betw een 
participants) BD I-II, STAI, BHS, LO T-R , A A Q -II, PA N A S
Total sam ple (both groups) com plete the Future T hinking IRAP (random ised I s' presentation o f  
consistent or inconsistent first trials betw een participants)
Step 2. The 3 test trials com m ence upon successful com pletion o f  practice trials.
Step 1. Participants com plete a m inim um  o f  2 practice trials.
F igure 31. O verview  o f  the E xperim ental Sequence for Experim ent 8.
4.4.1.4 Ethical Issues
Experiment 8 was conduct according to all of the appropriate ethical guidelines as 
identified by the British Psychological Society (2006) and followed the measures and 
procedures outlined in Experiment 5 (see Section 3.4.1.4) with only minor adjustments 
necessary to facilitate the change in methodologies to tailor instructions to the current
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experiment. Emphasis was put in to assuring participants that the computer task was not 
a measure of how quick they were at responding but that the focus was on the responses 
made. This emphasis was made to deter distress related to feelings of inept computer 
skills. As in Experiment 5, participants were screened for depression by use of the Beck 
Depression Inventory (BDI-II) with the decision not to include anyone who reported 
depression levels of 10 or above as reported on the BDI-II. The experiment was 
approved by the Ethics Committee at Swansea University Psychology Department prior 
to commencement.
4.4.1.5 Procedure
Prior to commencement of the experiment participants were provided with 
information about the sequence and details of the tasks and presented the opportunity to 
discuss any questions that they may have. Upon completion of a consent form 
participants were asked to complete the set of psychometric measures and subsequently 
the Verbal Fluency Control Task. Following the VFCT participants BDI-II scores were 
examined and participants who were found to score above 10 on the BDI-II did not 
commence the mood induction task. These participants were thanked for their 
participation and debriefed by stating that the second part of the experiment was no 
longer being conducted and that data from the first section was all that was required in 
this instance. The BDI-II scores were not revealed to, nor discussed with the participants.
The included participants were subsequently randomly allocated to complete
either the solvable or unsolvable version of the Maldonado computer based learned
helplessness tasks, followed by completion of the maze task. The procedure and
instruction for these tasks were as described in Experiment 5, without any adjustments
made (see Section 3.4.1.3). Participants subsequently completed the FT-IRAP task; this
commenced and proceeded as described in Experiment 6 (see Section 4.2.1.5 for full
instructions on the IRAP procedure). Upon completion of all tasks participants were
suitably debriefed as to the nature and intentions of the task. Particular care was taken in
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debriefing participants who were assigned to the unsolvable task, with reassurance that 
the task was in fact not a measure of intelligence rather the task had the concealed 
purpose of inducing a temporary mood state. All participants were thanked for partaking 
in the study.
4.4.2 Results and Discussion 
4.4.2.I. Group Allocation
As in Experiment 7, when looking at mood effects, data from any participants 
with a BDI-II score of 0 (N= 1) or above 10 (N= 0) were removed in order to more 
accurately capture a sample of non-depressed participants (BDI-II: M  = 4.60). No group 
differences were observed with respect to pre-induction psychometric scores. Overall 
reported findings from the psychometric measures were consistent with those of a 
presently healthy state of mind for each participant. The participant demographics and 
pre-experimental psychometric reports can be observed in Table 43 below. No mood 
differences where found between the two groups pre-experimentally (PA: p=.129; NA: 
p=.138). The two groups did not differ with respect to age, /(38) =1.033, p=.308; nor 
was there a significant difference between the two groups in regards to representation of 
gender, %2 (1) =.440, p=.507.
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Table 43. Demographics and Psychometric test Mean scores and Standard Deviations (SD) as reported by 
the Solvable and Unsolvable Task groups in Experiment 8 . T-Test score and statistical value (p) from 
between group comparisons are presented.
Variable Solvable Task Unsolvable Task
Mean (SD) Mean (SD) <(38) P
Gender: Females (Males) 12(8) 14(6)
Age 21.25 (L88) 20.60 (2.08) 1.033 0.308
VFCT 13.28 (4.19) 12.16 (4.26) -0.356 0.577
BDI 5.25 (2.29) 3.95(2.81) 1.601 0.118
BHS 2.50(1.14) 2.15 (1.04) 1.011 0.318
STAI 28.45 (10.05) 24.55(5.63) -1.514 0.138
LOT-R 15.30 (3.35) 15.20 (4.12) 0.084 0.933
AAQ-H 53.35 (6.89) 55.05 (9.62) -0.642 0.525
PA 31.55 (5.53) 33.75 (5.26) -1.552 0.129
NA 13.55 (4.52) 12.00 (5.05) 1.514 0.138
Note. BDI= Beck Depression Inventory; BHS= Beck Hopelessness Scale; STAI = State Anxiety Inventory; 
LOT-R= Life Optimism Test-Revised; AAQ-II= Acceptance and Action Questionnaire-II; PA = Positive 
Affective Scale; NA= Negative Affective Scale.
4.4.2.2 Maze Task measure o f  Learned Helplessness Induction
The amount of time taken to complete the maze task was recorded and is 
presented in Figure 32. As can be seen from Figure 32 the Solvable Task group took less 
time (M = 44.15 seconds) to complete the maze relative to those in the Unsolvable Task 
group (M=  48.65 seconds). This was further confirmed by statistical analysis by way of 
a One way ANOVA, F  (1, 38) = 6.333, p  = 0.016. These results can be taken to suggest 
that the differences displayed in maze completion were experienced due to successful 
induction of a learned helplessness state.
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Unsolvable Task Solvable Task 
Group Allocation
Figure 32. The tim e (in seconds) taken by each task group to com plete the m aze in Experim ent 8. E rror 
Bars show  M ean Standard Error.
4.4 .2 .3 . D im  [^-algorithm
The response latency data for each participant were transformed into D irap scores 
using the DiRAp-Aigorithm, derived from the DAigorithm developed by Greenwald, Nosek, and 
Banaji (2003). The steps involved in calculating the D irap scores were those denoted by 
Bames-Holmes et al. (2010), and as followed in Experiments 6 and 7 (see Section 4.2.2.2 
for information on the D-score algorithm).
4.4.2.4 D jh4p A nalysis
One sample T-tests were used to determine if the DiRAp scores were significantly 
different from zero in a positive direction (and concordant with expectancies o f positive 
relative to negative future experiences). Both groups displayed responses relating to a 
positive future outlook (Solvable Task Group, t ( \9) = 4.532, p<.001\ Unsolvable Task 
Group, /(19) = 2.927, p  =.009). Between group comparisons were made by use of an
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One-Way ANOVA with the Dirap data, revealing no significant difference between 
groups in their responses to the FT-IRAP following the Maldonado task completion, 
F(l,38)=2.247, p=.142. Though, as can be seen from Figure 33 there appeared to be a 
diverging trend pertaining to the level o f responding between groups, with the Solvable 
Task group showing somewhat faster responses to positive future relations.
0 45 -|
0.4 - 
0 35
Qi
Sol va ble Ta sk U nsolva ble Ta sk
Group Allocation
Figure 33. M ean D iRAP scores with S tandard E rror Bars (S .E) for the for the Solvable and U nsolvable Task 
groups in E xperim ent 8.
4.4.2.5 Participant-Type Analyses
Composite positive and negative D irap scores were calculated for the four trial-
types. The D i r a p - p o s  and D i r A p -n e g  scores calculated for both groups of participants are
presented in Figure 34. The FT-IRAP effect is apparent for the Solvable Task group
( D i r a p - p o s  = .353, cr=.407; D i r A p -n e g =  -273, a  =.324) and the effect can similarly be seen
for the Unsolvable Task group in regards to the trials pertaining to an optimistic future
outlook ( D i r a p -p o s  = .293, a  d i r a p - p o s  =.269), however, the two groups were found to
diverge in their responses to the inconsistent trial types ( D i r a p -n e g  = .061, o =.355); A
paired samples t-test found this difference between the two groups to be moderately
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significant, r(38)=1.967, p=.056. No significant between group difference was observed 
for the consistent trial type responses ( D i r a p - p o s ,  /(38) =.576, p=.568). One sample T- 
tests further found that the D i r a p -n e g  score for the Unsolvable Task group was not 
significantly different from zero (t(19)=.772, p=.450), thus participants in this group 
displayed ambiguous responses in regards to future expectancy o f negative events. That 
is their responses neither strongly deny nor confirm such expectancies. As such, this 
ambiguity, relative to the Unsolvable task group responses, is indicative o f a learned 
helplessness induction effect.
0.45 
0.4 
£ 0.35 I 0.3
s 0 25 £  0.2
a 0.15
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Solvable Task Unsolvable Task 
Group Allocation
Figure 34. M ean Positive and N egative D IRAP scores with Standard E rror Bars (S .E) for the Solvable and 
U nsolvab le  Task groups in Experim ent 8.
4.4.2.6 Emotional Avoidance
Similarly to Experiment 7, none of the FT-IRAP variables were found to correlate with 
the AAQ-2.
4.4.3 Summary
In relation to the main aim of Experiment 8(1)  the depressed mood induction was 
seen to affect the FT-IRAP performance. Within the Unsolvable Task group it was seen
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that response latencies were reduced across trials that were inconsistent with a positive 
future outlook. The main findings from Experiment 8 are noted in Table 44, and these 
findings are further discussed in conjunction with findings from Experiments 6 and 7 
below.
Table 44. Summary of Main Aims and Findings from Experiment 8.
Research Aim Hypothesis Main Findings
1 Examine the effect of induced 
analogue depressed mood, by 
use of a learned helplessness task 
(Solvable vs. Unsolvable Tasks), 
on implicit future oriented 
cognitions and sensitivity of the 
FT-IRAP.
Implicit future cognitions, as 
measured by the FT-IRAP 
responses, will differ for those 
who completed the Solvable 
Task relative to those who 
completed the Unsolvable 
Task.
The hypothesis is not supported.
No significant difference was 
found between groups in their 
responses to the FT-IRAP 
following completion of the 
Solvable or Unsolvable Task.
4.5 General Discussion
Chapter 4 sought to address the limitations of self-report measures in future 
thinking by developing an implicit measure targeting positive and negative future 
expectancies. To this end, an implicit measure was designed and tested in order to 
determine whether it might be a useful procedure to implicitly measure future thinking 
and to provide further empirical support to the postulate that a lack of positive future 
expectancies is a characteristic of depression. Three separate experiments sought to 
validate the efficacy of the FT-IRAP as an implicit measure of future expectancy for use 
in a sub-clinical population; In Experiment 6 the main aim (1) was to examine the 
specificity of the FT-IRAP effect in a sub-clinical population. Experiment 7 aimed to (2) 
assess the reliability of the FT-IRAP in accounting for depressive ideation relative to 
mere fleeting mood states. And Experiment 8 employed a learned helplessness paradigm 
in order to (3) systematically examine the FT-IRAP effect.
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To this end it was found that (1) the FT-IRAP, in Experiment 6, as an implicit 
measure, proved to be sensitive to sub-clinical depression. That is, the Non-Depressed 
group demonstrated strong expectancy of positive future experiences, by faster reaction 
times and greater accuracy on the consistent trials. Conversely, the Depressed group was 
found to generate faster response times and greater accuracy scores on the inconsistent 
trials, thus the positive directionality of expectancies was inversed, with stronger 
expectancies of negative future experiences. (2) Experiment 7 found the task to be 
resistant to fluctuating positive or negative mood states. Although (3) Experiment 8 
found that an analogue of depressed mood influenced the FT-IRAP effect pertaining to 
an increased pessimistic future outlook yet not a deflated optimistic outlook. The results 
from Experiment 8 imply a characteristic response in relation to depressed mood as 
pertaining to an increased pessimistic, and thus hopeless, future ideation. This 
implication is in line with previous research with clinical samples on implicit 
hopelessness, for instance, Friedman et al. (2001) observed an implicit hopelessness bias 
in their sample of currently depressed individuals. Similarly, induced negative mood has 
previously been noted to raise levels of explicit hopelessness and implicit depression in 
healthy controls (e.g. Hepburn, Bamhofer & Williams, 2006). Although the findings 
overall are in line with both research from the future thinking literature and recent 
attempts to address hopelessness implicitly, importantly, the findings from Experiment 8 
extend on previous research by Meites et al. (2008) who attempted to gain an implicit 
measure of hopelessness with their ‘hopelessness IAT’. That is, Meites et al. similarly 
made use of a learned helplessness induction, however found an optimistic future outlook 
to be retained within the sample. However, in contrast to Meites et al., who were limited 
by their use of the IAT, it was seen here that, despite the retained optimistic outlook 
overall by the Unsolvable Task group, differences were evident when the individual trial 
types were examined, in regards to the FT-IRAP being able to discriminate the 
directionality of the pessimistic future outlook.
The learned helplessness effect observed may serve to demonstrate the activation 
and progression of negatively framed relations pertaining to the link between attitudes
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and behaviour, or in this instance, a lack of positive reinforcement for behaviour and 
subsequent hopeless beliefs. The learned helplessness effect did not reduce the optimistic 
outlook held by participants; rather the effect emerged in terms of increased pessimism. 
Thus, the responses were not similar to that of the sub-clinically depressed population 
from Experiment 6, who demonstrated reduced optimism about future events. Due to the 
nature of the task the FTT (Experiment 5) was not able to detect this discrete increase in 
pessimistic future outlook, and as such the FT-IRAP is able to offer further insight in to 
the relational networks inherent in depressive future cognition.
Although in the learned helplessness paradigm reduced optimism was not 
observed, the increased pessimistic future outlook implies a shift in cognitions which 
may be indicative of how a lack of positive reinforcement demonstrates the initiation of a 
depressive thought pattern, which as such may firstly manifest itself in negativity about 
future experiences, whereas prolonged instances of such feedback will affect and reduce 
optimistic future outlook. This is consistent with the suggestion that people are inherently 
optimistic (e.g. Sedikides & Gregg, 2008; Robinson & Ryff, 1999; Taylor & Brown, 
1988), thus future optimism may be more resistant to change than pessimism. According 
to MacLeod and colleagues (e.g. MacLeod et al., 1996, 1997; O’Connor et al., 2008) 
reduced positive anticipation is a vital feature of hopelessness in depression and a 
characteristic of suicidal ideation. These researchers have suggested that it may be the 
co-morbidity of anxiety and depression that reflects this process of negative anticipation 
(i.e. an increased pessimistic future outlook) as a result of the accumulating lack of 
positive reinforcement necessary to maintain an optimistic future outlook.
The advantage of the FT-IRAP over the FTT extends beyond its implicit nature.
That is, with the FT-IRAP it is possible to discriminate the directionality of the
participants’ future expectancies, in the FTT participants are requested to report
expectancy of positive and negative events and as such obtain a measure of how strong
the belief is in what an individual thinks may occur is. However, the FT-IRAP offers a
measure of the strength of belief in events not occurring. That is, the FTT is firstly reliant
on participants reporting subjective positive and negative events for evaluation, secondly
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it is inferred that the likelihood of these events occurring can be evaluated on an 
expectancy continuum. The FT-IRAP targets these relations more directly by participants 
responding to events as expected or not, thus the forced evaluation is more likely to 
target pre-established relations relative to more elaborative responses as seen on the FTT, 
which often results in a ‘sitting-on-the-fence’ evaluation equivalent to the response of 
‘neither expect nor don’t expect’ the event to occur. As such the FT-IRAP may be more 
precise as it targets the depressive certainty which has been denoted in the literature as an 
essential feature in developing hopeless ideation (e.g. Andersen, 1990; Andersen, 
Spielman, & Bargh, 1992). Although no mediating effect was observed for emotional 
avoidance and future thinking in relation to depression levels per se, it was found that 
low emotional avoidance was related to positive future expectancy.
The data obtained from the current study have a number of implications for those 
involved in the assessment, treatment and management of depression. While technologies 
such as the IRAP are relatively new, the data presented herein suggests that there may be 
potential in developing these methodologies for use in the clinical domain. If the IRAP 
provides a valid measure of implicit beliefs, future research may be conducted to 
determine whether a relationship exists between implicit beliefs and subsequent 
behaviour. This research would allow for the relationship between implicit future 
expectancies and depression to be explored, with the aim of developing more effective 
remediation programmes that attempt to target future expectancies directly.
In Chapter 3 it was demonstrated that on the FTT (self-report measure)
participants were not openly reporting negative future events, they only generated fewer
positive expectations, whereas in Chapter 4 on the implicit measure a similar sample
reported a relation between the self and negative future events, as demonstrated by faster
reaction times on tasks that involved pairing future expectancy with negative events.
Specifically, in Chapter 3 participants in the Depression group chose not to report
negative events they may have thought of while also finding it difficult to produce
genuine positive events they looked forward to. Thus, the participants in Chapter 3 may
have decided not to disclose all their thoughts of negative events as they may have been
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anticipating negative reactions. Subsequently, when they attempted to generate more 
positive expectancies they were unable to, due to the interference of the negative 
thoughts present. This interpretation of events is applicable when looking at results on 
the IRAP -  where a similar group expressed a strong relation to negative future 
expectancies. This serves as a potential example of how participants avoid truthfully 
reporting beliefs and attitudes on explicit measures. One important route of future study 
is to compare the FT-IRAP and the FTT directly and at the level of prediction of category 
membership in order to determine the relative utility of each.
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Chapter 5
Comparing Explicit and Implicit 
Measures of Future and Past Thinking
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5.1 General Introduction
Chapters 2, 3 and 4 of the thesis tested both explicit and implicit measures of 
future and past thinking. In the current chapter the explicit future (i.e., the Future 
Thinking Task; FTT) and past (i.e., Autobiographical Memory Task; AMT) measures are 
directly compared with the implicit (FT-IRAP) measure across a sub clinical sample of 
depressed and healthy control undergraduate students. To this end, Experiments 9 and 10 
aimed to compare within subjects the compatibility of the FT-IRAP with, the FTT and 
the AMT, respectively, in detection of levels of depression and hopelessness.
5.2 Experiment 9
Experiment 9 aims to compare the Future Thinking Task (FTT; MacLeod et al. 
1998), with an IRAP task designed specifically to measure expectancies of future 
positive and negative experiences (FT-IRAP) across a sub clinical sample of depressed 
and healthy control undergraduate students. In line with previous research on the Future 
Thinking Task relating to clinically depressed participants, Experiment 9 will investigate 
if sub clinically depressed participants (i.e. high scorers on the Beck Depression 
Inventory; BDI-II) will similarly be found to indicate lower levels of future positive 
thinking on the FTT, as opposed to their healthy counterparts (i.e. low scorers on the 
BDI-II). Experiment 9 further aims to establish whether the sub-clinical groups’ 
responses will be faster on the FT-IRAP trials that require a response pairing negative 
future events as expected and positive future events as not expected and if the implicit 
measure will be a better marker of depression/hopelessness in a sub clinically depressed 
population. To this end Experiment 9 has two specific aims (1) to investigate if the FT- 
IRAP and the FTT will be comparably sensitive and specific in the detection of sub 
clinical depression as measured by the BDI-II; and (2) if the FT-IRAP and the FTT will 
be equally sensitive and specific in the detection of hopelessness ideation as measured by 
the Beck Hopelessness Scale. It is predicted that implicit future cognitions, as measured 
by the FT-IRAP, will be more sensitive in detection of depression and hopelessness 
ideation, relative to future thinking as measured by the FTT. To our knowledge, and at
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the time of writing, no other studies have directly compares the FTT with an implicit 
future thinking measure.
5.2.1 Method
5.2.1.1 Participants
Eighty-four adults from Swansea University volunteered to take part in the 
current experiment, though after employing the exclusion criteria pertaining to BDI-II 
scores (the criteria for inclusion is detailed in section 5.2.2.1) data from thirteen 
participants was removed, thus only data from seventy-one participants was utilised in 
the following analysis. As such, the subsequent information pertains to the included 18 
males and 53 females ranging in age from 18 to 34 years old (M = 21.14, a= 3.36).
5.2.1.2 Apparatus and Materials
Participants completed a series of self-report questionnaires assessing 
psychological health. This was the same set of assessments utilized throughout the 
previous chapters, (see Section 2.2.1.2 for details pertaining to each measure)i.e. the 
Beck Depression Inventory, Second Edition (BDI-II; Beck, Steer & Brown, 1996); The 
Beck Hopelessness Scale (BHS; Beck & Steer, 1988); The State Anxiety Inventory 
(STAI-S; Spielberger, Gorsuch, & Lushene,1970; Spielberger et al., 1983); The Positive 
and Negative Affect Schedule (PANAS; Watson, Clark, & Tellegen, 1988); The Life 
Orientation Test -  Revised (LOT-R; Scheier, Carver, & Bridges, 1994); The Acceptance 
and Action Questionnaire-2 (AAQ-2; Bond et al., (Submitted); Hayes, Strosahl, et al., 
2004) and the Verbal Fluency Control Task (Lezak, 1976).
The two main measures utilized were the FTT and the FT-IRAP. The measures 
have both been previously described and were utilized to the same format and method 
within the current study.
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The Future Thinking Task (FTT; MacLeod et al. 1993; 1997) presentation and 
procedure was identical to that of Experiment 3 (see Section 3.2.1.2)
The Future Thinking-Implicit Relational Assessment Procedure presentation 
and procedural settings were identical to that of Experiment 6 (see Section 4.2.1.4).
5.2.1.3 Experimental Overview
The current study was of mixed-between-within participant design and each 
participant completed all experimental phases in the same order. Figure 35 depicts the 
experimental sequence for Experiment 9.
5.2.1.4 Ethical Issues
In order to conduct the study according to all of the appropriate ethical guidelines 
as identified by the British Psychological Society (2006), a number of specific measures 
were put in place. These were consistent with those outlined previously for Experiment 3 
and Experiment 6 with measures and procedural details adopted from Experiment la 
specifically (see Section 2.2.1.4). Only minor adjustments were necessary to facilitate the 
change in methodologies to tailor instructions to the current experiment. As in 
Experiment 6, emphasis was put into assuring participants that the computer task was not 
a measure of how quick they were at responding but that the focus was on the responses 
made. This emphasis was made to deter distress related to feelings of inept computer 
skills. Due to the nature of the study with participants completing 2 subsequent tasks 
participants were encouraged to take a break between tasks. At no point during the 
experiment did any participant withdraw from the study or express dissatisfaction or 
distress of any kind. No participants reported emotional upset in relation to the future 
events generated. The experiment was approved by the Psychology Department Ethics 
Committee at Swansea University prior to commencement of the study.
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Participant Sample (N= 84)
Total sample complete Questionnaires (randomised order o f 1st presentation between 
participants) BDI-II, STAI, BHS, LOT-R, AAQ-II, PANAS
Total sample complete Verbal Fluency Control Task 
(randomised 1st presentation of letters F, A, S between participants)
Total sample complete the Future Thinking IRAP (randomised presentation o f consistent or 
inconsistent first trials between participants)
Step 2. The 3 test trials commence upon successful completion o f practice trials.
Step 1. Participants complete a minimum of 2 practice trials.
Step 1: Generation o f Positive/Negative future events for next week/next year/next 5-10years
Total sample complete the Future Thinking Task (randomised 1st presentation o f positive or 
negative future events between participants)
Step 3: Feeling rating o f Positive/Negative future event upon occurrence.
Step 2: Likelihood rating o f Positive/Negative future event occurrence.
Post-Experimental/Pre-Analysis BDI-II Group Split (see Section 5.2.2.1):
Low BDI-II score (1 <10): N= 38 (BDI-II = 0, excluded from analysis, N=  10) 
High BDI-II score (10<30): N= 33 (BDI-II score >29, excluded from analysis, N= 3) 
Final sample for analysis: N = 71
Figure 35. Overview of the Experimental Sequence for Experiment 9.
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5.2.1.5 Procedure
The experiment took place in a controlled environment, in the form of a standard 
research lab provided with a table, chair and portable computer. Prior to commencement 
the participants were informed about the tasks and invited to ask any questions before 
completing a consent form. The study commenced with the FT-IRAP directly followed 
by the Verbal Fluency Control Task and FTT, and lastly participants were requested to 
respond to the set of psychometric self-report measures. The procedures followed for 
these methods were as directed in previous chapters and adhered to the process described 
therein. The questionnaires were presented in a randomised order. Participants were 
offered breaks in between tasks although were found to generally opt out of this 
opportunity. Each task was explained prior to commencement, and questions were 
invited at any time. On completion of all tests, participants were thanked and verbally 
debriefed with reference to a written debriefing sheet provided for the participant to 
retain.
5.2.2 Results and Discussion
5.2.2.1 Group Allocation
The current experiment opted to remove any participants with a score of 0 (N = 
10) or above 29 (N = 3, M  = 31.75) in order to more accurately capture healthy 
participants and those at a sub-clinical level of depression. The cut off point for 
inclusion in the no depression group was a score of 1< 10, thus participants presenting 
scores of 1-9 (N= 38; M= 4.55) on the BDI-II were included in this group (Non- 
Depressed Group). For inclusion in the sub-clinical depression group BDI-II scores 
recorded where 10 < 30 (N = 33; M=  15.72; Depressed Group).
Group differences were observed with respect to BDI-II scores, with participants
in the Non-Depressed group reporting significantly lower BDI-II scores than the
corresponding Depressed group, t(69)= -11.994, p<.001. The two groups further
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diverged in their responses to measures of hopelessness (BHS; 7(69) = -5.019, p<.001), 
life optimism (LOT-R; 7(69) = 4.510, p<.001), experiential avoidance (AAQ-II; 7(69) = 
6.259, p<.001) and anxiety (STAI; 7(69) = -2.559, p=.011). No mood differences where 
found between the two groups (PA: p=.131\ NA: p=.071). The psychometric means are 
presented with the participant demographics in Table 45. As can be observed from Table 
45, the two groups did not differ with respect to age, 7(69) =-.377, p= .708, representation 
of gender, (2) =.558,/?=.455, or verbal fluency, 7(69) =.331, p=.741.
Table 45. BDI-II group split presentation of Demographics and Psychometric tests, presented as Mean 
scores with Standard Deviations (SD) for the Depressed and Non-Depressed groups in Experiment 9.
Variable Depressed (SD) Non-Depressed (SD)
Gender: Females (Males) 26 (7) 27(11)
Age 21.30 (3.72) 21.00 (3.05)
VFCT 10.03 (2.86) 10.27 (3.23)
BDI-II 15.12(5.04) 4.55 (2.58)
BHS 5.96 (3.12) 2.87 (2.04)
STAI 38.67 (8.11) 33.84 (7.52)
LOT-R 12.84 (4.44) 17.12 (3.50)
AAQ-II 37.27 (7.68) 50.08 (9.32)
PA 28.48 (7.19) 30.89 (6.08)
NA 16.55 (5.26) 14.32 (4.96)
Note. VFCT= Verbal Fluency Control Task; BDI= Beck Depression Inventory; BHS= Beck Hopelessness 
Scale; STAI = State Anxiety Inventory; LOT-R= Life Optimism Test-Revised; AAQ-II= Acceptance and 
Action Questionnaire-II; PA = Positive Affective Scale; NA= Negative Affective Scale.
52.2.2 The Future Thinking Task (FTT)
Analysis of the Future Thinking Task scores were performed following the 
procedure set by MacLeod et al. (1998), and as discussed in previous chapters (for 
complete instructions of the FTT scoring algorithm see Section 3.2.2.2) with composite
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index scores calculated for each period in each condition, by multiplying the number of 
responses generated in a period by the mean likelihood ratings given for those responses 
and by the mean feelings ratings given for those responses.
5.2.2.3 FTT Index Scores
Analysis of the composite scores with a Group (Depression: Low BDI, High 
BDI) x Valence (Future expectancy: Positive/Negative) x Period (Week, Year, 5-10 
years) mixed model ANOVA produced three significant effects. There was a significant 
main effect of Valence, with participants showing increased positive relative to negative 
future expectancy (F(l,69) = 185.98, p  < .001, rjp2 =.729). A significant main effect of 
Period was found, reflecting more future events generated as pertaining to the next 5-10 
years vs. the next year and the next week (F(2,68) = 12.12, p  < .001, rip2 =.149). There 
was also a significant interaction effect found for Period x Valence (F(2, 68) = 9.45, 
p<.001, rjp =.120), with more positive events expected in the more distant future of 5-10 
years. The predicted effect of a Group x Valence interaction was not found to be 
significant (F(l, 69) =2.618, p=.110, rjp =.037), nor was there a main effect for Group 
(F(\, 69) =.076,p=.784, r/p2 =.001).
Table 46. Means and Standard Deviations (SD) for Positive and Negative Future Thinking Task Index 
Scores, incorporating Fluency, Likelihood and Feeling values for each Time Period as reported by the 
Depressed and Non-Depressed groups in Experiment 9. T-Test score and statistical value (p) from between 
group comparisons are presented.
Variable Non-Depressed Depressed
Positive Responses
Mean (SD) Mean (SD) t(69) p
Next Week IQ.62 (24.89) 62.57 (39.56) 1.046 0.299
Next Year 71.98 (27.48) 70.52 (34.28) 0.199 0.843
Next 5-10 Years 90.68 (36.63) 83.67 (33.17) 0.841 0.404
Negative Responses
Next Week 36.54 (13.01) 43.29 (21.61) -1.614 0.111
Next Year 32.51 (14.11) 37.67 (17.93) -1.357 0.179
Next 5-10 Years 40.53 (19.75) 38.30 (21.95) 0.452 0.653
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The three-way interaction involving Group, Valence and Period did not approach 
significance (F(2, 68) =.611, p= 544, rjp2 =.009). Thus, the FTT index scores suggest that 
the Depressed and Non-Depressed individuals held similar expectations with regards to 
their subjective future experiences, with positive and negative expectancies consistently 
diverging across the three different time periods for both groups. Table 46 presents the 
collapsed FTT Index data.
5.2.2.4 FTT Raw Scores
The raw FTT scores were analysed for each of the three FTT components. Thus, 
raw scores for the number of events generated, likelihood values, and feeling ratings 
were calculated and are presented in Table 47. The same analysis was utilised with the 
raw data as for the FTT index scores.
Fluency for future events was firstly examined where a Group (Depression: Low 
BDI/High BDI) x Valence (Number of future thoughts: Positive/Negative ) x Period 
(Week, Year, 5-10 years) mixed-model ANOVA found a significant main effect for 
Valence, F (l, 69)=52.63,p<.001, rjp2 =.433); that is, participants generated significantly 
more positive events (M = 5.86, <7=1.73) for the future relative to events that they were 
not looking forward to (M  = 4.77, <7=1.66); the mean number of future thoughts by time 
period and valence for the Depressed and Non-Depressed groups are displayed in Table 
47). A significant main effect was also found for Period (F(2,68) = 5.24, p=.006, rjp 
=.071) reflecting a lower number of events generated for the next year relative to the next 
week and the next 5-10 years. No main effect for Group was produced by the ANOVA 
(F(l, 69) =.593, p=.444, rjp = .009). An interaction effect was observed for Valence x 
Group (F(2, 68) =4.81,/?= .032, rjp =. 065), with the Non-Depressed group generatmg a 
greater number of positive future events relative to the Depressed group (Non-Depressed, 
M= 6.16, o= 1.77; Depressed, M= 5.52, <7=1.65). No interaction effect was observed 
between Valence x Period (F(2, 68) =2.529, p=.083, rjp2 =.035) nor was an effect found 
for the three way interaction for Group x Valence x Period (F(2, 68) =1.432, p=.242, rjp 
= .020).
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These results show that the predicted Group and Valence effect for fluency was 
observed in this experiment, with the depressed individuals demonstrating reduced 
positive future fluency. This finding is consistent with previous research in the future 
thinking area.
Table 47. Means and Standard Deviations (SD) for Positive and Negative Future Thinking Task Raw 
Scores for Fluency (number of events generated), Likelihood Ratings (summed for all events) and Feeling 
Ratings (summed for all events) for each Time Period for the Depressed and Non-Depressed groups in 
Experiment 9.
Variable Non-Depressed Depressed
Mean (SD) Mean (SD)
Positive Responses, Next Week
Fluency (no. of events) 6.31 (2.15) 5.42 (2.13)
Likelihood 5.29 (0.90) 4.89 (1.44)
Feeling 2.20 (0.43) 2.33 (0.54)
Positive Responses, Next Year
Fluency (no. of events) 5.63 (1.79) 5.30 (1.67)
Likelihood 5.20 (0.91) 5.02 (1.06)
Feeling 2.46 (0.39) 2.59 (0.43)
Positive Responses, Next 5-10 years
Fluency (no. of events) 6.53 (2.10) 5.91 (2.05)
Likelihood 5.21 (0.92) 5.03 (1.10)
Feeling 2.67 (0.31) 2.93 (0.76)
Negative Responses, Next Week
Fluency (no. of events) 4.61 (1.95) 4.78(7.71)
Likelihood 4.06 (1.43) 3.99 (1.46)
Feeling 1.71 (0.59) 1.65 (0.68)
Negative Responses, Next Year
Fluency (no. of events) 4.55 (1.94) 4.91 (1.92)
Likelihood 3.78 (1.42) 3.64 (1.22)
Feeling 2.18 (0.65) 2.20 (0.54)
Negative Responses, Next 5-10 years
Fluency (no. of events) 5.13 (2.13) 4.69 (1.57)
Likelihood 3.68 (1.19) 3.86 (1.13)
Feeling 2.29 (0.56) 2.17 (0.86)
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5.2.2.5 Future Thinking Task measures o f Expectancy Likelihood
The raw data pertaining to likelihood ratings of the future events generated was 
examined in the same manner as the fluency variable, that is, a Valence (Events 
likelihood: Positive/Negative) x Period (week, year, 5-10 years) x Group (Depression: 
Low BDI/Hi BDI) mixed-model ANOVA was utilised in the analysis. A significant main 
effect for Valence was found, F(l, 69)=104.720, p<.001, rjp2 =.603); that is, across all 
three time periods participants reported significantly more positive future events as likely 
to occur {M = 30.01, o = 9.84) relative to the negative future events (M = 17.41, o = 
5.98). No significant main effects were found for Period (F( 1,69)=1.040, p= .356, rjp2 
=.015), nor Group (F(l,69)=.495, p= .484, rjp2 =.007), Further, no interaction effects 
were seen for Valence and Group (F(2,68)=.963, p= .330, rjp2 =.014), for Period and 
Group (F(2,68)=.605, p=.548, rjp2 =.009), nor for Valence and Period (F(2,68)=1.293, 
p= .278, rjp2 =.018). The three way interaction of Valence x Period x Group (F(2, 68) 
=.336, p= . 715, rjp2 =.005), further failed to produce any significant interaction effects.
These results show that the expectancy component of the FTT was unable to 
account for any of the variance observed between the two groups.
5.2.2.6 Future Thinking Task measures of Event Affect
The feeling values were explored in a similar fashion to the fluency and 
likelihood data, with an analysis of variance (ANOVA) completed with positive and 
negative future feeling raw scores. A Valence (Feeling: Positive/Negative) x Period 
(week, year, 5-10 years) x Group (Depression: Low BDI/Hi BDI) mixed-model ANOVA 
found a significant main effect for Valence, F(l, 69) =85.699,/?<.007, rjp2 =. 554); that 
is, across all time periods participants foresaw feeling more positive of future events they 
were looking forward to (M= 14.64, o= 4.32) relative to reports of negative anticipation 
relating to events that they were worried about (M = 9.68, a = 4.20). A significant main 
effect was also found for Period (F(l, 69) =39.935, p <.001, rjp2 = .367) with participants 
reporting increased feeling ratings for the next year and next 5-10 years vs. the next
week. However, no main effect was seen for Group (F(l, 69) =.514,/?=476, rjp2 =.007).
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Interaction effects were seen to approach significance for Valence and Group (F(2, 68) = 
3.374,/?=.067, rjp2 =.058) with the Non-Depressed group reporting greater affect ratings 
relative to the Depressed group. The Valence and Period interaction also approached 
significance (F(2, 68) =2.794, p= .065, rjp =.039) with increased reports of positive 
affect across the three time periods relative to negative affect. The interaction between 
Period and Group also approached significance (F(2, 68) = .068, p=.935, rjp = .001), 
with the Non-Depressed participants reporting greater affect for more proximate future 
events relative to the Depressed group. No three way interaction was found for Valence x 
Period x Group (F(2, 68) =.12S,p=.485, rjp2 =.010) as produced by the ANOVA.
These results show that the feeling variable on its own was unable to detect any 
differences in responding between the two groups, although it is noted that the expected 
interaction between Valence and Group did approach significance.
5.2.2.7 Summary o f  FTTfindings
The FTT index score was unable to account for any future thinking divergence 
between the Depressed and Non-Depressed groups. However, the independent fluency 
variable did find an interaction effect for valence and group; consistent with previous 
literature this interaction effect demonstrates reduced fluency for positive future events 
within the Depressed group. The likelihood and feeling variables were unable to offer 
any further insight to the variance observed between groups pertaining to fluency.
5.2.2.8 The Implicit Relational Assessment Procedure
In line with the experiments from Chapter 4 latency data from the FT-IRAP was 
transformed into the D i r a p  measure (Dawson et al., 2009; Bames-Holmes et al., 2010) 
(see Section 4.2.2.2. for further description of this transformation of data).
5.2.2.9 Participant-type analyses
Composite positive and negative Dirap scores were calculated for the four trial- 
types, with a positive marker including the two trial-types confirming positive future and
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denying negative future relations (+; i.e. consistent trials; D i r a p -p o s )  and respectively, a 
negative marker combining the two trial-types analogous to the verification of negative 
future and refutation of positive relations (-; i.e. inconsistent trials; D i r a p -n e g ) -  The D i r a p - 
p o s  and D i r a p -n e g  scores calculated for both groups of participants are presented in 36. 
The data show the mean FT-IRAP effect for the Non-Depressed group ( D i r a p -p o s  = -34, a 
= .33; D i r a p -n e g  = -10, o =.35) to demonstrate an opposing pattern of responses relative 
to that of the Depression group ( D i r a p -p o s  = --05, o =.64; D i r a p -n e g  = --22, a =.52). That 
is, the Non-Depressed group, relative to the Depressed group, responded more rapidly on 
trials that required confirmation of future-positive and denial of future-negative relations 
(i.e. consistent trials) over tasks requiring confirmation of future-negative and denial of 
future-positive relations (i.e. inconsistent trials). In short, the descriptive FT-IRAP data 
indicate that the Non-Depressed group convey a greater level of expectations for positive 
future experiences as compared to the Depressed group. This is evident by the inverse 
pattern of responding observed to the FT-IRAP stimuli is by individuals in the Depressed 
group, proportionate to their Non-Depressed counterparts.
A mixed model ANOVA found a main effect for Valence (F(l, 69) =17.204, 
p<.001, rjp = .200) with participant responses discriminating between positive and 
negative future expectancies. No interaction effect was found for Valence and Group 
(F(l, 69)=.606, p=.439, rjp2 =.009), though a main effect for group was found (F(l, 69)= 
12.747, p=.001, rjp =.156) with the Non-Depressed group responding in line with the 
consistent FT-IRAP effect, that is, relating to expectancies of positive future events, 
whereas the Depressed group did not show this effect (see Figure 36 for an illustration of 
the two groups D i r a p -p o s  and D i r a p -n e g  scores).
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Figure 36. M ean Positive and N egative D 1RAP scores, w ith Standard E rror Bars (S.E) fo r the D epressed and 
N on-D epressed groups in E xperim ent 9.
5.2.2.10 FT-IRAP Trial-Type Analysis
In order to explore the FT-IRAP data further and gain an indication of the 
relational responses within the groups, planned one sample T-tests were employed to 
determine if the mean D irap scores for the four trial types differ significantly from zero.
As can be seen in Figure 37 there was a difference in the implicit responses by the 
two groups. The Non-Depressed participants were found to show an optimistic bias in 
analysis of their responses represented in the trial-type data by a positive value, 
specifically as confirmation o f positive expectancies, i.e. T-expect-positive-7ri/e’ 
(S1T1), to ’ I-don’t-expect-negative-7n/e’(S2T2) both of which were significantly 
different from zero (/(37)=6.611, p<.001 and /t(37)=3.120, p=.003 respectively). 
However, the trials requiring denial o f negative expectancies were not found to be
296
significantly different from zero, i.e. ‘I-expect-negative-Fa/sF (S1T2; t(31) =1.465, 
p=.151) and M-donT-expect-positive-Fa/se’ (S2T1; f(37) =1.829, p= .076).
For the Depressed group the pattern of responses were again noted as relatively 
inverse to that of the Non-Depressed group, though with a significant bias only found in 
confirmation of negative expectancies on one o f the trial types, i.e. ‘I-expect-negative- 
True' (S1T2; /(32)=-2.818,p=.005). Participants in this group displayed no trend in their 
response towards confirmation of positive expectancies (S1T1; t(32) =.010, p=.992). 
Neither was there any significant findings in regards to denial o f positive expectancies 
(S2T1; /(32) =-1.176, p=.248) nor for denial o f negative expectancies (S2T2; ^(32) =- 
.962, p=.343). Figure 37 depicts the two groups’ responses on each o f the four trial 
types, as can be seen here, a clear optimistic bias is observed for the non-depressed group 
with an analogous pessimistic pattern found for the depressed group.
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Figure 37. M ean D IRAP scores (w ith S.E bars) fo r the tw o groups across the four FT -IR A P T rial-Types in
E xperim ent 9. Trial types are represented by sam ple and target d istribution o f  Positive (T l)  and N egative
(T 2) T arget W ords presented w ith the Sam ples ‘I expect’ (SI )  and ‘1 d o n ’t expect’ (S2).
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5.2.2.11 Summary of the FT-IRAP findings
The FT-IRAP data at split and combined levels of analysis all suggest that there is 
a distinct inverse pattern of responding for the two groups -  with the trial-type analysis 
offering the additional information of discriminating which relational responses are of 
relevance in relating the data to particular patterns in cognising about the future.
5.2.2.12 Correlations and Hierarchical Regression Analyses
In order to form a comparison of sensitivity in future thinking as reported by the 
FTT and the FT-IRAP a series of correlations were conducted followed by two 
Hierarchical Regression Analyses pertaining to depression and hopelessness.
5.2.2.13 Relationship between Implicit and Explicit Measures
Zero-order correlations were conducted at group level for depression, 
hopelessness, explicit (FTT) and implicit future expectancies (FT-IRAP) (a summary of 
the Pearson’s’ correlations can be found in Table 48). Consistent with prior studies (e.g., 
Bosson et al., 2000; Gemar et al., 2001; Haeffel et al., 2007), no significant correlations 
emerged between implicit and explicit measures for either group. Though, it can be seen 
that within the FTT positive future thinking correlated with negative future thinking for 
both groups.
5.2.2.14 Regression Analysis of Depression
A Hierarchical Regression Analysis was employed to predict the probability of a
participant being classified as depressed or non-depressed. The predictor variables were
hopelessness scores (BHS), positive (PFT) and negative future thinking fluency (NFT)
and implicit future expectancy (Dirap). Fluency was the only FTT component to display
the expected group and valence interaction across the FTT analyses (as opposed to the
index scores and raw likelihood and feeling scores) and as the FTT fluency variable is
commonly utilised in the future thinking literature, along with its pronounced relevancy
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within the current findings, it was opted in as the best predictor of sub-clinical depression 
level in the set context. The single overall D i r a p  score (calculated across all four trial- 
types) was used herein, as suggested as the best variable employed in correlations and 
regression analyses with relevant explicit measures (Bames-Holmes, Bames-Holmes, 
Stewart & Boles, 2010). A test of the full model versus a model with intercept only was 
statistically significant, ^ (4 , N=  71) = 87.51,/? < .001. The model was able to correctly 
classify 78.9% of those who reported a low score on the BDI-II and 66.7% of those who 
scored high on the BDI-II, with an overall success rate of 73.2%.
Table 48. Zero order correlations for the Non-Depressed (ND) and Depressed (D) group for Depression, 
Hopelessness and the Explicit and Implicit Future Thinking Tasks in Experiment 9.
Group and
Variable
Denominator Variable 1 2 3 4
ND 1 BDI
D 1 BDI
ND 2 BHS 0.235
D 2 BHS 0.167
ND 3 PFT 0.135 0.011
D 3 PFT 0.152 -0.005
ND 4 NFT 0.255 0.001 0.730***
D 4 NFT -0.051 0.218 0.739***
ND 5 D ir a p -t o t a l -0.126 -0.218 0.006 0.065
D 5
H I  ___ D ir a p -t o t a l
-0.022 -0.146 0.113 -0.026
Note. p<  .001. BDI = Beck Depression Inventory, BHS = Beck Hopelessness Scale, PFT = Positive 
Future Thinking (fluency), NFT = Negative Future Thinking (fluency), D i r a p .TOt a l =  composite D-score.
As is evident in Table 49, after controlling for hopelessness neither positive 
future thinking nor negative future thinking (pertaining to the FTT) were found to be 
significant predictors of depression at step 2, (7(69)=.304,/?=.l 19 and 7(69)=. 147,/?=. 93 9 
respectively). However, the FT-IRAP is seen as a significant predictor of depression 
scores at step 3, (7(69) = 9.349, /?<.001). Table 49 shows the logistic regression 
coefficient, Wald test, and odds ratio for each of the predictors. It is notable that, whereas
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the explicit future thinking measure fail to add significantly to the model, the FT-IRAP 
explains an additional 5% of the depression variance (Cohen’s f2 =.091) - a moderate 
effect size (Cohen, 1992).
Table 49. Hierarchical Logistic Regression Analysis Predicting Depression Scores in a Sub-Clinical 
Population (N= 71) in Experiment 9.
Step and Variable B SE
Wald
Statistic
Odds Ratio (95% 
confidence interval) *2 R2
Dependent variable: Depression
Step 1 X2(l)= 22.521*** 0.36
Beck Hopelessness Scale 0.487 0.125 15.215 1.628(1.274-2.079)”
Step 2 X2 (2)= 2.740ns 0.40
FTT
Positive Fluency -0.426 0.277 2.367 0.653(.380-1.124)
Negative Fluency 0.291 0.283 l .062 1.338 (.769-2.329)
Step 3
Implicit Relational
Assessment Procedure _ T **+ A/..  ** _ t # - l.704 ; " ns -kt' t
0.999 2.907
; _Asr....*
0.163 (.021-1 .255)as
X2(l)= 3.805* 0.45
Note. **’/?<.001, "^K.Ol, *p<.05, Ns =Not Significant,AS = Approaching Significance:p=.06
In a separate analysis, the FT-IRAP scores were dichotomized to indicate whether 
individual Dirap scores represented a relation between depression and expectancies of 
positive future events (Dirap score > 0) versus expectancies of negative future events 
( D i r a p  score < 0), to test this as a theoretically and clinically meaningful cut point. 
Participants whose performance revealed greater expectancy of negative future events 
were significantly more likely to report higher scores on the BDI-II (32.4%) relative to 
those with a greater expectancy of positive future events (14.1%), tf2 (1, N  = 71) 
=11.752, p  = .001. This cut point appears to produce adequate sensitivity and positive 
predictive value, as well as strong specificity and negative predictive value (see Table 
50).
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Table 50. Classification Statistics for the Future Thinking Implicit Relational Assessment Procedure in 
Prospectively Predicting Depression Levels (N=  71) in Experiment 9.
BDI Scores Sensitivity Specificity
Positive
Predictive
Value
Negative
Predictive
Value
Low
D score > 0 
n = 21 
D score < 0 
n=  11
High
D score >0 
n=  10 
D score < 0 
n = 23
.70 (23/33) .71 (27/38) .73 (27/37) .68 (23/34)
Note. Scores on the Implicit Relational Assessment Procedure were dichotomized to indicate either a 
relation between future expectancies and negative events (D score > 0) or a relation between future 
expectancy and positive events (D score < 0). Sensitivity is the proportion o f sub-clinically Depressed 
participants correctly identified by the FT-IRAP; Specificity is the proportion o f  Non-Depressed 
individuals correctly identified by the test. Positive Predictive Value is the proportion o f individuals with a 
positive score who were correctly classified as Non-Depressed; Negative Predictive Value is the proportion 
o f individuals with a negative test, correctly classified as a Depressed. Raw numbers for proportions are 
given in parentheses.
5.2.2.15 Regression Analysis of Hopelessness
The second hierarchical regression analysis focused on the same relationship with 
one difference, the outcome variable was hopelessness rather than depression. Given the 
lack of predictive ability for the explicit measures with relation to sub-clinical depression 
it was of interest to see if the FTT fluency variable was able to predict hopelessness 
ratings by participants. As deficiencies in positive future thinking has been termed in the 
literature as a marker of hopelessness and suicidal ideation it was of relevance to see if 
the predictive strength lie in these components specifically as opposed to depression 
more generally. The Hierarchical Regression Analysis was conducted with hopelessness 
as the dependent variable and positive and negative fluency, along with the Dirap as 
covariates. The hopelessness variable was dichotomized by use of a cutoff point of 5 on 
the Beck Hopelessness Scale, that is participants with a BHS score of <5 were considered 
healthy (N  = 44, M  = 2.36; Low BHS Group) whereas those with a score of >5 were 
considered to be showing signs of hopeless ideation (N  = 27, M  = 7.48; High BHS 
Group; this cut off was based on a mean split) the group difference was found to be 
significant, t(69)= -12.392, /?<.001.
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As is evident in Table 51 at step 1 the explicit future thinking reports were able to 
predict hopelessness ideation, though only positive future thinking (as represented by the 
fluency variable) predicted more hopeless ideation. At step 2 performances on the FT- 
IRAP predicted the reported occurrence of hopeless ideation above and beyond the 
influence of the explicit self-report variables,^2 (1, N=  71) = 15.39,/K.Ol, explaining an 
additional 28% of the variance in hopelessness (Cohen’s f2 =.444) -  a large effect size 
(Cohen, 1992).
Table 51. Hierarchical Logistic Regression Analysis Predicting Hopelessness Ideation in a Sub-Clinical 
Population (N= 71) in Experiment 9.
Step and Variable B SE
Wald
Statistic
Odds Ratio 
(95% confidence 
interval) X2 R2
Dependent variable: Hopelessness 
Step 1
FTT
Positive Fluency -0.504 
Negative Fluency 0.417
0.255
0.247
3.917
2.852
0.604 (,367-.995)‘ 
1.517 (.935-2.460)
X? (2)= 4.758 0.09
Step 2
Implicit Relational 
Assessment Procedure-----------www------- :—in----- — -3.282---------- 1.061 9.566 0.038 (.005-.301)**
X2 (1)= 17.823*** 0.37
Note. "'p<-001, "p<-01, ’p<-05
BHS scores where dichotomized to gain a measure of sensitivity, specificity and 
predictive value of the FT-IRAP positive and negative values in relation to hopeless 
ideation. As in the above analysis with the BDI-II, the FT-IRAP D-score values, 
representative of positive future expectancy (Dirap score > 0) versus negative future 
expectancy ( D i r a p  score < 0), were assessed as ample indicators of pathological future 
beliefs. Participants whose performance revealed stronger relations between future 
expectancies and negative events were significantly more likely to report higher scores 
on the BHS (26.8%) than were those with a stronger relation with positive future
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expectancies (11.13%), y? (1, N  = 71) = 8.825, p  = .003. Thus it appears that this cut 
point offers adequate negative predictive value (see Table 52).
Table 52. Classification Statistics for the Implicit Relational Assessment Procedure in Prospectively 
Predicting Hopelessness Scores (N= 71) in Experiment 9.
BHS Scores Sensitivity Specificity
Positive
Predictive
Value
Negative
Predictive
Value
Low
D score > 0 
n = 29 
D score < 0 
n=  15
High
D score >0 
n = 8
D score < 0 
n — 19
.70(19/27) .6 6  (29/44) .78 (29/37) .56 (19/34)
Note: Scores on the Implicit Relational Assessment Procedure were dichotomized to indicate either a 
relation between future expectancies and negative events (D score > 0) or a relation between future 
expectancy and positive events (D score < 0). Sensitivity is the proportion of participants with hopeless 
ideation correctly identified by the FT-IRAP; Specificity is the proportion of participants correctly 
identified by the FT-IRAP as showing no hopeless ideation. Positive Predictive Value is the proportion of 
individuals with a positive test who were correctly classified as not pessimistic about their future; Negative 
Predictive Value is the proportion of individuals correctly classified as pessimistic with regards to their 
future outlook. Raw numbers for proportions are given in parentheses.
5.2.3 Summary
The Future Thinking Task indicated a group and valence interaction in line with 
the existing literature in regards to future thinking fluency, with the Non-Depressed 
group reporting increased levels of future positive events relative to the Depressed group, 
who in turn demonstrated a deflated fluency of positive future events, with no such 
differences emerging with regards to negative future anticipation. The FTT index score 
and the likelihood and feeling variables did not detect any differences between the two 
groups in regards to overall future expectations, or likelihood and affect in their 
pertaining to cognitions about future events.
In regards to the main aims of Experiment 9 it was found that (1) the FT- IRAP 
was sensitive and specific in the detection of sub clinical depression, whereas the FTT
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failed to significantly improve on the regression model; and (2) the FT-IRAP appeared to 
allow for greater sensitivity and specificity in the detection of hopelessness relative to the 
FTT. As such, the FT-IRAP demonstrated a group difference relative to future 
expectancies, enabling recognition of specific relational responses concurrent to 
depression and hopelessness. This was further emphasised by the FT-IRAP effectively 
adding to the regression models of depression and hopelessness, in contrast to the FTT 
components that did not significantly improve on these models. Table 53 summarises the 
main findings from Experiment 9.
Table 53. Summary of Main Aims and Findings from Experiment 9.
Research Aim Hypothesis Main Findings
To investigate if the 
FT-IRAP and the FTT 
will be comparably 
sensitive and specific in 
the detection of sub 
clinical depression as 
measured by the BDI- 
II.
Examine if the FT- 
IRAP and the FTT will 
be equally sensitive and 
specific in the detection 
of hopelessness 
ideation as measured by 
the Beck Hopelessness 
Scale.
Implicit future cognitions, 
as measured by the FT- 
IRAP will be more sensitive 
in detection o f depression 
as measured by the BDI-II, 
relative to future thinking 
as measured by the FTT.
Implicit future cognitions, 
as measured by the FT- 
IRAP will be more sensitive 
in detection of hopelessness 
ideation as measured by the 
BHS, relative to future 
thinking as measured by the 
FTT.
The hypothesis is supported. No relationship 
was found for the FTT and FT-IRAP.
At Step 2 neither positive nor negative future 
thinking (as measured by the FTT fluency 
variable) were found to be significant 
predictors of depression.
At Step 3 the FT-IRAP is seen as a significant 
predictor of depression scores (p<.0 0 1 ).
The hypothesis is supported.. No relationship 
was found for the FTT, FT-IRAP or AMS.
At Step 1 positive future thinking (as 
represented by the FTT fluency variable) 
predicted more hopeless ideation (p<.05).
At Step 2 the FT-IRAP predicted hopeless 
ideation above and beyond the influence of the 
explicit self-report variables (p<.0 1 ).
5.3 Experiment 10
Within research looking at the relationship between past and future thinking (e.g. 
Bemtsen & Bohn, 2010) the focus has been on how past and future thinking is similarly
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operationalised. With deficits in each regard seen linked to psychological disorders. That 
is, it has been noted that AMS and reduced future positive thinking are both relevant 
features in depression. However, seemingly no published research has distinguished 
which, of the past or future thinking deficits, is a stronger contributor in disorders such as 
depression. Or indeed, whether the relationship between these constructs may be seen to 
equally predict depression levels. The focus has also been on the progression of 
depressive symptoms relative to the onset of depression, with reference to the ongoing 
prognosis and not vulnerability per se. To date, there have been no known attempts to 
look at the relationship between AMT responses and implicit future thinking.
Experiment 10 aimed to compare the Autobiographical Memory Task (AMT; 
Williams & Broadbent, 1986), with an IRAP task designed specifically to measure 
positive and negative future expectancies (FT-IRAP) across a sub clinical sample of 
depressed and healthy control undergraduate students. Sumner, Griffith and Mineka 
(2010) in their recent meta-analysis of the predictive powers of Autobiographical 
Memory Specificity (AMS) in depression found that across studies the predictive power 
of AMS appears to be small although it has been found to be statistically significant, 
relative to depression symptoms. That is, lower levels of AMS (i.e., fewer specific 
memories and more categoric/overgeneral memories) in initial assessments of depression 
have been seen to relate to increased depression symptoms at subsequent follow up 
(Sumner at al., 2010). From the future thinking literature it has been seen that reduced 
positive future thinking is considered a central feature in depression (MacLeod & 
Salaminiou, 2001). O’Connor, Fraser, Whyte, Stirling and MacHale (2008) have 
reported the predictive powers of positive future thinking, with no independent effect of 
negative future thinking, for suicidal ideation, above that of measures of global 
hopelessness.
To this end Experiment 10 has two main aims to (1) investigate if the FT-IRAP 
and the AMT will be comparably sensitive and specific in the detection of sub clinical 
depression as measured by the BDI-II.; and to see (2) if the FT-IRAP and the AMT will 
equally be sensitive and specific in the detection of hopelessness ideation as measured by
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the Beck Hopelessness Scale. It is predicted that the implicit future cognitions, as 
measured by the FT-IRAP will be more sensitive in detection of depression and 
hopelessness relative to AMS as measured by the AMT.
5.3.1 Method
5.3.1.1 Participants
Forty-seven students from Swansea University volunteered to take part in the 
current experiment, after employing the exclusion criteria pertaining to BDI-II scores 
(the criteria for inclusion is detailed in section 4.7.1.1.) data from six participants was 
removed, thus only data from forty-one participants was utilised in the following 
analysis. Of the included sample of 41 undergraduate and postgraduate students 27 were 
female and 14 were males, between the ages of 21 and 34 (M= 24.97, a=  2.97).
5.3.1.2 Apparatus and Materials
Participants completed a series of self-report questionnaires to assess 
psychological health. This was the same set of assessments utilized throughout the 
previous chapters (see Section 2.2.1.2 for details pertaining to each measure), i.e. the 
Beck Depression Inventory, Second Edition (BDI-II; Beck, Steer & Brown, 1996); The 
Beck Hopelessness Scale (BHS; Beck & Steer, 1988); The State Anxiety Inventory 
(STAI; Spielberger, Gorsuch, & Lushene ,1970; Spielberger et al., 1983); The Positive 
and Negative Affect Schedule (PANAS; Watson, Clark, & Tellegen, 1988); The Life 
Orientation Test -  Revised (LOT-R; Scheier, Carver, & Bridges, 1994); The Acceptance 
and Action Questionnaire-2 (AAQ-2; Bond et al., (Submitted); Hayes, Strosahl, et al., 
2004) and the Verbal Fluency Control task. (Lezak, 1976).
The Autobiographical Memory Task (AMT; Williams & Broadbent, 1986) was 
identical in presentation and procedural followings as to Experiment la  (see Section 
2.2.1.2).
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The Future Thinking-Implicit Relational Assessment Procedure was presented 
in the same form and the procedure was identical to that of Experiment 6 (see Section 
4.2.1.4).
5.3.1.3 Experimental Overview
The current study was of mixed-between-within participant design and each 
participant completed all experimental phases in the same order. Figure 38 depicts the 
experimental sequence for Experiment 10.
5.3.1.4 Ethical Issues
As with the previous experiments reported herein the ethical guidelines identified 
by the British Psychological Society (2006) were adhered to in Experiment 10 by 
ensuring a number of specific measures were put in place. These measures were 
consistent with those outlined previously for Experiment 6 and Experiment la (see 
Section 2.2.1.4). Only minor adjustments were necessary to facilitate the change in 
methodologies to tailor instructions to the current experiment. As in Experiment 6, 
emphasis was put into assuring participants that the computer task was not a measure of 
how quick they were at responding but that the focus was on the responses made. This 
emphasis was made to deter distress related to feelings of inept computer skills. Due to 
the nature of the experiment, with participants completing 2 subsequent tasks, 
participants were encouraged to take a break between tasks. At no point during the 
experiment did any participant withdraw from the study or express dissatisfaction or 
distress of any kind. No participants reported emotional upset in relation to the past 
events recalled. Experiment 10 was ethically approved by the Swansea University 
Psychology Department Ethics Committee prior to commencement.
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Participant Sam ple (N= 47)
Total sam ple com plete V erbal Fluency C ontrol Task 
(random ised 1st presentation o f  letters F, A , S betw een participants)
Total sam ple com plete the Future T hinking IR A P (random ised presentation  o f  consistent and 
inconsistent first trials betw een participants)
Step 2. The 3 test trials com m ence upon successful com pletion o f  practice trials.
Step 1. Participants com plete a m inim um  o f  2 practice trials.
Total sam ple com plete A utobiographical M em ory Task (random ised 1st presentation o f  
positive or negative cues betw een participants)
u
Total sam ple com plete Q uestionnaires (random ised order o f  1st presentation betw een 
participants) B D I-II, STAI, BHS, LO T-R , A A Q -II, PA N A S
' i ■ >
P ost-E xperim ental/P re-A nalysis BD I-II G roup Split (see Section 5.3.2.1):
Low B D I-II score (1 <10): N=  22 (B D I-II =  0, excluded from analysis, N =  4) 
H igh B DI-II score (10<30): N=  19 (B D I-II score >29, excluded from analysis, N =  2) 
Final sample for analysis: N = 41 
Figure 38. O verview  o f  the E xperim ental Sequence for E xperim ent 10.
5.3.1.5 Procedure
Experiment 10 took place in a controlled environment in the form of a standard 
research lab provided with a table, chair and portable computer. Prior to commencement 
participants were informed about the tasks and invited to ask questions before completing
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the consent form. The study commenced with the FT-IRAP (for details pertaining to the 
exact procedures of the FT-IRAP see Section 4.2.1.5), directly followed by the Verbal 
Fluency Control Task and the Autobiographical Memory Task (AMT) (for details 
pertaining to the exact procedures of the AMT see Section 2.2.1.3), and lastly followed 
by responses to the set of psychometric self-report measures. The procedures followed 
for these methods were as directed in previous studies and adhered to the process 
described therein. The questionnaires were given out in a randomised order. Participants 
were provided with the option to take short brakes between completions of the individual 
tasks; generally this offer was not made use of. On completion of all tests, participants 
were thanked and verbally debriefed with reference to a written debriefing sheet provided 
for the participant to retain.
An inter-rater reliability analysis using the Kappa statistic was performed to 
determine consistency among raters in regards to cue specificity on the AMT. A sample 
of 90% of the responses was rated by a second independent rater, and an inter-rater 
reliability of 93% (k = .93) was obtained.
5.3.2 Results and Discussion 
5.3.2.I. Group Allocation
Group allocation was determined via discriminating scores on the Beck 
Depression Inventory (BDI-II). Participants with a score of 0 (N = 4) or above 29 (N  = 2, 
M= 32) where excluded from the analysis. As before the BDI-II inclusion criteria for the 
no depression group was a score of 1< 10, thus participants presenting scores of 1-9 (N = 
22; M  = 3.18; Non-Depressed Group) whereas inclusion in the sub-clinical depression 
group required BDI-II scores of 10 < 30 (N = 19; M=  13.78; Depressed Group).
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5.3.2.2 Demographics and Psychometrics
The two groups were found to report significantly different depression levels on 
the BDI-II, with participants in the Non-Depressed group reporting significantly lower 
BDI-II scores than the corresponding Depressed group, ^(39)=-10.011, p<.001. Similar 
divergence between the groups were found in relation to the other well-being measures 
with the Depressed group consistently reporting higher levels of anxiety (STAI, t{39)=- 
4.171, p<.001), increased hopelessness (BHS, /(39)=-5.122, p<.001), deflated life 
optimism (LOT-R, r(39)=4.370, p<.001) and reduced psychological flexibility (AAQ, 
/(39)=2.771, p-.009 ) relative to the Non-Depressed group. Mood was not found to be 
significantly different between the groups (PA: p=.074; NA: p=.063), though there is a 
clear trend indicating some level of mood variance. The psychometric means are 
presented with the participant demographics in Table 54. As depicted in Table 54, 
Depressed and Non-Depressed participants did not differ with respect to age, t(39) =- 
1.216, p=.231, representation of gender, (2) =. 997,/? =37 3 or verbal fluency, t(39) =- 
1.311,/?= 197.
Table 54. BDI group split presentation of Demographics and Psychometric tests presented as Mean scores 
with Standard Deviations (SD) for the Depressed and Non-Depressed groups in Experiment 10.
Variable Depressed (SD) Non-Depressed (SD)
Gender: Females (Males) 16(6) 1 1 (8 )
Age 25.78 (3.79) 24.45 (1.96)
VFCT 14.31 (2.71) 13.05 (3.33)
BDI 13.78 (4.45) 3.18 (2.06)
BHS 8.73 (4.89) 2.81 (2.17)
STAI 47.68 (10.69) 34.72 (9.19)
LOT-R 10.68 (4.84) 16.81 (4.14)
AAQ-II 47.26 (10.43) 55.22 (7.93)
PA 31.47 (5.08) 35.41 (8.05)
NA 22.10 (9.01) 18.13 (3.42)
Note. VFCT= Verbal Fluency Control Task; BDI= Beck Depression Inventory; BHS= Beck Hopelessness 
Scale; STAI = State Anxiety Inventory; LOT-R= Life Optimism Test-Revised; AAQ-II= Acceptance and 
Action Questionnaire-II; PA = Positive Affective Scale; NA= Negative Affective Scale.
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5.3.2.3 The Autobiographical Memory Test
Following common practice in investigations of autobiographical memory 
specificity (AMS) (see Williams et al., 2006, 2007), the first response across the 12 trials, 
that is, memories that participants retrieved in response to the 12 AMT cue words that 
were specific, were used to index AMS (this variable is referred to here as memory 
specificity, with higher scores indicating increased specificity) (see Section 2.2.2.3 for 
further details on the AMT cue scoring).
High positive correlations were seen between the number of specific memories 
produced under each valence category with the total number of specific recall (Non- 
Depressed group positive cues, .91, and negative cues .88; Depressed group, positive 
cues .91 and negative cues .96). On average, retrieved memories for participants in the 
Non-Depressed group were specific 54.5% of the time across the 12 trials; whereas the 
Depressed participants showed somewhat diminished specificity in retrieval overall with 
merely 42.10% of the 12 trials noted as specific. Differences in specificity were 
predominantly noted for positive cues, with the Non-Depressed group retrieving a greater 
number of specific memories to positive cues, relative to the Depressed group (M = 4.04, 
o= 1.58 and M= 3.21, o= .92 respectively; t{39) =2.017, p=.05). Specificity in recall for 
negatively cued events was poor within both groups (Non-Depressed group, M  = 2.50, a 
= 1.43; Depressed group, M =  1.84, o = 1.38; t{39) =1.485, p=. 146). Table 55 presents 
the AMT performance for both groups and as can be seen omissions were rare. Verbal 
fluency scores did not correlate with the total number of cues for either group (Non- 
Depressed, p=.224; Depressed, p=. 136).
Memory specificity was subjected to a 2 (Group: Depressed/Non-Depressed) x 2 
(Cue valence: Positive/Negative) mixed analyses of variance (ANOVA). A main effect 
for Valence was found, with both groups being more specific in recall of positive 
memories (F(l, 39) =65.078, p<.001 rjp2 =.625) relative to negative past events. The 
main effect for Group did approach significance, with the trend showing the Non- 
Depressed individuals as more specific in recall overall (F(l, 39) =3.686, p=.062, rjp2
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=.086). No interaction effect was observed for Valence and Group (F(l, 39) =.240, 
p=.627, t/p2 = 006).
Table 55. Autobiographical Memory Test Performance presented as Percentage of Specificity, Mean 
number, with Standard Deviations (SD), of Memory Specificity Responses across the six cue words in 
each valence category for the Depressed and Non-Depressed groups in Experiment 10. T-Test score and 
statistical value (p) from between group comparisons are presented.
Variable Non-Depressed Depressed
Total %  of specific memories
Mean (SD)
54.50(18.69)
Mean (SD)
42.10 (20.45)
a m P
Total % of omissions 2.14 (3.56) 2.90 (4.62)
Total cues 6.54 (2.72) 5.05 (2.17) 1.603 0.117
Positive cues 4.04 (1.58) 3.21 (0.92) 2.017 0.051*
Negative cues 2.50 (1.43) l.S4(1.38) 1.485 0.146
Note. */?=.051. Positive/Negative Cues = number of specific first memories relative to the detailed valence 
category on the Autobiographical Memory Test.
5.3.2.4 Summary o f  AMTfindings
The results show that the two groups differ in regards to levels of AMS, this 
diverge is in regards to recall of positive past events, with the Non-Depressed individuals 
demonstrating greater specificity in such recall relative to those from the Depression 
group. This finding is consistent with the results seen from Experiment la and 2a in 
Chapter 2.
5.3.2.5 The Implicit Relational Assessment Procedure
Latency data from the FT-IRAP was transformed into the Dirap measure (Dawson 
et al., 2008) consistent with calculations in previous chapters, i.e. an adapted version of 
the IAT D-algorithm noted by Greenwald, Nosek & Banaji, 2003) (for instructions on the 
algorithm transformation see Section 4.2.2.2.).
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The two groups were found to differ significantly in relation to the overall Dirap 
score (/(39)=2.609, p=.013), with the Non-Depressed group producing scores 
significantly different from zero in a positive direction (M= .21, a= 0.17; J(21)=5.730, 
p < 0 0 1 ), whereas the Depressed group presented a rather ambivalent response pattern, 
with no significant difference from zero (M =  0.02, cr= 0.29; /(18)=.249, p=.806). Figure 
39 provides an illustration o f this finding, and as can be seen the Non-Depressed group 
holds a strong positive bias towards the future whereas the Depressed individuals are 
showing a negative trend.
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Figure 39. M ean D 1RAP scores for the D epressed and N on-D epressed  groups in E xperim ent 10, with 
Standard E rror B ars (S.E). A greater optim istic bias is indicated by larger positive scores, i.e. responding 
m ore quickly w hen confirm ing positive and denying negative fu ture expectancy than w hen asked to 
confirm  negative and deny positive expectancy on the relevant trials. A pessim istic bias incurs the inverse 
responding pattern.
5.2.3.6 Participant-type analyses.
The mean D i r a p -p o s  and D i r A p -n e g  scores calculated for both groups are shown in 
Figure 40. For the positive future trial type, both groups exhibited an implicit optimistic 
bias, although for the Non-Depressed participants the Djrap effect was much stronger
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than that of the Depressed group. For the negative future trial type, the Non-Depressed 
group showed a non-pessimistic bias and the Depressed group showed a small effect 
pertaining to a pessimistic outlook. The Dirap scores for each participant were entered 
into a 2 x 2 mixed repeated measures ANOVA, with group (Non-Depressed vs. 
Depressed) as the between-participants variable and IRAP trial-type as the within- 
participants variable ( D IRAp.pos and D i R A p - n e g ) -
The ANOVA revealed a significant main effect for Group, F ( l, 39) =9.596, 
p=.004 , rjp2 =A97), and for IRAP trial-type, F {\, 39) =6.563, p=.014, rjp~ =.144); though 
no interaction effect was found (F(l, 39) =3.322, p=.076, rjp2 =.076).
8  0.3
D lR A P -P O S  D i r a p . n e G
FT-IRAP Trial Types
'Non-Depressed 
i Depressed
Figure 40. M ean Positive and N egative D IRAP trial-type scores in Experim ent 10, w ith Standard E rror Bars 
(S.E), for the N on-D epressed and D epressed groups. The D IRAP.POs scores reflect an optim istic bias and the 
D i r a p - n e g  scores reflect a pessim istic bias. The zero-point reflects no bias. An optim istic bias, pertaining to 
positive future expectancy, w as produced if  participants responded m ore quickly to “ I ex p ec t-P o sitiv e - 
T rue” and “ I d o n ’t expect-P ositive-F alse” than to “ I ex p ec t-  P ositive-F a lse” and “ I do n ’t ex p ec t-P o sitiv e - 
T rue” (the opposite pattern indicated a pessim istic bias on positive expectancy trials). A pessim istic bias 
for future expectancy was produced if  participants responded m ore quickly to “ I ex p ec t-N eg ativ e-T ru e” 
and “ I don ’t ex p ec t-N eg a tiv e - False” than to “ I exp ec t-N eg a tiv e -F a lse” and “ I don ’t expec t-N eg a tiv e - 
T rue” (the opposite pattern indicated an optim istic bias on negative expectancy trials).
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Two one-way between-participant ANOVAs yielded significant differences only 
for expectancy of positive future events, F(1, 39) = 11.292, p  =.002, and not for 
expectancy of negative future event trial types F{ 1, 39) = 1.589, p  =.215. Two one- 
sample t tests indicated that the optimistic Dirap effect for the Non-Depressed group 
differed significantly from zero: D ir a p -p o s , *(21) = 8.328, p < .001; whereas the 
pessimistic D ir a p  effect only approached significance, D ir a p -n e g , *(19) = 1.862,/? =.077. 
For the Depressed group, however, no significance was found with either effect ( D ir a p - 
p o s , *(22) = .171, p  = .866; D ir a p -n e g ? *(19) = -.270, p  =.790). Overall, therefore, the 
IRAP indicated optimistic biases for the Non-Depressed group that differed significantly 
from the Depressed groups more pessimistic biases.
5.3.2.7 Summary of FT-IRAP findings
The data show that the two groups differed in their response pattern as recorded 
by the FT-IRAP. A clear optimistic bias was seen for the Non-Depressed group that 
differed significantly to the Depressed groups more pessimistic biases.
5.3.2.8 Correlations and Hierarchical Regression Analyses
In order to form a comparison between the AMT and the FT-IRAP sensitivity to 
depression and hopelessness a series of correlations were conducted followed by two 
Hierarchical Regression Analyses pertaining separately to depression and hopelessness.
5.3.2.9 Relationship between Implicit Future Thinking and Explicit Memory
Zero-order correlations were conducted at group level for depression, 
hopelessness, implicit future expectancies and autobiographical memory specificity (a 
summary of the Pearson’s’ correlations can be found in Table 56). As can be seen from 
Table 56 hopelessness and depression scores were found to positively correlate within 
the depressed sample. Hopelessness and positive cue specificity was seen to negatively 
correlate in the Non-Depressed sample, that is, those reporting high scores on the BHS 
were less specific in their recall of positive memories. Positive and negative cue
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specificity was found to positively correlate with the FT-IRAP within the Depressed 
group, thus indicating that those participants whom where more specific in their recall 
reported an optimistic bias pertaining to future expectancies of positive events.
Table 56. Zero order correlations for the Non-Depressed (ND) and Depressed (D) group for Depression, 
Hopelessness, Autobiographical Memory Specificity and Implicit Future Thinking in Experiment 10.
Group and 
Denominator
Variable Variable 1 2 3 4
ND 1 BDI
D 1 BDI
ND 2 BHS -.109
D 2 BHS .539*
ND 3 PCS .084 -.452*
D 3 PCS -.409 -.370
ND 4 NCS -.016 -.152 .614**
D 4 NCS -.257 -.006 .770’*
ND 5 D ir a p -t o t a l .171 .088 -.304 .106
D 5
——--------*---- -—r*-
D ir a p -t o t a l - .1 2 1 -.322 .655* .661**
Positive Cue Specificity, NCS = Negative Cue Specificity, D IRAp - t o t a l =  composite D-score.
5.3.2.10 Regression Analysis o f  Depression
A Hierarchical Regression Analysis was employed to test whether memory 
specificity and implicit future thinking contributed to the prediction of depression at a 
sub-clinical level. The predictor variables were hopelessness scores (BHS), positive 
(PCS) and negative cue specificity (NCS) and implicit future expectancy (Dirap). From 
the AMT analyses it was found that the valence categories indicated better predictive 
powers as individual variables than as a combined score thus accounting for the choice of 
inclusion of these as separate variables relative to a combined score within the regression 
analysis. The single overall D i r a p  score (calculated across all four trial-types) proved to 
be a successful predictor in Experiment 9 and was further employed herein. 
Hopelessness was entered as a predictor of group status (Depressed or Non-Depressed) in
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the first step. The BHS score proved to be a strong and significant predictor of group 
status, B = .61, p  = .002, accounting for 58.7% of the variance. Autobiographical 
memory specificity was entered at the second step and this produced a weak increment, 
accounting for 61.9% of the variance (R2 change = .032), and neither cue category were 
found to be significant (PCS, B = .27, p  = .623, NCS, B = -.59, p  = .241). At the third 
step the overall Dirap measure was entered, producing a significant increment, B = -  
6.726, p  = .056, and significantly adding to the overall variance of 69.7% (R change = 
.078). A test of the full model versus a model with intercept only was statistically 
significant, ^ (4 , N  = 41) = 30.263,/? < .001. The model was able to correctly to classify 
90.9% of those with low BDI-II scores, and 94.7% of those who scored high on the BDI- 
II, for an overall success rate of 92.7%.
Table 57 shows the logistic regression coefficient, Wald test, and odds ratio for 
each of the predictors. It is notable that, whereas the AMT fail to add significantly to the 
model, the FT-IRAP explains an additional 8% of the depression variance (Cohen’s f2 
=.266) - a moderate effect size (Cohen, 1992). As is evident in Table 57, after controlling 
for hopelessness, positive cue specificity was a moderately significant predictor, though 
negative cue specificity was not found to be a significant predictor of depression at step 
2, (/?=.051 and p= 146 respectively). However, the FT-IRAP is seen as a significant 
predictor of depression scores at step 3, (t(39) =9.349,/? =.034).
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Table 57. Hierarchical Logistic Regression Analysis Predicting Depression Scores in a sub-clinical 
population (N= 41) in Experiment 10.
Step and Variable b SE
Wald
Statistic
Odds Ratio 
(95% confidence 
interval) X2 R2
Dependent variable: Depression
Step 1
Beck Hopelessness Scale 0 .6 1 6 0.202 9 . 2 8 4 1 . 8 5 2 ( 1 . 2 4 5  2 .7 5 4 )* *
X 2 ( l ) =  2 3 .7 1 5 * * * 0 .5 9
Step 2
AMT
Positive Cue Specificity 
Negative Cue Specificity
0 .2 7
- 0 .5 9 3
0 .5 5
0 .5 0 6
0 .2 4 1
1 .3 7 2
1 .3 1 0  ( . 4 4 6 - 3 . 8 5 5 )  
.5 5 3  ( . 2 0 5 - 1 . 4 9 1 )
X2 ( 2 ) = 1 .8 2 6 n s 0 .6 2
Step 3
Implicit Relational
Assessment Procedure»*# . ..**............  Ai" - 6 .7 2 6 3 .5 2 2 3 . 6 4 6 0 .0 0 1  ( .0 0 0 - 1 .1 9 5 ) *
X2 ( l ) = 4 . 7 2 1 * 0 .7 0
Note. *”/><. 001; **p<.01; *p<.05; N!i =Not significant
In a separate analysis, the FT-IRAP scores were again dichotomized to indicate 
whether individual Dirap scores represented a relation between future expectancies for 
positive events ( D i r a p  score > 0) versus future expectancies for negative events ( D i r a p  
score < 0), to test this as a theoretically and clinically meaningful cut point. Participants 
whose performance revealed stronger relations between future expectancies and negative 
events were significantly more likely to report higher scores on the BDI (29.3%) than 
were those with stronger relations with positive future expectancies (17.1%), y? (1, N  = 
41) = 5.331,/? = .021. This cut point appears to produce adequate sensitivity and positive 
predictive value, as well as strong specificity and negative predictive value (see Table 
46).
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Table 58. Classification Statistics for the Future Thinking Implicit Relational Assessment Procedure in 
Prospectively Predicting Depression Levels (N=  41) in Experiment 10.
BDI Scores Sensitivity Specificity
Positive
Predictive Value
Negative 
Predictive Value
Low
D score > 0 
n = 16 
D score < 0 
n = 6
High
D score > 0 
n = 7
D score < 0 
n = 12
.63 (12/19) .73 (16/22) .70 (16/23) .67(12/18)
Note. Scores on the Implicit Relational Assessment Procedure were dichotomized to indicate either a 
relation between future expectancies and negative events (D score > 0) or a relation between future 
expectancy and positive events (D score < 0). Sensitivity is the proportion of sub-clinically Depressed 
participants correctly identified by the FT-IRAP; Specificity is the proportion of Non-Depresses 
individuals correctly identified by the test. Positive Predictive Value is the proportion of individuals with a 
positive score who were correctly classified as Non-Depressed; Negative Predictive Value is the proportion 
of individuals with a negative test, correctly classified as a Depressed. Raw numbers for proportions are 
given in parentheses.
5.3.2.11 Regression Analysis o f  Hopelessness
The second hierarchical regression analysis focused on the same relationship with 
one difference, the outcome variable was hopelessness rather than depression, in order to 
test whether memory specificity and implicit future thinking contributed to the prediction 
of hopelessness at a sub-clinical level. As deficiencies in autobiographical memory 
specificity has been termed in the literature as a marker of hopelessness and suicidal 
ideation it was of relevance to see if the predictive strength lie in these components 
specifically as opposed to depression more generally. The Hierarchical Regression 
Analysis was conducted with hopelessness as the dependent variable and positive and 
negative cue specificity, along with the Dirap, as covariates. The hopelessness variable 
was dichotomized by use of a cutoff point of 5 on the Beck Hopelessness Scale, that is 
participants with a BHS score of <5 were considered healthy (N  =21, M  = 2.24; Low 
BHS group) whereas those with a score of >5 were considered to be showing signs of 
hopeless ideation (N=  20, M=  9.05; High BHS Group; this cut off was based on a mean 
split) the group difference was found to be significant, t(39)= -6.702, /?<.001. 
Autobiographical memory specificity was not found to be a significant predictor of
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hopelessness levels, accounting for 5.5% of the variance and neither cue category were 
found to be significant (PCS, B =-.39, p  = .227, NCS, B = .15, p  = .608). At the second 
step the overall Dirap measure was entered, producing a significant increment, B = - 
5.335,p  = .023, and accounting for 26.7% of the variance (R2 change =.212). A test of 
the full model versus a model with intercept only was statistically significant, X*(3, N  = 
41) = 9.155, < .05.
As is evident in Table 59, at step 1 the AMT variables were not able to predict 
hopelessness ideation. At step 2 performances on the Dirap scores predicted the reported 
occurrence of hopeless ideation above and beyond the influence of AMS, ^  (2, N  = 41) = 
7.00, p=.030, explaining an additional 22% of the variance in hopelessness (Cohen’s f2 
=.294) -  a moderate to large effect size (Cohen, 1992).
Table 59. Hierarchical Logistic Regression Analysis Predicting Hopelessness Ideation in a Sub-Clinical 
Population (N= 41) in Experiment 10.
Step and Variable B SE
Wald
Statistic
Odds Ratio 
(95% confidence 
interval) x2 R2
Dependent variable: Hopelessness
Step 1
AMT
Positive Cue Specificity -0.395 
Negative Cue 0.157 
Specificity
0.326
0.306
1.462
0.263
0.674 (.356-1.277) 
1.170 (.642-2.135)
X2 (2)=1.711 o.o-
Step 2
Implicit Relational -5.335 
Assessment Procedure
2.347 5.165
0.005(.000-.480)*
X2 (1)= 7.444** 0.2<
Note. '><.01; ><.05
BHS scores where further dichotomized to gain a measure of sensitivity, 
specificity and predictive value of the FT-IRAP positive and negative values in relation 
to hopeless ideation. As in the above analysis with the BDI-II, the FT-IRAP D-score 
values representative of positive future expectancy ( D i r a p  score > 0) versus negative
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future expectancy ( D i r a p  score < 0) were assessed as ample indicators of pathological 
future beliefs. Participants whose performance revealed stronger relations between future 
expectancies and negative events were significantly more likely to report higher scores 
on the BHS (29.3%) than were those with a stronger relation with positive future 
expectancies (19.5%), tf2 N  = 4\) =4.108 ,p  = .043. Thus it appears that this cut point 
offers adequate negative predictive value (see Table 60).
Table 60. Classification Statistics for the Future Thinking Implicit Relational Assessment Procedure in 
Prospectively Predicting Hopelessness Scores (N= 41) in Experiment 10.
BHS Scores Sensitivity Specificity
Positive
Predictive
Value
Negative
Predictive
Value
Low
D score > 0 
77 = 15 
D score < 0
77 = 6
High
D score >0
77 = 8
D score < 0 
77=12
.60 (12/20) .71 (15/21) .65 (15/23) .68 (12/18)
Note: Scores on the Implicit Relational Assessment Procedure were dichotomized to indicate either a 
relation between future expectancies and negative events (D score > 0) or a relation between future 
expectancy and positive events (D score < 0). Sensitivity is the proportion of participants with hopeless 
ideation correctly identified by the FT-IRAP; Specificity is the proportion of participants correctly 
identified by the test as showing no hopeless ideation. Positive predictive value is the proportion of 
individuals with a positive test who were correctly classified as not pessimistic about their future; Negative 
predictive value is the proportion of individuals correctly classified as pessimistic with regards to their 
future outlook. Raw numbers for proportions are given in parentheses.
5.3.3 Summary
Experiment 10 offered a direct comparison of the AMT and FT-IRAP. Within the 
Depressed group, the D i r a p  was found to correlate with specificity in recall for both 
positive and negative events. The regression model for depression further suggested a 
link between past and future thinking by providing an overall success rate of 92.7%. In 
regards to the main aims of Experiment 10 it was found that (1) the FT-IRAP was a 
stronger predictor overall in the depression model; with the FT-IRAP effect was further
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seen to be a strong indicator, in its own right, of depression levels as measured by the 
BDI-II, by generating strong levels of sensitivity and specificity.
Table 61. Summary of Main Aims and Findings from Experiment 10.
Research Aim Hypothesis Main Findings
To investigate if the 
FT-IRAP and the 
AMT will be 
comparably sensitive 
and specific in the 
detection of sub 
clinical depression as 
measured by the 
BDI-E.
Examine if the FT- 
ERAP and the AMT 
will be equally 
sensitive and specific 
in the detection of 
hopelessness ideation 
as measured by the 
Beck Hopelessness 
Scale.
Implicit fu ture  
cognitions, as measured  
by the FT-IRAP will be 
more sensitive in 
detection o f  depression 
as measured by the 
BDI-II, relative A M S as 
measured by the AMT.
Implicit fu ture  
cognitions, as measured  
by the FT-IRAP will be 
more sensitive in 
detection o f  
hopelessness ideation 
as measured by the 
BHS, relative to AM S  
as measured by the 
A M T
The hypothesis is supported.
Within the Depression group a positive relationship 
was found for implicit future cognitions and 
positive AMS (p<.05) and negative AMS (p<.01).
The AMT failed to add significantly to the model.
At Step 2positive  cue specificity was a moderately 
significant predictor, (p=.051).
At Step 3 the FT-IRAP is seen as a significant 
predictor of depression scores (p<.05).
The hypothesis is supported.
Within the Non-Depressed group a negative 
relationship was found positive AMS and 
hopelessness (p<.05).
At Step 1 the AMT variables were not able to 
predict hopelessness ideation.
At Step 2 the FT-IRAP is seen as a significant 
predictor of hopelessness ideation (p<.05).
In regards to the second aim (2) it was seen in the hopelessness regression that 
AMS did not add to the model, by either valence category, with the FT-IRAP 
demonstrating predictive ability beyond that of the AMS variables. Thus suggesting that 
specificity in autobiographical memory may not be a feature component of hopelessness 
ideation. The FT-IRAP individually offered a strong detection of hopelessness ideation 
with stable levels of sensitivity and specificity in recognition of such cognition. 
Although, the findings from Experiment 10, from the AMT, support the findings from
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Chapter 2, implicit future thinking appears to represent a closer relationship to depression 
in general and hopelessness more specifically. Table 61 summarises the main findings 
from Experiment 10.
5.4 General Discussion
Chapter 5 aimed to determine whether the FT-IRAP could be employed as a 
useful procedure to implicitly measure future thinking in depression and how results on 
this measure compared with explicit measures of past (Autobiographical Memory Task: 
AMT) and future thinking (The Future Thinking Task: FTT). In addition to this, the 
empirical work herein aimed to provide further empirical support to the postulate that a 
lack of positive future expectancies is a characteristic of depression.
In Experiment 9 it was seen that, consistent with previous research, participants 
scoring high on the BDI-II were found to differ from those scoring low on the BDI-II in 
their generation of positive future events on the explicit Future Thinking Task (MacLeod, 
et al., 1997). Additionally, the general trend, for the generation of negative future events 
was also in line with previous studies, that is, no difference was seen in this regard for 
the Depressed on Non-Depressed individuals. The FT-IRAP proved more 
sensitive/predictive of depression levels in relation to the FTT, that is, the Non- 
Depressed group demonstrated a tendency towards positive future expectancies, by faster 
reaction times on the consistent trials. The Depression group appeared to identify with 
negative future expectancies, by generating faster response times on the inconsistent 
trials. This predictability was also seen in regards to hopelessness, with the FT-IRAP 
adding significantly to the model relative to the FTT fluency variables.
In Experiment 10 it was found that the AMT responses and levels of specificity 
demonstrated by the two groups were consistent with previous research, and the 
Experiments from Chapter 2, with improved levels of specificity in recall observed by 
the Non-Depressed individuals. A valence bias was found in parallel to the trend seen
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with Experiments la  and 2a, with specificity in recall of positive past events being the 
main factor contributing to the groups diverging on the AMT. In Experiment 10 it was 
found that participants with low BDI-II scores demonstrated greater future optimism as 
measured by the FT-IRAP, with the high BDI-II scorers responding in line with a 
reduced level of optimism. The FT-IRAP demonstrated predictability of depression and 
hopelessness levels beyond that of the AMT, with significant contributions to the 
depression and regression models as opposed to the AMT which failed to add to these 
regression models at a significant level.
Overall the FT-IRAP and AMT regression model proved the strongest predictor 
of depression relative to the FT-IRAP and FTT model, with the FTT/IRAP model able to 
correctly classify 78.9% of those who reported a low score on the BDI-II and 66.7% of 
those who scored high on the BDI-II, with an overall success rate of 73.2%, whereas the 
AMT/IRAP model was able to predict group membership for 90.9% of those who scored 
low on the BDI-II and 94.7% of those who scored high on the BDI-II, for an overall 
success rate of 92.7%.
The FT-IRAP most significantly added to the hopelessness regression models, 
relative to the depression models, by accounting for 28 % of the variance in the 
FTT/IRAP hopelessness model and for 22% in the AMT/IRAP hopelessness model. As 
such the FT-IRAP measure of future expectancy may be particularly relevant in regards 
to research on hopeless ideation in future thinking, e.g. suicidal ideation. The current 
results indicate that the FT-IRAP may have value in predicting group membership 
regarding BDI-II scores; as overall, the FT-IRAP demonstrated a clear advantage over 
both the AMT and FTT in regards to its predictive power of group membership in sub- 
clinical depression samples. Specifically, it was found that across two separate 
experiments, and with different participants, the FT-IRAP consistently demonstrated 
good levels of sensitivity and specificity in detection of depressed and hopeless ideation.
The current results may be important in terms of aiding our understanding of the 
vulnerability factors pertaining to clinical disorders. These results add to the
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understanding of how thoughts about the past and the future can impact on our affect and 
vice versa. In the current chapter the implicit pairing of subjective expectancies with 
future experiences was predictive of sub clinical depression. Many researchers have 
argued for explanations of depression that rely on cognitive processes, such as Becks 
schema (e.g. Beck, 1967). From a behaviour-analytic perspective, however, such 
explanations are incomplete because they leave terms such as schema, which are also 
behaviours, unexplained (Barnes, 1989; Hayes & Brownstien, 1986). The IRAP is 
grounded in Relational Frame Theory (see Section 1.3.3 for a detailed account) a 
behavioural account of human language and cognition (e.g., Hayes, Bames-Holmes & 
Roche, 2001; Sidman, 1994) and as such viewing future thinking as forms of derived 
relational responding (i.e., behaviours) may be useful at the level of intervention. 
Specifically, Acceptance and Commitment Therapy (ACT) is a therapeutic treatment 
package that has developed out of the Relational Frame Theory account of language and 
cognition that suggests useful ways for dealing with negative thoughts.
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Chapter 6
Coping Strategies for Negative Past and 
Future Outlooks - Part I:
Mindfulness
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6.1 General Introduction
In the foregoing chapters it has been noted that increased negative or reduced 
positive future anticipation are vulnerability factors for depressive disorders (e.g. Beck, 
1967; Macleod et al., 1996). However, it has also been noted that reduced access to 
negative past experiences may inhibit regulatory functions of episodic memory, as 
individuals fail to benefit from the functional quality of ‘learning from mistakes’, or even 
to make use of the prior experience in anticipation of future problems. That is, research 
has shown that lack of specificity in recalling past (negative) events is related to 
avoidance, rumination and impaired problem solving (Williams et al., 2007). This lack of 
contact with personal past content has been shown as a risk factor for major depression 
(Teasdale et al., 2002). As was noted in Chapter 1 (see Section 1.3) common accounts of 
depression, i.e. cognitive theories, have focused on altering negative beliefs and the 
emotional engagement with such beliefs in an effort to reduce symptoms and progression 
of such disorders (for review, see Hollon, Thase, & Markowitz, 2002). And indeed 
support has been noted for such approaches in view of negatively biased reasoning and 
self-regard as risk factors for depression. However, limitations of such treatments have 
been noted with high recurrence rates following cognitive therapies. These shortcomings 
in treatment have led to the emergence of new approaches.
Mindfulness is one of several third wave behaviour and cognitive techniques 
receiving increasing attention in the clinical literature (Kabat-Zinn, 1990). This technique 
focuses on increasing an individual’s willingness to experience distressing thoughts, 
feelings and bodily sensations without altering their content or frequency (Hayes, 
Strosahl & Wilson, 1999). Mindfulness has been described as ‘the awareness that 
emerges through paying attention on purpose, in the present moment and non- 
judgementally to the unfolding o f experience, moment to moment ’ (Kabat-Zinn, 2003, 
p. 145). It involves continuous, clear-sighted attention to ongoing subjective experience 
together with an attitude of acceptance towards that experience (Ortner, Kilner & Zelazo, 
2007). Knowledge of mindfulness meditation has grown exponentially over the past 
thirty years, resulting in scientifically-backed support for mindfulness by researchers in
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diverse fields, including psychology, neuroscience, and philosophy, amongst others 
(Fletcher & Hayes, 2005). The recent development of therapies such as mindfulness- 
based stress reduction (MBSR; Kabat-Zinn, 1990) and mindfulness-based cognitive 
therapy (MBCT; Teasdale, Segal & Williams, 2000) has resulted in medical practitioners 
increasingly encouraging their patients to explore mindfulness meditation practices to 
alleviate a variety of physical and mental ailments.
Acceptance and Commitment Therapy (Hayes, Strosahl & Wilson, 1999) as one 
of the third wave behaviour therapies, employs mindfulness techniques. ACT further 
emphasizes the postulate that thoughts are transitory events and should be accepted as 
such rather than interpreted literally. This endorsement of accepting emotional content, 
even when perceived as negative, is similar to mindfulness as it promotes experiencing 
psychological events in a non-evaluative and non-judging way. ACT emphasizes the 
willingness to experience such events without trying to control, change or suppress them 
(Hayes, 2004). As argued in Chapter 1, attempts to control or suppress unwanted 
thoughts may be counterproductive and result in an increase of such negative thoughts 
(e.g. Wegner, 1994; Wenzlaff & Wegner, 2000). Lynch, Robins, Morse, and MorKrause 
(2001) have shown that avoidance of, or resistance to, emotional content is predictive of 
psychological distress in both clinical and non-clinical populations. Cognitive defusion 
(or defusion) is an ACT based coping strategy for dysfunctional or negative thoughts. 
Defusion involves encouraging people to view their thoughts as just thoughts rather than 
ontological truths. Mindfulness and defusion create cognitive flexibility by re- 
contextualising thoughts, that is, by altering the function of thoughts (i.e. the strength of 
belief in thoughts) (Blackledge, 2007).
In an attempt to construct a measure of mindfulness processes Bishop and
colleagues (2004) focused on two components, that of the current experience, and
curiosity to and acceptance of thoughts (defusion). Lau and colleagues (2006) later added
the concept of ‘intentional self regulation of attention’. Thus, Bishop and Lau and
colleagues set the focus on awareness and acceptance in their evaluation of the
mindfulness process. The Toronto Mindfulness Scale (TMS) (Lau et al., 2006) was
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specifically constructed to assess the processes proposed in this two-component model. 
Therefore, the TMS assesses (1) curiosity (i.e. wanting to learn more about the 
experience) and (2) decentering/defusion (i.e. distancing from thoughts and feelings with 
an increased awareness of current experiences, Lau et al., 2006).
The importance of such awareness and acceptance has been noted in research on 
Autobiographical Memory Specificity (AMS) where it has been found that by use of 
interventions to increase these components the risk of recurrence of depression is reduced 
(Teasdale et al., 2002). These findings have important clinical implications as they 
demonstrate the need for access to negative events, which is functional if the content can 
be experienced without the individual becoming overwhelmed or fused with the 
emotional connotations of such events. A study by Teasdale et al. (2002), focused on 
MBCT as an intervention aimed to increase AMS. This was one of the first studies to 
demonstrate that mindfulness can facilitate changes in decentering. However, this study 
was based on a prolonged treatment program which extended over several weeks. 
However, the effect of mindfulness processes have been demonstrated in experimental 
laboratory studies after inductions as short as ten minutes in length (Roemer & Orsillo, 
2003; Williams, 2008). That is, laboratory studies with untrained meditators have 
compared brief mindful breathing exercises to rumination and distraction, suggesting that 
mindfulness may facilitate recovery from a depressed mood induction (Broderick, 2005). 
Arch and Craske (2006) similarly found participants to demonstrate an increased 
willingness to carry out a stressful task. However, this study did not explicitly examine 
whether mindfulness lead to decentering from private experiences.
The concept of decentering as an outcome of mindfulness based interventions has
gained some focus in recent laboratory studies. Frewen, Evans, Maraj, Dozois, and
Partridge (2008) investigated trait mindfulness by use of a random student sample in
relation to the rate of, and response to, negative thoughts as separate concepts.
Mindfulness was found to facilitate decreased frequency of negative automatic thoughts
as well as higher perceived ability to “let-go” of negative thoughts. However, they did
not include a control group, leaving the question regarding the specific effect of
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mindfulness meditation unanswered. In a related line of research, the TMS has been used 
to assess decentering directly following the practice of mindfulness meditation (Lau 
et al., 2006; Ortner, Kilner, & Zelazo, 2007; Thompson & Waltz, 2007). Although, many 
of the initial studies failed to include control groups, Erisman and Roemer (2010) 
recently included a neutral control condition in comparison with a brief mindfulness 
task, in which the control condition included the solving of a ‘mental puzzle’ or paying 
attention to recordings with educational content. The findings from this study suggested 
that mindfulness facilitated greater decentering as measured by the TMS. The recent 
upsurge in mindfulness based practice calls for an understanding of how increased 
awareness and acceptance operates. Appreciation of the underlying effect may be 
facilitated by examination of the presence of such an effect of improved cognitive 
functioning in healthy samples, prior to inferring and generalizing treatment effects at a 
more clinical level. Due to the exploratory nature of the current thesis, on the relation 
between past and future thinking in depression, it seemed pertinent to examine how this 
relation may be facilitated by the subjective level of awareness of private cognitions.
As has been noted, the subjective discrepancies between explicit and implicit 
cognitions may lead to difficulties in (psychological) functioning; with mood regulation 
strategies and emotional avoidance observed utilised by individuals in order to 
accommodate such conflicting explicit and implicit cognitions which do not adhere with 
ones current self-perspective. The understanding of the basic level of operation in 
relation to increased awareness via mindfulness is particularly relevant in attempts to 
facilitate explicit recognition of more automatic implicit cognitions in order to create 
greater coherence between such processing. Thus, mindfulness may act as a moderator of 
implicit and explicit attitudes in past and future thinking as related to depression. In this 
regard it would be expected that increased awareness of implicit cognitions would lead to 
stronger relations between implicit and explicit beliefs. That is, if automatic cognitions 
are not unconscious per se, the concordance between implicit and explicit cognitions 
would be related to the level of subjective awareness of such implicit cognitions. 
However, if automatic cognitions are exclusively unconscious, such increased awareness
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and introspection would not affect the relationship between explicit and implicitly held 
cognitions. This may have implications for clinical interventions and impact on the 
treatment packages currently offered.
In the previous chapters it has been consistently demonstrated that within healthy 
samples there exists a positivity bias in relation to both past and future cognitions, with 
increased levels of details and expectancy towards such positive experiences in relation 
to more negative events. However, it has also been noted that negative content has a 
functional role within daily living and psychological health. Mindfulness would facilitate 
healthy individuals to contact negative content if required to do so, by want or necessity. 
If mindfulness based approaches are to be applied in this context it is necessary to 
understand how these approaches would operate within healthy samples prior to use in 
clinical settings. That is, the moderating effects need to be established in order to 
understand the basic underlying processes. To this end Experiments 11,12 and 13 aim to 
directly examine the contribution mindfulness based strategies may offer in relation to 
cognitions about the past and future.
6.2 Experiment 11
The rationale of AMS in depression has been demonstrated in several studies (for 
a review, see Van Vreeswijk & de Wilde, 2004; Williams et al., 2007) and is discussed in 
Chapter 1 (see Section 1.4.1.1.1) and Chapter 2 (see Sections 2.1 and 2.2). In short, 
reduced AMS is a contributing factor to depression (Gibbs & Rude, 2004; van Minnen, 
Wessel, Verhaak, & Smeenk, 2005). From an intervention perspective mindfulness-based 
cognitive therapy (MBCT) has been found to increase AMS (Williams, Teasdale, Segal, 
& Soulsby, 2000). MBCT specifically facilitates increased attention to present 
experiences, without judging or analytically processing it (Kabat-Zinn, 1982). MBCT 
consists of weekly training sessions with meditative exercises and group discussions 
pertaining to the individual experiences of these exercises. As part of MBCT individuals 
are encouraged to complete daily 45-min exercises.
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Decentring following mindfulness inductions have been seen to increase 
awareness pertaining to the relative fluctuation of mood states. This increased awareness 
works to challenge depressed mood as everlasting and as a trait feature of the self. 
Watkins et al. (2000) found that participants in a decentring group, relative to a control 
group, recovered more easily from an induced negative mood, and reported shifts in 
perspective concerning mood states. In a reported pilot study Watkins (1999) 
investigated the effect of a decentring induction (Watkins et al., 2000) in regards to AMS 
and found increased AMS in memories recalled by dysphoric participants. However, 
Watkins' (1999) did not follow the standard procedure of the Autobiographical Memory 
Test (AMT; Brittlebank et al. 1993; Williams, 1995) as in the Watkins study participants 
were asked to ruminate on the recalled memory for 8 minutes in order to maximize any 
existing negative thoughts and feelings. The rumination procedure involved directing 
attention to the self, current symptoms, causes, consequences and importance of the 
current mood. As such it may be that the increased AMS resulted from an interaction 
between rumination and decentring rather than as a main effect of decentring per se.
Experiment 11 aims to determine whether a brief Focused Attention task (i.e. a 
mindfulness based technique; adapted from Arch & Craske, 2006) will facilitate 
decentering and influence AMS in a non-clinical population, relative to an Unfocused 
Attention condition. It is expected that the group who receive the Focused Attention 
induction will report greater levels of specificity on the AMS. Specifically, decentering 
in form of experiential awareness should allow for greater contact with negative content, 
relative to that of the Unfocused Attention group. To this end Experiment 11 has two 
main aims, (1) to determine if AMS is improved following a Focused Attention Task 
relative to an Unfocused Attention task, with particular reference to improved specificity 
in recall of negative past events; it is predicted that AMS of past events will differ 
between those who completed the Focused Attention Task and those who completed the 
Unfocused Attention Task. (2) To test if a Focused Attention task has a unique effect on 
experiential awareness as measured by the decentering component of the Toronto 
Mindfulness Scale; it is predicted that decentring scores as measured by the Toronto
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Mindfulness Scale will differ between those who completed the Focused Attention Task 
and those who completed the Unfocused Attention Task.
6.2.1Method
6.2.1.1. Participants
Thirty-Six undergraduate students at Swansea University volunteered to take part 
in this experiment in return for course credits. Following the exclusion criteria pertaining 
to BDI-II scores (see Section 6.2.2.1) data from six participants were left out of the final 
statistical analysis. Of the included thirty participants there were 9 males and 21 females. 
Participant ages ranged from 19 to 25 years, with a mean of 21.03 (a = 1.62) years. All 
participants were undergraduates at Swansea University, with English as their first 
language.
6.2.1.2 Apparatus and Materials
Autobiographical Memory Task (AMT; Williams & Broadbent, 1986; Williams 
et al., 1996). The AMT procedure and stimuli was equivalent to that employed in 
previous experiments (i.e., la, 2a and 10) (see Section 2.2.1.2 for details of presentation 
and Section 2.2.1.3 for AMT procedure). All cue responses were recorded on a 
Dictaphone and inter-rated for consistency in coding. An inter-rater reliability analysis 
using the Kappa statistic was performed to determine consistency among raters. A 
sample of 85% of the responses was rated by a second independent rater, and an inter­
rater reliability of 98% (k = .98) was obtained.
The Toronto Mindfulness Scale (TMS; Lau, Bishop, Segal, Buis, Anderson, 
Carlson, Shapiro, & Carmody, 2006) is a 13-item, two-factor scale assessing the capacity 
to invoke a mindful state immediately following e.g. a meditation or focused breathing 
exercise for which participants must rate their awareness during this time. Items within 
the TMS reflect Bishop, Lau, Shapiro, Carlson, Anderson, Carmody, et al.’s (2004) two-
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component definition of mindfulness: (i) ‘the intentional self-regulation of attention to 
facilitate greater awareness’ and (ii) ‘a quality of attention characterized by curiosity, 
acceptance, and openness to experience’. The items of Factor 1 (Curiosity) reflect 
awareness of the present and an attitude of wanting to learn more about the experience. 
The items of Factor 2 (Decentering) emphasize awareness of the experience rather than 
being ‘carried away’ by thoughts and feelings (Lau et al, 2006, p. 1425). Decentring 
scores thus reflect a change in awareness, by creating some distance to the thoughts and 
feelings the experience is one of a wider awareness. There are 6 questions measuring 
curiosity and 7 questions measuring decentring. Items are rated on a 5 point scale with 0 
being “not at all” and 4 being “very much”. All items are written in a positively keyed 
direction, so no reverse scoring of items is required, with a higher score reflecting higher 
level of mindfulness. There has been limited study of this measure, but preliminary 
evidence suggests that the TMS has adequate internal consistency reliability (Cronbach's 
alpha = .95) and criterion and incremental validity, and there is support for the two-factor 
structure (Lau et al., 2006).
Psychometric and psychological tests. The psychological measures employed in 
previous chapters were completed in the same manner and direction within the current 
study. These included the The Beck Depression Inventory, Second Edition (BDI-II; 
Beck, Steer & Brown, 1996); The Beck Hopelessness Scale (BHS; Beck & Steer, 1988); 
The State Anxiety Inventory (STAI; Spielberger, Gorsuch, & Lushene ,1970; Spielberger 
et al., 1983); The Positive and Negative Affect Schedule (PANAS; Watson, Clark, & 
Tellegen, 1988); The Life Orientation Test -  Revised (LOT-R; Scheier, Carver, & 
Bridges, 1994); The Acceptance and Action Questionnaire-2 (AAQ-2; Bond et al., 
(Submitted); Hayes, Strosahl, et al., 2004) and the Verbal Fluency Control Task (Lezak, 
1976) (see Section 2.2.1.2 for details on each measure).
Experimental groups. Participants were randomly allocated to one of two
experimental groups, Focused Attention and Unfocused Attention. The intervention tasks
(Focused vs. Unfocused Attention) were based on similar interventions used by Arch and
Craske (2006). The aim of the Focused Attention task was for participants to direct their
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attention and awareness to any sensations that they were experiencing in that present 
moment, with particular focus on their breathing. The Unfocused Attention Task served 
as a control task, which had no intended effect apart from a ‘free flow of thoughts’. Both 
pre-experimental tasks included listening to and adhering to instructions presented on a 
recorded tape. The recorded instructions for each induction lasted 15 minutes. The length 
of instructions in each of the tasks was matched in the opening directions with ‘Now 
we’re going to do an exercise for 15 minutes. First, settle into a comfortable sitting 
position ’, and in provision of instructions on what to do if attention fades (e.g. * ‘bring 
your mind back” to the focus of the exercise). A Dictaphone (Olympus VN-2100PC) 
was used in the recording and presentation of the two tasks. The following instructions 
were presented at the start of the recordings:
i) Presented to both groups; Much o f the emotional distress people 
experience is the result o f  thinking about upsetting things that have 
already happened or anticipating negative events that have yet to occur.
ii) Presented only to the Focused Attention group; Distressing emotions 
such as anger, anxiety, guilt and sadness are much easier to bear i f  you 
only focus on the present -  on each moment one at a time. This is an 
exercise to increase your awareness o f the present moment so that you 
can clear away any thoughts about past and future events.
iii) Presented only to the Unfocused Attention group; Distressing 
emotions such as anger, anxiety, guilt and sadness are often brought to 
mind. With this exercise let your mind wander freely amongst thoughts 
about past and future events
Focused Attention. The main recorded instructions for the Focused Attention induction 
were adapted from Arch and Craske (2006) who previously adapted their version from 
the sitting mindfulness meditation exercise used by Kabat-Zinn (1990) in his 
Mindfulness Based Stress Reduction program and subsequently by Segal et al. (2002) in 
Mindfulness Based Cognitive Therapy. The aim of the Focused Attention induction was 
for participants to direct their attention and awareness to whatever sensations they were 
experiencing in the present moment, with a particular focus on the experience of
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breathing. Participants were told “Don’t try to change anything about your breathing,
just notice the air moving in and out o f your body  focus on the actual sensations o f
breath entering and leaving the body. There is no need to think about the breath - just 
experience the sensations o f it....if you notice that your awareness is no longer on your
breath gently bring your awareness back to the sensations o f breathing  Try to
focus all your attention on your breathing... ’ ’
Unfocused Attention. This induction advised participants ‘ ‘Don’t try to focus on 
your thoughts, just let them drift...without hesitation...simply think about whatever comes
to mind Allow yourself to think freely Openly let your thoughts flow. Let your
mind wander freely without trying to focus on anything in particular. ’’ Variants of these 
instructions were repeated every 30-60 seconds for the first 5 minutes, leaving longer 
intervals (i.e. every 1 to 2 minutes) between instructions in the last 10 minutes of the 
exercise, which lasted in total for 15 minutes.
Manipulation check. Following the mindfulness induction, individuals were 
asked to complete a Post Attention Test (PAT), that is, a post-experiment feedback report 
that inquired about their adherence to the recorded induction instructions. Participants 
responded to the question: 7 attempted to follow the induction instructions ’ on a scale 
Likert scale (0-7), 1= very untrue, 4 = feel neutral about it, 7= very true, thus high scores 
reflected higher levels of task adherence.
6.2.1.3 Experimental Overview
The current study used a 2 x 2 mixed design, with Group (Focused Attention,
Unfocused Attention) as the between participant variable and Valence (Positive Memory
Specificity, Negative Memory Specificity) as the within participant variable. All
participants completed the psychometric and wellbeing questionnaires along with the
Verbal Fluency Control Task; this was followed by random assigned to one of two
groups that were differentiated in terms of the instructions they received regarding
completion of a focused or unfocused attention task. All participants subsequently
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completed the Post Attention Test, the Toronto Mindfulness Scale and the 
Autobiographical Memory Test. The experimental sequence is depicted in Figure 41.
6.2.1.4 Ethical Issues
Ethical considerations were adhered to in Experiment 11 by ensuring specific 
measures were put in place in line with the British Psychological Society (2009, 2006) 
guidelines. These were consistent with those outlined previously for Experiment la (see 
Section 2.2.1.4). Minor adjustments were made to facilitate the change in methodologies 
to tailor instructions to the current experiment, with emphasis put on the focused and 
unfocused tasks. No participants reported recalling a traumatic past event during the 
Autobiographical Memory Task. No participants reported a deflated mood or a negative 
emotional response upon departure. At no point during the experiment did any 
participant withdraw from the experiment or express dissatisfaction or distress of any 
kind. Prior to commencement the experiment was approved by the Department of 
Psychology, Swansea University Ethics Committee.
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Participant Sample (N= 36)
i l
Total sample complete Questionnaires (randomised order of 1st presentation between participants) 
BDI-n, STAI, BHS, LOT-R, AAQ-II, PANAS
U
Participants are randomly assigned to complete the Focused Attention Task or the Unfocused
Attention Task
Unfocused Attention (A=15)Focused Attention (N=\5)
Total sample complete the Post Attention Test
Total sample complete the Toronto Mindfulness Scale
Total sample complete Verbal Fluency Control Task 
(randomised 1st presentation of letters F, A, S between participants)
Total sample complete Autobiographical Memory Task and (randomised 1st presentation of 
positive or negative cues between participants)
Post-Experimental/Pre-Analysis BDI-II Group Screening Exclusion Criteria 
Data from participants who scored 0 (N=  4) or >10 (N= 2) on the BDI-II were excluded from
statistical analysis.
Final sample for analysis: N= 30
Figure 41. Overview of the Experimental Sequence for Experiment 11.
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6.2.1.5 Procedure
The experiment took place in a quiet room free from distraction which contained 
only a desk and a chair. All participants completed the psychological measures and the 
Verbal Fluency Control Task prior to commencement of the experimental induction task. 
Participants were randomly allocated to either the Focused or Unfocused Attention task. 
Instructions were provided verbally by the experimenter prior to the induction and 
participants were encouraged to follow and adhere with the instructions presented on the 
tape to their best ability. Care was made to ensure the participants were comfortably 
seated and participants were encouraged to undertake the exercise with their eyes closed, 
so as to free up any distraction. Following the induction participants completed the post 
attention test followed by the Toronto Mindfulness Scale. The Autobiographical Memory 
Task (AMT) subsequently followed and took form as an experimenter led task; with 
participants allocated 60 seconds of recall for each of the 12 cue words (see Section
2.2.1.3 for further details on the AMT procedure), with positive and negatively emotive 
cue words interchangeably presented. At the end of the experiment, participants were 
thanked for participating, and suitably debriefed.
6.2.2 Results and Discussion
As in all previous studies the current study opted to remove any participants with 
a score of 0 (N= 4). Due to the nature of the study, additionally it was also sought here to 
remove any participant data from those displaying depression levels of 10 or above as 
reported on the BDI-II (N  = 2, M  =13.5) in order to more accurately capture a sample of 
non-depressed participants. All the included participants reported a score of 9 or less (M  
= 5.10) on the BDI-II.
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Table 62. Demographics and Psychometric tests results for the Focused and Unfocused groups, presented 
as Mean scores with Standard Deviations (SD) for each group in Experiment 11.
Variable Focused Attention (SD) Unfocused Attention (SD)
Gender: Females (Males) 11(4) 10(5)
Age 21.00 (1.73) 21.06 (1.57)
VFCT 10.47 (4.53) 10.73 (2.88)
BDI-II 5.20 (2.51) 5.00 (2.92)
BHS 5.13 (4.47) 2.93 (2.21)
STAI 30.73 (10.25) 33.06 (6.95)
LOT-R 17.13(2.99) 16.67 (2.31)
AAQ-II 49.40 (7.50) 51.46 (5.26)
PA 27.93 (8.37) 30.86 (7.42)
NA 12.80 (4.72) 14.20 (3.91)
Note. VFCT= Verbal Fluency Control Task; BDI= Beck Depression Inventory; BHS= Beck Hopelessness 
Scale; STAI = State Anxiety Inventory; LOT-R= Life Optimism Test-Revised; AAQ-H= Acceptance and 
Action Questionnaire-H; PA = Positive Affective Scale; NA= Negative Affective Scale.
6.2.2.1 Group Allocation
Preliminary analyses found no difference between groups pertaining to age <28) 
= -.110,/? =.913, verbal fluency t(28) = -.184,/? =.856, nor gender, /2  (1) =. 159,/?=.690. 
Data analyses further indicated no difference between the Focused and Unfocused 
Attention groups on the psychometric measures of STAI, t(28) = -.730, p  =.472, BDI-II, 
<28) = 201,/? = .842, BHS, <28) =1.707,/? =.099 and LOT-R t(28) = .477, p =.637. Nor 
were there any differences pertaining to Mood (PA, <28) =-1.015,/? =.319, NA, <28) =- 
.884, p =.384) or emotional avoidance (AAQ-2; <28) =-.874, p  =.390). The groups were 
thus well matched and the group characteristics can be seen displayed in Table 62.
6.2.2.2 Induction adherence.
The post-experiment attention measure (PAT) found no significant differences 
between groups in response to the statement: 7 attempted to follow the induction 
instructions \ Although participants in the Focused Attention group reported somewhat
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higher levels of adherence (M= 5.73, a =.88) relative to the Unfocused Attention group 
(M= 5.06, a  =1.27) although these were not statistically significant (t(28) =1.66,/?=. 108). 
The overall mean across groups of indicated that participants viewed this statement as a 
‘somewhat true’ (M= 5.40, o = 1.13).
6.2.2.3 Post Induction Mindfulness,
In analysis of the factors pertaining to the TMS a significant difference was found 
between groups with regards to the Decentering component, with the Focused Attention 
group reporting higher levels of awareness (M = 14.13, o =2.97) relative to the 
Unfocused Attention group (M = 11.67, a  = 3.53; t(28)=2.067, /?=.048). However no 
difference was observed between groups for the Curiosity component, in fact the 
Unfocused Attention group were seen to report somewhat higher scores in this direction 
relative to the Focused Attention group (M = 13.06, a = 5.25 and M  = 11.33, a = 4.83 
respectively; p=.355).
6.2.2.4 Autobiographical Memory Test
The first response across the 12 trials, i.e. memories that participants retrieved in 
response to the 12 AMT cue words that were specific, was used to index AMS with 
higher scores indicating increased specificity (see Section 2.2.2.3 for further details on 
the transformation of AMT data; cf. Williams et al., 2006, 2007),.
High positive correlations were seen between the number of specific memories 
produced under each valence category with the total number of specific recall (Focused 
Attention group positive cues, .91, and negative cues .91; Unfocused Attention group, 
positive cues .93 and negative cues .89). On average, retrieved memories for participants 
in the Focused Attention group were specific 78.88% of the time across the 12 trials; 
whereas the Unfocused Attention group showed reduced specificity in retrieval overall 
with 53.88% of the 12 trials noted as specific. Differences in specificity between groups 
were seen for both valence categories with the Focused group retrieving a greater number
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of specific memories relative to the Unfocused group on overall specificity (M = 9.46, o= 
1.92 and M= 6.46, a= 2.55 respectively).
Table 63 presents the AMT performance for both groups and as can be seen both 
groups recalled more positive than negative events, and omissions were rare.
Memory specificity was subjected to a 2 (Group: Focused vs. Unfocused) x 2 
(Cue valence: Positive & Negative) mixed model Analysis of Variance (ANOVA). A 
main effect for Valence specificity was found, F{ 1,28) =10.892,/?=.003, rjp2 = .280, with 
participants being more specific in recall to positive cues overall relative to negative 
cues. A main effect for group was also found, F{1, 28) =13.174,/?=.001, rjp2 =.320, with 
the Focused Attention group being more specific in recall of past events relative to the 
Unfocused Attention group. The Group and Valence interaction was seen to approach 
significance (F(l,28)=3.651 ,/?=.066, rjp2 =.115), with the Focused group more specific 
in recall of negative past experiences relative to the Unfocused group.
Table 63. Autobiographical Memory Test Performance responses presented as Percentage o f Specificity, 
Mean number, with Standard Deviations (SD), o f  Memory Specificity across the six cue words in each 
valence category within the Focused and Unfocused Attention groups in Experiment 11. T-Test score and 
statistical value (p) from between group comparisons are presented.
Variable
Focused
Attention
Unfocused
Attention
Total %  o f specific memories
Mean (SD)
nM(16.01)
Mean (SD) 
53.88 (21.32)
<(28) P
Total % o f omissions 1.14 (2.26) 2.30 (3.63)
Total cues 9.46 (1.92) 6.46 (2.55) 3.630 0.001***
Positive cues 4.86 (1.06) 3.73 (1.27) 2.641 0.013*
Negative cues 4.60 (1.05) 2.73 (1.53) 3.630 0.001***
Note. *p<.05; ***p=.001. Positive/Negative Cues = number o f specific first memories relative to the 
detailed valence category on the Autobiographical Memory Test.
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6.2.2.5 TMS correlations
No correlations were found for AMS and either of the TMS components. 
However, the decentering factor from the TMS was found to positively correlate with the 
pre-experimental AAQ-2 scores (r =.430, p  =.018), with low emotional avoidance 
related to increased decentering reports. The two groups did not differ in regards to their 
pre-induction AAQ-2 scores, perhaps suggesting that the brief Focused Attention task 
facilitated cognitive defusion which facilitated greater specificity in the recall of past 
events.
6.2.3 Summary
Regarding the main aims of Experiment 11 it was found that (1) AMS varied 
following the Focused Attention Task relative to the Unfocused Attention task overall, 
with enhanced specificity in recall of negative past events particularly notable. In regards 
to the second aim it was seen that (2) a brief Focused Attention Task had a distinctive 
effect on experiential awareness as measured by the decentering component of the TMS. 
The current data reveal that implementation of even very brief mindfulness based 
techniques facilitates specificity in retrieval of autobiographical memories, and thus may 
be relevant in relation to overcoming OGM deficiencies. As such, Experiment 11 
replicates findings by Williams et al. (2000) and extends on Heeren, Van Broeck and 
Philippot (2009) with a non-clinical sample, as the data suggest that a short focused 
attention (mindfulness based technique) increases specific and decreases general (i.e., 
extended and categorical) autobiographical memory retrieval. Support is also provided to 
previous suggestions by Roemer and Orsillo (2003) who proposed that focused attention 
may facilitate a change in pre-established relations, by a shift to flexible and intentional 
responding relative to more rehearsed and automatic relations. As such it may be this 
awareness which facilitates a move from automatic to conscious processing and creates 
the space to make the choice of distancing oneself from the content. Roemer and Orsillo 
(2003) sees the complete focus on present-moment experience as the main facilitator of 
flexible responding, which is supported by Hayes, Strosahl and Willson (1999) who have
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argued that a certain level of awareness is required in order to shift environmental 
contingencies, such as rigid rule following. Thus, it is likely that such present moment 
awareness was induced by the Focused Attention task, which likely evoked an active 
choice of approaching the past experiences with an ‘open mind’, a process noted as 
‘relating openly with experience’ (Bishop et al., 2004). Acceptance and mindfulness 
based approaches aim to vary the impact of, and response to, thoughts and feelings 
relative to the content of these. As such these approaches appear particularly effective for 
use in relation to psychological disorders characterized by increased negative affect, as 
intolerance to negative content is related to experiential avoidance. The main findings 
from Experiment 11 are summarised in Table 64.
Table 64. Summary o f Main Aims and Findings from Experiment 11.
Research Aim Hypothesis Main Findings
1 Determine i f  AMS is 
improved following a 
Focused Attention Task 
relative to an Unfocused 
Attention task, with 
particular reference to 
improved specificity in 
recall o f negative past 
events.
AMS of past events will differ 
between those who completed 
the Focused Attention Task 
and those who completed the 
Unfocused Attention Task.
To test i f  a Focused 
Attention Task increases 
experiental awareness, as 
measured by the 
decentering component 
o f the Toronto 
Mindfulness Scale.
Decentring scores as 
measured by the Toronto 
Mindfulness Scale will differ 
between those who completed 
the Focused Attention Task 
and those who completed the 
Unfocused Attention Task.
The hypothesis is supported.
A group difference was found, with the 
Focused Attention group seen to be more 
specific in recall o f past events relative to 
the Unfocused Attention group (p=.001).
A Valence x Group interaction was 
found to approach significance, with the 
Focused Attention group being more 
specific in recall o f negative past 
experiences relative to the Unfocused 
Attention group (p=.066).
The hypothesis is supported.
The Focused Attention group was found 
to report higher levels o f awareness 
relative to the Unfocused Attention group 
(p<.05).
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6.3 Experim ent 12
Experiment 12 aimed to extend on the findings from Experiment 11 by application of the 
focused attention task in a future thinking paradigm. There is currently no literature 
pertaining to mindfulness practice in facilitation of future directed cognition per se. 
However, mindfulness based approaches have been employed in the depression literature 
in relation to reduction of depression related characteristics, one of which is a negative 
future outlook. Experiment 12 has two main aims, (1) to examine if future cognitions, as 
measured by the FTT, with particular reference to increased generation of negative future 
events, will vary following a Focused Attention Task relative to an Unfocused Attention 
Task. It is predicted that future cognitions, as measured by the FTT, will differ between 
those who undertaking the Focused Attention Task and those undertaking the Unfocused 
Attention Task. The second aim is to (2) test if a Focused Attention task has a unique 
effect on experiential awareness as measured by the decentering component of the 
Toronto Mindfulness Scale; it is predicted that decentring scores as measured by the 
Toronto Mindfulness Scale will differ between those who completed the Focused 
Attention Task and those who completed the Unfocused Attention Task.
6.3.1 Method
6.3.1.1. Participants
Thirty-four adults volunteered to take part in this experiment. Following the 
exclusion criteria pertaining to BDI-II scores (see Section 6.3.2.1) data from four 
participants were excluded from the final analysis. Of the included thirty participants 12 
were male and 18 female. Participant ages ranged from 19 to 27 years, with a mean of 
21.76 (a = 2.04) years.
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6.3.1.2 Apparatus and M aterials
All materials and procedures were the same as in Experiment 11 with the 
exception of the AMT and the inclusion of the Future Thinking Task.
The Future Thinking Task (MacLeod et al. 1993; 1997). The FTT procedure and 
stimuli were without exception equivalent to that employed in previous experiments (see 
Section 3.2.1.2 and 3.2.1.3 for details as to the presentation and procedure).
Psychometric and Psychological Tests. The psychological measures employed in 
previous chapters were completed in the same manner and direction within the current 
study. These included the Beck Depression Inventory, Second Edition (BDI-II; Beck, 
Steer & Brown, 1996); The Beck Hopelessness Scale (BHS; Beck & Steer, 1988); The 
State Anxiety Inventory (STAI; Spielberger, Gorsuch, & Lushene ,1970; Spielberger et 
al., 1983); The Positive and Negative Affect Schedule (PANAS; Watson, Clark, & 
Tellegen, 1988); The Life Orientation Test -  Revised (LOT-R; Scheier, Carver, & 
Bridges, 1994); The Acceptance and Action Questionnaire-2 (AAQ-2; Bond et al., 
(Submitted); Hayes, Strosahl, et al., 2004) and the Verbal Fluency Control task (Lezak, 
1976) (see Section 2.2.1.2 for details on each of these measures) and The Toronto 
Mindfulness Scale (see Section 6.2.1.2 for details on this measure).
Experimental Groups. Participants were randomly allocated to one of two 
experimental groups. The groups were exposed to the same induction as described in 
Experiment 11, a Focused Attention Task and an Unfocused Attention Task, based on 
interventions used by Arch and Craske (2006). The aim of the Focused Task was for 
participants to direct their attention and awareness to any sensations that they were 
experiencing in that present moment, with particular focus on their breathing. A 
Dictaphone was used as before in the recording and presentation of the two tasks.
Manipulation check. Following the mindfulness induction, individuals were 
asked to complete a Post Attention Test (PAT), by responding to the question: 7 
attempted to follow the induction instructions ’ by ratings on a scale Likert scale (0-7),
346
where 1= very untrue, 4 = feel neutral about it, 7= very true, thus high scores reflected 
higher levels of task adherence.
6.3.1.3 Experimental Overview
The current study used a 2 x 2 mixed design, with Group (Focused Attention, 
Unfocused Attention) as the between participant variable and Valence (Positive Future 
Cognitions, Negative Future Cognitions) as the within participant variable. All 
participants completed the psychometric and wellbeing questionnaires along with the 
Verbal Fluency Control Task; this was followed by random assigned to one of two 
groups that were differentiated in terms of the instructions they received regarding 
completion of the Focused or Unfocused Attention Task. All participants subsequently 
completed the Post Attention Test, the Toronto Mindfulness Scale and the Future 
Thinking Task. The experimental sequence is depicted in Figure 42.
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Participants are random ly assigned to com plete the Focused A ttention Task or the U nfocused
A ttention Task
U nfocused A ttention (N= 15)Focused A ttention (N= 15)
Total sam ple com plete the Post A ttention Test
Total sam ple com plete the T oronto M indfulness Scale
Participant Sam ple (7V= 34)
Total sam ple com plete Q uestionnaires (random ised order o f  presentation betw een participants) 
B D I-II, STAI, BH S, LO T-R, A A Q -II, PA N A S
Total sam ple com plete Verbal Fluency C ontrol Task 
(random ised 1st presentation o f  letters F, A, S betw een participants)
Step 1: G eneration o f  Positive/N egative future events for next w eek/next year/next 5-10years 
Step 2: L ikelihood rating o f  Positive/N egative future event occurrence.
Step 3: Feeling rating  o f  Positive/N egative future event upon occurrence.
Total sam ple com plete the Future T hinking Task (random ised 1st presentation o f  positive or 
negative future events betw een participants)
Post-E xperim ental/P re-A nalysis BD I-II G roup Screening Exclusion C riteria 
D ata from participants who scored 0 (N =  3) or >10 ( N =  1) on the BD I-II w ere excluded from
statistical analysis.
Final sample for analysis: N=  30
Figure 42. O verview  o f  the Experim ental Sequence for E xperim ent 12.
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6.3.1.4 Ethical Issues
In order to conduct the experiment according to the appropriate ethical guidelines 
as identified by the British Psychological Society (2009, 2006), precautionary measures 
were explicitly employed in Experiment 12. The steps taken were consistent with those 
employed in previous experiments (i.e., Experiment 3, and as outlined in Experiment la 
(see Section 2.2.1.4). The only differences relate to the specific experiment information, 
i.e. the nature of the study and procedural details of Experiment 12 as detailed in the 
written and verbal experimental briefs. A ‘cooling off period of a minimum 24 hours 
was implemented between receiving information about the experiment and participation 
commencement as in the previous experiments. Emphasis was again given in the brief 
and debrief to any psychological distress that may arise following the experimental 
procedures. At no point during the experiment did any participant withdraw from the 
study or express dissatisfaction or distress of any kind. No participants reported 
emotional upset in relation to the future events generated. The experiment was approved 
by the Psychology Department Ethics Committee at Swansea University.
6.3.1.5 Procedure
The experiment was conducted in a quiet room free from distraction which 
contained only a desk, and a chair. All participants completed the psychological 
measures and the Verbal Fluency Control Task prior to the experimental induction task. 
The induction took form as directed in Experiment 11 (see Section 6.2.1.3). Following 
the induction participants immediately completed the post attention test along with the 
Toronto Mindfulness Scale. The Future Thinking Task (FTT) was subsequently 
presented and took form as an experimenter led interview, the FTT procedure is 
described in detail in Experiment 3 (see Section 3.2.1.2) and the present experiment did 
not deviate from these proceedings. Participants were thanked and suitably debriefed on 
completion of all tasks.
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6.3.2. Results and Discussion
6.3.2.1 Group Allocation
As in all previous studies the current study opted to remove any participants with 
a score of 0 (N = 3). Due to the nature of the study, and in conjunction with Experiment 
11, additionally it was also sought to remove any participant data by those displaying 
depression levels of 10 or above as reported on the BDI-II (N = 1, M  = 15) in order to 
more accurately capture a sample of non-depressed participants. All the included 
participants reported a score of 9 or less (M= 5.31) on the BDI-II.
Table 65. Demographics and Psychometric tests results for the Focused ad Unfocused groups mean scores, 
with Standard Deviations (SD), for each group in Experiment 12.
Variable Focused Attention (SD) Unfocused Attention (SD)
Gender: Females (Males) 8(7) 10(5)
Age 21.87 (2.41) 21.66 (1.67)
VFCT 11.51 (3.31) 10.66(2.83)
BDI-II 5.20 (2.27) 4.73 (3.12)
BHS 3.93 (1.98) 2.93 (2.01)
STAI 34.20 (9.95) 29.60 (6.78)
LOT-R 15.20(4.72) 17.33 (3.13)
AAQ-II 48.66 (6.82) 52.13 (5.19)
PA 27.73 (7.17) 31.06(8.51)
NA 15.20 (4.72) 17.33 (3.13)
Note. VFCT= Verbal Fluency Control Task; BDI= Beck Depression Inventory; BHS= Beck Hopelessness 
Scale; STAI = State Anxiety Inventory; LOT-R= Life Optimism Test-Revised; AAQ-II= Acceptance and 
Action Questionnaire-II; PA = Positive Affective Scale; NA= Negative Affective Scale.
Preliminary analyses found no difference between groups pertaining to age 7(28) 
=-.263, p  =.794, verbal fluency 7(28) = .751,/? =.459, nor gender/2 (1) =. 556, p=.456. 
Further analysis indicated no difference between the Focused and Unfocused Attention
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groups on the psychometric measures of anxiety (STAI, 7(28) =-1.480, p  =.150), 
depression (BDI-II, 7(28) = .467,/? = .644), hopelessness (BHS, 7(28) =1.370,/? =.182) 
and optimism (LOT-R 7(28) =1.458,/? =.156). Nor were there any differences pertaining 
to mood (PA 7(28) =1.159,/? =.256, NA 7(28) =-1.141,/? =.264) or Emotional Avoidance 
(AAQ-2; 7(28) =1.566,/? =.129). Both groups’ characteristics are displayed in Table 65 
and as can be seen the groups were well matched.
6.3.2.2 Induction Adherence.
The post-experiment attention measure found no significant differences between 
the two groups in response to adherence to task instructions for the Focused and 
Unfocused inductions, with the majority reporting high agreement with the statement: ‘ 7 
attempted to follow the induction instructions Participants in the Focused Attention 
group reported somewhat higher levels of adherence (M= 5.733, a =.88) relative to the 
Unfocused Attention group (M= 5.133, a =1.06) although this was not found to be 
statistically significant (7(28) =1.684, /?=. 103). The overall mean of 5.43(cr =1.01) 
indicated that participants viewed this statement as ‘ ‘somewhat true. ’'
6.3.2.3 The Future Thinking Task
Analysis of the Future thinking scores were performed following the standards set 
by MacLeod et al. (1998). Table 66 presents the future thinking index scores and results 
from independent T-tests. As can be seen the only significant finding was obtained 
between groups in relation to negative expectancies for the next year, where interestingly 
the Focused Attention group are reporting greater expectancy of such events occurring 
relative to the Unfocused group. Similarly the two groups diverge in regards to 
expectancies for the next 5-10 years, is apparent from the mean scores, though this did 
not result as statistically significant.
6.3.2.4 FTT Index Scores
Analysis of the composite index scores, with a Group (Depression: Low BDI vs.
High BDI) x Valence (Future expectancy: Positive/Negative) x Period (Week, Year, 5-10
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years) mixed model ANOVA, produced three significant effects. There was a significant 
main effect of Valence, with participants showing higher levels of positive relative to 
negative future expectancy (F(l,28) = 63.189, p  < .001, r\p2 =.693), as well as a 
significant main effect of Period, reflecting higher scores for the next 5-10 years vs. the 
next week or the next year (F(2,28) = 13.229, p  <.001, r\p2 =.321). There was also a 
significant interaction effect found for Period x Valence (F(2, 28) = 3.196, p=.048, rip2 
=.102), with more positive and more negative events anticipated for the more distant 
future of 5-10 years time. The interaction effect for Group x Valence was not found to 
be significant (F(l, 29) =.970,p=.333, rip2 =.033), nor was there a main effect for Group 
(F(l, 29) =2.487, p=.126, r\p2 =.082). The three-way interaction involving Group, 
Valence and Period did not approach significance (F(2, 28) =.285,/>=. 753, rjp2=.010).
Thus, the FTT index scores suggest that the Focused and Unfocused groups 
reported similar personal future expectancies, with positive and negative expectancies 
consistently diverging across the three different periods for both groups.
Table 66. Means and Standard Deviations (SD) for Positive and Negative Future Thinking Task Index 
Scores, incorporating Fluency, Likelihood and Feeling Values for each Time Period within the Focused 
and Unfocused Attention groups in Experiment 11. T-Test score and statistical value (p) from between 
group comparisons are presented.
Variable
Focused
Attention
Unfocused
Attention
Positive Responses
Mean (SD) Mean (SD) t(28) P
Next Week 66.60(28.02) 60.30(31.75) 0.576 0.569
Next Year 84.39 (53.70) 57.97 (21.13) 1.773 0.087
Next 5-10 Years 96.63 (44.40) 81.88 (33.09) 1.032 0.311
Negative Responses
Next Week 27.39 (11.06) 29.39 (13.64) -0.443 0.661
Next Year 39.05 (15.19) 28.89 (12.04) 2.030 0.052*
Next 5-10 Years 42.07 (22.06) 33.42 (12.16) 1.330 0.194
Note. *p=.052.
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6.3.2.S FTT Raw Scores
Raw scores for the FTT variables pertaining to number of events generated, 
likelihood values, and feeling ratings were calculated and analysed separately to the 
compiled index score. The individual means for each variable are presented in Table 67.
Fluency was firstly analysed in a Group (Depression: Low BDI/High BDI) x 
Valence (Number of future thoughts (fluency): Positive/Negative) x Period (Week, Year, 
5-10 years) mixed-model ANOVA. A significant main effect was found for Valence, 
F (l, 28) =19.749,/?<.001, rjp2 =.414). A main effect was also found for Period (F(2, 27) 
= 5.722, p=.005, rjp2 =.170). Though no main effect for Group was found (F(l, 28) 
=2.125, p=.156, rjp2 = .071). Nor was any interaction effects observed for Valence x 
Group (F(l,28)=.088, /?= .769, rjp2 =.003), Valence x Period (F(2,28)= 1.903, p=159, 
tjp2 =.064), or Group x Valence x Period (F(2,28)=.145,p=.866, rjp2 =.005).
In regards to the other FTT variables of likelihood and feeling, the statistical 
analyses found no significant results for either variable.
6.3.2.6 Post Induction Mindfulness.
In analysis of the TMS factors a significant difference was found between groups 
with regards to the Decentering component, with the Focused Attention group reporting 
higher levels of awareness (M  = 14.93, o = 3.28) relative to the Unfocused Attention 
group (M=  12.26, o=  3.41; £(28)= 2.181,/?= .038). However no difference was observed 
between the experimental groups for the Curiosity component, £(28) =.038,/?=.970.
Decentering scores were further found to positively correlate with the pre- 
experimental AAQ-2 scores (r=.394,/?=.031). The two groups did not differ in regards to 
their pre-induction AAQ-2 scores, thus it may be inferred that the brief Focused 
Attention task facilitated cognitive defusion which lead to more experiential contact with 
personally relevant content in the construction of personal future events. None of the 
FTT components were found to correlate with neither Decentering nor Curiosity.
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Table 67. Means and Standard Deviations (SD) for Positive and Negative Future Thinking Task Raw 
Scores for Fluency, Likelihood and Feeling Ratings for each Time Period within the Focused and 
Unfocused Attention groups in Experiment 12.
FTT Variable
Focused
Attention
Unfocused
Attention
Mean (SD) Mean (SD)
Positive Responses, Next Week
Fluency (no. of events) 5.46 (2.13) 4.733 (1.75)
Likelihood 4.95 (1.29) 5.14 (1.31)
Feeling 2.59(0.36) 2.46 (0.45)
Positive Responses, Next Year
Fluency (no. of events) 6.60 (2.97) 5.20 (2.04)
Likelihood 5.27 (1.08) 5.08 (1.05)
Feeling 2.37 (0.54) 2.28 (0.44)
Positive Responses, Next 5-10 years
Fluency (no. of events) 6.53 (2.09) 5.80 (1.78)
Likelihood 5.27 (1.08) 5.08 (1.05)
Feeling 2.77 (0.19) 2.74 (0.24)
Negative Responses, Next Week
Fluency (no. of events) 4.93 (1.71) 4.26 (1.38)
Likelihood 3.97 (1.30) 4.20 (0.16)
Feeling \ .51 (0.65) 1.77 (0.74)
Negative Responses, Next Year
Fluency (no. of events) 5.20 (2.07) 4.20 (2.08)
Likelihood 3.58 (0.84) 4.11 (1.28)
Feeling 2.21 (0.40) 1.94 (0.73)
Negative Responses, Next 5-10 years
Fluency (no. of events) 5.27 (2.15) 4.46 (1.59)
Likelihood 3.58 (0.84) 4.11 (1.27)
Feeling 2.29 (0.65) 2.04 (0.71)
6.3.3 Summary
In regards to the main aims set out for Experiment 12 it was found that (1) overall 
there were no significant group difference between the Focused and Unfocused Attention 
induction on the FTT. However, inspection of the FTT index and raw data revealed that 
the Focused Attention group generated more negative events for the future, greater
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expectancy of negative future events occurring and increased levels of negative affect in 
the likelihood of these negative events occurring relative to the Unfocused Attention 
group. However, only one of these differences was found to be statistically significant, 
that is, the combined index score revealed that expectancy of negative events occurring 
in the next year diverged between the two groups. In regards to the second aim (2) it was 
seen that a brief Focused Attention Task was able to facilitate a decentering effect as 
measured by the TMS. Table 68 summarises the main findings from Experiment 12.
Table 68. Summary of Main Aims and Findings from Experiment 12.
Research Aim
1 Examine if future cognitions, as 
measured by the FTT, with 
particular reference to increased 
generation of negative future 
events, will vary following a 
Focused Attention Task relative 
to an Unfocused Attention 
Task.
2 To test if a Focused Attention 
Task increases experiental 
awareness, as measured by the 
decentering component of the 
Toronto Mindfulness Scale.
Hypothesis
Future expectancy, as measured 
by the FTT, will differ between 
those who undertaking the 
Focused Attention Task and 
those undertaking the 
Unfocused Attention Task.
Decentring scores as measured 
by the Toronto Mindfulness 
Scale will differ between those 
who completed the Focused 
Attention Task and those who 
completed the Unfocused 
Attention Task.
Main Findings
The hypothesis is not 
supported.
No significant group 
differences were found.
The hypothesis is supported.
A significant difference was 
found between groups with the 
Focused Attention group 
reporting higher levels of 
awareness relative to the 
Unfocused Attention group 
(p<. 05).
6.4 Experiment 13
Meditation and mindfulness exercises have previously been found to be related to 
improvements in automatic cognitive flexibility (e.g., lower Stroop interference scores) 
in comparison to relaxation and no-treatment conditions (Alexander, Langer, Neman, 
Chandler & Davies, 1989). As such, mindfulness based techniques, for instance a
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focused attention task, may improve awareness of and attention to stimuli. Experiment 13 
sought to examine the implementation of such a mindfulness based techniques, in form 
of a focused attention task, in relation to implicit future thinking as measured using the 
FT-IRAP. To this end Experiment 13 has two main aims (1) to examine if implicit future 
thinking, as measured by the FT-IRAP effect, will vary following a Focused Attention 
Task relative to an Unfocused Attention task. It is predicted that implicit future thinking, 
as measured by the FT-IRAP, will differ for those who undertook the Focused Attention 
Task relative to those who undertook the Unfocused Attention Task. A further aim of 
Experiment 13 is to (2) test if a Focused Attention task has a unique effect on 
experiential awareness as measured by the decentering component of the Toronto 
Mindfulness Scale; it is predicted that decentring scores as measured by the Toronto 
Mindfulness Scale will differ between those who completed the Focused Attention Task 
and those who completed the Unfocused Attention Task.
6.4.1Method 
6.4.1.1. Participants
Thirty-five undergraduate students at Swansea University volunteered to take part 
in this experiment in return for course credits. Following the exclusion criteria pertaining 
to BDI-II scores (see Section 6.4.2.1) seven participants were left out of the final data 
analysis. Of the included twenty-eight participants there were 8 males and 20 females. 
Participant ages ranged from 18 to 29 years, with a mean of 21.14 (er = 2.55) years.
6.4.1.2 Apparatus and Materials
Materials and procedures were the same as in experiment 11 and 12 except with the FT- 
IRAP as the main measure.
356
Future Thinking-IRAP. The FT-IRAP stimuli and procedure was the same as in 
previous chapters (see Section 4.2.1.4 for details pertaining to stimuli presentation, and 
Section 4.2.1.5 for procedure). Positive and negative future expectations were presented 
on a computer screen requiring immediate and accurate responding by the participants. 
With participants responses recorded as time in milliseconds.
Psychometric and psychological tests. The psychological measures employed in 
previous chapters were completed in the same manner and direction within the current 
study. These included the Beck Depression Inventory, Second Edition (BDI-II; Beck, 
Steer & Brown, 1996); The Beck Hopelessness Scale (BHS; Beck & Steer, 1988); The 
State Anxiety Inventory (STAI; Spielberger, Gorsuch, & Lushene ,1970; Spielberger et 
al., 1983); The Positive and Negative Affect Schedule (PANAS; Watson, Clark, & 
Tellegen, 1988); The Life Orientation Test -  Revised (LOT-R; Scheier, Carver, & 
Bridges, 1994); The Acceptance and Action Questionnaire-2 (AAQ-2; Bond et al., 
(Submitted); Hayes, Strosahl, et al., 2004), the Verbal Fluency Control Task (Lezak, 
1976) (see Section 2.2.1.2 for details on each measure) and The Toronto Mindfulness 
Scale (see Section 6.2.1.2 for details).
Experimental groups. Participants were randomly allocated to one of two 
experimental groups, either a Focused Attention Task or an Unfocused Attention Task 
(see Section 6.2.1.2). These inductions were based on interventions used by Arch and 
Craske (2006). The aim of the Focused task was for participants to direct their attention 
and awareness to any sensations that they were experiencing in that present moment, 
with particular focus on their breathing. A Dictaphone was used in the recording and 
presentation of the two tasks.
Manipulation check. Following the mindfulness induction, individuals were 
asked to complete a Post Attention Test (PAT), by responding to the question: 7 
attempted to follow the induction instructions ’ by ratings on a scale Likert scale (0-7), 
where 1= very untrue, 4 = feel neutral about it, 7= very true, thus high scores reflected 
higher levels of task adherence.
6.4.1.3 Experim ental Overview
The current study used a 2 x 2 mixed design, with Group (Focused Attention, 
Unfocused Attention) as the between participant variable and Valence (Implicit Positive 
Future Cognitions, Implicit Negative Future Cognitions) as the within participant 
variable. All participants completed the psychometric and wellbeing questionnaires along 
with the Verbal Fluency Control Task; this was followed by random assigned to one of 
two groups that were differentiated in terms of the instructions they received regarding 
completion of the Focused or Unfocused Attention Task. All participants subsequently 
completed the Post Attention Test, the Toronto Mindfulness Scale and the Implicit 
Future Thinking Task (FT-IRAP). The experimental sequence is depicted in Figure 43.
6.4.1.4 Ethical Issues
In order to conduct the study according to the appropriate ethical guidelines, as 
identified by the British Psychological Society (2009), a number of specific measures 
were put in place. These measures were consistent with those adopted for Experiment 6, 
and as outlined previously for Experiment la (see Section 2.2.1.4). Only minor 
adjustments were necessary in order to facilitate the change in methodologies to tailor 
instructions to the current experiment. Emphasis was put on assuring participants that the 
computer task was not a measure of how quick they were at responding but that the focus 
was on the responses made. This emphasis was made to deter distress related to feelings 
of inept computer skills. At no point during the experiment did any participants withdraw 
from the experiment or express dissatisfaction or distress of any kind. The experiment 
was approved by the Department of Psychology Ethics Committee at Swansea University 
prior to commencement.
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Participants are random ly assigned to complete the Focused Attention Task or the Unfocused
Attention Task
Unfocused Attention (N= 14)Focused Attention (A/=14)
Total sample complete the Post Attention Test
Total sample complete the Toronto Mindfulness Scale
Participant Sample (N= 35)
Total sample complete Verbal Fluency Control Task 
(randomised 1st presentation o f letters F, A, S between participants)
Total sample com plete Questionnaires (randomised order o f 1st presentation between 
participants) BDI-II, STAI, BHS, LOT-R, AAQ-II, PANAS
Total sample com plete the Future Thinking IRAP (randomised presentation o f consistent and 
inconsistent first trials between participants)
Step 2. The 3 test trials commence upon successful completion o f  practice trials.
Step 1. Participants complete a minimum o f 2 practice trials.
Post-Experimental/Pre-Analysis BDI-II Group Screening Exclusion Criteria 
Data from participants who scored 0 (N -  4) or >10 ( N =  3) on the BDI-II were excluded from
statistical analysis.
Final sample for analysis: 7V= 28
Figure 43 . O verview  o f  the E xperim ental Sequence for E xperim ent 13.
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6.4.1.5 Procedure
The experiment was conducted in a quiet room free from distraction which 
contained only a desk, a chair and a personal computer. All participants completed the 
psychological measures and the Verbal Fluency Control Task prior to the experimental 
induction tasks. Participants were presented with verbal instructions regarding the 
induction tasks and were requested to adhere with the instructions presented to the best of 
their abilities (see Section 6.2.1.3 for procedural details). Following the induction 
participants immediately completed the post attention test along with the Toronto 
Mindfulness Scale. Detailed verbal and visual instructions were presented to participants 
prior to the FT-IRAP -  and a minimum of two practice trials were completed prior to the 
testing commencement. Feedback was provided throughout the FT-IRAP trials, 
presented as on screen instructions (see Section 4.2.1.5 for the FT-IRAP procedure). 
Participants had access to the experimenter for any questions that arose. On completion 
of all tasks participants were thanked and suitably debriefed.
6.4.2 Results and Discussion
6.4.2.1 Group Allocation
As in all previous studies the current study opted to remove any participants with 
a score of 0 (N = 4). Due to the nature of the study, and in conjunction with Experiments 
11 and 12, additionally it was also sought to remove any participant data by those 
displaying depression levels of 10 or above as reported on the BDI-II (N=  3, M  =16.67) 
in order to more accurately capture a sample of non-depressed participants. All the 
included participants reported a score of 9 or less (M= 6.85) on the BDI-II.
Preliminary analyses found no difference between groups pertaining to age t(26) 
=.146, p  =.885, verbal fluency t{26) =.788,/? =.438 nor gender/2 (1) =. 700,/?=.403. The 
analyses further indicated no difference between the Focused Attention and Unfocused 
Attention groups on the psychometric measures of anxiety (STAI, t{26) =.739, p  =.106),
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depression (BDI-II, t{26) =.384,p  = .704), hopelessness (BHS, t(26) =.658,p=.5\6) and 
optimism (LOT-R t(26) =-1.031, p=.312). Nor were there any differences pertaining to 
mood (PA t{26) =.460, /?=.649, NA /(26) =1.324, /?=. 197) or Emotional Avoidance 
(AAQ-2; t(26) =.525, p  =.604). The groups’ characteristics are displayed in Table 69 and 
as can be seen the two groups were well matched on all the variables.
Table 69. Demographics and Psychometric test results presented as Means, with Standard Deviations (SD) 
for the Focused and Unfocused Attention groups in Experiment 13.
Variable Focused
Attention
Unfocused
Attention
Gender: Females (Males) 11(3) 9(5)
Age 21.21 (2.86) 21.07 (2.30)
VFCT 11.78 (3.15) 10.90 (2.75)
BDI-II 7.35 (6.93) 6.36 (6.85)
BHS 5.21 (3.16) 4.57(1.83)
STAI 39.92 (8.41) 34.36 (9.20)
LOT-R 13.14 (3.89) 14.50 (3.01)
AAQ-II 50.71 (5.96) 49.71 (3.89)
PA 28.64 (8.36) 27.42 (5.24)
NA 14.85 (4.62) 12.71 (3.91)
Note. VFCT= Verbal Fluency Control Task; BDI= Beck Depression Inventory; BHS= Beck Hopelessness 
Scale; STAI = State Anxiety Inventory; LOT-R= Life Optimism Test-Revised; AAQ-H= Acceptance and 
Action Questionnaire-II; PA = Positive Affective Scale; NA= Negative Affective Scale.
6.4.2.2 Induction adherence.
The post-experiment measure found no significant differences between groups in 
their responses to the statement: 7 attempted to follow the induction instructions The 
overall mean of 5.28 (o =.81) indicates that participants generally viewed this statement 
as ‘ ‘somewhat true. ’ ’
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6.4.2.3 The FT-IRAP
Statistical analyses first involved transforming the individual response latencies 
for each participant using the D irap algorithm. Latency data from the IRAP was 
transformed into the Dirap measure (Dawson et al., 2009) consistent with calculations in 
previous chapters (i.e. an adapted version o f Greenwald, Nosek and Banaji’s (2003) I AT 
D-algorithm) (see Section 4.2.2.2 for details on the transformation o f the DiRAp scores).
No significant difference was found between the two groups in relation to the 
overall Dirap score (f(26) =.288, p=.776), with both groups producing scores 
significantly different from zero in a positive direction (Focused Attention, M  = .21, o = 
0.27; f(13) =2.963, p=.012; Unfocused Attention, M= .18, o  = 0.23; f(13) = 3.059, p  
=.009). Figure 44 provides an illustration o f this finding, and as expected in a healthy 
population both groups are depicted as holding a strong positive bias towards the future.
0.25
0.2
a>
s*eO
5/5 0 15
e  o.i  
0 >
0.05
Positive Future Expectancy
Focused Attention Unfocused Attention
Group Allocation
Negative Future Expectancy
Figure 44. M ean D IRAP scores for the Focused and U nfocused A ttention groups in E xperim ent 13, with 
Standard E rror Bars (S.E). A greater optim istic bias is indicated by larger positive scores, i.e. responding 
m ore quickly w hen affirm ing positive and refuting  negative expectancy than w hen asked to affirm  negative
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a n d  r e f u t e  p o s i t i v e  e x p e c t a n c y  o n  t h e  r e l e v a n t  t r i a l s .  A  p e s s i m i s t i c  b i a s  i n c u r s  t h e  i n v e r s e  r e s p o n d i n g  
p a t t e r n .
6.4.2.4 Participant-type analyses.
In order to explore the effect of the mindful exercise in relation to negative future 
expectancies the FT-IRAP trial types were looked at individually. In responses to the 
consistent FT-IRAP trial types, both groups exhibited an implicit optimistic bias, 
although for the Focused Attention group the D i r a p - p o s  effect was stronger than that of 
the Unfocused Attention group, both were significantly different from zero (p=.004 and 
p =.011 respectively). For the inconsistent FT-IRAP trial types, again both groups showed 
a non-pessimistic bias, though the Unfocused Attention group showed a stronger D i r a p -  
n e g  effect which was significantly different from zero (p=.028). The Focused Attention 
group did not produce a significant D i r a p - n e g  effect (p=.155).
The Dirap trial type scores for each participant were entered into a 2 x 2 mixed 
repeated measures ANOVA, with group (Focused vs. Unfocused Attention) as the 
between-participants variable and IRAP effect-type as the within-participants variable 
( D i r a p -p o s  and D i r a p -n e g ) -
The ANOVA revealed a moderately significant effect for trial type, F (l, 26) 
=3.819, p=.061, rjp2 =.128), with a non-significant interaction (F(l, 26) =1.039, p=.317, 
r\p2 =.038). No main effect for group observed, F (l, 26) =.083, p=. 776, rjp2 =.003).
A split plot analysis looked at the within group effects pertaining to the consistent 
and inconsistent trials; the observed difference in responses these trials, as measured by 
the Dirap-pos and Dirap-neg means, were not found to be significant for the Focused 
(/(13)= 1.788, p  =.097) or the Unfocused Attention groups( f(13)= .841, p  =.415). 
Notably a trend is emerging within the Focused Attention group, demonstrating greater 
differences in responses to the varying trial types. Overall the FT-IRAP indicated 
optimistic biases for both groups with regards to future expectancies. The mean Dirap-pos 
and Dirap-neg scores calculated for both groups are shown in Figure 45.
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6.4.2.5 Post induction mindfulness -  Toronto Mindfulness Scale.
In analysis of the TMS variables a significant between group difference was 
observed with regards to the Decentering component within the TMS; with the Focused 
Attention group reporting higher levels of awareness (M= 16.28, a =2.36) relative to the 
Unfocused Attention group (M = 13.64, o = 4.16; t(26)= 2.065, p=.049). However no 
difference was observed between the experimental groups for the Curiosity component, 
f(28) = 1.121,/?=.273.
Decentering scores were further found to approach significance in correlation 
with the pre-experimental AAQ-2 scores (r=.344, p=.074). Decentering scores were also 
found to positively correlate with the Dirap score, r =.41 \ ,p  =.030. More specifically the 
decentering component correlated positively with the D i r a p - n e g  scores (r=.386,/?=.042), 
whereas D i r a p - p o s  did not show significance (r=.319,/?=.098). There was also a positive 
correlation between curiosity scores and induction adherence, r=.417,/?=.027.
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Figure 45. Mean Positive and Negative D iRAP Trial-Type scores, with Standard Error Bars (S.E) for the 
Focused and Unfocused Attention groups in Experiment 13. Positive D)RAP scores reflect an optimistic bias 
and negative D iRAP scores reflect a pessimistic bias. The zero-point reflects no bias. An optimistic bias for 
positive future expectancy was produced if participants responded more quickly to “I expect-Positive- 
True” and “1 don't expect-Positive-False” than to “I expect- Positive-False” and “I don’t expect-Positive- 
True” (the opposite pattern indicated a pessimistic bias on positive expectancy trials). A pessimistic bias 
for future expectancy was produced if participants responded more quickly to “1 expect-Negative-True” 
and “1 don’t expect-Negative- False” than to “1 expect-Negative-False” and “I don’t expect-Negative- 
True” (the opposite pattern indicated an optimistic bias on negative expectancy trials).
6.4.3 Summary
In relation to the main aims o f Experiment 13(1) the FT-IRAP effect was found 
to be consistent across participants with responses pertaining to an overall optimistic 
future outlook. Although this effect was robust the Focused Attention group revealed 
greater flexibility in responding, with a stronger effect in response to inconsistent FT- 
IRAP trials, although this effect was not statistically significant. (2) It was further seen 
that the brief Focused Attention Task lead to increased awareness as measured by the
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decentering component of the TMS. Table 70 summarises the main findings from
Experiment 13.
Table 70. Summary of Main Aims and Findings from Experiment 13.
Research Aim Hypothesis Main Findings
Examine i f  implicit future 
thinking is altered following a 
Focused Attention Task relative to 
an Unfocused Attention Task.
To test i f  a Focused Attention 
Task increases experiental 
awareness, as measured by the 
decentering component o f  the 
Toronto Mindfulness Scale.
Implicit future cognition as 
measured by the FT-IRAP 
will differ between those 
who undertook the 
Focused Attention Task 
and those who undertook 
the Unfocused Attention 
Task.
Decentring as measured by 
the Toronto Mindfulness 
Scale will differ between 
those who completed the 
Focused Attention Task 
and those who completed 
the Unfocused Attention 
Task.
The hypothesis is not supported.
No significant differences were 
found.
The hypothesis is supported.
A significant between group 
difference was observed with the 
Focused Attention group reporting 
higher levels o f awareness relative 
to the Unfocused Attention group 
(p<. 05).
6.5 General Discussion
Chapter 6 aimed to examine (1) the contribution of mindfulness based strategies
in relation to past and future thinking and to (2) determine if implicit future cognitions
could be targeted in this approach. It was found that (1) increased awareness was related
to improved specificity in recall of past events, with increased AMS in relation to past
negative experiences particularly notable. However, no significant difference was
observed in regards to explicit future thinking as measured by the FTT. (2) Implicit
future thinking responses were found to vary between those who completed the Focused
Attention Task relative to who completed the Unfocused Attention Task, with
participants in the former group found to be more accepting of negative future
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experiences. It was found that (3) a Focused Attention Task had a unique effect on 
awareness, as consistently across the three Experiments (11-13) it was found that 
following the brief Focused Attention Task participants reported increased levels of 
awareness (as measured by the decentering component within the TMS), relative to the 
Unfocused Attention group. The pre-experimental levels of emotional avoidance were 
similar between groups; as such following the induction task participants may have 
experienced defusion from negative connotations. This finding is in line with previous 
research which found that exposure to a brief mindfulness intervention by inexperienced 
participants lead to an increased decentering score relative to participants in an inactive 
control group (Erisman & Roemer, 2010).
In Experiment 11 it was seen that autobiographical memory specificity was 
increased for the Focused Attention group relative to the Unconfused Attention group. 
Recall of negative past events were particularly raised in relation to the previous 
experiments with the AMT (e.g. Experiment la, 2a and 10) in which specificity was seen 
predominantly for positive event recall. Findings with the FTT in Experiment 12 found 
no group differences emerging in regard to future outlook, neither at a combined nor split 
variable level of analysis. The pattern of responses by both groups on the FTT is 
consistent with those of healthy participants and as such in line with the previous 
literature and findings from the control samples (non-depressed groups) utilised in 
Experiments 3 and 9. However, as predicted the Focused Attention group did 
demonstrate an increased level of endorsement for negative future content. Although 
there was only one significant between group differences regarding increased negative 
future events, that it, appears to be linked to defusion provided by the mindfulness task. 
That is, if the Focused group reported high levels of defusion, access to negative content 
was also evident. In Experiment 13 a similar pattern emerged for the FT-IRAP as to that 
observed with the FTT. Specifically, there were no group differences per se, but with the 
Focused Attention group notably responded more flexibly to the negative content. The 
most notable finding from this series of experiments was the increased level of contact 
with negative past and future content, due to defusion from verbal content and
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engagement with the process of the tasks. This has implications for the understanding of 
how negative future cognition is construed and as such how we can reform less 
functional approaches to thinking about the past and future, for instance as a useful 
alternative approach to emotional avoidance.
The current series of experiments found that in relation to past experiences, 
explicit acceptance of negative future events as likely to occur showed some resistance. 
Interestingly, the implicit future thinking task was able to account for such an 
approaching shift more clearly than the explicit future thinking task. This discrepancy 
may be accounted for by two separate arguments. First, due to the nature of the tasks 
being explicit versus implicit, the responses on the FTT may be influenced by the 
elaborative process with participants expressing the socially endorsed positive future 
events rather than openly confirming expectancy of more negative events. Second, the 
FT-IRAP may be more sensitive in detecting the shift towards acceptance of negative 
future events due to the relation between past and future thinking. That is, in Chapter 5 
the AMT and FT-IRAP was found to correlate, and with the finding from Experiment 11 
supporting a mindful shift towards contact with negative past content, it maybe that it is 
this relation which facilitated greater exposure of the effect on the FT-IRAP. As noted in 
Chapter 3, there is recent evidence to suggest that memory may implicitly inform future 
thinking, relative to more explicit activation when individuals consciously attempt to 
recall past information. Implications from this would pertain to the focus on the 
functional role of past experience in informing future thinking and as such for the 
recognition of the influence past content holds on present and future behaviour, implicit 
or otherwise. In this regard acceptance and mindfulness based approaches appear 
particularly relevant.
Overly focusing on negative events as well as avoiding any thoughts about
negative events is linked with psychological ill health. Similarly, it has been reported that
suppressing negative thoughts is related to increased levels of pathology (Wenzlaff &
Bates, 1998). Thus thinking too much about an event is equally as damaging as not
thinking about an event at all. The experimental series reported herein suggests that
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defusion from negative content can be achieved, with increased present awareness of 
such past and future events. This is of particular interest as recent research suggests that 
defusion plays a functional role in adjusting and directing future behaviour, with 
favorable effects of specific cognitive defusion techniques found in several recent 
empirical studies (e.g. Masuda, Hayes, Sackett, & Twohig, 2004; Melia, Roche, & 
Blackledge, 2006; Healy, Bames-Holmes, Bames-Holmes, Wilson, Luciano, & Keogh, 
2006; Keogh & Bames-Holmes, 2006).
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Chapter 7
Coping Strategies for Negative Past and 
Future Outlooks - Part II:
Values Clarification
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7.1 G eneral Introduction
ACT conceptualisations, similarly to the early behavioural conceptualisations, 
view depression in light of the reduced ability to contact positive reinforcers, that is, 
either through a reduction the effectiveness of the reinforcer(s) or as a result of 
withdrawal from activities where positive reinforcement occurs (Zettle & Hayes, 2002; 
Kanter, Busch, Weeks, & Landes, 2008). As such it is considered that in order for 
behaviour to be maintained over time, regular positive reinforcement is needed. Thus, 
values clarification is seen as a crucial process in order to model committed action in 
valued directions. Values clarification can be facilitated through undermining pliance and 
increasing tracking and helps to reveal the specific function of values. Hayes, Bames- 
Holmes & Roche (2001) describe pliance as an individual’s rule following behaviour that 
is reinforced for the sake of rule following. From an RFT perspective, pliance and 
experiential avoidance function somewhat differently. Avoidant reasoning pertains to 
following values that might be under aversive control in the form of experiential 
avoidance, e.g. where individuals follow certain values to avoid certain feelings relating 
to cognitions of guilt or anxiety (Plumb & Hayes, 2008). Pliant ‘valuing’ has the 
potential to lead to positive reinforcement for rule-following, whereas experientially 
avoidant ‘valuing’ behaviour will typically lead to negative reinforcement (or the 
removal of an unpleasant stimulus such as guilt or anxiety). Depressed individuals as 
such are noted as experiencing a lack of reinforcement when engaged in life activities; 
this can bring about the assumption that they do not value those domains. When thoughts 
of personal values arise in depressed individuals they may at times be under aversive 
control. For instance, when ruled by avoidance strategies in an attempt to cope with such 
cognitions. On the contrary, ‘appetitive’ reasons are positively reinforcing reasons for 
values following. That is, individuals follow chosen values based on personal and 
positively reinforcing experiences, such as ‘fun and enjoyment’, and increased positive 
perceptions of a vital life. Importantly appetitive reasoning shuns influence from external 
factors, and is self-fulfilling. As such values following which is appetitive are targeted 
and fostered by ACT processes (Plumb & Hayes, 2008; Hayes et al., 1999).
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In the context of depressive cognitions there are a variety of behaviours which 
may facilitate avoidant engagement of valued activities. Fusion (the opposite of defusion, 
see Section 1.8.1.1) refers to individuals considering thoughts as literal truths, that is, 
when the thought or emotion experienced is considered the reality of the here and now. 
As such fusion plays a significant role in feared outcomes that are believed as likely to 
result from engagement in value-directed behaviour. For example, a depressed individual 
may not complete course assignments because they are fused with the thought of being 
unable to achieve important goals when they are feeling sad, or avoid social gatherings 
for fear of being seen as uninteresting (Plumb & Hayes, 2008; Hayes et al., 1999). Thus, 
behaviour consistent with valued living is reduced, or when present, becomes less 
reinforcing due to fusion with thoughts about the self, worries about the future, 
ruminations about the past, or a lack o f awareness of present moment reinforcers.
Hayes et al. (1999) define values as “verbally desired global life consequences”, 
adding that they can be thought of as “verbally constructed contingencies useful when 
the consequences of actions are remote, subtle, or probabilistic” (p. 206). More recently, 
Wilson has defined values as ‘Freely chosen, verbally constructed consequences 
of ongoing, dynamic, evolving patterns of activity, which establish predominant 
reinforcers for that activity that are intrinsic in engagement in the valued behavioural 
pattern itself’ (Wilson & Dufrene, 2009, p.66; cf. Wilson & Sandoz, 2008). Within 
Acceptance and Commitment Therapy (ACT) values serve as an organisational rubric for 
groups of activities that the client perceives as reinforcing and as enhancing his/her 
quality of life. While values are assumed to be shaped by the learning history of the 
client, the client narrates his/her most important values during the course of treatment, 
subdivided into domains such as intimate and social relationships, spiritual beliefs, and 
career path. Values never refer to specific actions, but rather to overarching, guiding 
aspirations in the client’s life. Accordingly, a value for the intimate relationship domain 
could be something like “having an honest, open, trusting relationship with my partner.” 
More specific actions like “sharing details of my day regularly with my partner” could be 
subsumed under such a value, but would not comprise values in and of themselves. In
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fact (and not surprisingly, given ACT’s behavioural roots), ACT clients must clearly 
delineate specific goals within each value, as well as specific behaviours or sets of 
behaviours likely to achieve those goals. The focus on value-driven behaviour is 
implemented to bring the client’s behaviour increasingly under the control of long-term 
contingencies likely to provide a higher reinforcement ratio for the client. According to 
Hayes, an extensive behavioural literature shows that, “in the absence of verbal 
behaviour, consequences are effective over only a very short time frame: minutes to 
hours at most” (Hayes et al., 1999, p. 206). Essentially, the verbal rules known as values 
put human beings more under the control of desirable long-term consequences.
Previous research has demonstrated that not living in accordance with values (i.e. 
valued living) is associated with increased levels of psychological distress (Wilson et al., 
2008) and depression (Plumb & Hayes, 2008). Michelson, Lee, Orsillo and Roemer 
(2008) found differences in reports of active values between individuals diagnosed with 
general anxiety disorder relative to individuals not diagnosed with any anxiety disorders, 
with the anxious participants reporting less stability in living their values. In a recent 
paper, Hayes, Orsillo and Roemer (2010) targeted values, along with mindfulness, when 
examining the use of ACT for generalized anxiety disorder. Hayes et al. found that 
change in both acceptance and engagement in meaningful activities predicted positive 
outcome of post-treatment status beyond that of change in worry. Support for the benefits 
of engagement with personal values also comes from the chronic pain literature, where, 
for instance, McCracken and Yang (2006) found that reports of pain-related disability 
and anxiety correlated with accounts of success in living personal values. In fact, values 
clarification and engagement has received a lot of support in the area of behavioural 
medicine, with a large amount of the existing research pertaining to chronic pain (e.g. 
Vowles & McCracken, 2008).
In the original ACT text, Hayes et al. (1999) suggested that it may be functional
for individuals to describe and record valued directions and values-consistent goals.
Since this original suggestion several values assessment and treatment tools have been
developed to aid values clarification and the direction of goals related to the values
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process. One measure that is increasingly popular in this regard is the Personal Values 
Questionnaire (Blackledge & Ciarrochi, 2006). The Personal Values Questionnaire 
(PVQ) aims to facilitate contact with values and to evaluate aversive versus appetitive 
control. The PVQ considers valued living across nine values domains: family 
relationships, friendship/social relationships, romantic relationships, work/career, 
educations, recreation, spirituality, community and physical well-being. The PVQ 
facilitates the categorisation of the function behind reported values into three categories: 
social compliance, appetitive control or avoidance.
Hildebrandt et al. (2008) found that specific components of the PVQ, that is, 
pliant and avoidant values reasoning, demonstrated strong predictive power in terms of 
psychological health, specifically poorer psychological health at baseline in a sample of 
teachers and substance abuse counsellors. Plumb and Hayes (2008) similarly reported 
that these same components, pliant and avoidant reasoning, correlated with pre-treatment 
levels of depression. Thus, values clarification and thinking about the past and future on 
face value appear to be intrinsically linked. Therefore, it is surprising that no research to 
date has attempted to demonstrate an empirical link between the two. Chapter 7 aims to 
examine the link between valued living and past and future thinking. Chapter 7 
comprises of three experiments where valued living, as reported on the Personal Values 
Questionnaire (PVQ), is compared to responses on the AMT (Experiment 14), the FTT 
(Experiment 15) and the FT-IRAP (Experiment 16), respectively.
7.2 Experiment 14
Although AMS has not been seen to be directly associated to personal values per 
se, theories pertaining to autobiographical memory have referred to its functional quality 
in informing future directed behaviour (e.g. Williams, 1996). It is likely that reduced 
AMS, in a similar fashion to its link with future thinking, would also be related to 
personal values and behavioural direction on this path, with values direction supported 
by the role of past experiences in personal goals and self-identity. This relationship has
374
been emphasised in the self-memory system model (see Sections 1.4.1.1 and 1.4.1.2) 
proposed by Conway and Pleydell-Pearce (2000). The self-memory model argues that 
access to autobiographical memories may be disrupted if the memories sought are 
unpleasant (i.e. aversive) or in conflict with the person's ideal self-image. Conway and 
Pleydell-Pearce (2000) propose that reduced AMS may be an adaptive behaviour aimed 
at retaining (i.e. avoiding a loss of) confidence in personal goals and identity. Recurring 
avoidance of such aversive memories, have been argued by Williams et al. (2007) as 
consequently leading to a more instinctive and universal (i.e. overgeneral) retrieval style.
Experiment 14 will explore the relationship between Autobiographical Memory 
Specificity (AMS), as measured by the Autobiographical Memory Test, and personal 
values, as measured by the Personal Values Questionnaire (PVQ). Experiment 14 has 
four aims; To examine the role of AMS, in relation to (1) values reasoning (i.e. pliant, 
appetitive and avoidant reasoning), (2) perceived values importance (3) and values 
success. It is predicted that Autobiographical Memory Specificity, will be related to 
values reasoning, values success and values importance. (4) Experiment 14 further aim to 
explore the role of emotional avoidance, as measured by the Acceptance and Action 
Questionnaire (AAQ-II), in relation to values reasoning as measured by the PVQ. It is 
predicted that emotional avoidance will be related to values reasoning.
7.2.1 Method
7.2.1.1 Participants
Thirty-Six undergraduate students at Swansea University volunteered to take part 
in this experiment in return for course credits. Following the exclusion criteria pertaining 
to BDI-II scores (see Section 7.2.2.1) seven participants were left out of the final data 
analysis. Of the included twenty-nine participants there were 17 females and 12 males, 
whose ages ranged from 19 to 24 years, with a mean of 20.24 (p = 1.43).
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7.2.1.2 M aterials and Apparatus
Psychometric Measures. The psychometric and psychological well-being 
measures used were identical to those used in Chapter 2, 3, 4 5 and 6, that is the Beck 
Depression Inventory 2nd version (BDI-II; Beck, Steer & Brown, 1996), The Beck 
Hopelessness Scale (BHS; Beck & Steer, 1988), The State Anxiety Inventory, (STAI-S; 
Spielberger, Gorsuch, & Lushene ,1970; Spielberger et al., 1983), the Life-Orientation 
Scale (LOT-R; Scheier, Carver, & Bridges, 1994), The Acceptance and Action 
Questionaire-2 (AAQ-2; Bond et al., (Submitted); Hayes, Strosahl, et al., 2004), The 
Positive and Negative Affective Scale (PANAS; Watson, Clark, & Tellegen, 1988) and a 
Verbal Fluency Control Task (Lezak, 1976) (for details pertaining to each of these 
measures see Section 2.2.1.2).
The Autobiographical Memory Task. The AMT was identical in stimuli and 
procedure to that used in previous chapters (cf. chapter 2, Section 2.2.1.2 for details on 
its presentation and Section 2.2.1.3 for the AMT procedure).
The Personal Values Questionnaire (PVQ; Blackledge & Ciarrochi, 2006). The 
PVQ was developed by Blackledge and Ciarrochi (2006) and is consistent with the core 
theories of Acceptance and Commitment Therapy (ACT) as it was adapted for use in an 
ACT context. The PVQ was modified from work by Sheldon and colleagues (e.g. 
Sheldon & Kasser, 1995; Sheldon Ryan, Deci & Kasser, 2004) pertaining to the 
assessment of goal content and motives (i.e. the function of goals) and the revised 
version of Sheldon’s goal attainment procedures is as such considered a variation of 
these measures.
The PVQ is a multifaceted measure and as such provides assessment of personal 
values across nine different values areas, i.e. family (1); friendships/social relationships 
(2); couples/romantic relationships (3); work/career (4); education/schooling/personal 
growth/development (5); recreation/leisure (6); spirituality/religion (7); 
community/citizenship (8); health/physical well-being (9). Within each of the nine 
domains the PVQ aims to capture a brief description of the chosen value; that is, each
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values domain requests consideration of the features of the chosen value and respondents 
are asked to note down: i) what is vital in the chosen value; ii) the reason for choosing 
the value; iii) if they have been successful in living consistent with the chosen value, iv) 
how committed they are to that value, v) the importance of that value, and vi) how much 
they would like to improve on living consistent with that value.
Following this, ratings are made on a five-point Likert scales, with the 
respondents indicating how much they agree with statements regarding their reasons for 
endorsing particular values, with 1 being ‘not at all for this reason ’ and 5 being ‘entirely 
for this reason \ The considerations of, and belief in, a particular value may be assessed 
in regards to appetitive, avoidant, and pliant reasons.
Appetitive reasons for valuing. Appetitive, or positively reinforcing, reasons for 
valuing is reported in reply to three questions for each domain. These items include, 
(i)‘doing these things makes my life more vital’, (ii)7 view this value as important, 
whether or not others agree; this value may have been taught to me by others, now it is 
my own heartfelt value ’ and (iii) ‘7 experience fun and enjoyment when engaged in this 
value ’.
Avoidant reasoning is targeted by replies to the statement, 7 would feel ashamed, 
guilty or anxious if  I  didn’t value this ’. This question aims to get at the respondents 
reasons for valuing that might be under aversive control in the form of experiential 
avoidance.
In an effort to obtain levels of Pliant reasoning respondents are asked to rate then- 
level of agreement to the statement, “I  value this because somebody else thinks I  ought to 
or because someone else will like it i f  I  do. I  probably wouldn’t say I  value this i f  I  didn’t 
get some kind o f praise or approval for i f .  This question aims to get at reasons for 
valuing that might be under the control of a particular form of rule-governed behaviour, 
such as pliance. That is, the extent to which someone is behaving under aversive control, 
by following a rule in light of it being reinforced by someone in the respondent’s
environment, rather than the probability of valuing for personally reinforcing reasons.
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Next, participants rate how successful they have been at living each value in the 
past month on a 5-point Likert scale, with 1 indicating 0 -  20% success and 5 indicating 
80-100% success. Respondents subsequently indicate how important the value is to them, 
how committed they are in following this value, and how much they would like to 
improve on the value commitment; with 1 being very low importance, commitment or 
desired improvement and 5 being very high importance, commitment or desired 
improvement. Preliminary examinations have shown good internal consistency among 
the items on the PVQ with encouraging parallel validity (Blackledge, Ciarrochi, Bilich, 
& Heaven, 2007). The PVQ is particularly relevant for use in research, were assessment 
occurs outside of the therapeutic context, as the main purpose of the PVQ is to facilitate 
ACT-consistent contact with values and to assess for aversive versus appetitive control 
(Ciarrochi, Bilich, & Godsell, 2010).
7.2.1.3 Experimental Overview
Experiment 14 used a 2 x 2 mixed participants design, with Beck Depression 
Inventory Scores (Sub-clinically Depressed and Non-Depressed) as the between 
participant variable, and Autobiographical Memory Specificity (Overgeneral, Specific) 
as the as within-participant variable. A correlational design was further employed for 
examination of relationships between the AMT, PVQ and AAQ-II measures. All 
participants received the same instructions and all completed the AMT and the PVQ. All 
participants completed all other measures and questionnaires, i.e., the AAQ-II, the BDI- 
II, the BHS, the LOT-R, the PAN AS and the STAI. Participant data was categorised and 
analysed based on their Beck Depression Inventory responses (see Section 7.2.2.1 for 
group allocations to the Depressed and Non-Depressed groups). Figure 46 summarises 
the experimental sequence utilised for Experiment 14.
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Participant Sample (N= 36)
Total sample complete Verbal Fluency Control Task 
(randomised 1st presentation of letters F, A, S between participants)
Total sample complete Autobiographical Memory Task (randomised Is presentation of 
positive or negative cues between participants)
Total sample complete Questionnaires (randomised order of 1st presentation between 
participants) BDI-H, STAI, BHS, LOT-R, AAQ-II, PANASu
Total sample complete Personal Values Questionnaire
Post-Experimental/Pre-Analysis BDI-II Group Split (see Section 7.2.2.1):
Low BDI-n score (1<10): N= 19 (BDI-II = 0, excluded from analysis, N =  4) 
High BDI-H score (10<30): N= 10 (BDI-H score >29, excluded from analysis, N -  3) 
Final sample for analysis: N =  29
Figure 46. Overview of the Experimental Sequence for Experiment 14.
7.2.1.4 Ethical Issues
Given that recall of negative past events may invoke past traumatic events, induce 
a negative mood or an emotional response the current experiment raised a number of 
ethical considerations. Precautionary measures were taken with all participants in order 
to conduct the experiment within the appropriate ethical guidelines (The British 
Psychological Society, 2009). Thus Experiment 14 followed the same carefully
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considered procedural process as laid out in Experiment la  (see Section 2.2.1.4). No 
participants reported recalling a traumatic past event during the Autobiographical 
Memory Task, nor did any participants report a deflated mood or a negative emotional 
response upon departure. At no point during the experiment did any participant withdraw 
from the experiment or express dissatisfaction or distress of any kind. Prior to 
commencement the experiment was approved by the Department of Psychology, 
Swansea University Ethics Committee.
7.2.1.5 Procedure
The experiment took place in a psychology laboratory consisting of a table and 
chair. Prior to the experimental tasks participants received further information about the 
study and completed a consent form. Participants first completed the Autobiographical 
Memory Task (AMT), which was identical in regards to stimuli and procedure to the 
AMT employed in previous experiments and described in Chapter 2 (see Section
2.2.1.2). After completing the AMT participants were presented with a set of 
psychometric tests along with the Verbal Fluency Control Task and the AAQ-II. These 
were presented in the exact same manner as described in previous chapters (see Section
2.2.1.2). Participants were lastly presented with the Personal Values Questionnaire 
(PVQ). Participants were asked to read the instruction sheet accompanying the PVQ, 
which detailed the Values Domains as ‘areas o f your life you may find important’ (cf. 
Blackledge & Ciarrochi, 2006). Unlimited time was offered to participants for reading 
through these instructions. The experimenter remained present during this time and 
participants were encouraged to ask questions pertaining to the completion of the PVQ. 
Once participants indicated confidence in completing the task at hand the experimenter 
left the room. No time limits were enforced in completion of the PVQ and participants 
were told to take as long as they needed. In an effort to increase truthful values reporting 
participants were reminded that the questionnaire responses were confidential, and that 
all replies would be anonymous in the experimental analysis and write up. It was
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emphasised that participants should write down their own values where indicated, 
described as ‘ways o f living and doing things related to that Values Domain that are very 
important to you Upon completion the participants were thanked and suitably debriefed 
as to the nature of the study.
7.2.2 Results and Discussion
7.2.2.1 Group Allocation
Participants were split based on their depression scores as reported on the BDI-II 
in order to form two experimental groups. The study adhered with the practise utilised in 
the foregoing experiments by excluding data for any participants with a BDI-II score of 0 
(N = 4) or above 29 (N = 3; M =  30.67) in order to more accurately capture samples from 
healthy and sub-clinically depressed participants. The inclusion criteria for the Non- 
Depressed group was a score of 1< 10 as reported on the Beck Depression Inventory, 
thus participants presenting scores of 1-9 (N = 19; M  = 4.11) were allocated to this group, 
whereas inclusion in the sub-clinical Depression group required BDI-II scores of 10 < 30 
(N -  10; M -  16.90; Depressed Group).
7.2.2.2 Demographics and Psychometrics
The Non-Depressed and the Depressed group were found to present diverging 
responses on all of the psychometric measures. The groups reported significantly 
different levels of depression (BDI-II, t i l l )  = -7.571,/? < .001), optimism (LOT-R, t i l l)  
= 6.131,/? < .001), anxiety (STAI, /(27) =- 4.439, /?<. 001% and hopelessness (BHS, ti l l)  
= -3.560,/? = .001). The groups were also significantly different with respect to levels of 
emotional avoidance (AAQ-2, t( ll)  = 4.520,/? <.001). No group differences were seen 
with respect to Verbal fluency {till)  = -.034, p  =.455), age {t i l l )  = -.700, /?=.490) or 
gender {X2{\) =.012, /?=.913), nor for positive (PA, /?=.069) or negative mood (NA, 
/?=.071). The psychometric means are presented with the participant demographics in 
Table 71 depicting the mean differences for each of these variables.
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Table 71. Participant Demographics and Psychological well-being reports presented as Means, with 
Standard Deviations (SD) as reported by the Depressed and Non-Depressed groups in Experiment 14.
Variable Depressed (SD) Non-Depressed (SD)
Gender: Females (Males) 6(4) 11(8)
Age 20.50 (1.26) 21.15 (5.65)
VFCT 12.43 (3.49) 13.12 (4.02)
BDI-II 16.90 (6.75) 4.11 (2.28)
BHS 7.30 (3.30) 4.21 (1.39)
STAI 45.50 (11.61) 30.52 (6.66)
LOT-R 9.90 (1.59) 17.68 (3.81)
AAQ-II 42.50 (6.20) 51.73 (4.66)
PA 28.10 (3.66) 31.10 (4.24)
NA 16.70 (6.23) 13.47 (3.09)
Note. VFCT = Verbal Fluency Control Task; BDI-II= Beck Depression Inventory; BHS= Beck 
Hopelessness Scale; STAI = State Anxiety Inventory; LOT-R= Life Optimism Test-Revised; AAQ-II= 
Acceptance and Action Questionnaire-II; PA = Positive Affective Scale; NA= Negative Affective Scale.
1.2.23 Personal Values Questionnaire
Values Importance. Values importance was examined across all of the nine value 
domains for both the Depressed and the Non-Depressed group. The typical response to 
the question “How Important is this value to you?” was ‘quite important\ though some 
variance was observed between values. For values pertaining to Family Relationships, 
Friendships/Social Relationships, Couples/Romantic Relationships, Education/Personal 
Development (PVQ values domains 1, 2, 3 and 5 respectively), responses were 
consistently high, that is, either noted as ‘quite important ’ or ‘extremely important ’ for 
both groups. Examination of importance for Family Relationships, Friendships/Social 
Relationships, Recreation/Leisure/Sport , Community/Citizenship and Health/Physical 
Well-Being (value domains 1, 2, 6, 8 and 9 respectively) saw the widest range of 
responses, with respondents rating these as ‘not at all important ’ to ‘extremely 
important ’. Examining the level of importance by group showed that the percentage of
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“quite important” and “extremely important” responses across domains did not differ 
much between the Non-Depressed (78.31%) and the Depressed group (70%).
7.2.2.4 Values Success and Values Reasoning Variables
Values success and values reasoning (i.e. pliant, avoidant, or appetitive reasons 
for valuing) were examined for group differences. The appetitive reasoning composite 
variable was created by combining PVQ items 3, 4, and 5 (see Section 7.2.1.2). There 
were differences between the Depressed and Non-Depressed groups in relation to 
appetitive (/(27) = 2.058, p  = .049), avoidant reasoning (t(21) = -2.327, p  = .028) and 
success at living all values (t(27) = 2.850, p  =.008), with the Depressed group presenting 
less appetitive and more avoidant reasoning for values, along with reporting less success 
at living values. No group differences were found for pliant reasoning (/(27) = .777, p  = 
.444) and levels of importance { till)  = .357, p  = .724). Table 72 presents the mean scores 
for both the Depressed and Non-Depressed groups responses to the PVQ variables 
analysed.
7.2.2.5 Correlations between Values, Reasoning, Psychological Variables and the 
AM T
The relationships between psychological symptom variables and values were 
examined by use of Pearsons’ correlations. Avoidant reasoning was seen to correlate 
positively with depression (BDI-II; r =.351, p  =.062), hopelessness (BHS, r =.370, p  
=.048) and anxiety (STAI, r = .459, p  =.012) and negatively with optimism (LOT-R, r = 
-.362, p  =.054). Values success correlated negatively with depression (BDI-II, r = -.404, 
p  =.030) and anxiety (STAI, r = -.484, p  =.008) and positively with optimism (LOT-R; r 
= .445, p  =.016). The less successful respondents were at living their values the more 
likely they were to report higher levels of depression and anxiety. No correlations were 
found with appetitive or pliant reasoning, nor values importance and psychological 
variables. Emotional avoidance, as measured with the AAQ-2, was not found to correlate 
with either of the PVQ variables.
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Table 72. Means and Standard Deviations (SD) for each of the PVQ variables Values Success, Values 
Importance, Pliant-, Avoidant- and Appetitive Reasoning as reported by the Depressed and Non-Depressed 
groups in Experiment 14.
Values Component Group N Mean SD
Success Non-Depressed 19 3.12 0.52
Depressed 10 2.42 0.81
Importance Non-Depressed 19 4.07 0.43
Depressed 10 4.01 0.39
Pliant Reasons Non-Depressed 19 1.62 0.47
Depressed 10 1.48 0.40
Avoidant Reasons Non-Depressed 19 2.01 0.58
Depressed 10 2.62 0.79
Appetitive Reasons Non-Depressed 19 4.03 0.08
Depressed 10 3.74 0.09
7.2.2.6 Lack o f  Success in Living Important Values: Assessing Values Discrepancy
An examination of the discrepancy between values importance and values success 
was conducted. Theoretically of interest was the psychological impact of being less 
successful at living values ranked as especially important, therefore only the positive 
discrepancies were examined. First, success scores were subtracted from importance 
scores. Negative scores on the discrepancy variable were re-coded into zeros, as this 
indicated higher success scores than importance scores (meaning the respondents 
reported being more successful at living less important values). Finally, a total score of 
values discrepancy was calculated across values domains by summing discrepancy in 
each domain.
Significant group differences for the samples were found for the variable “Total 
Values Discrepancy” demonstrating that Depressed participants were more likely to
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report reduced success in living important values (t (27)=-2.720, p  =.011) relative to the 
Non-Depressed sample.
1.2.2.1 Autobiographical Memory Test
The AMT data was collated and assessed following common practice in 
investigations of autobiographical memory specificity (AMS) (see Williams et al., 2006, 
2007), where the first response across the 12 trials, that is, memories that participants 
retrieved in response to the 12 AMT cue words that were specific, was used to index 
AMS (referred to here as memory specificity) with higher scores indicating increased 
specificity (see Section 2.2.2.3 for further discussion on the AMT data transformation).
Moderate to high positive correlations were seen between the number of specific 
memories produced under each valence category with the total number of specific recall 
(Non-Depressed group positive cues, .63, and negative cues .91; Depressed group, 
positive cues .82 and negative cues .86). On average, retrieved memories for participants 
in the Non-Depressed group were specific 83.82% of the time across the 12 trials; 
whereas the Depressed participants showed somewhat reduced specificity in retrieval 
overall with 78% of the 12 trials noted as specific. Differences in specificity were 
predominantly noted for positive cues, with the Non-Depressed group retrieving a greater 
number of specific memories relative to the Depressed group (M  = 5.52, o= .69 and M= 
4.70, <7= 1.05 respectively; t{27) =5.232, p=.017). Both groups generally recalled less 
specific details in recall which was prompted by negative cues, and no significant group 
difference was observed in this domain (t(27)=1.769, p=.088). Table 73 presents the 
AMT performance for both groups and as can be seen omissions were rare.
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Table 73. Autobiographical Memory Test Performance presented as Percentage of Autobiographical 
Memory Specificity, with Mean number and Standard Deviation (SD) of Memory Specificity responses 
across the six cue words in each valence category as reported by the Depressed and Non-Depressed groups 
in Experiment 14. T-Test score and statistical value (p) from between group comparisons are presented.
Variable Non-Depressed Depressed
Total % of specific memories
Mean (SD)
82.82(13.75)
Mean (SD)
78.00 (15.24)
K28) P
Total %  of omissions 1.16(2.16) 2.25 (2.30)
Total cues 10.00 (1.63) 8.30 (1.88) 2.526 0.018*
Positive cues 5.52 (0.69) 4.70 (1.05) 2.532 0.017*
Negative cues 4.47 (1.30) 3.60 (1.17) 1.769 0.088
Note: *p<.05. Positive/Negative Cues = Number of specific first memories relative to the detailed valence 
category on the Autobiographical Memory Test.
Memory specificity was subjected to a 2 (Group: Non-Depressed vs. Depressed) 
x 2 (Cue valence: Positive vs. Negative) mixed model Analysis of Variance (ANOVA). 
A main effect for Valence specificity was found (F(l, 2) =18.695, /K.001, tjp2 =.409) 
with participants in general being more specific in recall to positive cues. A main effect 
for Group was also found, (F(l, 27) =6.382,/?=.018, rjp2 =.191), with the Non-Depressed 
group found to be more specific in recall of events overall, relative to the Depressed 
group. No significant interaction was found, F(l, 27) =.009,/?=.925, rjp2 <.001.
7.2.2.8 Correlations between AM T specificity and Values
The relationship between autobiographical memory specificity (AMS) and values 
was examined across groups. No significant relationship was found for AMS with either 
of the values components neither between nor within groups.
1.2.2.9 Autobiographical Memory Specificity and Values predictability
In a final analysis the AMS scores were dichotomized to indicate whether each 
person’s response was specific (AMS score > 75%) or not specific in cued recall (AMS 
score < 75%), to test this as a theoretically meaningful cut point relating to values 
discrepancy. Participants who were specific in cued recall where marginally more likely
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to report success at living their values (34.5%) than were those whom where less specific 
in recall (20.7%), though this difference was not found to be significant (1, N  = 29) 
=.697,/?=.404).
Table 74. Summary of Main Aims and Findings from Experiment 14.
Research Aim
1 Examine the role of AMS, as 
measured by the AMT, in 
relation to values reasoning 
(i.e. pliant, appetitive and 
avoidant reasoning) as 
measured by the PVQ.
2 Examine the role of AMS, as 
measured by the AMT, in 
relation to perceived values 
importance as measured by 
the PVQ.
3 Examine the role of AMS in 
relation to and values success 
as measured by the PVQ.
4 Examine the relationship 
between emotional avoidance 
and pliant, appetitive and 
avoidant reasoning as 
measured by the PVQ.
Hypothesis
There is a relationship between 
A M S and  use o f  avoidant 
reasoning as measured by the 
PVQ.
There is a relationship between 
A M S and  use o f  pliant reasoning 
as m easured by the PVQ.
There is a relationship between 
A M S and  use o f  appetitive 
reasoning as measured by the 
PVQ.
There is a relationship between 
A M S and  values importance.
There is a relationship between 
A M S and  values success.
There is a relationship between 
emotional avoidance and pliant 
reasoning.
There is a relationship between 
emotional avoidance and  
appetitive reasoning.
There is a relationship between 
emotional avoidance and  
avoidant reasoning.
Main Findings
The hypotheses are not 
supported.
No significant relationship was 
found for AMS with either of 
avoidant, pliant or appetitive 
reasoning neither between nor 
within groups.
The Hypothesis is not supported.
No relationship was found for 
AMS and values importance.
The Hypothesis is not supported.
No relationship was found for 
AMS and values success.
The hypotheses are not 
supported.
No relationship was found for 
emotional avoidance and either 
pliant, avoidant or appetitive 
reasoning.
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7.2.3 Sum m ary
The AMS group difference noted in previous experiments (i.e. la, 2a and 10) was 
again confirmed within the current sample. That is, the Non-Depressed individuals were 
seen to be more specific in recall of past events relative to the Depressed group. In 
relation to the aims of Experiment 14 no relationship was found between AMS and (1) 
values reasoning (i.e. pliant, appetitive and avoidant reasoning), nor (2) perceived values 
importance. In relation to values success it was found that (3) when the AMS scores were 
dichotomised to represent high and low specificity groups, independent of depression 
levels, a trend was seen with the low specificity group reporting less success in valued 
living, although this was not supported by statistical analysis as significant. No 
relationship was found between (4) emotional avoidance with either of the PVQ 
variables. Table 74 summarise the main findings from Experiment 14.
7.3 Experiment 15
Experiment 15 aims to extend on Experiment 14 by examining the relationship 
between future thinking, valued living and sub clinical depression. A withdrawal from 
important areas of life functioning often co-exists with negative future expectations (e.g. 
Plumb & Hayes, 2008; Young, Beck & Weinberger, 1993; Beck, Rush, Shaw, & Emery, 
1979). When someone is experiencing depressive thoughts (e.g., ‘I don’t expect to 
succeed in life’) and takes those thoughts literally (e.g., ‘it is true that I’m a failure’), it 
follows that this person will be less successful at actively engaging in valued living. For 
example, a depressed individual may avoid asking for a promotion at work based in the 
belief that they are not worthy of such an endorsement, or they may leave their degree 
course as they are fused with thoughts telling them that they cannot accomplish anything 
significant when they are feeling sad.
It is important in this context to distinguish between having goals and not 
engaging with goals. Melges and Bowlby (1969) described future hopelessness as a state 
of having goals, but feeling that these goals are unattainable. It was seen by Melges and
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Bowlby, that even when a goal was perceived as inaccessible, individuals were unable to 
‘let go’ of these goals, with the spiraling effect of subsequent goals not being pursued. 
Hadley and MacLeod (2010) recently offered support to Melges and Bowlby’s account, 
as they found that individuals high in hopelessness did hold personal goals for the future, 
but displayed a lack of belief in the likelihood of such events occurring. It was argued 
that this lack of belief is underpinned by a reduction in positive future thinking (Vincent 
et al., 2004). MacLeod and Conway (2007) describe this inability to plan or clarify future 
goals, not as disengagement, rather, these individuals seem to be ‘painfully engaged’ 
with the future.
Experiment 15 aims to examine the relationship between responses on the Future 
Thinking Task (FTT; Macleod et al., 1993; 1996) and personal values, as measured by 
the PVQ, in relation to sub-clinical depression. Experiment 15 has four main aims; i.e. to 
examine the role of positive future thinking, as measured by the FTT, in relation to (1) 
values reasoning (i.e. pliant, appetitive and avoidant reasoning), (2) perceived values 
importance (3) and values success as measured by the PVQ. With precedence in the 
future thinking literature it is predicted there will be a relationship between positive 
future expectancies, depression and success in living values. A further aim is to (4) 
explore the role of emotional avoidance, as measured by the AAQ-II, in relation to values 
reasoning, as measured by the PVQ. It is predicted that there will be a relationship 
between emotional avoidance and values reasoning.
7.3.1 Method
7.3.1.1 Participants
Thirty-five undergraduate students at Swansea University volunteered to take part 
in this experiment in return for course credits. Following the exclusion criteria pertaining 
to BDI-II scores (see Section 7.3.2.1) the data from four participants were left out of the 
final data analysis. Of the included thirty-one participants there were 20 females and 11 
males, whose ages ranged from 19 to 24 years, with a mean of 20.29 (cr = 1.13).
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7.3.1.2 Materials and Apparatus
Psychometric Measures. Participants completed a set of psychometric and 
psychological well-being measures; The psychometric and psychological well-being 
measures used were identical to those used in Chapter 2, 3, 4 5 and 6, that is the Beck 
Depression Inventory 2nd version (BDI-II; Beck, Steer & Brown, 1996), The Beck 
Hopelessness Scale (BHS; Beck & Steer, 1988), The State Anxiety Inventory, (STAI-S; 
Spielberger, Gorsuch, & Lushene ,1970; Spielberger et al., 1983) , the Life-Orientation 
Scale (LOT-R; Scheier, Carver, & Bridges, 1994), The Acceptance and Action 
Questionaire-2 (AAQ-2; Bond et al., (Submitted); Hayes, Strosahl, et al., 2004), The 
Positive and Negative Affective Scale (PANAS; Watson, Clark, & Tellegen, 1988) and a 
Verbal Fluency Control Task (Lezak, 1976) (for details pertaining to each of these 
measures see Section 2.2.1.2).
The Future Thinking Task (FTT) was identical in stimuli and procedure to that 
used in previous chapters (cf. chapter 3, Section 3.2.1.2 for details on its presentation and 
Section 3.2.1.3 for procedure).
The Personal Values Questionnaire (PVQ; Blackledge & Ciarrochi, 2006) was 
again used in the values assessment and the presentation and procedure was exactly the 
same as that of Experiment 14 (see Sections 7.2.1.2 and 7.2.1.3).
7.3.1.3 Experimental Overview
Experiment 15 used a 2 x 2 mixed participants design, with Beck Depression 
Inventory Scores (Sub-clinically Depressed and Non-Depressed) as the between 
participant variable, and Future Thinking (Positive, Negative) as the as within-participant 
variable. A correlational design was further employed for examination of relationships 
between the FTT, PVQ and AAQ-II measures. All participants received the same 
instructions and all completed the FTT and the PVQ. All participants completed all other 
measures and questionnaires, i.e. the Verbal Fluency Control Task, the AAQ-II, the BDI-
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II, the BHS, the LOT-R, the PANAS and the STAI. Participant data was categorised and 
analysed based on their Beck Depression Inventory responses (see Section 7.3.2.1 for 
group allocations to the Depressed and Non-Depressed groups). Figure 47 summarises 
the experimental sequence of Experiment 15.
Participant Sample (N= 35)
Total sample complete Verbal Fluency Control Task 
(randomised I s' presentation of letters F, A, S between participants)
Step 1: Generation o f Positive/Negative future events for next week/next year/next 5-10years 
Step 2: Likelihood rating o f Positive/Negative future event occurrence.
Step 3: Feeling rating o f Positive/Negative future event upon occurrence.
Total sample complete the Future Thinking Task (randomised T1 presentation o f positive or 
negative future events between participants)
Total sample complete Questionnaires (randomised order o f  l sl presentation between 
participants) BDI-II, STAI, BHS, LOT-R, AAQ-II, PANASu
Total sample complete Personal Values Questionnaire
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- j
Post-experimental/Pre-analysis BDI-II group split (see Section 7.3.2.1):
Low BDI-II score (1 <10): N= 17 (BDI-II = 0, excluded from analysis, N =  3)
High BDI-II score (10<30): N= 14 (BDI-II score >29, excluded from analysis, N = 1)
Final sample for analysis: TV = 31
Figure 47. O verview  o f  the Experim ental Sequence for E xperim ent 15.
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7.3.1.4 Ethical Issues
In order to conduct the experiment according to the appropriate ethical guidelines 
as identified by the British Psychological Society (2009), precautionary measures were 
explicitly employed in Experiment 15. The steps taken were consistent with those 
employed in previous experiments (i.e., Experiment 3) and as outlined in Experiment 1 a 
(see Section 2.2.1.4 for full details). The only differences relate to the specific 
experiment information, i.e. the nature and procedural details of Experiment 15 as 
detailed in the written and verbal experimental briefs. A ‘cooling off period of a 
minimum 24 hours was implemented between receiving information about the 
experiment and participation commencement as in the previous experiments. Emphasis 
was again given in the brief and debrief to any psychological distress that may arise 
following the experimental procedures. At no point during the experiment did any 
participant withdraw from the study or express dissatisfaction or distress of any kind. No 
participants reported emotional upset in relation to the future events generated or 
following completion of the PVQ. The experiment was approved by the Psychology 
Department Ethics Committee at Swansea University.
7.3.1.5 Procedure
The experiment took place in a specifically allocated psychology lab, which 
comprised of a small room with a table and chair. Participants received further 
information about the experiment and completed a consent form prior to the experiment 
commencing. Participants firstly completed the Future Thinking Task (FTT), which was 
identical in regards to presentation and procedure as to the FTT tasks employed in 
previous experiments and as described in Chapter 3 (see Section 3.2.1.3). Upon 
completion of the FTT participants were presented with the set of self-report 
psychometric tests along with the Verbal Fluency Control Task and the AAQ-2. The 
completion of self-report questionnaires took form of that reported in previous 
experiments (see Section 2.2.1.3). Participants were lastly presented with the Personal
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Values Questionnaire (PVQ). As in Experiment 14, participants were asked to read the 
instruction sheet accompanying the PVQ (cf. Blackledge & Ciarrochi, 2006) prior to 
commencement of the task. Participants were not confined to any time limitations in this 
task and the experimenter remained present during this time for which participants were 
encouraged to ask any questions they may have pertaining to the completion of the PVQ. 
Once participants indicated confidence in completing the task at hand the experimenter 
left the room. Truthful values reporting was encouraged by ensuring participants that the 
questionnaire responses were confidential, and that all replies would be anonymous in 
the experimental analysis and write up. Emphasis was put on presentation of ‘their own 
values described as ‘ways o f living and doing things related to that Values Domain that 
are very important to you ’. Upon completion of all tasks the participants were thanked 
and suitably debriefed as to the nature of the study.
7.3.2 Results and Discussion
7.3.2.1 Group Allocation
As in Experiment 14 participants were split based on their depression scores 
(BDI-II) in order to form two experimental groups. The study adhered with the practise 
utilised in the foregoing experiments by excluding data for any participants with a BDI-II 
score of 0 (N = 3) or above 29 (N = 1; M  = 30) in order to more accurately capture 
samples from healthy and sub-clinically depressed participants. The inclusion criteria for 
the Non-Depressed group was a score of 1< 10 as reported on the Beck Depression 
Inventory-II, thus participants presenting scores of 1-9 (N = 17; M  = 4.17) were allocated 
to this group, whereas inclusion in the sub-clinical Depression group required BDI-II 
scores of 10 < 30 (N = 14; M=  16; Depressed Group
7.3.2.2 Demographics and Psychometrics
The Non-Depressed and the Depressed samples were seen to differ significantly 
on all the psychometric measures. I.e. the groups differed on depression scores (BDI-II,
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t(29) = -6.834, p  < .001), optimism (LOT-R, t (29) = 4.501, p  < .001), anxiety (STAI, 
£(29) =- 4.589, p<.001), and hopelessness (BHS, t (29) = -3.641, p  = .001). The two 
groups also reported differing levels of emotional avoidance (AAQ-2, t (29) = 6.352, p  
<.001). No group differences were seen with respect to age (t (29) = -1.067, /?=.295), 
gender (X2(\) =.2.203,/?=. 138), or verbal fluency (t (29) = .024,/? = .981). Nor was any 
group differences seen for positive (PA, /?=.150) or negative mood (NA, /?=. 156). The 
psychometric means are presented with the participant demographics in Table 75 
depicting the mean differences for each of these variables.
Table 75. Means and Standard Deviations (SD) o f  Demographics and Psychometric measures as reported 
by the Depressed and Non-Depressed groups in Experiment 15.
Variable Depressed (SD) Non-Depressed (SD)
Gender: Females (Males) 11(3) 9(8)
Age 21.85 (6.44) 20.17 (0.88)
VFCT 10.83 (3.17) 10.86 (3.79)
BDI-II 16.00 (6.64) 4.17 (2.40)
BHS 6.64 (3.12) 3.41 (1.73)
STAI 42.50 (8.08) 31.64 (4.97)
LOT-R 11..57 (3.54) 17.23 (3.43)
AAQ-II 40.64 (7.34) 55.17 (5.38)
PA 26.78 (7.45) 30.47 (6.42)
NA 13.78 (2.45) 12.58 (2.12)
Note. VFCT= Verbal Fluency Control Task; BDI= Beck Depression Inventory; BHS= Beck Hopelessness 
Scale; STAI = State Anxiety Inventory; LOT-R= Life Optimism Test-Revised; AAQ-H= Acceptance and 
Action Questionnaire-!!; PA = Positive Affective Scale; NA= Negative Affective Scale.
7.3.2.3 The Future Thinking Task
Analysis of the Future Thinking Task scores were performed following the 
standards set by MacLeod et al. (1998), with composite index scores calculated for each 
period within in each valence condition, by multiplying the number of responses 
generated in a period by the mean likelihood ratings given for those responses and by the
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mean feelings ratings given for those responses. The composite scores from both groups 
of the overall positive and negative conditions are shown in Table 76.
Table 76. Means and Standard Deviations for Positive and Negative Future Thinking Task Index Scores, 
incorporating Fluency, Likelihood and Feeling ratings for each Time Period as reported by the Depressed 
and Non-Depressed groups in Experiment 15. T-Test score and statistical value (p) from between group 
comparisons are presented.
Variable Non-Depressed Depressed
Positive Responses
Mean (SD) Mean (SD) t(29) P
Next Week 71.24 (20.66) 59.86 (32.06) 1.195 0.242
Next Year 78.28 (23.88) 77.31 (42.61) 0.080 0.937
Next 5-10 Years 53.70 (28.01) 55.12 (42.11) -0.112 0.912
Negative Responses
Next Week 27.95 (12.39) 27.83 (9.98) 0.031 0.976
Next Year 31.12(13.45) 31.51 (17.74) -1.152 0.259
Next 5-10 Years 41.40 (21.04) 40.85 (20.15) 0.073 0.942
7.3.2.4 FTT Index Scores
Analysis of the composite scores with a Group (Depression: Low BDI vs. High 
BDI) x Valence (Future expectancy: Positive/Negative) x Period (Week, Year, 5-10 
years) mixed model ANOVA produced three significant effects. There was a significant 
main effect of Valence, with participants showing higher levels of future positive relative 
to negative expectancy (F(1,29) = 57.154, p < .001, rjp2 =.663), as well as a moderate 
main effect of Period, reflecting higher scores for the next year vs. the next week the next 
5-10 years (F(2,28) = 3.018, p  = .057, rjp2 =.094). There was also a significant 
interaction effect found for Period x Valence (F(2,28)= 1 2 .5 1 9 ,<.001, rjp2 =302), with 
more positive events expected in the next year relative to more negative events 
anticipated for the more distant future of 5-10 years time. The predicted effect of a 
Group x Valence interaction was not found to be significant (F(l, 29) =.448,p=.508, rjp2 
=.015), nor was there a main effect for group (F(l, 29) =.025,p=.875, rjp2 =.001).
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The three-way interaction involving Group, Valence and Period did not approach 
significance (F(2, 28) =.564, p =.572, rjp2 =.019). Thus, the FTT index scores suggest that 
the Depressed and Non-Depressed individuals held similar expectations with regards to 
their subjective future expectancies, with positive and negative expectancies consistently 
diverging across the three different periods for both groups.
7.3.2.5 FTT Raw Scores
Raw scores of number of events generated, likelihood values, and feeling ratings 
were calculated and are presented in Table 77. The same analysis was employed with the 
raw data as for the FTT index scores.
The fluency data was firstly analysed in a Group (Depression: Low BDI-II/High 
BDI-II scores) x Valence (Number of future events (fluency): Positive/Negative ) x 
Period (Week, Year, 5-10 years) mixed-model ANOVA found a significant main effect 
for Valence, F(l, 29)=43.598, p<.001, rjp2 =.601); that is, participants generated 
significantly more positive thoughts for the future relative to events that they were 
worried about. No main effect was found for Period (F(2, 28) = 1.467, p=.239, rjp2 
=.048) nor for Group (F(l, 29) =.109, p=.744, rjp2 = .004). No significant interaction 
effect was observed for Valence x Group (F(2, 28) = 2.072, p= .161, rjp2 =.067). No 
interaction effect was observed between Valence x Period (F(2, 28) =.582, p=.562, rjp2 
=.020) nor was there a three way interaction for Group x Valence x Period (F(2, 68) 
=1.019,p=.367, rjp2 =.034).
The results indicate that the two groups did not diverge in regards to the number 
of future events generated for either valence category.
7.3.2.6 Future Thinking Task measures of Expectancy Likelihood
As with the fluency data, an analysis of variance (ANOVA) was conducted for
the likelihood ratings as an individual variable. A Valence (Events likelihood:
Positive/Negative) x Period (week, year, 5-10 years) x Group (Depression: Low BDI-
II/High BDI-II scores) mixed-model ANOVA found a significant main effect for
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Valence, F (l, 29) =44.554, p<.001, rjp2 =.606); that is, across all time periods 
participants generated significantly more positive expectations for the fiiture relative to 
the events that they were worried about. A significant interaction was seen for Period and 
Group (F(2, 28) =3.148, p=.050, rjp2 =.098). No main effect was found for Period 
(F(l,29)=.919,/?=.404, rjp2 =.031), nor for Group (F(l,29)=. 1.985,/?= .169, rjp2 =.064), 
Further, no interaction effects were seen for Valence and Group (F(l,28)=.650p= .427, 
rjp2 =.022), or Valence and Period (F(2,28)= 2.051,/?= 138, rjp2 =.066). The three way 
interaction of Valence x Period x Group further failed to produce any significant 
interaction effects (F(2, 28) =.106,/?= .900, rjp2 =.004). The results show that expectancy 
as an individual component of the FTT was not able to detect any future expectancy 
differences between the two groups.
7.3.2.7 Future Thinking Task measures o f  Event Affect
The feeling values were explored in a similar fashion to the fluency and 
likelihood data, with an analysis of variance (ANOVA) completed with positive and 
negative future feeling raw scores. A Valence (Feeling: Positive/Negative) x Period 
(week, year, 5-10 years) x Group (Depression: Low BDI-II/High BDI-II scores) mixed- 
model ANOVA found a significant main effect for Valence, F (l, 29) = 64.327, p<.001, 
rjp =.689); that is, across all time periods participants foresaw feeling more positive of 
future events relative to increased negative anticipation relating to events that they were 
not looking forward to. A significant main effect was also found for Period (F(l, 29) 
=11.159, p<.001, rjp =.278) with participants reporting increased levels of affect at the 
time of events occurring in the next 5-10 years vs. the next week and the next year. 
However, no main effect was seen for Group (F(l, 29) =.255,/?= 617, rjp2 =.009). None 
of the interaction effects were significant, Valence and Group (F(2, 28)=. 185, p=.670, 
rjp2 =.006), Valence and Period (F(2,28)=1.056,/?= .354, rjp2 =.035) , nor Period and 
Group (F(2, 28) = .667, p=.517, rjp = .022), nor was there a three way interaction for 
Valence x Period x Group (F(2, 28) =1.674,/?=. 197, rjp2 =.055).
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The raw feeling data as an individual component of the FTT was not able to 
detect any differences between the two groups in relation to anticipated affect.
Table 77. Means and Standard Deviations (SD) for Positive and Negative Future Thinking Task Raw 
Scores for Fluency (number o f events generated), Likelihood and Feeling Ratings for each Time Period as 
reported by the Depressed and Non-Depressed groups in Experiment 15.
Variable Non-Depressed Depressed
Mean (SD) Mean (SD)
Positive Responses, Next Week
Fluency (no. o f  events) 6.12 (2.02) 6.35 (2.79)
Likelihood 5.27 (1.11) 4.61 (1.27)
Feeling 2.15 (0.42) 2.37 (0.59)
Positive Responses, Next Year
Fluency (no. o f  events) 6.11 (1.69) 5.71 (1.77)
Likelihood 5.21 (0.87) 5.24 (1.23)
Feeling 2.51 (0.35) 2.48 (0.38)
Positive Responses, Next 5-10 years
Fluency (no. o f  events) 6.64 (2.23) 6.50 (1.82)
Likelihood 4.94 (0.69) 4.81 (0.86)
Feeling 1.69 (0.61) \.10(0.79)
Negative Responses, Next Week
Fluency (no. o f  events) 4.35 (2.14) 5.14 (1.79)
Likelihood 4.61 (1.61) 3.53 (1.17)
Feeling 1.68 (0.63) 1.65(0.62)
Negative Responses, Next Year
Fluency (no. o f  events) 4.35 (1.96) 5.21 (2.32)
Likelihood 3.81 (1.52) 3.50 (1.32)
Feeling 2.21 (0.62) 2.21 (0.50)
Negative Responses, Next 5-10 years
Fluency (no. o f events) 5.05 (2.35) 4.92 (1.94)
Likelihood 3.83 (1.39) 3.58 (0.89)
Feeling 2.36 (0.61) 2.38 (0.58)
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7.3.2.8 Summary
Overall the FTT data, at split and combined levels of analysis suggests that the 
two groups did not differ in regards to cognitions about future events, with no reported 
difference in the number of events occurring, the likelihood of the events taking place, 
nor feelings pertaining to the anticipated experience of such events occurring.
7.3.2.9 Personal Values Questionnaire
Values Importance. The values domains spirituality/religion and 
community/citizenship (PVQ domains 7 and 8 respectively) were consistently found to 
be rated as not important across the sample. Most participants (75%) did not respond to 
the questions related to these values or incomplete responses were made (25%). Thus 
these values were omitted from further examination and are not included in statistical 
calculations here.
Values importance was examined across the remaining value domains for both 
the Depressed and the Non-Depressed groups. The typical response to the question “How 
Important is this value to you?” was ‘quite important’, though some variance was 
observed between values. For values pertaining to Family Relationships, 
Friendships/Social Relationships, Couples/Romantic Relationships and Work/Career 
(PVQ values 1, 2, 3 and 4 respectively), responses were consistently high, that is, either 
noted as ‘quite important ’ or ‘extremely important’ for the Non-Depressed group. The 
Depressed group were seen to follow the same pattern of responses as the Non- 
Depressed group, with the exception of Work/Career which saw a slightly wider range of 
responses from ‘moderately important’ to ‘extremely important’. The Depressed group 
also rated Health/Weil-Being (values domain 9) as ‘quite important’ or ‘extremely 
important ’. Overall the most common responses were “quite important ” across all the 
inclusive domains, with none of the inclusive value domains considered as ‘not at all 
important
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7.3.2.10 Values Success and Values Reasoning Variables
In subsequent analyses group differences in responses to Values Success and 
Values Reasoning (pliant, avoidant, or appetitive reasons for valuing) were examined. 
The Appetitive Reasoning composite variable was created by combining PVQ items 3, 4, 
and 5 (as described in Section 7.2.1.2). Differences were observed between the 
Depressed and Non-Depressed groups in relation to Appetitive reasoning (t(29) = 2.120, 
p  = .043). No group differences were found for Avoidant (t{29) = -.583, p  = .565) or 
Pliant reasoning {t (29) = -.913,/? =.369), levels of importance (t (29) = .674,p  = .506) or 
success at living all values (t (29) = .232, p  =.819). Mean differences pertaining to values 
reasoning, importance and success are presented in Table 78.
Table 78. Means and Standard Deviations (SD) o f  the participant responses to the PVQ variables o f Values 
Success, Values Importance, Pliant-, Avoidant- and Appetitive Reasoning for the Depressed and Non- 
Depressed groups in Experiment 15.
Values Component Group N Mean SD
Success Non-Depressed 17 3.46 0.88
Depressed 14 3.39 0.59
Importance Non-Depressed 17 4.40 0.44
Depressed 14 4.28 0.52
Pliant Reasons Non-Depressed 17 1.82 1.11
Depressed 14 2.21 1.27
Avoidant Reasons Non-Depressed 17 2.29 0.90
Depressed 14 2.51 1.15
Appetitive Reasons Non-Depressed 17 4.27 0.33
Depressed 14 3.96 0.48
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7.3.2.11 Correlations between PVQ components and Psychological Variables
The relationships between psychological symptom variables and the PVQ 
components were examined and found that Avoidance correlated moderately with 
depression and hopelessness (BDI-II, r = .337, p  =.060, BHS, r = .506, p  =.004 
respectively), thus reports of increased Avoidant reasoning related to higher levels of 
depression and hopelessness. A positive relationship was seen between Pliant reasoning 
and depression (r = .373, p  =.039), hopelessness (r = .563, p  =.001), and anxiety (r = 
.416, p  =.020). Whilst a negative correlation was found for Pliant reasoning and 
optimism (LOT-R, r = -.380, p  =.035). Appetitive reasoning correlated positively with 
emotional avoidance (with higher AAQ-2 scores reflecting lower levels of emotional 
avoidance) (AAQ-2, r = .540, p  =.002) and negatively with anxiety (STAI, r = -.387, p  
=.031). Values Importance and Success did not correlate with any of the psychological 
variables.
7.3.2.12 Lack o f  Success in Living Important Values: Assessing the Values 
Discrepancy
It was of interest to examine the psychological impact of being less successful at 
living values ranked as important. In this regard an examination of the discrepancy 
between values importance and values success was conducted. First, success scores were 
subtracted from importance scores. Negative scores on the discrepancy variable were re­
coded into zeros, as this indicated higher success scores than importance scores (meaning 
respondents were more successful at living less important values). Finally, a total score 
of values discrepancy was calculated across values domains by summing discrepancy in 
each domain. No significant group differences for the sample were found for the variable 
“Total Values Discrepancy” indicating that Depressed and Non-Depressed participants 
reported similar experiences in success at living important values (t (29)= -1.630, p  
=.114).
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7.3.2.13 Correlations between FTT index scores and Values.
In examination of the FTT index score relationship with the values components it 
was seen that Pliant reasoning correlated negatively with both positive (r = -.489, p  
=.005) and negative future thinking index scores (r = -.383, p  =.033). Appetitive 
reasoning correlated positively with the positive index scores (r = .448, p  =.012). 
Avoidant reasoning, values importance and values success was not seen to correlate with 
either of the index scores.
Within group correlations found that pliant reasoning was inversely related to 
positive future thinking within the Non-Depressed group (r = -.579, p  =.015) and with 
negative future thinking within the Depressed group (r = -.611, p  =.020). That is higher 
levels of pliant reasoning were related to less optimistic outlook within the Non- 
Depressed sample, whereas the Depressed sample reported higher levels of pliant 
reasoning with lower levels of negative future expectancies. Appetitive reasoning was 
also found to correlate with positive future thinking within the Non-Depressed sample (r 
= .480, p  =.051). No correlations for appetitive reasoning were seen within the Depressed 
sample. Avoidant reasoning, values importance and values success were not seen to 
correlate with either of the FTT index scores at the split level of analysis.
These results show that future expectancies were related to Pliant reasoning, with 
within group analysis revealing this relationship to be related to reduced negative future 
outlook in the Depressed group and a reduced positive future outlook in the Non- 
Depressed group. Appetitive reasoning was seen to relate to positive future thinking, with 
within group analysis demonstrating that this relationship was only found in the Non- 
Depressed sample, where increased Appetitive reasoning was related to improved 
positive future outlook.
7.3.2.14 Correlations between FTT individual variables and Values
The relationship between raw data from the Future Thinking Task and values was 
examined across groups. Pliant reasoning was seen to correlate positively with both
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positive and negative likelihood ratings from the FTT (Likelihood of Positive Future 
Events, r = .493, p  =.005 and Likelihood of Negative Future Events r = .428, p  =.016 
respectively). Negative correlations were seen for Pliant reasoning and positive feeling 
ratings (r = -.411, p  =.022) along with positive fluency (r = -.525, p  =.002) and negative 
fluency (r = -.556, p  =.001). Appetitive reasoning marginally correlated with positive 
fluency (r = .325, p  =.075). Values importance correlated negatively with negative 
likelihood ratings (r = -.368, p  =.042) and positively with positive feeling ratings (r = 
.520, p  =.003). Values success, similarly to importance, correlated negatively with 
negative likelihood ratings (r = -.342, p  =.060) and positively with positive feelings (r = 
.471, p  =.007). Avoidant reasoning was not found to correlate with any of the FTT 
components.
Looking at the raw data it can be seen that increased expectancy of future events 
occurring (as measured by likelihood scores and independent of valence category) was 
related to Pliant reasoning. Increased Pliant reasoning was related to decreased fluency in 
number of positive and negative events generated. With increased Pliant reasoning also 
seen to relate to a decreased level of affect associated with positive future events. 
Increased likelihood of negative events occurring was seen to be related to ratings of 
decreased Values Importance and decreased Success, with increased reports of positive 
affect pertaining to positive future events seen to relate to increased Values Importance 
and similarly increased Success.
7.3.2.15 Future Thinking and Values Predictability
In a final analysis the FTT index scores were dichotomized, by using a median 
(32.47) cut off point for discrepancy of the index scores in regards to generation of 
Positive and Negative future expectancy. That is the negative future index score was 
subtracted from the positive future index score with the discrepancy variable indicating 
the variance between positive and negative future expectancy. Thus a higher discrepancy 
score reflected a greater overall positive future outlook; In this regard it was possible to 
indicate whether each person’s response was generally of a more (FTT discrepancy score
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> 32.47) or less positive future outlook (FTT discrepancy score < 32.47), and to test this 
as a cut point relating to values discrepancy. Participants who were generally noted by 
higher positive scores were marginally more likely to report success at living their values 
(47.1%) than were those with lower discrepancy sores (42.9%), though this difference 
was not found to be significant (1, N=  31) =.055,/?=.815).
7.3.3 Summary
The FTT data did not detect any differences between the two experimental groups 
pertaining to their reported future outlook. Between group differences were noted in 
relation to appetitive reasoning. In relation to the main aims of Experiment 15 it was seen 
that (1) within the Non-Depressed sample Appetitive reasoning was related to an overall 
optimistic future outlook as seen in correlations between Appetitive reasoning and the 
positive future index score and fluency of positive future events. Values importance (2) 
and success (3) were linked to both positive affect and decreased anticipation of negative 
events occurring. Both groups reported similar levels of successfully living their values. 
(4) Appetitive reasoning was the only PVQ variable which correlated with emotional 
avoidance and found that low emotional avoidance was related to increased reports of 
appetitive reasoning. Table 79 summarises the main findings from Experiment 15.
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Table 79. Summary of Main Aims and Findings from Experiment 15.
Research Aim Hypothesis Main Findings
E x a m in e  th e  r o le  o f  
p o s i t iv e  fu tu r e  th in k in g , 
a s  m e a s u re d  b y  th e  F T T , 
in  re la t io n  to  v a lu e s  
r e a s o n in g  (i.e . p l ia n t ,  
a p p e t i t iv e  a n d  a v o id a n t  
re a s o n in g )  a s  m e a s u re d  
b y  th e  P V Q .
There is a relationship between positive 
future thinking and use o f  pliant 
reasoning as measured by the PVQ.
The hypothesis is supported. A  n e g a t iv e  
re la t io n s h ip  w a s  o b s e rv e d  fo r  p l ia n t  re a s o n in g  
a n d  p o s i t iv e  F T T  in d e x  s c o re s  (p < .0 1 ) ; 
p o s i t iv e  F T T  f lu e n c y  (p < .0 1 ) ;  a n d  p o s it iv e  
F T T  fe e lin g  (p<.05).
A  p o s i t iv e  re la t io n s h ip  w a s  fo u n d  fo r  p o s i t iv e  
F T T  lik e lih o o d  a n d  p l ia n t  re a s o n in g  ( jK .O l) .
There is a relationship between positive 
future thinking and use o f  avoidant 
reasoning as measured by the PVQ.
The hypothesis is not supported. N o  
re la t io n s h ip  w a s  fo u n d  fo r  fu tu r e  e x p e c ta n c y  
a n d  a v o id a n t re a s o n in g .
There is a relationship between positive 
future thinking and use o f  appetitive 
reasoning as measured by the PVQ.
2  E x a m in e  th e  ro le  o f There is a relationship between positive 
p o s i t iv e  fu tu re  c o g n itio n s ,  future cognitions and values importance. 
a s  m e a s u re d  b y  th e  F T T , 
in  re la t io n  to  p e rc e iv e d  
v a lu e s  im p o r ta n c e  as  
m e a s u re d  b y  th e  P V Q .
E x a m in e  th e  r o le  o f  
p o s i t iv e  fu tu re  th in k in g , 
a s  m e a s u re d  b y  th e  F T T , 
in  r e la t io n  to  a n d  v a lu e s  
s u c c e s s ,  a s  m e a s u re d  b y  
th e  P V Q .
E x a m in e  th e  re la t io n s h ip  
b e tw e e n  e m o tio n a l 
a v o id a n c e  a n d  p lia n t,  
a p p e t i t iv e  a n d  a v o id a n t  
r e a s o n in g  a s  m e a s u re d  b y  
th e  P V Q .
There is a relationship between positive 
future cognitions and success in living 
values.
There is a relationship between emotional 
avoidance and pliant reasoning.
There is a relationship between emotional 
avoidance and appetitive reasoning.
There is a relationship between emotional 
avoidance and avoidant reasoning.
The hypothesis is supported. A  p o s i t iv e  
r e la t io n s h ip  w a s  fo u n d  fo r  p o s i t iv e  F T T  in d e x  
s c o re s  a n d  a p p e t i t iv e  r e a s o n in g  (p<.0 5 ).
The hypothesis is not supported.
N o  re la t io n s h ip  w a s  fo u n d  b e tw e e n  p o s it iv e  
fu tu r e  e x p e c ta n c y  a n d  v a lu e s  im p o r ta n c e .
A  p o s i t iv e  re la t io n s h ip  w a s  fo u n d  b e tw e e n  
v a lu e s  im p o r ta n c e  p o s i t iv e  fe e lin g  ra tin g s
(p<.01).
The hypothesis is partially supported.
A  p o s i t iv e  r e la t io n s h ip  w a s  fo u n d  fo r  v a lu e s  
s u c c e s s  a n d  p o s i t iv e  fe e lin g s  (p < .0 1 ) .
The hypothesis is not supported. N o  
re la t io n s h ip  w a s  fo u n d .
The hypothesis is supported. A  p o s i t iv e  
re la t io n s h ip  w a s  fo u n d  fo r  a p p e t i t iv e  
r e a s o n in g  a n d  e m o tio n a l a v o id a n c e  (p < .0 1 ) .
The hypothesis is not supported. N o  
re la t io n s h ip  w a s  fo u n d .
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7.4 Experim ent 16
In Experiment 16 the relationship between the PVQ components is examined in 
regards to implicit future expectancy. Experiment 16 has four main aims, (1) examine the 
role of implicit future thinking, as measured by the FT-IRAP, in relation to values 
reasoning (i.e. pliant, appetitive and avoidant reasoning) as measured by the PVQ; (2) 
perceived values importance (3) and values success. It is predicted that those who 
respond in concurrence to reduced future optimism, as measured by the FT-IRAP effect, 
will report lower levels of values success. A further aim is to (4) examine emotional 
avoidance, as measured by the AAQ-II, in relation to values reasoning.
7.4.1 Method
7.4.1.1 Participants
Thirty-one adults volunteered to participate in Experiment 16, however, 
following the exclusion criteria pertaining to BDI-II scores (see Section 7.4.2.1) the data 
from three participants were left out of the final data analysis. Of the included twenty- 
nine participants 11 were male and 17 female. Participant ages ranged from 19 to 24 
years, with a mean of 20.57 (a = 1.28) years. All participants were undergraduates at 
Swansea University, with English as their first language. Participants were recruited by 
advertisements in the Psychology Department.
7.4.1.2 Materials and Apparatus
The study was conducted in a quiet room free from distraction which contained 
only a desk, a chair, and a Personal Computer, with a 550 MHz processor, a 14-inch 
colour monitor, and a standard computer mouse. All FT-IRAP trial presentations, and 
response recordings, were controlled by a program written in Visual Basic 6.0.
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The Future Thinking-IRAP. The implicit future thinking task was identical in 
stimuli and procedure to that used in previous experiments (cf. Chapter 4, Section 4.2.1.4 
for details on stimuli and instructions).
The Personal Values Questionnaire (PVQ; Blackledge & Ciarrochi, 2006) was 
utilised and presented in the same manner as for Experiments 11 and 12 (see Section
7.2.1.2 for details on presentation and procedure).
Psychometric Measures. The set of self-report psychological measures used were 
the same as utilised throughout all the experiments in Chapter 2, 3, 4 5 and 6, that is the 
Beck Depression Inventory 2nd version (BDI-II; Beck, Steer & Brown, 1996), The Beck 
Hopelessness Scale (BHS; Beck & Steer, 1988), The State Anxiety Inventory, (STAI-S; 
Spielberger, Gorsuch, & Lushene ,1970; Spielberger et al., 1983) , the Life-Orientation 
Scale (LOT-R; Scheier, Carver, & Bridges, 1994), The Acceptance and Action 
Questionaire-2 (AAQ-2; Bond et al., (Submitted); Hayes, Strosahl, et al., 2004), The 
Positive and Negative Affective Scale (PANAS; Watson, Clark, & Tellegen, 1988) and a 
Verbal Fluency Control Task (Lezak, 1976) (see Section 2.2.1.2 for details pertaining to 
each of these measures).
7.4.1.3Experimental Overview
Experiment 16 used a 2 x 2 mixed participants design, with Beck Depression 
Inventory Scores (Sub-clinically Depressed and Non-Depressed) as the between 
participant variable, and Implicit Future Thinking (Positive, Negative) as the as within- 
participant variable. A correlational design was further employed for examination of 
relationships between the FT-IRAP, PVQ and AAQ-II measures. All participants 
received the same instructions and all completed the FT-IRAP and the PVQ. All 
participants completed all other measures and questionnaires, i.e. the Verbal Fluency 
Control Task, the AAQ-II, the BDI-II, the BHS, the LOT-R, the PANAS and the STAI. 
Participant data was categorised and analysed based on their Beck Depression Inventory
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responses (see Section 7.4.2.1 for group allocations to the Depressed and Non-Depressed 
groups). Figure 48 summarises the experimental sequence utilised for Experiment 16.
7.4.1.4 Ethical Issues
In order to conduct the study according to the appropriate ethical guidelines, as 
identified by the British Psychological Society (2009), a number of specific measures 
were put in place. These were consistent with those outlined previously for Experiment 6 
and as outlined in Experiment la  (see Section 2.2.1.4), with only minor adjustments 
necessary to facilitate the change in methodologies to tailor instructions to the current 
experiment. Emphasis was put on assuring participants that the computer task was not a 
measure of how quick they were at responding but that the focus was on the responses 
made. This emphasis was made to deter distress related to feelings of inept computer 
skills. Focus was again given in the brief and debrief to any psychological distress that 
may arise following the experimental procedures. At no point during the experiment did 
any participant withdraw from the study or express dissatisfaction or distress of any kind. 
No participants reported emotional upset in relation to the FT-IRAP task or following 
completion of the PVQ. The experiment was approved by the Psychology Department 
Ethics Committee at Swansea University prior to commencement.
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Participant Sample (N= 31)
Total sample complete the Future Thinking IRAP (randomised presentation of consistent or 
inconsistent first trials between participants)
Step 2. The 3 test trials commence upon successful completion of practice trials.
Step 1. Participants complete a minimum of 2 practice trials.
Total sample complete Verbal Fluency Control Task 
(randomised 1st presentation of letters F, A, S between participants)
It
Total sample complete Questionnaires (randomised order of 1st presentation between 
participants) BDI-II, STAI, BHS, LOT-R, AAQ-II, PANAS
It
Total sample complete Personal Values Questionnaire
Post-Experimental/Pre-Analysis BDI-II Group Split (see Section 7.4.2.1):
Low BDI-II score (1<10): N= 15 (BDI-II score = 0, excluded from analysis, N- 2 )  
High BDI-II score (10<30): V=13 (BDI-II score >29, excluded from analysis, N=  1) 
Final sample for analysis: N=  28
Figure 48. Overview of the Experimental Sequence for Experiment 16.
7.4.1.5 Procedure
Participation took place in a designated psychology laboratory, which comprised 
of a table, chair and portable personal computer. The participants received further 
information about the study, were offered the opportunity to ask questions and completed 
a consent form prior to commencement of the experimental tasks. Participants firstly
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completed the FT-IRAP, which was identical in regards to stimuli and procedure to the 
FT-IRAP employed in previous chapters (cf. Section 4.2.1.5). After completion of the 
FT-IRAP, the Verbal Fluency Control Task followed (see Section 2.2.1.3 for details on 
the Verbal Fluency Control Task) after which participants were subsequently presented 
with the set of self-report psychometric tests along with the AAQ-2. The self-report 
measures were presented in the exact same manner as described in previous chapters (see 
Section 2.2.1.3). Participants were lastly presented with the Personal Values 
Questionnaire (PVQ). As in the foregoing experiments participants were asked to read 
the instruction sheet accompanying the PVQ (cf. Blackledge & Ciarrochi, 2006). 
Unlimited time was offered to participants for reading through these instructions and the 
experimenter remained present during this time and encouraged participants to ask 
questions pertaining to the completion of the PVQ. Once participants indicated 
confidence in completion of the task at hand the experimenter left the room. Participants 
were given unrestricted time to complete the questionnaire and were told to take as long 
as they needed. In an effort to increase truthful values reporting participants were 
reminded that the questionnaire responses were confidential, and that all replies would be 
anonymous in the experimental analysis and write up. It was emphasised that participants 
should write down ‘their own value’s where indicated; this was described in the PVQ 
instructions as ‘ways o f living and doing things related to that Values Domain that are 
very important to you’. Upon completion of all tasks participants were thanked and 
suitably debriefed as to the nature of the study.
7.4.2 Results and Discussion
7.4.2.1 Group Allocation
Participants were categorised based on their depression scores as measured by the 
BDI-II in order to form two experimental groups. In line with the previous experiments 
participants with a BDI-II score of 0 (N= 2) or above 29 (N= 1, M  = 31) where excluded 
from the analysis. The inclusion criteria for the No-Depression group was a score of 1<
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10 as reported on the Beck Depression Inventory, thus participants presenting scores of 
1-9 (N= 15; M  — 4.86) were allocated to this group, whereas inclusion in the sub-clinical 
depression group required BDI-II scores of > 10 < 30 (N = 13; M  = 14; Depressed 
Group) (cf. Chapter 2, Section 2.2.2.1 for details on the inclusion criteria).
7.4.2.2 Demographics and Psychometrics
The groups were found to differ in their responses on depression scores (BDI-II, t 
(26) = -7.48, p  < .001), optimism (LOT-R, t (26) = 6.24, p  < .001), anxiety (STAI, 7(26) 
=- -2.316, p=.028\ and hopelessness (BHS, t (26) = -3.04, p  = .005). The groups also 
reported significantly different levels of emotional avoidance (AAQ, t (26) = 3.92, p  
<.001). No group differences were seen with respect to age (t (26) = .124, /?=.903) or 
gender (X2(l) =2.673, p=AQ2), nor for positive (PA, p=A32) or negative mood (NA, 
p=.598). The psychometric means are presented with the participant demographics in 
Table 80 depicting the mean differences for each of these variables.
Table 80. Means and Standard Deviations (SD) of Demographics and Psychometric reports for the 
Depressed and Non-Depressed groups in Experiment 16.
Variable Depressed (SD) Non-Depressed (SD)
Gender: Females (Males) 10(3) 7(8)
Age 20.54 (1.33) 20.60 (1.29)
VFCT 11.13 (3.28) 12.38 (3.28)
BDI-II 14.00 (4.00) 4.86 (2.35)
BHS 5.46 (2.36) 3.06(1.79)
STAI 39.76 (8.49) 32.26 (8.58)
LOT-R 11.53 (2.84) 17.67 (2.35)
AAQ-II 43.23 (8.30) 53.20 (4.94)
PA 28.00 (7.32) 32.20 (6.98)
NA 15.31 (6.54) 14.13 (5.08)
Note. VFCT= Verbal Fluency Control Task; BDI-II= Beck Depression Inventory; BHS= Beck 
Hopelessness Scale; STAI = State Anxiety Inventory; LOT-R= Life Optimism Test-Revised; AAQ-II= 
Acceptance and Action Questionnaire-II; PA = Positive Affective Scale; NA= Negative Affective Scale.
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7.4.2.3 The Future Thinking Implicit Relational Assessment Procedure
Statistical analyses first involved transforming the individual response latencies 
for each participant using the Dirap algorithm consistent with calculations in previous 
chapters (i.e. an adapted version of Greenwald, Nosek & Banaji’s (2003) IAT D- 
algorithm) (see Section 4.2.1.4 for details on the transformation of Dirap scores).
The two groups were found to differ significantly in relation to the overall Dirap 
score fr(26)=2.566, p=.016), with the Non-Depressed group producing scores 
significantly different from zero in a positive direction (M= .24, a= 0.25; /(14)=3.633, 
p=.003), whereas the Depressed group presented a rather ambivalent response pattern, 
with no significant difference from zero, though a leaning towards a negative bias was 
apparent (M= -.01, a = 0.26; t{\2)=-. 194, p=.849). Figure 49 provides an illustration of 
the Dirap scores for each group, and as can be seen the Non-Depressed group holds a 
strong positive bias towards the future whereas the Depressed individuals are showing a 
trend towards a negative bias.
7.4.2.4 Participant-type analyses.
The Dirap scores for each participant were entered into a 2 x 2 mixed repeated 
measures ANOVA, with group (Non-Depressed vs. Depressed) as the between- 
participants variable and FT-IRAP effect-type as the within-participants variable ( D i r a p - 
p o s  a n d  D ir a p -n e g )-
The ANOVA revealed a significant main effect for group, F (l, 26) = 4.249, p —. 049, rjp2 
=.140), and a moderately significant effect for the IRAP trial type, F (l, 26) = 3.592, 
/?=.069, rjp2 =.121), with a non-significant interaction CF(1, 26) =.013, p=.908, r\p2 = 
.001).
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0.4
0.3
Positive Future Expectancy
Non-Depressed Depi essed
- 0.1
Participant Group Negative Future Expectancy
- 0.2
Figure 49. M ean D iRAP scores for the D epressed and N on-D epressed groups in E xperim ent 16, with 
S tandard E rror Bars (S .E). G reater positive future expectancy is indicated by larger positive scores, i.e. 
responding m ore quickly w hen accepting positive and denying negative experiences than w hen asked to 
accept negative and deny positive expectancy on the relevant trials. G reater negative future expectancy 
incurs the inverse responding pattern.
Two one-sample * tests indicated that the optimistic Dirap effect for the Non- 
Depressed group differed significantly from zero: D |RAp-pos, /(14) = 3.795, p  = .002;
whereas the pessimistic DiRAp effect only approached significance, DiRAp.neg, *(14) = 
1.938,/? =.073. For the Depressed group, however, no significance was found with either 
effect ( D i r A p . p o s , *(12) = .933, p  = .369; D i r A p -n e g ,  *(12) = -.456, p  =.657). Overall the 
FT-IRAP indicated a positive future outlook for the Non-Depressed group that differed 
significantly from the Depressed groups more negative future outlook.
The mean D i r A p - p o s  and D i r A p -n e g  scores calculated for both groups are shown in 
Figure 50. For the positive future trial type, both groups exhibited an implicit positive 
bias, although for the Non-Depressed participants the DiRAp effect was much stronger
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than that of the Depressed group. For the negative future trial type, the Non-Depressed 
group showed a no negative bias and the Depressed group showed a small negative 
outlook effect.
0.5 Djrap Trial Type Scores
0.4
' IRAP
■ Non-Depressed
■ Depressed
Negative Future Expectancy
Positive Future Expectancy
F T -IR A P  T ria l T yp e
- 0.2
Figure 50. Mean Positive and Negative D|RAP Trial-Type scores, with Standard Error Bars (S.E), for the 
Non-Depressed and Depressed groups in Experiment 16. Positive DIRAP scores reflect an optimistic bias 
and negative DIRAP scores reflect a pessimistic bias. The zero-point reflects no bias. An optimistic bias for 
positive future expectancy was produced if participants responded more quickly to “I expect-Positive- 
True” and “1 don’t expect-Positive-False” than to “I expect- Positive-False” and “1 don’t expect-Positive- 
True” (the opposite pattern indicated a pessimistic bias on positive expectancy trials). A pessimistic bias 
for future expectancy was produced if participants responded more quickly to “I expect-Negative-True” 
and “I don’t expect-Negative- False” than to “1 expect-Negative-False” and “1 don’t expect-Negative- 
True” (the opposite pattern indicated an optimistic bias on negative expectancy trials).
7.4.2.5 Personal Values Questionnaire
Values Importance. The values domains spirituality/religion and community 
/citizenship (PVQ domains 7 and 8 respectively) were consistently found to be rated as 
not important across the sample. Most participants (88%) did not respond to the
414
questions related to these values or incomplete responses were made (12%). Thus these 
values were omitted from further examination and are not included in statistical 
calculations here.
Values importance was examined across the remaining value domains for both 
the Depressed and the Non-Depressed groups. The typical response to the question “How 
Important is this value to you?” was ‘quite important’, though some variance was 
observed between values. For values pertaining to Family Relationships, 
Friendships/Social Relationships, Couples/Romantic Relationships and Health/Physical 
Well-Being (PVQ values 1, 2, 3 and 9 respectively), responses were consistently high, 
that is, either noted as ‘quite important ’ or ‘extremely important ’ for the Non-Depressed 
group. A slightly wider range of responses to the same values domains were observed for 
the Depressed group, with responses in the range of ‘moderately important' to ‘extremely 
important\ Examination of importance for Work/Career and Education- 
Schooling/Personal Growth and Development (value domains 4 and 5 respectively) saw 
the widest range, with respondents rating these ‘not at all important ’ to ‘extremely 
im p o rta n tThough overall the most common responses were ‘‘quite important” across 
all the inclusive domains.
7.4.2.6 Values Success and Values Reasoning Variables
Values success and values reasoning (pliant, avoidant, or appetitive reasons for 
valuing) were examined for group differences. The Appetitive Reasoning composite 
variable was created by combining PVQ items 3, 4, and 5 (as described in Section 
7.2.1.2). Differences were observed between the Depressed and Non-Depressed groups 
in relation to Appetitive it (26) = 1.940, p = .063) and Avoidant reasoning (t (26) = 
2.041,/? = .052). No group differences were found for Pliant reasoning (t (26) = -1.065,/? 
= .297), levels of Importance (t (26) = .978,/? = .337) or Success at living values (t (26) = 
1.011,/? =.322). Table 81 presents both the group mean responses to the PVQ items.
415
Table 81. Means and Standard Deviations (SD) o f the separate PVQ variables for Values Success, Values 
Importance, Pliant-, Avoidant- and Appetitive reasoning for the Depressed and Non-Depressed groups in 
Experiment 16.
Values Component Group N Mean SD
Success Non-Depressed 15 3.47 0.66
Depressed 13 3.26 0.39
Importance Non-Depressed 15 4.45 0.43
Depressed 13 4.27 0.53
Pliant Reasons Non-Depressed 15 1.30 0.33
Depressed 13 1.45 0.45
Avoidant Reasons Non-Depressed 15 2.06 0.61
Depressed 13 1.63 0.49
Appetitive Reasons Non-Depressed 15 4.21 0.41
Depressed 13 3.87 0.51
7.4.2.7 Correlations between PVQ components and Psychological Variables
The relationship between psychological symptom variables and the PVQ 
components was examined. Results indicated that Success at living consistently with 
one’s values and values Importance significantly correlated with anxiety (STAI; r = - 
.392, p  =.058 and r = -.447, p  =.029 respectively). The less successful respondents were 
at living their values and the less important values were rated across domains the more 
likely they were to display increased levels of anxiety. Depression was seen to correlate 
with Appetitive reasoning (BDI-II, r = -.408 p  =.048), that is, those who scored low on 
depression were more likely to report appetitive reasoning in view of values. No other 
correlations were found pertaining to psychometrics and values components. Emotional 
avoidance was not found to relate to either of the PVQ components.
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7.4.2.8 Lack o f Success in Living Important Values: Assessing the Values Discrepancy
An examination of the discrepancy between values importance and values success 
was conducted. The “Total Values Discrepancy” variable was constructed by first, 
subtracting success scores from importance scores. Negative scores on the discrepancy 
variable were re-coded into zero, as this indicated higher success scores than importance 
scores (meaning respondents were more successful at living less important values). 
Finally, discrepancy in each domain was summed. Marginally significant group 
differences were found for “Total Values Discrepancy” indicating that Depressed 
participants were more likely to report lack of success at living important values (t 
(26)= 1.88,/? =.07).
7.4.2.9 Correlations between FT-IRAP and Values
The relationship between implicit future thinking ( D ir a p )  and values was 
examined across groups. Results saw the D ir a p  correlating negatively with Avoidant 
reasoning (r (28) = -.410, /?=.047) and positively with values Success (r(28) = .353, p  
=.065). Total Values Discrepancy approached significance (r(28) = -.332, p  =.084). No 
significant relationship was found with the FT-IRAP responses and values Importance (r 
(28) = -.033,/? =.868), Pliant reasoning (r(28) = -.116,/? =.590) nor Appetitive reasoning 
(r(28) = .104,/? =.597) across groups.
7.4.2.10 FT-IRAP and Values predictability
In a final analysis the D ir a p  scores were dichotomized to indicate whether each 
person’s score represented a relation between positive future expectancies ( D ir a p  score > 
0) versus negative future expectancies ( D ir a p  score < 0), to test this as a theoretically 
meaningful cut point relating to values discrepancy. Participants whose performance 
revealed stronger relations with negative future expectancies were significantly more 
likely to report lower success at living their values (28.6%) than were those with a 
stronger relation with positive future expectancies (10.7%), (1, N  = 28) = 3.743,
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/?=.053. This cut point appears to produce sensitivity and positive predictive significance, 
as well as strong specificity and negative predictive significance (see Table 82).
Table 82. Classification Statistics for the Future Thinking Implicit Relational Assessment Procedure in 
Prospectively Predicting Successful Values Living (N= 28) in Experiment 16.
Total Values Discrepancy Sensitivity Specificity
Positive
Predictive
Value
Negative
Predictive
Value
Successful
Dirap score > 0 
n = 8
Dirap score < 0 
n = 3
Less Successful
Dirap score >0 
n = 6
Dirap score < 0 
n=  11
.64 (11/17) .72 (8/11) .57 (8/14) .78 (11/14)
Note. Scores on the Implicit Relational Assessment Procedure were dichotomized to indicate either a 
relation with negative future expectancies (Dirap score > 0) or a relation with positive future expectancy 
(Dirap score < 0). Sensitivity is the proportion of participants who are not successful in living their values 
correctly identified by the FT-IRAP; Specificity is the proportion of individuals successfully living their 
values correctly identified by the test. Positive Predictive Value is the proportion of individuals with a 
positive score who were correctly classified as living their values; Negative Predictive Value is the 
proportion of individuals with a negative Dirap score, correctly classified as a not living their values. Raw 
numbers for proportions are given in parentheses.
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Table 83. Summary of Main Aims and Findings from Experiment 16.
Research Aim Hypothesis Main Findings
Examine the role of 
implicit future thinking, 
as measured by the FT- 
IRAP, in relation to 
values reasoning (i.e. 
pliant, appetitive and 
avoidant reasoning) as 
measured by the PVQ.
There is a relationship between 
implicit future thinking and use of 
pliant reasoning as measured by 
the PVQ.
There is a relationship between 
implicit future thinking and use of 
avoidant reasoning as measured 
by the PVQ.
The hypothesis is not supported.
No relationship was found.
The hypothesis is supported.
A negative relationship was found for 
implicit future thinking and avoidant 
reasoning (p<.05).
2 Examine the role of 
implicit future thinking, 
as measured by the FT- 
IRAP, in relation to 
perceived values 
importance as measured 
by the PVQ.
3 Examine the role of 
implicit future thinking, 
as measured by the FT- 
IRAP, in relation to and 
values success, as 
measured by the PVQ.
There is a relationship between 
implicit future thinking and use of 
appetitive reasoning as measured 
by the PVQ.
There is a relationship between 
implicit future thinking and 
values importance as measured 
by the PVQ.
There is a relationship between 
implicit future thinking and 
success in living values as 
measured by the PVQ.
4 Examine the relationship There is a relationship between
between emotional 
avoidance and pliant, 
appetitive and avoidant 
reasoning as measured 
by the PVQ.
emotional avoidance and pliant 
reasoning.
There is a relationship between 
emotional avoidance and 
appetitive reasoning.
There is a relationship between 
emotional avoidance and 
avoidant reasoning.
The hypothesis is not supported. 
No relationship was found.
The hypothesis is not supported. 
No relationship was found.
The hypothesis is partially supported.
A positive relationship approached 
significance for the implicit future 
thinking and values success (p=.065).
The hypotheses are not supported.
Emotional avoidance was not found to 
relate to either of the PVQ 
components.
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7.4.3 Sum m ary
The FT-IRAP was able to detect group differences in relation to future 
expectancies, with the Non-Depressed groups’ response pattern indicating an increased 
level of positive future expectancies, relative to the Depressed group. Group differences 
were observed for PVQ responses with the Depressed group reporting more avoidant and 
less appetitive reasoning for endorsing values, relative to the Non-Depressed group. 
Depressed participants were also seen to report being less successful at living their values 
relative to their Non-Depressed counterparts. In relation to the main aims of Experiment 
16 a relationship was found between the PVQ components and the FT-IRAP. That is, 
within the sub clinically depressed group reduced positive future outlook was found to 
relate to (1) reduced reports of reinforcement by appetitive reasoning, (2) values rated as 
low in importance and (3) less successful values following. Within the healthy sample, 
increased positive future outlook was related to (1) reduced avoidant reasoning, 
increased appetitive reasoning and (3) successful values following. (2) Values 
importance was not found to relate to the FT-IRAP within the healthy sample. Reduced 
success in living their values was related to a reduced positive future outlook. (4) 
Emotional avoidance was not found to relate to either of the PVQ components. Table 82 
gives a summary of the main findings from Experiment 16.
7.5 General Discussion
Across Experiments 14, 15 and 16 group differences were consistently found in
relation to values reasoning and reports of success at living one’s values. With the
Depressed samples reporting greater use of avoidant reasoning, though not a reduced
level of importance of values. However, a decreased level of values success was
reported. In Experiment 14 it was seen that AMS was not found to correspond with either
of the PVQ variables, thus indicating that autobiographical memory specificity may not
directly influence the values process. However, AMS was seen to vary between the two
groups, thus indirectly, AMS may be significant in the construction, relative to the
ongoing process, of values. Experiment 15 found appetitive reasoning to be related to
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optimistic future outlook as measured by the FTT. Specifically, a distinction was 
observed between the two groups in that the Non-Depressed group reported an increased 
level of appetitive reasoning which was found to relate to optimistic future outlook. 
Values importance and success was further seen to relate to both positive affect and 
decreased anticipation of negative events occurring. Experiment 16 further expanded on 
the findings pertaining to future relations and values processing by revealing that implicit 
optimistic future biases corresponded with increased values success and reports of 
appetitive reasoning.
Deficiencies in past and future cognitions throughout Chapter 7 were related to 
the values process as well as depression levels. The recurrent use of avoidant coping 
strategies in construction and following of values by the depressed samples strengthen 
the postulate that emotional avoidance functionally mediates past and future cognition 
(Hayes et al., 1999). The data indicate that, at a sub-clinical level, individuals who report 
higher levels of depression, and other forms of psychological distress, are likely to be 
living a life that is not consistent with their stated values, whereas non-depressed 
individuals are more likely to be living consistently with their values. This is in line with 
findings from research with a clinically depressed sample, which noted that depression 
symptoms often include a withdrawal from important areas of life functioning (Plumb & 
Hayes, 2008).
Overall, it was seen that family, social relationships, romantic relationships and
education were the values highest ranked across the three studies, which may be expected
in an undergraduate student population. The AMT study was the only one to find an
explicit difference between groups in terms of values success, with the depressed group
reporting lower levels of success in this domain relative to non-depressed participants.
Though there are marginal differences between the groups within these three
experiments, the AMT Experiment (14) was the one with depressives scoring the highest
for levels of depression on the BDI-II, which may be indicative of why such a diverge
amongst groups occurred in this experiment relatively speaking. Interestingly, also within
the AMT experiment it was found that the depressed sample reported values as
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pertaining to pliant reasoning. This was not found for the non-depressed sample or in the 
other two studies.
The most consistent values finding across the three experiments was that within 
all samples a difference relating to appetitive reasoning emerged, that is, across the three 
experiments it was found that participants in the depressed groups reported lower levels 
of appetitive reasoning. This is further supported by differences between groups, in 
Experiments 14 and 16 pertaining also to avoidant reasoning, with depressed participants 
reporting greater use of such strategies. Avoidant reasoning was also seen to correlate 
with depression and hopelessness levels within these studies. Regarding future 
expectancies in relation to hopeless thoughts such as “I’ll always be a failure”, taking 
these thoughts literally, e.g., “It is true that I’m a failure”, corresponds to not living 
consistently with many important values domains. Also consistent across the studies was 
the lack of group difference found for levels of importance of values. Although across 
two experiments (i.e. 14 and 16) significance was found between groups for the ‘Total 
Values Discrepancy’ variable, indicative of depressed participants being more likely to 
report less success at living important values relative to the non-depressed individuals. 
Values success was also seen to correlate with anxiety across studies, that is, those who 
reported less success in living their values were found to report higher levels of anxiety.
Only Experiment 15 found any correlations for emotional avoidance with either 
of the values components, in the FTT Experiment (15), however, appetitive reasoning 
was seen to correlate with the AAQ-2, that is, lower levels of emotional avoidance were 
associated with reports of appetitive reasoning in values following. No significant 
relationship was found for AMS with any of the values components, neither across nor 
within the experimental groups. However, the future thinking measures showed more 
fruitful findings with regards to the values components. Pliant reasoning was seen to 
correlate positively with both positive and negative future expectancy in regards to event 
outcome as measured by likelihood ratings on the FTT.
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Furthermore, within this sample, it was seen that values importance correlated 
negatively with outcome expectancy for negative future events and positively with 
positive feeling rating. Values success, similarly to importance, was seen to be negatively 
associated with reduced likelihood ratings and positively with optimistic feelings. That 
is, the participants reported that their expectancy for future outcomes were based on 
negative reinforcement, i.e. as sanctioned by ‘others’; where values importance and 
success in attainment of values were related to strength in subjective belief of negative 
future events occurring, along with the strength of emotion they anticipated in relation to 
this event. At the split level of analysis it was seen that higher levels of pliant reasoning 
were related to less optimistic future outlook, as measured by the FTT index score, 
within the non-depressed sample. The depressed sample reported higher levels of pliant 
reasoning with overall lower levels of negative future expectancies. This is interesting in 
terms of the function of pliant reasoning is playing here. It appears that the depressed 
participants are considering ‘if I do what I am told is reasonable (or what others expect 
me to do) nothing can go wrong’.
This pattern of responding has been reported previously in the attribution theory 
literature and is known as the ‘Just world hypothesis’, where people believe they ‘get 
what they deserve and deserve what they get’ (Lemer & Miller, 1978). That is, failure in 
attaining goals and following values is attributed to dispositional causes which are 
unchangeable and uncontrollable, rather than situational causes. People are as such 
motivated to see a ‘just world’ as this reduces the perceived threats, and provides a sense 
of security. This may further help people find meaning in difficult and unsettling 
circumstances, particularly when bad things happen to other people. However, such 
belief holds a strong negative connotation in the case of a personally relevant ‘turn of 
events’, that is people who hold beliefs such as ‘if I follow the rules I will be ok and 
nothing bad will happen’, and as such follow the ‘rules’, suffer worse when things 
actually do go wrong, as they struggle with thoughts relating to evaluations of ‘but I did 
everything right -  it must be something wrong with me, or I did something wrong, if this 
happened to me’ and so on. When the depressed sample reported more appetitive
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reasoning this was seen to be related to higher levels of positive future thinking. In line 
with previous research by Sheldon and colleagues, whether value-based goals are under 
appetitive or aversive control is thus quite important. The Dirap measure further adds to 
these interpretations, as it correlated negatively with avoidant reasoning and positively 
with values success. That is, reports of avoidant reasoning were measured as reduced 
positive future outlook, whereas reports of successfully living ones values were seen to 
be reflected in a positive future outlook as measured by the FT-IRAP.
In regards to values predictability, the AMS was unable to specify consistency in 
values success, whereas the two future thinking measures were more successful. The use 
of median split cut off points for the compiled FTT index score and zero as a cut off 
marker for the D ir a p  score were both seen to offer a level of specificity in determining 
success at living values as reported by participants in these studies. Thus it can be 
inferred that values attainment is a relevant and important indicator within future 
hopeless thinking. Given the FT-IRAP’s strong ability to detect depression and 
hopelessness levels, as demonstrated in Chapter 4, it is perhaps not surprising that it is 
also able to detect such hopeless cognising evident within the reflection on values 
construction. It appears within the current findings that values attainment is related to 
psychological distress, and may be important for future thinking, and indeed the 
phenomena of mental time travel. The findings of these studies are also consistent with 
the theoretical postulate that someone suffering from depression and subsequently losing 
contact with reinforcers would potentially rate values as less important than non- 
depressed individuals. Although these results are informative it cannot, from these 
analyses alone, be determined whether a lack of values success causes depressive 
thoughts, or more extensively - psychological distress, or if psychological distress causes 
lack of values success, or if the relationship is bidirectional. However, the results 
reported herein begin to answer some of the questions regarding the importance of values 
in preventing the escalation of a depressive course.
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Chapter 8
General Discussion
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8.1 Overview
The current thesis had three main aims. The first aim was to investigate the 
relationship between past and future thinking in sub clinically depressed versus non- 
depressed individuals. There is a burgeoning literature suggesting that depressed 
individuals are particularly susceptible to such deficits in past recall, and arguably - by 
association, future thinking (e.g. MacLeod et al., 1996; Williams et al., 1996, 2007; 
O’Connor et al., 2008). The autobiographical memory literature reports suppression of 
negative past events in relation to depression, whereas in the future thinking literature 
reduced generation of positive future experiences is linked with depression. Thus a 
valance effect has been noted across past and future thinking which has been accounted 
for in terms of emotional avoidance. However, there is limited evidence from previous 
research specifically looking at emotional avoidance in relation to such autobiographical 
memory deficits and no studies have made the comparison between future thinking and 
emotional avoidance per se. Although much evidence has been gathered for past and 
future thinking deficits in depressed individuals, discrepancies currently exist within this 
literature, particularly in regards to levels of such deficits in a sub-clinical population. 
Chapter 2 and 3 of the current thesis aimed to examine the role of valence and emotional 
avoidance in past and future events in a sub-clinical sample.
A current debate in the literature surrounds how to best conceptualize and
measure cognitive vulnerability to depression, as some researchers focus on targeting
explicit cognitions (e.g., cognitive products) whereas others argue for the importance of
targeting implicit cognitions (e.g., cognitive processes/information-processing). Notably,
previous research has made extensive use of explicit measures which are susceptible to
demand characteristics and mood effects. The second aim of the current thesis was to
offer an alternative to the use of self report measures in the mental time travel literature.
Recent research, stemming from behaviour analysis, has proposed a model which aims to
address the empirical and conceptual diverges noted between implicit and explicit
measures of cognition; The REC model, grounded in RFT, suggest that explicit and
implicit procedures reflect the same behavioural repertoire, i.e. arbitrarily applicable
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relational responding. A new methodology that directly targets this repertoire is the 
Implicit Relational Assessment Procedure (IRAP; Bames-Holmes, Bames-Holmes, 
Hayden, et al., 2006); Chapter 4 described the adoption of the IRAP methodology in the 
development of a robust and accurate implicit measure of positive future expectations in 
depression. Chapter 5 further sought to compare the sensitivity and specificity of this 
new implicit measure with the currently utilised methodologies of explicit past and future 
thinking. Lastly, the thesis aimed to provide analogue evidence of techniques that may be 
useful in the remediation of reduced positive future thinking, which is characteristic of 
hopelessness in depression. In Chapter 6 a brief mindfulness induction was explored in 
regards to the facilitation of increased contact with negative past and future content. The 
empirical work reported in Chapter 7 further examined the link between personal values 
and past and future cognitions in depression.
Taken together the empirical work reported in Chapters 2 - 7  aimed to review the 
existing, and predominantly cognitive, research in the mental time travel domain 
pertaining to depression and to add to this work, by drawing on new behavioural theories 
and related methodology, in designing more effective methods of assessment and 
potentially useful remediation strategies for those with deficits in these areas. The 
discussion will commence with a section providing a summary of findings for the 
empirical Chapters 2 to 7, followed by a separate section which will address the 
theoretical issues relating to these findings.
8.2 Summary of Findings
Chapter 2 sought to explore if deficits in autobiographical past and future
cognitions were present in a sample of sub-clinically depressed individuals relative to
non-depressed individuals. The proposed function of such deficits was explored in
regards to assessment of the subjective experience related to autobiographical recall and
the use of avoidant coping strategies. Two experiments (la  and 2a) explored the relation
between specificity in recall of past experiences and depression whereas two parallel
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experiments (lb  and 2b) investigated the representation of such specificity deficits in 
generation of future events. Experiments la  and lb had three main aims: (1) to 
investigate the specificity of assessment for the autobiographical memory test and the 
future cuing test in a sub-clinical sample; (2) to examine reported levels of emotional 
avoidance in relation to reported phenomenological characteristics of positive and 
negative past and future event specificity; and (3) examine emotional avoidance in 
relation to positive and negative past and future event specificity.
The results of Experiment la indicated that (1) that the sub-clinically depressed 
sample demonstrated reduced specificity in recall of past events relative to the non- 
depressed individuals, thus supporting previous research from the clinical literature (e.g. 
Williams et al. 1996) and the use of the AMT with a sub-clinical population. The sub 
clinically depressed group also presented subjective reports of the past event experience 
as seen from a more objective point of view, with reports of less clarity, frequency of 
consideration and greater proximal distance of positive events recalled relative to the 
non-depressed sample. (2) Lower levels of emotional avoidance was seen in those who 
recalled positive events from the more recent past and negative events from the more 
distant past. A lower level of emotional avoidance was also found to correlate with recall 
of positive past events from the first person perspective. (3) Lower levels of emotional 
avoidance were found to correlate with increased specificity of past positive events and 
lower levels of depression; this was the first known empirical evidence of such an effect 
and extends on the work by Hermans et al. (2005).
The results from Experiment lb indicated that (1) the sub-clinically
depressed individuals were less specific in generation of positive future events, relative
to specificity overall, a finding that contrasts previous research (e.g. Williams et al. 1996)
where participants in a clinical sample were found to be less specific overall relative to
non-clinical controls. As such the valence effect observed here was unexpected in
relation to past research with the FCT. The results can be related to affect regulation
models proposed within the literature (e.g. Williams et al., 2007) as well as the extended
literature from future thinking research, where reduced contact with positive future
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content has been noted as linked to hopelessness in depression (e.g. MacLeod et al., 
1997). The subjective reports by the depressed sample, relating to the future experiences, 
indicated that these events were observed more objectively with information pertaining 
to reduced levels of having previously considered such future events, relative to the non- 
depressed group who reported having frequently considered such fixture positive events. 
The depressed group further reported the expected positive events to be occurring in a 
more distant future relative to the non-depressed group who expected these events to be 
more likely to occur, as well as to be occurring in the near future. (2) A lower level of 
emotional avoidance was related to clarity of positive events and frequency of negative 
future event generation. Within the Non-Depressed group lower levels of emotional 
avoidance were related to improved clarity of future events. Within the Depressed group 
a high level of avoidant coping strategies was found to relate to a decreased expectancy 
of negative future events occurring. (3) Emotional avoidance was found to correlate with 
depression scores, with the depressed sample more likely to report use of avoidant 
strategies relative to the non-depressed group. Although no relationship was found with 
regards to the degree of specificity in future events. This was the first known empirical 
investigation of such an effect in relation to specificity in episodic fixture thinking. With 
the depressed group notably objectifying the subjective experience of the past and fixture 
events in both Experiments la and lb, two subsequent experiments (i.e. 2a and 2b) 
sought to account for imagery as a conflicting variable in reports of specificity. The main 
aim of Experiment 2a and 2b was to (2) explore independently measured imagery 
abilities in relation to phenomenological characteristics of past and fixture event 
specificity.
The results from Experiment 2areplicated the AMS findings from Experiment la. 
Although (2) no effects were found for imagery abilities in relation to group or 
specificity of recall. Though, imagery abilities and reported clarity in recall of positive 
past events were related. The results from Experiment 2b replicated the FES findings 
from Experiment lb. (2) Decreased specificity of negative futxxre events was seen to 
correspond with increased imagery abilities independent of depression levels. Overall,
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the findings from Chapter 2 support the proposal that past and future cognitions are 
related (e.g. Atance & O’Neill, 2001; Suddendorf & Corballis, 1997). The most 
informative relations between past and future cognition, emotional avoidance and 
depression emerged from the reports pertaining to the subjective experiences of past and 
future events relative to the episodic incidence per se; with belief in future event 
occurrence specifically relevant to the diverge between the sub clinically depressed and 
healthy individuals. As the FCT make use of experimenter cued future events which may 
have lead to weak links with emotional avoidance, a future thinking task which allowed 
for personally primed future events and the obtainment of a measure of future expectancy 
in depression was subsequently adopted.
Chapter 3 sought to evaluate the Future Thinking Task (FTT) (MacLeod et al., 
1993; 1997) as a more adequate measure of fixture directed cognitions and expectancies. 
Three experiments validated the efficacy of the FTT for use in a sub-clinical population. 
Experiment 3 sought to explore the effectiveness of the FTT in accounting for depression 
among a sub-clinical population. Experiment 4 examined the reliability of the FTT in 
accounting for a depressive state relative to current mood state. Experiment 5 employed a 
learned helplessness paradigm in order to systematically examine the expectancy 
component of the FTT relative to more general future thinking and fluency for fixture 
events. Experiment 3 had four main aims, (1) to examine whether the FTT was efficient 
in its employment with a sub-clinical population, (2) to examine whether the valence and 
group interaction found in previous clinical samples would is present in a sub-clinical 
population, (3) whether future expectancy as a separate variable would offer further 
insight to the role of cognitions about the fixture in relation to depression, and (4) to 
examine the relationship between emotional avoidance and fixture cognitions. Results 
from Experiment 3 indicated that (1) there was no clear between group differences found 
for any of the FTT variables; this finding is inconsistent with previous research in the 
clinical future thinking literature (e.g. MacLeod et al., 1997). (2) The valence and group 
interaction for fluency, pertaining to number of future events generated, approached 
significance. Subsequent tests revealed that the sub clinically depressed sample was less
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able to produce personally primed positive future events relative to healthy individuals, 
with no group differences observed in relation to negative future events. This finding is 
in line with previous research and supports the suggestion that depressed mood is related 
to the reduced ability to consider positive future experiences (cf., MacLeod et al., 1997). 
(3) Future expectancy, as measured by a separate variable pertaining to the likelihood of 
future events occurring, was not found to differ between groups, nor was the predicted 
interaction observed in regards to valence specific future expectations. This finding is not 
in line with past research per se, in regards to between group differences of future 
cognitions, however previous studies utilising the FTT have notably failed to include the 
likelihood measure in their reported findings, thus the current result is ambiguous in 
terms of the literature on expectancy of future events occurring. (4) Emotional avoidance 
was found to differ significantly between groups, with the sub clinically depressed 
individuals reporting greater use of avoidant strategies. High levels of avoidance were 
found to relate to increased expectancy of negative events occurring. This finding is 
relevant to previous studies with the FTT where increased generation of negative events 
were related to worry about the future (i.e. anxiety) (MacLeod et al., 1997). Thus, the 
current results extend on previous research which has suggested that expectancy is a sub 
component of future thinking. After considering the inconsistency of results herein in 
relation to past studies it was suggested that mood effects may interact with the 
generation of future events, and as such account for the variance in fluency, relative to 
depression levels per se. In this regard such potentially latent mood effects were sought 
to be explored.
Experiment 4 sought to examine if induced positive or negative mood would 
affect the generation of cognitions about the future as measured by the FTT. Experiment 
4 had three main aims; (1) to examine whether positive and negative mood would 
generate group differences on the FTT overall and (2) to determine whether future 
expectancy would be more resilient to the induced mood effect relative to fluency of 
future events; and (3) to examine the relationship between induced mood, emotional 
avoidance and future cognitions.The results from Experiment 4 show that, (1) the mood
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induction affected fluency responses, with the induction of a positive mood generating an
increase in positive, relative to negative future events produced. In comparison, induction
of a negative mood lead to participants generating significantly more negative relative to
positive events. This finding is in line with previous studies that looked at mood effects
on the FTT (e.g. Hepburn, Bamhofer & Williams, 2006; 2008; 2009; Jong-Meyer et al.,
2007). (2) No significant effects of the mood induced were found for the perceived
likelihood of positive and negative future events occurring. The previous studies that
looked at mood effects on the FTT failed to report any effects of the mood induced in
regards to the expectancy component of the FTT. (3) Following the negative mood
induction it was found that those who reported high levels of emotional avoidance at
baseline reported increased expectancy of positive future events. The results from
Experiment 4 overall indicate that the strength of belief in positive/negative outcomes is
a more stable characteristic to measure in relation to frequency of positive/negative
events generated. To this end, future expectancy may serve as a more reliant measure in
relation to future thinking as a feature of depression. In response to the consideration of
expectancy as a relevant feature of depression the associated role of hopelessness about
the future was considered to be of interest in further examining this construct. The
literature on learned helplessness has suggested that subjective perceptions relating to the
lack of control of external events are related to depression symptoms. Experiment 5 was
designed to follow on from the initial findings of Experiment 3 and 4, by employing a
learned helplessness paradigm in order to systematically examine the expectancy
component relative to more general future thinking and fluency for future events.
Experiment 5 had four main aims (1) to examine if the analogue depressed mood
induction would lead to an overall group diverge in responses on the FTT, (2) to
determine whether the valence and group interaction found in previous clinical samples
could be replicated following a depressed mood induction, (3) to explore whether future
expectancy would be affected by the depressed mood induction, and (4) examine group
differences in relation to emotional avoidance and future expectancy. Results from
Experiment 5 indicated that (1) that the induction of a depressed mood by completion of
an unsolvable task lead to an overall decreased ability to generate events for the future,
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relative to participants who completed a solvable task; (2) no group and valence specific 
interactions were found, thus the main group effect found did not extend to the expected 
interaction which has been noted in clinically depressed samples (e.g. Macleod et al., 
1997). (3) The depressed mood induction did not affect the expectancy ratings of the 
likely occurrence of the future events generated. (4) Those high in emotional avoidance 
reported increased expectancy of positive future experiences following completion of the 
Unsolvable Task, whereas no such biases were found for those high in emotional 
avoidance that completed the Solvable Task. Thus, overall the results from Experiment 5 
found that the learned helplessness effect was not evident when looking at expectancy 
ratings relative to fluency for future events.
Overall, Chapter 3 found that the FTT is unstable in its detection of sub clinical 
levels of depression (Experiment 3), is susceptible to current mood effects (Experiment 
4) and a short analogue depression induction produced false positives (Experiment 5). 
One potential weakness of the experimental series of future thinking pertains to the fact 
that the FCT and FTT are both explicit self report measures. Recently, Szpunar (2010) 
has suggested that future thinking may be more automatic in its construction, with recent 
arguments for the potential importance of looking at implicit cognition in the analysis 
and treatment of psychopathology (e.g. Wiers, Teachman, & De Houwer, 2007). Thus, 
an implicit measure of future thinking in depression would be advantageous as the self 
report nature of the FTT and the FCT may not facilitate access to more implicit 
cognitions, furthermore, self-report renders it easy for participants to ‘conceal’ 
information from assessors, thus limiting their value in clinical research.
Chapter 4 sought to address the limitations of self-report measures in future
thinking by developing an implicit measure targeting positive and negative future
expectancies. Three experiments sought to validate the efficacy of the adopted procedural
design of the Implicit Relations Assessment Procedure (IRAP) (Bames-Holmes et al.,
2006), which allows for relations between and among chosen stimuli to be considered for
use in a sub-clinical population. Experiment 6 aimed to construct and trial the IRAP
methodology in targeting future expectancy, i.e. the FT-IRAP, in a sub-clinical
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population. Experiment 7 examined the reliability of the FT-IRAP in accounting for a 
depressive state relative to mere fleeting mood. Experiment 8 employed a learned 
helplessness paradigm in order to systematically examine the FT-IRAP effect. To this 
end, Experiment 6 had two main aims, (1) to examine if  the FT-IRAP was efficient in its 
employment with a sub-clinical population, (2) to determine if implicit future expectancy 
would offer some insight on the role of emotional avoidance in future thinking. The 
results from Experiment 6 found (1) the FT-IRAP to be an adequate measure of future 
expectancy with clear group differences observed, i.e. the sub clinically depressed 
sample demonstrated a reduced level of positive future expectancy relative to increased 
positive future expectancy responses by the healthy participants. This was the first 
empirical evidence of such an effect. (2) Clear links between future expectancy and 
emotional avoidance were observed with strong correlations between low emotional 
avoidance and increased positive future expectancies. This was the first empirical 
evidence of such an effect. Overall, Experiment 6 demonstrated rather encouraging 
findings regarding the use of implicit methods (i.e. the FT-IRAP) in the measurement of 
future thinking. Although implicit measures are known to be more resistant to mood 
effects than explicit measures, the findings of Experiment 4, Chapter 3, demonstrated 
that the Future Thinking Task at the sub clinical level is susceptible to current mood 
state. Given the fact that Experiment 6 also involved a sub clinical sample and an 
affective state (depression) it was considered important to test for any mood effects to 
ensure the implicit measures stability.
Experiment 7 sought to test the effect of induced positive or negative (i.e. current) 
mood state on the FT-IRAP in order to ensure that the group differences in Experiment 6 
were due to sub-clinical levels of depression and not a result of fluctuating mood. 
Experiment 7 aimed to (1) to examine if a positive or negative induced mood state would 
influence the FT-IRAP effect. The results from Experiment 7 found that (1) neither an 
induced positive nor negative mood state significantly impacted the participants’ 
performance as the FT-IRAP effect remained stable across the two groups. This was the 
first empirical trial of mood effects on the IRAP. Unlike the FTT the FT-IRAP was found
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to be resistant to the influences of current mood states. As such it was inferred that the 
FT-IRAP, as a measure of expectancy appears more resistant to fluctuating mood relative 
to assessments of fluency for future cognition. Experiment 8 sought to examine the FT- 
IRAP response pattern for participants post a Learned Helplessness paradigm. To this 
end Experiment 8 had one main aim, (1) to assess if the FT-IRAP effect would be 
affected by the induction of a depressed mood state. An effect of the depressed mood 
induction on the FT-IRAP performance was observed; (1) within the depressed mood 
group, pertaining to the participants who attempted to complete an unsolvable task within 
the learned helplessness paradigm, it was seen that response latencies were reduced 
across trials that were inconsistent with a positive future outlook. That is, the depressed 
mood group responses reflected those confirming the expectancy of negative events. It 
was inferred that the pattern of responses demonstrated after the induced depressed mood 
(i.e. Unsolvable Task group) was analogous with a depressed mood state. The results 
from Experiment 8 support findings by Hepburn, Bamhofer and Williams (2006) who, 
after inducing negative mood found raised levels of explicit hopelessness and implicit 
depression in healthy controls. Similarly, the results are in line with Friedman et al. 
(2001) who observed an implicit hopelessness bias in their sample of currently depressed 
individuals. Overall, Chapter 4 found that the FT-IRAP is stable in its detection of sub 
clinical levels of depression (Experiment 6), is not susceptible to current mood effects 
(Experiment 7) and is sensitive to a hopelessness effect as induced in a learned 
helplessness paradigm (Experiment 8). Thus, the findings from Chapter 4 provide 
evidence for the utility of an implicit measure, i.e. the FT-IRAP, as a functional 
procedure to implicitly measure future thinking, and provide further empirical support to 
the postulate that a lack of positive future expectancies is a characteristic of depression.
Chapters 2, 3 and 4 of the thesis tested both explicit and implicit measures of 
future and past thinking. Chapter 5 aimed to directly compare and contrast the novel 
implicit measure with the more widely used explicit measures, that is, the explicit future 
(i.e., Future Thinking Task: FTT) and past (i.e., Autobiographical Memory Task) with 
the implicit measure (FT-IRAP) across a sub clinical sample. To this end, Chapter 5
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consisted of two experiments, Experiments 9 and 10, which each aimed to assess the 
compatibility of the FT-IRAP with, the FTT and the AMT, respectively, in detection of 
levels of depression and hopelessness. Experiment 9 had two main aims, (1) to 
investigate whether the FT-IRAP and the FTT would be comparably sensitive and 
specific in the detection of sub clinical depression; and (2) to determine whether the FT- 
IRAP and the FTT would be comparably sensitive and specific in the detection of 
hopelessness. The results from Experiment 9 showed that the depressed participants were 
found to demonstrate a reduced generation of positive future events on the explicit FTT; 
however this finding did not extend to expectancy ratings. The depressed participants’ 
did however demonstrate reduced future expectancy as measured by the FT-IRAP. (1) In 
a regression analysis the FT-IRAP proved more sensitive and specific in the detection of 
depression levels. This improved predictability over the FTT was also seen in regards to 
(2) hopelessness, with the FT-IRAP adding significantly to the regression model relative 
to the FTT variables. It may be inferred that the improved specificity of the FT-IRAP is 
likely due to its implicit construct, relative to the measure of future expectancy, as it was 
seen here that two groups did not differ in regards to their responses as measured by the 
FTT expectancy variable. However, due to the inherent nature of such explicit tasks 
being subjective to demand characteristics it is difficult to make any causal judgments 
pertaining to this discrepancy of findings between the two tasks. As future expectancy is 
strongly related to hopelessness (e.g. O’Connor et al., 2008) it may be inferred here that 
reduced positive future expectancy, relative to reduced positive future thinking deficits 
per se in depression (e.g. MacLeod et al., 1997) is indicative of increased hopelessness. 
This finding is in contrast to previous research which has focused on fluency in regards 
to the number of positive events generated as indicative of such future hopelessness (e.g. 
O’Connor et al., 2008; MacLeod et al., 200x). This improved specificity may be further 
explained by the nature of the FT-IRAP as a relational construct in measuring the 
strength of belief in relations held for future occurrences, i.e. the quality of such beliefs; 
relative to the mere number of such associated future events generated, i.e. the quantity 
of future associations, as measured by the FTT fluency variable.
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Experiment 10 sought to investigate the FT-IRAP effect in relation to AMS as 
measured by the AMT. Experiment 10 had two main aims (1) to investigate whether the 
FT-IRAP and the AMT would be comparably sensitive and specific in the detection of 
sub clinical depression; and (2) to determine whether the FT-IRAP and the AMT would 
be comparably sensitive and specific in the detection of hopelessness. Results from 
Experiment 10 found that the AMT responses by the depressed sample reflected an 
overall reduced specificity in recall. The FT-IRAP found the depressed sample to 
respond in line with a reduced level of future expectancy. (l)The regression results found 
the FT-IRAP to demonstrate predictability of depression levels beyond that of the AMT, 
with significant contributions to the regression model relative to the AMT, which failed 
to add to the regression model at a significant level. The regression analysis relating to 
hopelessness (2), suggested that the FT-IRAP was more specific and sensitive in 
detection of hopelessness relative to AMS. These findings suggest that there may be a 
link between past and future thinking as the same sample demonstrated deficits in past 
event specificity and future expectancy. However, autobiographical memory specificity 
was a less accurate indicator of depression than the FT-IRAP. It may be inferred from 
these results that as the FT-IRAP is a measure of pre-established relations, i.e. based on 
individual learning histories, it may not be the content of past events per se (as measured 
by the AMT) which informs depression and ultimately hopeless ideation, rather, it may 
be belief in the content and the relational network incurred. As such it may be that the 
AMT, with its inherent focus on the level of detail, attributes the number of details 
recalled to specificity rather than the clarity or vividness related to re-living the past 
experience. Furthermore, it maybe that the method of questioning by the AMT in itself is 
confusing the retrieval process; that is, participants are requested to verbally report a past 
experience related to the emotional cues presented, something which would likely lead to 
a number of prior experiences being brought to mind. Thus, the task becomes one of 
selecting the more appropriate or representative experience for the task rather than re- 
experiencing the event per se. In this regard the lab-based retrieval on an explicit 
measure may not be able to target the cognitions experienced in private, whereas implicit
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targeting of relations omits the elaborative selection process and as such is able to gain 
insight into such cognitions.
Given the finding that the belief in the content of their past memories and future 
expectations was predictive of sub clinical levels of depression a worthwhile endeavour 
for the mental time travel literature might be to consider how these cognitions can most 
effectively be addressed and modified. And with implicit cognitions being a stronger 
predictor of depression, relative to the explicitly expressed past and future cognitions, it 
would be relevant to consider how awareness of such implicitly held beliefs may be 
raised. To this end, Chapters 6 and 7 sought to examine potential techniques that may 
facilitate the reduction in believability of such thoughts. In order to raise awareness of 
the automaticity of beliefs and the construction of such cognitions mindfulness appears 
like a potentially useful technique. Mindfulness techniques aim to increase awareness of 
and willingness to experience distressing cognitions without altering their content or 
frequency (Hayes, Strosahl, & Wilson, 1999) (see Section 1.8.1.1.2). Chapter 6 focused 
on the reporting of such cognitions following a brief mindfulness induction; to this end 
the chapter comprised of three experiments looking at the effects of a Focused Attention 
Task relative to an Unfocused Attention Task, with subsequent responses measured on 
the AMT (Experiment 11), the FTT (Experiment 12) and the FT-IRAP (Experiment 13). 
It was also sought to test the prediction that mindfulness, by way of a focused attention 
task, has a unique effect on decentering (that is, a reduction in believability). Experiment 
11 had two main aims (1) to determine whether AMS was improved following the 
Focused Attention Task relative to the Unfocused Attention task, with particular 
reference to improved specificity in recall of negative past events. (2) To test if a 
Focused Attention task has a unique effect on decentering as measured by the Toronto 
Mindfulness Scale. The results from Experiment 11 suggested that (1) autobiographical 
memory specificity increased for the Focused Attention group relative to the Unfocused 
Attention group. Increased specificity in recall of negative past events was particularly 
notable in Experiment 11, in relation to the previous experiments with the AMT (e.g. 
Experiment la, 2a and 10) in which increased specificity by the healthy groups were
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predominantly seen in positive event recall. (2) Furthermore, a brief Focused Attention 
task facilitated defusion via increased experiential awareness as measured by the TMS 
and as seen in the increased specificity in recall of past negative experiences.
Experiment 12 had two main aims (1) to examine if future cognitions, as 
measured by the FTT, with particular reference to increased generation of negative future 
events, would vary following a Focused Attention Task relative to an Unfocused 
Attention Task; (2) to test if a Focused Attention task has a unique effect on decentering. 
The Results from Experiment 12 did not show any group differences emerging in regard 
to future thinking. However, (1) inspection of the FTT index and raw data revealed that 
the Focused group reported more negative events for the future, greater expectancy of 
negative future events occurring and increased levels of negative affect in the likelihood 
of these negative events occurring. Although only one of these differences was 
statistically significant, a trend was clearly emerging with participants demonstrating 
increased acceptance of negative future cognitions relative to the Unfocused Attention 
group. (2) The Focused Attention task was found to facilitate decentering in form of 
increased experiential awareness, as measured by the TMS and as seen in the increased 
reporting of negative future experiences. The mindfulness induction was subsequently 
examined in relation to improved contact with implicit cognitions and Experiment 13 
sought (1) to examine if implicit future thinking is altered following a Focused Attention 
Task relative to an Unfocused Attention Task, with particular reference to expectancy of 
negative future events. And to (2) test whether a Focused Attention Task has a unique 
effect on decentering. The results from Experiment 13 reflected a similar pattern 
emerging for the FT-IRAP to that observed with the FTT in Experiment 12; i.e. the FT- 
IRAP effect was not influenced per se, though the Focused Attention group notably 
responding more flexibly to the negative content (1) (2). Thus, overall the most notable 
finding from Chapter 6 was the increased level of contact with negative past and future 
content, likely due to defusion from verbal content and increased task engagement. These 
results have implications for the understanding of how negative future cognition is 
construed and as such how we can reform dysfunctional strategies in thinking about the
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past and future. That is, in relation to the potential role of emotional avoidance in future 
thinking.
Chapter 7 sought to explore values processing as a means for understanding the 
function of past and future related cognitions. Values have been described as a personally 
relevant and chosen behaviour towards preferred consequences (Hayes et al., 1999; 
Wilson, 2009) (see Section 7.1). Chapter 7 comprised of three experiments where the 
construct of values, as reported on the Personal Values Questionnaire (PVQ), were 
examined in relation to responses on the AMT (Experiment 14), the FTT (Experiment
15) and the FT-IRAP (Experiment 16). Experiment 14 had four aims, to assess (1) AMS 
in relation to values reasoning (i.e. pliant, appetitive and avoidant reasoning), (2) 
perceived values importance (3) and values success. Furthermore it was sought (4) to 
explore if general emotional avoidance serves a function in endorsement of personal 
values. The results from Experiment 14 demonstrated that (1) AMS was not found to 
relate to pliant, appetitive or avoidant reasoning, (2) perceived values importance, (3) nor 
success at living one’s values, thus indicating that memory specificity may not directly 
influence the values process. However, AMS was seen to vary between sub clinically 
depressed and non-depressed individuals, who again were found to differ in their 
responses to the PVQ components, thus indirectly, AMS may be significant in the 
construction, relative to the ongoing process of values. No relationship was found 
between (4) emotional avoidance with either of the PVQ variables. Personal values in 
relation to future thinking were subsequently examined and Experiment 15 had four main 
aims, (1) to assess future thinking in relation to values reasoning (i.e. pliant, appetitive 
and avoidant reasoning), (2) perceived values importance (3) and values success. 
Furthermore it was sought (4) to examine emotional avoidance in relation to values 
reasoning. The results from Experiment 15 found (1) positive future outlook, as 
measured by the FTT, to relate to appetitive reasoning. Specifically, the healthy 
participants, relative to the sub clinically depressed sample, reported an increased level of 
appetitive reasoning seen to correlate with a positive future outlook. (2)Values 
importance and (3) success was further seen to relate to both intensity of positive affect
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and decreased anticipation of negative events occurring. (4) Appetitive reasoning was the 
only PVQ variable found to correlate with emotional avoidance, with low emotional 
avoidance related to increased reports of appetitive reasoning.
Experiment 16 examined values in relation to implicit future cognitions and had 
three main aims, (1) to assess the FT-IRAP effect in relation to values reasoning (i.e. 
pliant, appetitive & avoidant reasoning), (2) and perceived values importance (3) and 
values success. (4) Examine the relationship between emotional avoidance and values 
reasoning. The results from Experiment 16 indicated that there was a relationship 
between the PVQ components and the FT-IRAP. That is, within the sub clinically 
depressed group reduced positive future outlook was found to relate to (1) reduced 
reports of reinforcement by appetitive reasoning, (2) values rated as low in importance 
and (3) less successful values following. Within the healthy sample, increased positive 
future outlook was related to (1) reduced avoidant reasoning, increased appetitive 
reasoning and (3) successful values following. No relation was found, within this group 
to, with (2) values importance. Thus, in line with the predictions those with reduced 
positive future outlook also reported reduced success in living their values. (4) Emotional 
avoidance was not found to relate to either of the PVQ components. Overall, Chapter 7 
further expanded on the findings pertaining to future relations and values processing by 
revealing that implicit positive future biases corresponded with increased values success 
and reports of appetitive reasoning. Given the finding that implicit positive future 
thinking was linked with lower depression levels, increased awareness of such implicit 
cognitions emerge as a meaningful target in therapeutic approaches. The results clearly 
indicate that sub-clinically depressed individuals are able to think of personal values, but 
are likely to be living a life that is not consistent with their stated values. These results 
reflect the importance of having a theoretically consistent explanation of values as a 
process, and calls for additional work on targeting these experiences in regards to future 
thinking and expectancies therein, with a focus on raising the awareness of implicit 
cognitions.
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8.3 Theoretical Issues
The first aim of the thesis was to examine the relationship between past and 
future thinking in sub clinically depressed versus non-depressed individuals. The 
theoretical issues that arose in the experimental series (i.e. Experiments la, 2a, 10, (11) 
and 14) that aimed to examine memory deficits in depression will initially be detailed. 
Subsequently, a discussion on theoretical issues related to the experiments which aimed 
to examine future thinking deficits (Experiments lb and 2b) and future expectancy in 
depression (FTT: Experiments 3,(4, 5) 9, (12) and 15; FT-IRAP: 6, (7, 8) 9, 10, (13) and
16) will follow.
8.3.1. Autobiographical Memory Specificity in Depression
In Chapter 2, consistent differences in AMS within a sub clinical population 
emerged across several Experiments (i.e. la, 2a,) (along with Chapter 5, Experiment 9; 
Chapter 7, Experiment 14). These results reflect previous results with clinical samples 
(e.g. Williams et al., 1996; cf. Williams et al., 2007 for a review). Additionally, a trend 
toward valence specificity on the AMT emerged. That is, it was noted that sub clinically 
depressed individuals differed from their healthy counterparts in relation to recall of 
positive past events, rather than negative past events. In previous research with the AMT 
valence specific findings were not regularly reported although a more recent focus has 
been given to such valence effects, with increased recognition of reduced positive recall 
as the stronger predictor of depression (Williams & Scott, 2009). This postulate is 
supported by evidence from the parallel research domain of future directed behaviour, 
which has emphasized reduced contact with positive experiences serving as a 
vulnerability factor for depression and the progressive development of depressive 
symptoms. That is, in regards to reduced recall of positive relative to increased recall of 
negative experiences (MacLeod, Tata, Kentish, & Jacobsen, 1997). The relation between 
such reduced exposure to positive events and depression has further been recognized in 
behavioural theories of depression (e.g., Lewinsohn & Gotlib, 1995). For instance, 
behavioural activation intended to boost exposure to behaviour that augments cognitions
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related to mastery and pleasure are central to both Beck’s cognitive therapy (Beck, Rush, 
Shaw, & Emery, 1979) and Lewinsohn’s behavioural therapy for depression (Lewinsohn, 
Antonuccio, Brekenridge, & Teri, 1984). The current findings are thus in line with 
existing research within the Autobiographical Memory field, and support behavioural 
theories of depression.
The subjective phenomenological characteristics related to the past events, as 
recorded by the MCQ strongly supported the AMT results. That is, the past event 
accounts by sub clinically depressed individuals, portrayed reduced contact with past 
positive experience by a lack of previous retrievals, as well as reduced clarity and an 
objective vantage adopted in reliving the experience, relative to the healthy sample. 
Several authors have emphasized that the ability to re-live the original experience is the 
core feature of autobiographical memory (e.g. Baddeley, 1992; Greenberg & Rubin, 
2003; Rubin, 1998). The retrieval of an episodic event has been seen to involve the 
present awareness of a former conscious experience, a state of mind which Tulving 
referred to as autonoetic consciousness (Tulving, 1983, 1985; Wheeler, Stuss, & Tulving, 
1997). The accounts by the healthy sample supported this notion as the subjective 
memory characteristics very much reflected a re-lived experience. However, this was in 
stark contrast to that of the sub clinically depressed sample. One component noted to 
hold a significant relation to re-living past experiences is visual imagery, a (cf. Brewer, 
1996; Larsen, 1998; Rubin, 1998; Rubin, Burt, & Fifield 2003; Rubin & Greenberg,
2003); as it has been argued that one function of the process of recollection is to separate 
imagining (or dreaming) from autobiographical memory. Experiment 2a showed that, 
within the given sample, imagery was not seen to account for AMS variance, thus 
supporting the ability of the AMT to adequately report memory deficits relative to 
imagery deficits within a sub-clinical sample.
Belief is another central feature in autobiographical memory (e.g. Brewer, 1996),
and is a variable that can better be related to the proposed role of AMS deficits as a form
of functional avoidance. That is, if an individual is fused with die content of their past
experience, i.e. has a strong belief in the content, avoidant coping strategies are more
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likely to be implemented. In this regard it was found that emotional avoidance was 
related to specificity of past positive events and levels of depression. With imagery ruled 
out as a factor it may be inferred that the subjective differences observed were due to sub 
clinically depressed participants experiencing fusion with the content of past events, and 
as such emotional avoidance may impact the belief in the experiences, i.e. avoidance of 
past events which do not ‘fit’ with current self-perceptions or future expectations. 
Previous research has documented that belief in memories are predicted by depression 
levels (i.e. the Beck Depression Inventory) and dissociation (i.e. the Dissociative 
Experience Scale) (e.g. Rubin, Schrauf & Grenneberg, 2003). Rubin et al. (2003) found 
that improved contact with past experiences, as subjectively reported (e.g. pertaining to 
clarity, frequency and detail), was related to individual differences in autobiographical 
memory per se, though visual imagery was not found to be related to belief in memory, 
nor did they find any relations with regards to subjective differences in belief in these 
memories. The authors were not able to explain these findings and referred to 
shortcoming in the cognitive measures used in an effort to clarify their results. However, 
these findings are relevant to the current thesis, as it is argued herein that the strength of 
belief in cognitions, past or future, is a relevant indicator of depression progression. 
Specifically, the AMT as a measure was unable to offer further insight to the relationship 
between strength of belief and depression in relation to emotional avoidance. Such 
directionality and belief in past experiences may be a relevant feature which warrants 
further attention. Indeed, Andersen et al. (1992; Andersen, 1990; Andersen & Lyon, 
1987) has argued that hopelessness develops once a degree of certainty is established 
regarding private cognitions.
Autobiographical memories are multifaceted in their construction, typically 
evoked due to personal relevance and involving vision, hearing, smell, taste, touch etc 
(e.g., Willander & Larsson, 2006; Rusted, Marsh, Bledski, & Sheppard, 1997; Johnson, 
1988; Larsen, 1998). As such some limitations have been noted pertaining to evoking 
autobiographical past events in an experimental setting (i.e. Experiments la, 2a, 10, 11 
and 14). By cued recall in an experimental setting many of the natural sensory
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facilitators are not produced and as such may limit the understanding of how the past 
events are experienced. Furthermore, the multifaceted construct of autobiographical 
memory means that the self is not a ‘single entity’ (Conway & Pleydell-Pearce, 2000), 
rather the perception of the self is spread across diffuse subjective organizations of 
events. The stability of an individual’s self image resolves from the relations formed 
between these organizations and contextual cues; as such, in many cases, much of what is 
‘remembered’ as part of a personal ‘life story’ is likely common cultural knowledge 
about the life course. This common knowledge can often be endorsed by social and 
cultural expectations, rather than personal autobiographical memory (Bemtsen & Rubin,
2004). The brief content analysis of the past experiences reported relates well to this 
suggestion, and as such the AMT may have been subjected to such self-reports of more 
socially expected experiences. However, the group difference in specificity of positive 
past events still marks an important relation to depression. First, a reduced rate of past 
positive experiences would be a central risk factor in depression. And second, the 
perceived belief that there was a reduction in such past positive experiences, as facilitated 
by emotional avoidance of contacting such past events, would likely influence cognitions 
about present and future circumstances thus also serving as a vulnerability factor.
8.3.2 Future Thinking in Depression
A clear valence bias was observed, across the two FCT Experiments (lb and 2b)
in Chapter 2; this finding is consistent with the current proposal that reduced contact with
positive future cognitions are indicative of depression. The sub clinically depressed
individuals were notably seen to differ from the healthy individuals in regards to positive
event specificity relative to specificity of negative future events. In the early literature
pertaining to FES, much as in the AMS literature, valence differences were not notably
recognised per se, with overall specificity in recall and future projection more generally
reported. Thus the procedural shift towards examining valence specific effects is
supported by the present experiments. The relevance of accounting for valence specific
effects have more commonly been noted in research with the Future Thinking Task,
pertaining to reduced positive future expectancy, relative to increased negative future
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expectancy as associated with future hopelessness (e.g. MacLeod, Pankhania, Lee, &
Mitchell, 1997). As such the valences of cognition have been strongly linked with
depression and hopelessness, in particular reduced positive cognitions. The clear valence
discrepancy observed across the two separate experiments (lb and 2b) warrants attention,
as it is inferred that the FCT may not be sensitive or specific in its relation to depression
without considering such valence specific effects. The accounts of the subjective
experience of the future events generated in Experiment lb and 2b supports this, as the
phenomenological characteristics (as measured by the FCQ) specifically points to a more
objectified perception of positive future events as experienced by the sub clinically
depressed samples. No previous research has reported on differences in
phenomenological characteristics in future thinking between depressed and non-
depressed individuals, nor on between subject experiences in clinical and healthy
samples per see, as the focus has been on differences of the within participant experience
of past relative to future events (c.f. D’Argembeau & Van der Linden, 2004). As such,
the between group results of phenomenological characteristics in Experiment lb and 2b
are novel, and significantly contributes to understanding of the valance findings with the
FCT. Notably, the sub clinically depressed individuals overall responses to the FCQ
indicated deficiencies in perception of positive future events. Taking into account that
future oriented thinking (valence was not reported), as accounted for by healthy student
samples, come to mind around 59 times per day (i.e. equivalent to once every 16 minutes
within a cycle of 16 waking hours) (D’Argembeau et al., 2009), it may be inferred that
the reduced consideration of positive events by the sub clinically depressed sample, in
the present series of experiments, support previous notions of reduced positive future
thought as implying vulnerability to depression. Subsequently, the depressed sample
reported positive future events as less likely to occur in the proximate future, relative to
their healthy counterparts (e.g. MacLeod et al., 1996). If episodic future thoughts direct
behaviour, constructing detailed accounts of events that are perceived as unlikely to
occur for some time is not efficient (Spreng & Levine, 2006). As such the lack of detail
presented by the depressed individuals may be due to a lack of belief that such future
events are likely to occur in the near future. As such, generation of more proximate
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future events would likely be more detailed due to the influence of the current context 
relative to distant future events (Szpunar & McDermott, 2008), thus the reduced level of 
generating more proximate events, as well as a lack of detail in positive future events, 
may indicate a (perceived) lack of recent past positive events within the sub clinically 
depressed sample.
Similarly to its proposed function in reliving past experiences, visual imagery has 
been linked to individual differences in the construction of hypothetical future episodes 
(D’Argembeau & Vander Linden, 2006). Experiment 2b examined visual imagery as a 
potential confounding variable in accounting for the FES discrepancy noted in 
Experiment lb, and found that, independent of depression levels, those who 
demonstrated high imagery abilities were less specific in generation of negative future 
events. This is not surprising given the fact that the vivid construction of painful future 
events is generally difficult. However, judgments about the future may have been 
facilitated by automatic relations with personal schemas as a brief content analysis 
revealed that the constructed future events were schema-consistent relative to more 
elaborative personal accounts of future events. It is inferred that automatic execution of 
schema based descriptions would reduce the specificity of future events as these are not 
being sufficiently pre-experienced in their construction. An alternative explanation for 
the reduced specificity by those high in imagery may be that more deliberate mood 
regulation strategies were implemented, i.e. in an effort to avoid the negative 
connotations related to the emerging image so as to restore a positive bias in regards to 
future expectations (Taylor & Brown, 1988). Thus two independent arguments arise from 
these findings relating to inferences of implicit (automatic) and explicit (reflective and 
deliberate) processing in relation to depression vulnerability. Although visual imagery 
has been noted as ‘interesting’ in relation to episodic future thought (e.g., Norem & 
Illingworth, 1993; Quoidbach, Hansenne, & Mottet, 2008; Quoidbach, Hansenne, & 
Mikolajczak, 2010; Zimbardo & Boyd, 1999) it has been granted little focus in the 
clinical literature, thus the lack of previous research in this area renders it difficult to
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sufficiently interpret the results from Experiment 2b and further research is need in this 
regard.
8.3.3 Future Expectancy
In an attempt to target personal future expectancy with the Future Thinking Task
(e.g. MacLeod et al., 1993; 1996) no group differences emerged between the sub-
clinically depressed and non-depressed individuals. The FTT literature specifically looks
for an interaction effect between valence and group, predicting that depressed individuals
will present with reduced positive future anticipation relative to non-depressed
individuals. In the current set of experiments (Experiments 3, 9 and 15) no such
interaction emerged for the FTT index score, nor was it observed for the expectancy or
feeling values. However, the fluency value did approach significance for the valence and
group interaction. Given that there have been some inconsistencies in findings with non-
clinical samples on the FTT, with some studies reporting the same interaction effect as
obtained in clinical samples (MacLeod & Salaminiou, 2001; MacLeod, Pankhania, Lee,
& Mitchell, 1997; MacLeod, Tata, Kentish, & Jacobsen, 1997), whereas others are
unable to replicate such effects (e.g., depressed patients: Butler & Mathews, 1983;
MacLeod et al., 1997; dysphoric students: Andersen, Spielman, & Bargh, 1992;
Pietromonaco & Markus, 1985), the present series of experiments may be able to shed
some light on this inconsistency. That is, it was found that the most commonly analysed
and reported variable in previous FTT experiments, i.e. fluency in the number of future
events generated, consistently contrasted the other FTT variables within the given
samples (i.e. future expectancy and future event affect). Furthermore, high levels of
avoidance were found to be related to increased expectancy of negative events occurring,
with emotional avoidance seen to differ significantly between groups, with the sub
clinically depressed individuals reporting greater use of avoidant strategies; thus it may
be inferred that the FTT expectancy value may be more sensitive in detection of sub-
clinical levels of depression relative to fluency, although notably this was not reflected in
analysis of the raw data, as the expectancy variable did not discriminate between groups
in relation to depression levels per se. Furthermore, a review by Taylor (1991) support
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the consistency of the expectancy variable as opposed to fluency, as it was found that 
negative events (e.g. cognitive, behavioural, and emotional) obtain faster and more 
robust responses relative to positive events. It has been reported that anticipated negative 
events might also produce such an effect (MacLeod, Tata, Tyler, Schmidt, Davidson, & 
Thompson, 2005). As such it has been proposed that the number of events generated per 
se may be less relevant in regards to negative expectancies as the emotional influence is 
elicited more rapidly; that is, negative affect is less fluctuating and more enduring which 
means the image of a few negative future events has a strong effect on the individuals 
anticipation of the future. Whereas the more gradual approach for positive events means 
the emotional influence is reached less rapidly and as such is more accumulative 
(MacLeod et al., 2005). Thus the relationship between emotional avoidance and negative 
expectancy may be due to the use of such mood regulation coping strategies to monitor 
the impact of the anticipated negative events generated. In fact, such mood regulation 
strategies would likely see an initial increase in the generation of positive future events 
due to the suppression of negative content. However, as previously noted, such strategies, 
functional as they may be in the short term, are related to increased psychological 
distress in the long-term. Longitudinal and follow up studies would be able to 
discriminate this effect and offer further insight on the progressive role of emotional 
avoidance as a coping strategy in depression over time.
It is important to further examine the processes underlying expectancy in future
thinking, particularly in relation to findings where perceived expectancy of negative
outcomes has been noted as strong predictors of avoidance behaviour in anxious patients
(Warren, Zgourides, & Jones, 1989), whereas low expectancy of positive outcomes is a
strong predictor of hopelessness (MacLeod et al., 2005). Given the focus on varying
valence effects it is surprising that mood influences have previously been left
unaccounted for in many experiments. Experiment 4 found that induced positive and
negative mood did affect the number of events generated, with the negative mood
induction demonstrating an increased number of negative events generated by
participants within this group. Whereas the participants exposed to the positive mood
induction produced more positive events within this group and in relation to the negative
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mood induction group. The FTT fluency responses were seen to differ following the
induced mood (Positive mood group: Positive Fluency, M= 7.27; Negative Fluency, M=
3.66; Negative Mood group: Positive Fluency, M= 4.39; Negative Fluency, M= 4.90), in
relation to that of healthy participants who received no intervention in Experiments 3, 9
and 15 (collated mean across the three groups: Positive Fluency, M= 5.97; Negative
Fluency, M= 4.39), with the positive mood group demonstrating an inflated number of
positive future events and a reduced number of negative future events relative to the no
intervention groups. The negative mood group demonstrated an inverse pattern to the
positive mood group, where in relation to the no-intervention groups an increased
number of negative events were generated and a reduced number of positive events.
However, mood was not found to affect the expectancy values reported. These findings
are consistent with previous research looking at mood effects on the FTT, although these
studies only considered mood effects on fluency (Hepbum, Bamhofer & Williams, 2006;
de Jong-Meyer et al., 2007). An interesting finding emerged with the feeling ratings,
where it was found that the negative mood induction led to ratings of perceived mood for
future events being raised for positive and negative events. That is, relative to the
positive mood induction group, the negative mood group reportedly expected to feel
more positive in anticipated future events. Some researchers have suggested that negative
mood may lead to a more analytical and logical approach to ‘problem solving’ and other
cognitive tasks (e.g. Forgas, 1998; Schwarz, 1990). In this regard the current finding may
be interpreted as the negative mood group approaching the future events from a more
analytical point of view, where the current mood facilitated more ‘logical’ assessment of
potential future events. However, there are implications for this finding in regards to the
fluency reports, as this even more clearly demonstrates how the fluency measure is
inconsistent with findings from the separate FTT variables, and may indeed be causing
false reports of findings. That is, it is demonstrated in Experiment 4 that the feeling and
expectancy values report variances which are inconsistent to those of a depressed
individual, thus detecting a fluctuating mood, whereas the fluency report indicates that
the variances are in line with those of a depressed person. In this regard by looking at
fluency alone it may be inferred that the pattern of responses are indicative of depression,
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however, when the variables are viewed together a more coherent picture emerges. To 
this end, Experiment 4 raises a relevant question pertaining to within participant 
differences noted on the FTT, as was seen, the two groups did differ in their responses 
and as a between group measure the FTT falsely determined the negative mood group as 
depressed relative to the positive mood group. However, looking at the within participant 
scores it is evident that, in all variables bar event fluency, the negative mood group 
demonstrated the valence difference noted as ‘healthy’, that is, the negative mood group 
still rated positive relative to negative future events as more likely to occur. In this regard 
the question of what constitutes a normative cut off point for the FTT in terms of looking 
at individual data sets arises. Especially, as to whether there needs to be a significant 
difference between valence categories to warrant a healthy/positive future outlook. As a 
proposed measure indicative of hopelessness there is no cut off point to suggest when an 
individual is demonstrating hopeless ideation per se. That is, a reduced positive future 
outlook is relative to individual differences, and as some individuals may produce two 
positive future events to one negative, it is unclear if this signifies a healthy or unhealthy 
future outlook. If the numbers become inversed, with more negative than positive events 
generated, it is proposed that this no longer reflects depression or hopelessness but is 
more indicative of anxiety. As such there may be some scope for clarification as to the 
degree of positive expectancy required in order to represent a healthy level of future 
optimism. Most measures operate on a continuum and are usually scored as ‘high’ or 
‘low’ with some indication of levels becoming of a more clinical range (e.g. the BDI, 
BHS).
In Experiment 5 a learned helplessness paradigm was employed in order to
systematically examine the expectancy component relative to more general future
thinking and fluency for future events. The induction demonstrated group differences
pertaining to the overall ability to generate events for the future, with the unsolvable task
group generating less positive and negative future events relative to those who completed
a solvable task. However, the valence effect was still present, with both groups reporting
more positive relative to negative future events. As such, as discussed in relation to the
mood induction in Experiment 4, on an individual level, participants in the unsolvable
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task group did not demonstrate a learned helplessness effect. The depressed mood 
induction did not affect the expectancy ratings of the likely occurrence of the future 
events generated. Thus, overall the results from Experiment 5 suggested that the learned 
helplessness effect was not evident at a group or an interaction level when looking at 
expectancy ratings relative to fluency for future events. One notable limitation arose 
from the mood and learned helplessness inductions pertaining to baseline measures. As 
the FTT was only completed following the inducted positive, negative and depressed 
mood comparisons cannot be made with a pre-induction response pattern on this 
measure. However, in the mood induction experiment both groups displayed similar 
mood levels prior to the tasks and reported good levels of psychological health with no 
notable group differences. In comparison to Experiment 3, where the healthy individuals 
provided evidence of healthy responses, the induced mood groups in Experiment 4 and 5 
show differing response patterns on the FTT, yet are of a similar population in regards to 
demographic and psychological measures. Thus it is inferred that in the two experiments 
it was in fact the mood induction that influenced the pattern of responses. Overall, the 
findings from the FTT were inconsistent with previous research which has obtained a 
more specific interaction effect for group and valence, pertaining to depressed 
individuals demonstrating reduced positive future expectancies. Specifically, the FTT 
was found to be influenced by mood and susceptible to false positive reports of induced 
depression levels.
8.3.4 The Relationship between Explicit Past and Future Thinking in Depression
Taken as a whole, participants were seen to generate similar responses pertaining
to specificity in past and future episodic thinking (as reported on the AMT and FCT,
Experiments la, lb, 2a and 2b), with the sub clinically depressed samples displaying
deficits on both measures relative to the healthy samples. Although, in relation to future
thinking group differences were seen more clearly in relation to valence of events, i.e.
positive future events, relative to past events. Emotional avoidance was seen to relate to
recall of positive past events and it is likely that the relation between past and future
thinking deficits stems from a lack of availability of such past positive events in
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construction of future positive events. These findings support the suggestion that 
vulnerability to depressive episodes may be marked by deficits pertaining to past and 
future relations. This was further supported by findings with the FTT in relation to the 
mood induction task (Experiment 4), where it was seen that recent recall of a positively 
valenced memory facilitated greater generation of such positive future events. Thus, 
suppression of positive experiences and rumination over past negative experiences likely 
impact on the ability to attend to cues which may facilitate positive future projection. 
These findings support the suggestion that emotional avoidance underlies the deficits 
observed in future thinking. However, the current experiments do not imply that this is 
related to episodic memory per se. In this regard it is likely that whether it is episodic or 
semantic information that is drawn upon in the construction of future events is affected 
by the accessibility of the relevant information, that is, the information which is first 
brought to mind is more likely to influence the content of future cognitions (Tversky & 
Kahneman, 1973; Kahneman & Tversky, 1982). It has been proposed that more abstract 
representations related to the context of the future event would be more accessible than 
episodic representations of similar information (Szpunar 2010). Indeed this proposal will 
be discussed further below in regards to the use of implicit measures where the individual 
response is based on personal past learning history combined with current contextual 
variables.
8.4 Implicit Future Thinking
The second aim of the thesis was to examine an implicit measure as an alternative 
to the current use of self report measures in the mental time travel literature. Notably 
previous research conducted in these domains has made extensive use of explicit 
measures, however as noted in Experiments 3 and 4, such methods are susceptible to 
demand characteristics and mood effects, and recent debates question the accessibility of 
more automatic cognitions via such measurements. Chapter 4 described the development 
of a robust and accurate implicit measure of positive future expectations in depression
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(i.e. the FT-IRAP). Chapter 5 further sought to compare the sensitivity and specificity of 
this new implicit measure with the currently used explicit past and future thinking 
measures.
8.4.1 Implicitness
One implication in the comparison of the tasks within this thesis refers to the 
nature of ‘implicitness’. De Houwer and colleagues (De Houwer & Moors, 2007; De 
Houwer, Tiege-Mocigemba, Spruyt, & Moors, 2009) have noted that implicit measures 
can be implicit in different ways, and separate automaticity elements may not be 
presented within a given measure (De Houwer et al., 2009). A recent meta-analysis 
included measures that were considered to have at least one automatic attribute (Moors et 
al., 2010), as indicated by empirical evidence or deduction (Phillips, Hine, & 
Thorsteinsson, 2010). The FTT was included in this meta-analysis as it was considered to 
be implicit in the sense of ‘efficient and fast’; i.e. De Houwer and Moors (2007) have 
noted that responses under time pressure are reasonably linked with other implicitness 
features such as being uncontrolled. However, it was found that the FTT may ‘tolerate 
too much conscious awareness’ and as such generate an overlap with measures of 
explicit processing (Phillips, Hine, & Thorsteinsson, 2010). This is consistent with 
findings within the thesis, with the FTT seen as unable to demonstrate the same level of 
efficiency as the FT-IRAP in detection of implicit cognitions, as well as in regards to the 
demonstrable mood influence found for the FTT. Overall the meta-analysis by Phillips, 
Hine and, & Thorsteinsson (2010) found insufficient empirical evidence to confidently 
categorize measures as implicit or not. However, it would be important to further clarify 
and catalog implicit features of measures, as this would assist further research in regards 
to the methodologies chosen as well as the interpretation of data of implicit depressive 
cognitions.
8.4.2 Future Thinking Implicit Relational Assessment Procedure
The FT-IRAP demonstrated good utility in relation to depressive and hopeless
ideation, as an adequate level of sensitivity and specificity was found in regards to
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categorization of group membership at a sub-clinical level (Experiments 6, 9, 10 and 16). 
The FT-IRAP was further found to be resistant to mood effects (Experiment 7) and 
sufficiently responsive in an experiment of analogue depressed mood (Experiment 8). 
Overall, it was seen that the FT-IRAP effect suitably reported responses indicative of 
established behavioural characteristics in relation to future expectancy. These results are 
encouraging and address many of the shortcomings seen in more explicit self-report 
measures. For example, explicit measures have been reported as affected by mood states 
(as was the FTT in Chapter 3). The finding that the FT-IRAP is resistant to mood effects 
further supports the suggestion that implicit measures more readily target latent 
cognitions indicative of subjective behavioural characteristics. Furthermore, 
inconsistencies within research utilizing the FTT have lead to an ambiguous picture of 
the role of reduced positive future thinking in sub-clinical samples, and indeed question 
the efficacy of more direct measures of future thinking (i.e. the FTT) as a suitable 
method within such populations. The two future thinking measures (FTT vs. FT-IRAP) 
were directly compared in Experiment 9, where it was seen that the FT-IRAP was a 
stronger predictor of group membership for depressed and healthy individuals relative to 
the FTT. This finding has implications for research utilizing the FTT in samples of 
vulnerable individuals such as paracuicidals, where overt verbal reports of hopeless and 
suicidal intentions are restricted, and as such the FT-IRAP may be suitable in meeting the 
need for more implicit recognition of such cognitions without enforcing self-report. This 
is particularly relevant in recognition of such cognitions being ‘hidden’ from the 
vulnerable individual, as explicit recognition (i.e. conscious awareness) of such 
cognitions may not have occurred. The results from Experiment 9 support suggestions of 
explicit and implicit procedures reflecting the same behavioural functions, and rather that 
the divergence between findings from implicit and explicit measures pertain to explicit 
measures allowing for conscious deliberation and ‘denial’ of automatic evaluations 
which do not cohere with the more elaborate and extended relational responding (cf. 
Hughes et al., 2010 for a discussion). In this regard, a task such as the FT-IRAP may 
facilitate the early therapeutic intervention stages by reflection on individual behavioural
response patterns related to depression and suicidality not verbally reported.
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The FT-IRAP results further support the current literature pertaining to reduced
positive future outlook as a significant feature in depression and hopelessness ideation. It
was clearly demonstrated that, at a sub-clinical level, participants demonstrating reduced
implicit expectations of positive future experiences were also likely to display increased
levels of depression. Furthermore, the relation between emotional avoidance and reduced
positive future expectancy can be linked to the relationship between autobiographical
memory and implicit future expectancy. That is, greater emotional avoidance
independently, and in the context of personal past content, was seen to relate to reduced
responding in accordance to an optimistic future outlook on the FT-IRAP. This relation
was further strengthened by increased negative AMS and decreased positive implicit
future thinking both resulting from increased awareness (i.e. focused attention) (Chapter
6, Experiments 11 and 13), where the AMT and FT-IRAP measures reflected an
increased willingness to experience negative past and future content respectively. Overall
individuals who were specific in their recall of past events also reported stronger implicit
relations with positive future experiences. Thus, the functional role of reduced specificity
in recall to avoid affective content, and autobiographical experiences in future thinking,
was supported. The implication of negative or reduced positive future expectancies has
been noted in a range of psychological disturbances, with a common approach in therapy
being to try to alter such expectancies. It has been proposed that future expectancies
constitute a prearranged knowledge construction that can become automatized (e.g.
Andersen, Spielman, & Bargh, 1992), with more global expectancies operating as
schemas that may facilitate or inhibit healthy psychological functioning with assessments
of these targeted in several instruments (e.g. Scheier & Carver, 1985). The FT-IRAP
provides a measure of future expectancies that does not seem to strongly rely on
introspection or on conscious access to a restricted account of representation of past
experience. In this regard the FT-IRAP shows resistance to methodical measurement
issues found with subjective recall or external influence in accounts of past behaviours.
Additionally, the Dirap measure may provide a guide of established relations about the
future that may automatically direct behaviours. Approaches in cognitive psychology
have emphasized the centrality of such automatic cognitions in both etiology and
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treatment of psychopathology. The FT-IRAP has a clear, theoretically interpretable 
structure and good test-retest reliability. Its nomological network follows logically from 
its conceptualization as a measure of general positive and negative expectancies. It also 
has good discriminant validity with the FT-IRAP able to detect depression and 
hopelessness in a sample of sub-clinically depressed individuals.
In addition, the fact that FT-IRAP ‘optimism’ and FT-IRAP ‘pessimism’ (as 
discriminated by the D ir a p -p o s  a n d  D ir a p -n e g  variables) differentially predicted individual 
differences indicates that the directionality of relations offered by investigating separate 
constructs of the FT-IRAP may offer greater links to theoretical underpinnings. At the 
time of their first approach to treatment, individuals are often experiencing difficult life 
events as well as emotionally laden feelings such as worries pertaining to their situation 
and confusion related to the experience of psychological distress. In such scenarios it 
may be difficult to gain the ‘objective’ perspective required to help them in identifying 
and defusing from such maladaptive cognitions and expectancies. And as such this is 
likely a target in therapy. An implicit assessment tool, such as the FT-IRAP, may in this 
regard offer a way to assess the strength and direction of such automatic schemas in 
order to increase awareness of these cognitions. As such it is felt that the FT-IRAP is 
well suited as a measure of relatively automatic future expectancies and its exploration 
for continued and expanded use is recommended with further investigation and 
application in clinical samples. One suggestion may also be to include the use of 
personally relevant target stimuli to investigate if different responses may be obtained in 
this context. For example, personal values as measured by the Personal Values 
Questionnaire (Blackledge & Ciarrochi, 2006) may be particularly relevant targets. 
Chapter 4 raised some potential clinical implications whereof results from Experiments 
6, 7 and 8 suggest that positive expectancies may be a specific behavioural target in 
treatment approaches. One advantage of the FT-IRAP is that the responses provide 
concrete suggestions that could be incorporated into clinical interventions such as the 
recognition of personal goals and values. As such, the present results emphasize positive 
future expectancy as central in depression and hopeless ideation in a sub-clinical
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population -  which may go some way towards supporting Williams (2001, 2005)‘Cry of 
Pain’ model, detailing how in the absence of rescue factors, perceived entrapment may 
lead to hopeless ideation. Thus, further adding to the self-regulation model (Carver & 
Scheier, 1998) which proposes that the ability to relate to (as well as pursue and attain) 
future goals is essential in facilitating flexibility in self-directed behaviour.
8.4.3 The Relationship between Implicit Future Expectancy and Explicit Measures of 
Past and Future Thinking
One aim within this line of research was to examine the relationship between 
implicit and explicit measures of future thinking. Previous research pertaining to such 
implicit -  explicit comparisons have found that when adequate resources are available to 
facilitate subjective behavioural observation, self report measures may be useful in the 
prediction of such behaviours, although when such introspection is inhibited, as is often 
the case in regards to determining psychological distress, more implicit measures have 
been seen to predict behaviour over and above self report (e.g. impulsive vs. self 
regulatory behavior; Freise, Hofmann, & Wanke, 2008). Some researchers have worked 
from the point of view that implicit and explicit measures target unrelated and 
independently formed evaluations; with automatic evaluations believed to be more ‘trait’ 
like and stemming from early learning experiences (e.g. De Hart, Pelham, & Tennen, 
2006; Rudman, 2004); with contextual relations considered as mere noise factors 
interfering with a person’s ‘true’ beliefs. However, as has been observed in the foregoing 
Experiments (11-13) brief mindfulness tasks were able to shift the direction of response 
patterns for the AMT, the FTT and the FT-IRAP. As such both the explicit and implicit 
tasks were susceptible to contextual changes, which render future expectancy unlikely to 
be a stable trait. These findings are in line with previous research with AMS and future 
thinking, which have been found to be modifiable. The results lend further support to the 
postulate that implicit and explicit attitudes are structurally similar, but may be 
independently acquired through targeting separate processing levels (e.g. Fazio & 
Towles-Schwen, 1999; Olson & Fazio, 2009). As reported (see Sections 1.3.4 and 1.7.2 ) 
the Relational Elaboration and Coherence (REC) Model (Bames-Holmes et al., 2010)
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offers some light on the relationship between implicit and explicit attitudes, by proposing 
that when formed under time-pressure, implicit responding, such as the FT-IRAP effect, 
is motivated largely by instant and comparatively brief relational responses, while 
responses on explicit measures reflect contact with more extended and contextually 
consistent relational networks (Hughes, Bames-Holmes, & De Houwer, 2010). The REC 
model proposes relational coherence as a likely variable accounting for the diverge 
sometimes observed between explicit and implicit measures:
‘A relational network is said to cohere when all of the individual elements 
relate to each other in a manner that is consistent with the reinforcement 
history typically provided by the verbal community for such relational 
responding. According to RFT, the verbal community constantly 
reinforces coherence (and punishes incoherence) within relational 
networks, to the extent that relational coherence itself becomes a type of 
conditioned reinforcer for most language users’ (Hughes, Bames-Holmes, 
& De Houwer, 2010, p.32)
As such it has been suggested that the observed relations between implicit and explicit 
measures rely on contextual factors, such as the incentive and availability to intentionally 
elaborate on the responses required (Dovidio & Fazio, 1992). In this regard weak 
correlations have notably been found in studies of socially-sensitive attitudes (e.g. 
prejudice, Ziegert & Hanges, 2005). As such, the nature of the reports requested is 
relevant in research designs, pertaining to an individual’s true awareness of the 
underlying features, as self reports rely on responses being consciously accessible, as 
well as ‘socially acceptable’. One advantage of the IRAP methodology is that it has been 
shown that individuals are unable to consciously influence the level or direction of the 
IRAP effect, this was seen to hold true even after participants were provided with 
directions to do so (McKenna, Bames-Holmes, Bames-Holmes, & Stewart, 2007). 
Consequently, it is not surprising that discrepancies between the FTT and the FT-IRAP 
were observed.
Structural similarity has also been shown to be a variable that effects correlations 
between measures. For instance, Ajzen and Fishbein (1977) reported that structural 
similarity increased the strength of correlations between different explicit measures. The
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FT-IRAP stimuli stems from the FTT, and as such there exist similarities between the
two future thinking measures herein; however, it may be that the implicit nature of the
FT-IRAP, combined with more specifically targeting expectations about the future, i.e.
the strength of belief in such events occurring, is what renders the FT-ERAP more precise
in detection of depression relative to the FTT. For instance, it has been found that
responses in associative learning paradigms depend on the strength of belief in proposed
events relative to the targeted events per se (De Houwer, 2002). It is relevant to note here
that propositions are referred to in RFT research as ‘stimulus relations’ (Hughes, Bames-
Holmes, & De Houwer, 2010) and by De Houwer in the associative learning paradigm as
‘statements about a state of affairs, [that] refer not only to the presence of a relation
between events but also to the manner in which events are related’ (2009, p.3), and as
such are distinguished from associations as ‘unqualified links between representations’
(De Houwer, 2009, p.3). The IRAP methodology capitalizes on the focus of predictive
ability, and as such this may be what separates the two future thinking measures herein,
i.e. the lack of correlation between the FTT and the FT-IRAP. However, the FT-IRAP
and the AMT were found to correlate, suggesting that future cognitions extend on
relations generated on the basis of prior knowledge. For instance, when looking towards
the likely occurrence of a future event, individuals may consider similar past experiences
as a construct for how likely the event is to re-occur, with relevant structural details of
what is likely to occur. The fact that experience may inform associative learning, is not
challenged though awareness is raised in relation to associative learning effects as
obtained through subjective beliefs about events, that is, the extent to which propositions
about the events are believed to be true (De Houwer, 2009. Thus the focus on episodic
events in their own regard may not be of as much relevance as previously thought. As
such, previous experiences seem to influence future thinking only by their impact on the
truth evaluation of propositions, something which is facilitated via the IRAP
methodology. This postulate holds implications for the literature pertaining to episodic
memory as an underlying informant of episodic future thinking. As it may not be specific
past experiences per se that forms the expectancies, rather the relations drawn on a basis
of the belief that such past experiences were ‘true’. That is, the current framework
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pertaining to constructive episodic simulation (Schacter & Addis, 2007), propose
sampling of past experiences as likely in the generation of potential future experiences.
However, recent data by Szpunar (2010) implies that implicit memory may be implicated
in this process. Implicit memory, relative to episodic memory, is related to how
information from past experiences is utilized rather than to content specificity per se
(Szpunar, 2010). Implications of such findings pertain not to priming effects per se, e.g.
in regards to tasks such as ‘name ten capital cities’. However, the relevance lies in the
postulate that cognitions about the future have been seen as a source of information that
subsequently guides behaviour (Suddendorf & Corballis, 1997, 2007; Taylor, Pham,
Rivkin, & Armor, 1998; Taylor & Schneider, 1989). Szpunar (2010) thus propose recent
experiences as likely to implicitly influence the generation of future experiences in light
of how this past experience was perceived, i.e. as positive or negative, subsequently
guiding behavioural approach or avoidance. As was seen in the mood induction paradigm
in Experiment 4 recalling a positive or negative past event did affect the subsequent
generation of future events, with the future events generated congruent to the valence of
the past event recalled. However, this effect was not found with the FT-IRAP, thus
looking at future expectancy relative to specific events may be relevant. Although recent
experiences may implicitly bias future thinking content, as has been seen the use of even
brief mindfulness exercises may counterbalance this effect. Future research that
incorporates follow-up studies may be able to observe whether increased awareness of
the potential influences of recent experiences (i.e. implicit memory) in relation to future
thoughts will impact future behaviour. Importantly, this may warrant some further
consideration of the proposed construction of episodic future events. That is, past
experience appears to impact on the construction of future events, however, this
influence may not be limited to specificity of episodic memories. More accurately
mixtures of contextual, episodic and semantic details, as well as vicarious observations,
are likely to form expectations of future events. Anticipation of future outcomes is
understood to equally signify direct learning and vicarious observation of past events
(Goldman, 1999). Chapter 5 found that in direct comparison with the AMT, the FT-IRAP
was a better predictor of depression and hopelessness. As such the FT-IRAP, with its
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grounding in RFT, is able to account for such derived relations from vicarious 
experiences, whereas measures such as the AMT would miss out any relations which 
have not been directly experienced due to the inherent nature of the task requesting 
information from personal past experiences. Thus there may be some limitations seen in 
the use of measures that ignores contextual sources as influencing behaviour, relative to 
reliance of privately held feelings and emotions as the main sources of information 
drawn on by individuals. Overall, it seems likely that the results presented in Chapters 2, 
3, 4 and 5 reflect a single processing system of which implicit and explicit measures 
reflect different patterns of responding (e.g. Hughes et al., 2010) and as such it is likely 
that the results are due to procedural differences of the methods utilised. Although a clear 
pattern of similarity for the implicit and explicit future thinking tasks were observed the 
lack of a significant correlation is consistent with previous findings within the literature 
where for instance a comprehensive study into self-esteem found reduced correlations 
between implicit and explicit measures (e.g. Bosson et al., 2000).
8.5 Coping Strategies for Negative Past Experiences and altering Future Outlooks
The final aim of the current thesis sought to examine techniques that may 
increase awareness of implicit cognitions and alter cognitive vulnerability to depression. 
The effects of a brief mindfulness induction were explored in Chapter 6, whereas Chapter 
7 sought to examine past and future cognitions in relation to personal values following 
and depression. From the results in Chapter 3 (Experiments 4 and 5) it is known that 
under distress, i.e. as following recall of a personal past negative event, or a learned 
helplessness task, those who reported high levels of emotional avoidance, responded to 
such distress by overtly expressing an increased number of positive future experiences on 
the FTT. It was inferred therein that emotional avoidance, as a coping strategy, lead to 
the deliberate response of suppressing evaluations of future negative experiences by 
subsequently overemphasizing descriptions of positive future events. However, this same 
pattern was not found for implicit cognitions as assessed by the FT-IRAP, as such
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emotional avoidance may initially be shaped in the form of overt verbal behaviour, and 
with rehearsal may become relational and implicit in its form. The explicit and implicit 
responses only diverged for depressed/high emotional avoidance participants; thus 
discrepancies between implicit and explicit assessments may pertain the implicit task 
relations more strongly reflecting previous experiences and as such the past learning 
history of individuals, whereas the explicit task, reflects more recent experiences. 
Inconsistencies between past and present experiences may instigate thoughts of 
‘entrapment’, that is, a state of hopelessness as past experiences are not concurring to 
expectancies in the present moment, with escalating inferences of the future offering 
more of the same. As the future is progressive, the fact is that the present moment of 
today, or the future of tomorrow, will in a few days be the past events of last week, as 
such the direct and immediate effect of emotional avoidance on overt verbal behaviour, if 
rehearsed under a prolonged depressive mood state, becomes the experiences of the past 
which forms relations in implicit knowledge of self. In this regard it is apparent that past 
and future thinking is related, that this relationship may become dysfunctional following 
use of inefficient coping strategies, and that this relationship is additive through natural 
temporal progression. Inconsistent self-perception in relation to the future may as such be 
a marker in depression relative to positive vs. negative outlook per se. That is, emotional 
avoidance may incur as a result of inconsistencies in implicit and explicit future outlook, 
and may be vital in regards to the progressive course of depression. It is thus imperative 
that individuals who experience depressive mood become aware of the cognitions and 
coping strategies which may be shaping their future behaviour
8.5.1 Parti: Willingness to Experience Negative Content
Techniques which encourage observing thoughts and feelings as passing events,
relative to attributing these cognitions as personal, or a set reality, has gained much
interest in regards to research on depression and hopelessness ideation (e.g. Teasdale et
al., 1995; Segal et al., 2002). The postulate behind these techniques is that the
significance of such cognitions will be perceived as less threatening, which subsequently
leads to reduced psychological suffering and the impact of emotional distress. In this
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regard language based procedures, that consider the complexity of private cognitive 
accounts (e.g., Labouvie-Vief, Chiodo, Goguen, Diehl, & Orwoll, 1995), and 
autobiographical recall (e.g., Moore, Hayhurst, & Teasdale, 1996) have been noted as 
useful paradigms for investigating if acceptance facilitates a change in the context of ‘the 
event’ (Peterson & Reiss, 1992, 1993). In Chapter 6 a mindfulness induction (i.e. a 
Focused Attention task) proved effective in increasing willingness to experience negative 
content across three separate experiments; with participants reporting greater decentering 
(measured by the TMS) relative to the comparative group who completed an Unfocused 
Attention induction. The results thus support increased awareness of cognitions leading 
to a contextual change which sees negative cognitions as less threatening. Specifically, 
greater overall AMS was found for the Focused Attention group, with a notable increase 
in AMS in relation to past negative events; as previous experiments (e.g. la, 2a and 9) 
only found group differences in relation to AMS in recall of positive past events. 
Similarly, in Experiment 12, the FTT responses showed the Focused Attention group as 
reporting more negative events for the future, greater expectancy of negative future 
events occurring and increased levels of negative affect in the likelihood of these 
negative events occurring relative to the Unfocused Attention group. Although, only 
expectancy of negative events was found to be statistically significant, the pattern of i 
responses is markedly different to that of the healthy participants in previous experiments 
(i.e. 3 and 10) who more strongly endorsed positive future expectancies. The FT-IRAP
I
also found that there was a general trend by the Focused Attention group to be more ! 
flexible in their responses to the inconsistent trials where the trials requiring acceptance 
of negative future events were endorsed, relative to the Unfocused Attention group. 
Overall, across the experiments, the mindfulness induction was seen to facilitate 
psychological flexibility by increased engagement with negative content. These findings 
are consistent with Arch and Craske (2006) who found that a focused attention task 
increased acceptance of and willingness to endure unpredictable, negative stimuli. 
Furthermore, the results are in line with the clinical approach of Acceptance and 
Commitment Therapy, which suggests that the outcome is not to directly change
:
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psychological events; rather the focus is on shifting the function of, as well as the relation 
to distressing events (Hayes, Luoma, Bond, Masuda, & Lillis, 2006).
Two relevant issues arise from the findings within Chapter 6. First, if a 
demonstrable positive bias exists, examining decentering effects in a healthy sample is 
particularly relevant as it offers the opportunity for individuals to engage more readily 
with negative content. This is relevant as if the mindfulness exercise is not demonstrable 
at this level - interpretation of an effect would be difficult in a clinical sample. The 
foregoing experiments support the postulate of an optimistic/positivity bias in healthy 
samples, with healthy participants consistently, across task (i.e. the AMT, FCT, FTT and 
FT-IRAP) and experiments (la, lb, 2a, 2b, 3, 6, 9, 10, 14, 15 and 16) demonstrating such 
a positivity bias in their responses. Second, as awareness and acceptance of negative 
content will likely initially lead to an increase in reporting of such cognitions, merely 
looking at the quantity of negative events/expectancies could be wrongly interpreted. 
Given that such an increase would likely lead to an inflated number of reported negative 
events, e.g. on the FTT, methodological assessment following mindfulness tasks needs 
clarification. This is particularly pertinent given the fact that with the AMT and FTT 
responses pertaining to ‘positive-more’ and ‘negative-less’ are indicative of 
psychological health, thus increased reporting of negative future events may be taken as a 
dysfunctional future outlook. This notion adds to the importance of looking at the content 
in context, rather than by valence, and the ability to defuse from valence per se to allow 
for experiencing the event fully. In this regard MacLeod et al.’s suggestion that reduced 
positive future thought is functionally different to increased negative thought may 
constitute a valid presentation of this valence quandary, as here the experience of the 
event is somewhat targeted relative to valence in its own right. Although, without clear 
focus on the function of the experience, i.e. by priming the events as positive or negative, 
the FTT is inadvertently facilitating an evaluative condition where the content becomes 
the focus due to the nature of questioning where the request is for an experience related 
to valence categories. That is, by asking participants to think of something they ‘look 
forward to’ the experience needs to be evaluated as either positive or negative before it is
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reported, and as such the individual has to engage in an elaborative process related to the 
experience. In this regard the expectancy value is ‘contaminated’ by the elaborative 
process, i.e. with the event already evaluated as ‘positive’ or ‘negative’ the expectancy 
value is likely not novel. The Focused Attention task did generate differences between 
groups on the FTT, though the expectancy value did not add to this interpretation. It is 
likely that the mindfulness induction was able to inhibit this elaborative process and 
allowed for greater experience of the anticipated event, as reflected in the increased 
representation of negative future expectations. The FT-IRAP responses were equally 
seen to benefit from such elaborative inhibition, even at the implicit level, thus 
demonstrating that decentering extends to targeting implicit cognitions generally 
believed to be less elaborative in their construct. The focused attention task appears able 
to contribute to positive conscious expectancies being retained, but also directly increase 
decentering by facilitating monitoring of their private implicit responses. As such, 
conscious awareness of implicit responses that are incompatible with their explicit goals 
would likely lead to corrective explicit processing. The current findings are in line with 
emerging evidence from acceptance and mindfulness based interventions in clinical 
research, which have demonstrated that private cognitions can be targeted by 
mindfulness exercises in order to increase contact with private cognitions without 
arousing distress (e.g. Bach & Hayes, 2002; Feldman, Harley, Kerrigan, Jacobo, & Fava, 
2009). Taken together, the current experiments, and previous clinical studies, imply that 
approaches which promote mindfulness and acceptance may shift the way that 
individuals respond to private thoughts and emotions, and potentially render such 
cognitions less upsetting.
Given that mindfulness is a general ability prospective benefits may arise from 
its’ examination in a range of populations (Brown, Ryan, & Creswell, 2007), i.e. 
successful results have been noted in samples of undergraduate students (Shapiro, 
Brown, & Astin, 2008), as in the current experiments, as well as in more generic non- 
clinical samples (Chiesa & Serretti, 2009). Participant adherence to experimental 
instructions and procedures may be a concern in such tasks with participants being
466
novice mediators’, however subjective adherence reports of explicit following of 
instructions for the Focused and Unfocused Attention tasks in Experiments 11-13, 
support the observed mindfulness induction and decentering reports which were found to 
be consistent across all three experiments and tasks. Further research is warranted with 
clinical samples before the findings can be generalised to individuals with more severe 
depression and hopelessness. Overall, the series of experiments presented in Chapter 6 
adds to the evidence supporting mindfulness as a potential process that may facilitate 
acceptance of past and future negative cognition. Additionally, the current Experiments 
(11-13) add to the clinical literature by examining the immediate effect of a specific 
mindfulness meditation practice on decentering. This is important as most acceptance 
and mindfulness based approaches contain many components and as such these 
experiments may aid in the process of singling out relevant effects related to the different 
exercises available (Roemer & Orsillo, 2003).
8.5.2 Part II: Personal Values
Chapter 7 found that across three experiments (14-16) depressed participants
reported lower levels of appetitive reasoning relative to a sample of non-depressed
participants. This is further supported by between group differences observed in
Experiments 14 and 16, where it was found that depressed participants reported greater
use of avoidant reasoning. One could assume that social desirability may explain the high
frequency with which appetitive reasons were endorsed by the non-depressed group, but
the fact that there are group differences, with the depressed individuals less likely to
endorse appetitive reasons for their values choices, indicates that there was a level of
truthful reporting on this measure. As avoidant reasoning was also seen to correlate with
depression and hopelessness levels within these experiments, further indications merge
of the respondents’ willingness to disclose endorsing the items from an honest and
reflective point of view. Thus, suggesting that social desirability may have played a
limited role in these subjective accounts. This is further supported by findings from
Experiment 15 where lower levels of emotional avoidance were associated with reports
of appetitive reasoning in values following. No relation was found between emotional
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avoidance and pliant reasoning, thus it may be this item was a more likely result of social 
desirability. In this regard it may be inferred that reports of following values for personal 
reasoning, be it appetitive or avoidant, are more easily accounted for and justified. 
However, it may also, and quite likely, be that individuals are not explicitly aware of the 
role of other external influences on their behaviours, thus emphasising the relevance of 
values clarification in targeting behaviour change.
Also consistent across the experiments was the lack of group difference found for 
values importance, something which may be taken in support of the proposal that 
depressed or suicidal individual’s may be painfully engaged with their goals, i.e. where 
people are attached to goals that they see as important even though they may not be able 
to see how to achieve such goals (MacLeod & Conway, 2007). That is, suicidals (e.g. 
MacLeod & Conway, 2007; Vincent, Boddana, & MacLeod, 2004) or those high in 
hopelessness more generally (Hadley & MacLeod, 2009), were reported by Macleod and 
colleagues to have goals but show reduced expectancy of such goals transpiring. This 
postulate is supported in the present series of experiments by the findings across two of 
the experiments (i.e. 14 and 16) where significance was found between groups for the 
‘Total Values Discrepancy’ variable, indicative of depressed participants being more 
likely to report reduced success at living values noted as important, relative to the non- 
depressed individuals. This further demonstrates the importance of values clarification, 
as belief in future happiness, fulfillment, and even a sense of self-worth appear to be 
contingent on particular goals being achieved. Although a likely and powerful force for 
retaining a goal, this is an unhealthy approach given the unlikely obtainment of such 
goals. In the present experiments the sub clinically depressed samples rated values across 
domains as highly important, however, demonstrated a low level of positive future 
expectations. This discrepancy between outlook in relation to outcome and process may 
be inferred as a conflict reflected in different ways of attending to future experiences, i.e. 
there are beliefs about the future and mere fantasies. Whereas future beliefs are linked to 
planning all types of future outcomes and tackling obstacles, fantasies are noted as 
entirely positive in tone and mainly focus on the desired outcome being true (Oettingen
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& Mayer, 2002). The ‘problem’ with fantasies is that a focus on the outcome relative to 
the process of obtaining a goal is not linked with the motivation to actively behave 
towards obtaining personal goals. Thus, it is clear that sub clinically depressed 
individuals are able to present ideal outcomes, but as demonstrated by the FT-IRAP, a 
lack of belief in positive outcomes may be hindering the motivation needed to act in 
accordance to obtain these goals. Recent studies also support this postulate, e.g. Vincent, 
Boddana and MacLeod (2004) and Danchin, MacLeod and Tata (2010) found that 
parasuicidal individuals were able to think about the future in a very positive way, but 
demonstrated a lack of belief in the actual event being likely to occur. It was argued in 
these studies that this aversion to relinquish unobtainable goals was linked not only to the 
loss of a goal, but also the positive reinforcement gained when engaging in this purely 
confabulated future fantasy. This was noted even in the absence of belief that the event 
would occur. As such this demonstrates further the potential psychological distress 
related to a loss of present moment contact, and the role of mindfulness in values pursuit. 
One clinical implication derived from these findings is thus that an understanding of the 
quality and function of goals in values pursuit, as demonstrated at a sub-clinical level, is 
important in clarifying why some goals are endorsed and also why such goals or values 
may not be working in the valued direction. This is consistent with suggestions from the 
literature which has proposed that hopelessness reflects a state of having and believing in 
goals, yet experiencing helplessness in a response to the inability to relive oneself from 
dysfunctional goals pursuit (Melges & Bowlby, 1969). These results also link to theories 
pertaining to ‘conditional goal setting’ where it has been noted that participants believe 
that only achievement of the goal will bring happiness and well-being (cf. Street, 2002).
Furthermore, it has been noted that when goals considered as personally
important are not met, rumination surrounding this discrepancy is likely (Martin &
Tesser, 1996). Rumination is generally considered in the clinical literature as intensifying
negative emotions. For example, rumination in depression has been noted as an attempt
to ‘problem solve’ by invariable consideration of the perceived failure to achieve the
expected outcome (Nolen-Hoeksema, 1991). It has also been noted that rumination
indicates an attempt to recover a perceived loss of identity or worth related to achieving
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personal goals (Pyszczynski, & Greenberg, 1987); with such ruminative thought patterns
likely to continue until the unobtainable goal is relinquished (Martin & Tesser, 1989).
This corresponds with conditional goal setting and suggestions that the process is reliant
on a hierarchy of goals (McIntosh, 1996), that is, individuals put their happiness on
‘hold’ during the process of goal pursuit, and may ruminate about the lack goal success
and a lack of happiness, i.e. where ‘being happy’ is strongly dependent on another goal,
e.g. ‘to be married’. Such disengagement, in lieu of the perceived importance of goals,
has been emphasized by O’Connor et al. (2008) as relating to suicidal ideation. In this
regard defusion from the maladaptive goals pursuit would relieve rumination and
dysfunctional cognitions, and subsequently the increased vulnerability to depression. In
this context it is hoped that individuals will become more flexible in their values
approach, as defusion from hopeless ideation should facilitate the recognition that the
values pursued may be maladaptive and as such the rumination may dissolve. To this
end it has been proposed that in order to more effectively encourage values engagement
it is useful to identify the individual organization of goals perceived as important in
regards to achieving happiness (Street, 2002); i.e. aiming to increase recognition of the
function behind the retained motivation to maintain such unhelpful goals pursuit. The
focus on an ideal outcome, i.e. as a fantasy, may not be useful, and linked with low
attainable goals such cognitions are likely inhibiting acceptance and awareness required
in undertaking what is likely a more painful engagement with the planning and
anticipation of potential difficulties in order to implement the process needed in order to
work towards personal values. As was seen in Chapter 6, mindfulness is likely a useful
tool in this regard as it will centre the focus on present moment rather than wishful future
outcomes, and will facilitate contact with the more negative aspects of future
anticipation. It may be somewhat beneficial to include a way of reporting the perceived
likelihood of values obtainment when considering values, as clearly the strength of belief
in such goals and values pursuit may inform the researcher about differences pertaining
to ‘real’ and more imagined values outcomes. As an initial assessment, additionally
requesting information about the current values experience relative to future outcomes
may increase focus on the present behaviour and more easily identify the first point of
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treatment targets; though in a therapeutic context such an agenda would likely be 
identified during the treatment process. Thus, overall Chapter 7 shows that sub-clinical 
depression is linked with low values success thus proposing that psychological health is 
related to living consistently with values. This is an important finding as by 
demonstrating that there is a pre-clinical link between depression levels and successful 
engagement with values directed behaviours the use of values clarification to facilitate 
committed action are supported. The discrepancy between having values and actively 
engaging with these should be emphasised in regards to the finding that values between 
depressed and non-depressed individuals was similar and the diverge emerged in relation 
to differences in acting in accordance with these values, and as such informs us about 
relevant starting points for clinical interventions. Having values and not acting 
accordingly, so called ‘painful engagement’, likely serves to maintain the depressive 
symptoms. It is proposed that acceptance and mindfulness processes would aid the 
willingness required to engage in such committed action, as there may be a level of 
discomfort arising in following the valued direction. For instance, accepting that certain 
life changes may be required or that the valued action may involve contacting negative 
content may be perceived as aversive or painful to the individual.
In relation to the link between values and past and future thinking it was found 
that AMS did not relate to any of the PVQ variables, this may be due to the previously 
stated argument that detail is not as relevant as the awareness of past experiences. That 
is, the relations between past and future thinking in regards to values may likely draw on 
more contextual factors relative to specific past events, as well as the individual 
interpretation of such past events in the context of future outcomes. Although it is likely 
that past experiences inform such planning and motivation there may not be a link 
between specific instances of experience, rather it is the experience across a continuum 
of past events and the learned behaviours acquired during this process which informs 
values. The role of values success was however seen to relate to both positive affect and 
decreased anticipation of negative events occurring, as well as implicit optimistic future 
biases. This link between positive future thinking and appetitive reasoning and values
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success further underlines the importance of looking at values in therapy in order to gain 
insight to the function of behaviours. This also supports the findings throughout the 
thesis in regards to positive future outlook and its relevance in depressive and hopeless 
future ideation, and it may be that this reduced positive future expectancy is brought on 
by the lack of appropriate values understanding and subsequently values 
following/living.
Emotional avoidance was not found to relate to values following at the sub- 
clinical level, as such it may be that this is something which develops at a later stage, e.g. 
once appetitive reasoning becomes less reinforcing. As emotional avoidance has 
previously been seen to relate to depression, the role of a mediating relationship with 
values requires further investigation to understand when such reasoning strategies 
become endorsed by individuals. Emotional avoidance did differ between the two groups 
but the most significant relationship at the sub-clinical level pertains to appetitive 
reasoning. Given that no relationship was found for AMS and values, it may be that the 
functional role attributed to AMS (i.e. reducing contact with aversive past content) is less 
evident in values following due to the activation of future schemas and pliant reasoning. 
Although pliant reasoning was not endorsed within these samples this may be due to the 
negative connotations related to endorsing such reasoning. The assessment of behaviour 
as under pliant, appetitive or avoidant control is not easily targeted by self-report as such 
measures in their construct, as well as the inherent properties of the content required, are 
susceptible to demand characteristics and social desirability -  or even a lack of 
awareness of the controlling influences on one’s behaviour, i.e. the measures are 
vulnerable to effects of the very aspects that are sought to be assessed. At the very least 
such measures should thus be applied and considered in relation to behavioural measures 
pertaining to the attributing factors of an individual’s behaviour. Given the successful 
application of the IRAP methodology in a future thinking paradigm it may be relevant to 
also consider the use of such implicit behavioural measures in values assessment, 
particularly given the currently limited empirical support for values as an assessment
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tool. The PVQ should also, in its own right, be further evaluated in regards to its 
sensitivity and specificity over time.
8.6 Analogue versus Clinical Depression
In the medical literature there has been substantial debate about the relationship 
between syndromal depression (clinical) (major depressive disorder) and sub-threshold 
depressive symptoms (sub-clinical depression) (e.g. Enns, Cox, & Borger, 2001). The 
debate was noted by Flett (1997) as of conceptual as well as practical importance. The 
discussion has centred on the differences in clinical depression and sub-clinical 
depression in regards to qualitative features or merely on a quantitative continuum, that 
is, if sub-clinical depression is in fact a less severe form of clinical depression. A relevant 
concern in this debate has been related to the correctness of utilising sub-clinical student 
(e.g. convenience) samples in depression research. Notably, this is a concern which holds 
practical implications given that many researchers in the depression field have relied on 
undergraduate students as participants in their studies (Vredenburg, Flett, & Krames, 
1993). A particular issue in this regard relates to the matter of generalising findings from 
students to the more general population. The most widely used instrument for measuring 
depression in students is the Beck Depression Inventory (BDI) (Beck, Steer, & Brown,
1996). The BDI is for the most part accepted as a reliable and valid measure of 
depression and in analogue depression studies with students, a cut-off score on the BDI 
(commonly, >9) has frequently been used, with students levels of depression found to be 
relatively similar to depression in clinical populations (Cox, Enns, Borger, & Parker, 
1999; Hill, Kemp-Wheeler, & Jones, 1987); though notably depression in students has 
been found to be more transient (Vredenburg, O’Brien, & Krames, 1988). Agreement has 
emerged in support of clinical and sub-clinical depression as representative of varying 
levels in a continuum. The support for this came from several large clinical and 
community studies (e.g. Angst & Dobler-Mikola, 1984; Judd et al., 1998, 2000; Kendler 
& Gardner, 1998).
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Certain characteristics of depression may be continuous across sub-clinical and
clinical depression. However, it still remains that other features in depression are not
(Haaga & Solomon, 1993). Continuity should as such not automatically be considered an
‘all-or-nothing’ issue. However, Flett et al. (1997) addressed this debate with an
extensive review, which included looking at phenomenological, typological, etiological
and psychometric continuity. The findings from the review led to the conclusion that
most of the available evidence was consistent with the continuity assumption (Flett et al.,
1997). Support for Flett’s review comes from several studies by Cox and colleagues (e.g.
Cox et al., 1999; Enns, Cox, & Borger, 2001; Cox, Enns, & Larsen, 2001) who in their
studies focused on symptom construction in depression. Cox and colleagues have found
that self-reported DSM-IV depression symptom profiles were quantitatively different, but
qualitatively very similar in clinical and analogue samples. This notion of a dimensional
view of depression has been supported by evidence of cognitive disturbances in clinical
conditions presenting in a weaker form in individuals with non-clinical dysphoria
(Watson, Gamez, & Simms, 2005; Clark, Beck, & Alford, 1999). The focus in the
clinical vs. analogue samples debate has mainly been on the student population being of
a convenience sample. Although the issue of convenience is not disputable per se, there
are imperative reasons for studying depression in undergraduate students. One such
factor pertains to the concerning number of university students who either commit
suicide or demonstrate high levels of suicidal ideation, with numbers form the UK
showing that approximately two people under the age of 24 commit suicide every day
(UK, Statistics, 2008). For young people between the ages of 15 and 24 years, suicide is
the third leading cause of death with an increase to the second leading cause within a
student population (Center for Disease Control and Prevention, 2007; Suicide Prevention
Resource Center, 2004). In their study Vredenburg, O’Brien and Krames (1988) found
that around half of the depressed students in their sample reported having suicidal
ideation. It has further been argued that being young and having a chronic level of
negative affective distress increase the likelihood of major depression (Lewinsohn,
Hoberman, & Rosenbaum, 1988). Vredenburg, Flett and Krames (1993) propose that as
first year students tend to be young, and the transition to university life involves a great
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deal of stress, it seems that undergraduate students may on the whole be suitable for 
researchers interested in the initial development of depression. As noted by Beck and 
Young (1978), undergraduate students ‘experience simultaneously all the transitions that 
are major stressors in adulthood* (p.84). To this end research concerned with the link 
between coping and depression have proposed that the use of first year undergraduate 
students may in fact be predominantly suitable (e.g. Pennebaker, Colder, & Sharp, 1990). 
A recent meta-analysis pertaining to the use of implicit measures in depression found 
comparable relations between negative implicit self-referential biases and depression in 
undergraduate, clinical and community samples (Phillips, Heine, & Thorsteinsson, 2010). 
It was inferred from these findings that research on predisposition to depression in such 
varied samples supports a dimensional view of depression (Ruscio & Ruscio, 2000). 
Another criticism to the use of student samples in depression research has been that 
depression scores in these populations are related to other psychological constructs, e.g. 
anxiety, and as such the samples are not depressive specific but rather related to more 
general psychopathology issues (e.g. Gotlib, 1984). However, both clinical and sub- 
clinical samples are characterized by general distress (Vredenburg, Flett, & Krames, 
1993); with anxiety commonly seen as co-morbid to depression in clinical samples also.
In addition to the above debate, which pertains to the student population being
suitable for depression research, it has been noted that methodological advantages exist
for use of such samples. Particularly, it is noted that as an ideal, a sample of participants
would have been subjected to a relatively homogeneous environment, characterised by a
relatively high frequency of personally stressful life events. Such an environment appears
to exist with undergraduate students. For instance, there is a reduced likelihood that other
psychiatric disorders are present and can account for the results (Kendall et al., 1987).
Similarly, it is less likely that students have undergone drug treatments that may
influence the data (Vredenburg, Flett, & Krames, 1993). Another methodological
advantage may be found in the fact that undergraduate students do not typically seek help
for depression -  nor do they undergo various forms of psychological or psychiatric
treatment (Vredenburg et al., 1988). In this regard they are more similar to the general
population, because a large number of people do not seek help for depression (Amato &
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Bradshaw, 1985; Goodman, Sewell, & Jmapol, 1984). Instead, both students and the 
general population tend to seek help from friends and family members (Padesky & 
Hammen, 1981; Tinlsey, de St.Aubin & Brown, 1982; Vredenburg et al., 1988). The fact 
that student depression often goes untreated is important because it is possible that 
various forms of psychiatric treatment may introduce a source of bias in to the findings 
when psychiatric patients are being studied, but this bias is simply not present among 
students (Vredenburg et al., 1993).
8.7 Future Directions
Approaches to depression have emphasized that reduced positive beliefs about
self and the personal future serve as vulnerability factors pertaining to depression (e.g.
Beck, 1967, 1976). In addition to this, hopelessness about the future is frequently
endorsed by depressed individuals (e.g. Abramson et al., 1989; Beck, 1967), in that
negative future events are perceived as certain to occur relative to positive future events
which are not expected to occur (e.g. Andersen, 1990). It has been noted that healthy
individuals show reduced certainty in such negative events occurring, relative to
depressed individuals, where predictive certainty increases with exacerbated depressed
mood (Andersen, 1990). Additionally, it has been argued that certainty in such
expectations may be schematic in nature (Andersen et al., 1992). That is, experience and
rehearsal of negative cognitions may lead to the formation of schema for predicting
negative future events in depressed individuals, thus such schemata may facilitate
automatic judgments about the future. Since these expectations have been noted to occur
automatically, depressed individuals may not be able to intentionally engage in
deliberating on the ‘evidence’ for and against negative future expectancies. In this regard,
and with reference to the aims of the thesis, it was found that past and future thinking are
related and that past experiences inform cognitions about the future. However, it is
proposed that this influence is not independent of contextual factors and may not relate to
episodic autobiographical memory per se. The finding that a shift in focus of cognitive
processing, as facilitated by a brief mindfulness exercise, prior to completion of an
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autobiographical memory task can influence the specificity in recall of personal past 
experiences, suggests that AMS is subjective to the present mental state at the time of 
recall. As such, it is likely that increased AMS depends on continuous activation of a 
particular state or form of processing; i.e. shifting the focus away from this level of 
processing may increase AMS. As such the observed effects of defusion likely occur 
during retrieval, as the encoding of the autobiographical memories occurred prior to the 
experimental tasks. This has implications for the role of emotional avoidance as it may 
be inferred that the accessibility of content pertaining to past experiences which are 
inhibited at the retrieval stage due to the current state of mind, relative to more stable 
traits or affect during encoding. As such, the shift in the focus of attention from 
propositional to experiential knowledge allowed for enhanced contact with specific 
memories. This is in line with the improved levels of AMS found following exposure to 
mindfulness-based cognitive therapy, which also facilitates focus on present moment 
experiences (Williams et al., 2000). The current set of experiments support the link 
between past and future relations and the role of emotional avoidance therein. However, 
more longitudinal examination is required in order to determine whether increased 
awareness may retain this effect over periods of time, and if repeated use of such 
mindfulness strategies will be beneficial.
It has been suggested that theoretical frameworks which account for contextual 
influence, such as RFT, may be able to offer greater insight into the factors which are 
related to depression. This revival of behaviour analytic theory may be able to offer a 
more functional analytic approach to depression research relative to the more cognitively 
based, and currently endorsed, methodology. This is particularly pertinent in light of the 
FT-IRAP findings, (the composition of which is grounded in RFT), seen herein to be an 
effective measure of sub-clinical depression. Additionally, RFT and the REC model offer 
further insight to the very recent proposals occurring within the future thinking literature, 
with specific reference here to recent suggestions by Szpunar (2010) who suggests that, 
rather than episodic memory, it may be relevant to examine the impact of more relational 
constructs pertaining to historical personal events on future thinking. The RFT and REC
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model would offer such a framework for exploration and thus further developments with 
the IRAP methodology in clinical research is warranted. Although individuals may 
become aware of automatic thoughts implicit relations may be more difficult to access 
and modify. As such implicit measures may provide a means of access to implicit 
knowledge, and progress in defusion from such implicit knowledge, or at least the degree 
of acceptance and openness to such dysfunctional relations may be observed via implicit 
measures. Consistent with this suggestion components within ACT, as an approach to 
targeting psychological distress, such acceptance and defusion need further application 
across more clinical samples and over prolonged time periods to allow for longitudinal 
effects to be observed. Values clarification is another ACT component which is relevant 
in the current context, particularly in regards to the aspect of future thinking and the 
relevance of the link between personal values and depression and hopeless ideation. 
Values may be particularly relevant in targeting hopeless ideation and subsequently 
suicidal ideation. As such further validation and exploration of the use of values 
measures in research and clinical application is required. It may be particularly feasible 
to apply the IRAP methodology in the construction of an implicit values measure, as it 
has been recognized that individuals are not always conscious about the reasoning behind 
their particular values, or about the impact implicit cognitions have in regards to values 
pursuit. Social and cultural connotations may further inhibit explicit elaborative 
responding to such values exploration in a personal and therapeutic context, and as such 
slow down the therapeutic process. Thus, an implicit measure that raises awareness of 
personal values direction and endorsement would be able to facilitate the initial 
therapeutic process.
The FT-IRAP may be relevant in the assessment and treatment of underlying 
dysfunctional relations before depressive symptoms become more serious. Implicit 
assessment, such as by the FT-IRAP, may as such also be used in prevention of relapse, 
by use of individualized implicit depression measures in addition to self-report. Further 
research is needed to investigate conditions under which implicit cognitive vulnerability 
takes effect. Considering the diverse nature of implicitness, overlap may exist between
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implicit and explicit cognitions. As such, the structure of negatively-biased implicit and
explicit cognitions may benefit from a person-level approach. That is, vulnerability may
be derived from patterns of implicit and explicit cognitions, and by examination of how
individual profiles may be individually related to depression. Understanding of high-risk
profiles would likely be able to inform individual treatment approaches. As such, rather
than focusing on latent negative beliefs about self, it may be beneficial to focus on
strengthening the underlying positive beliefs about self that already exist. Across
experiments with the FTT (i.e. Experiments 3, 10 and 15) there were some indications of
an effect for period, however the effect varied across experiments and no consistent
pattern of response emerged in terms of group differences for temporal distance of
anticipated future events with the FTT. However, in Chapter 2, clear differences were
observed between depressed and non-depressed samples in regards to the generation of
cued future events as reported on the FCT and FCQ (i.e. Experiment lb and 2b). It was
seen here that healthy participants anticipated significantly more positive events to take
place in the near future relative to sub clinically depressed individuals. Bjarhead et al.
(2010), in analysis of the FTT index score, observed a significant time effect between the
depressed and non-depressed samples, in relation to the near future, although the groups
did not differ in regards to the more distant future expectancies. The depressed group
were found to expect proximate positive future events, as less likely to occur relative to
the non-depressed sample. However, it has been argued that if episodic future thoughts
do serve a function of directing behaviour, it may not be helpful to engage with events
perceived as unlikely to occur for some time (Spreng & Levine, 2006). In relation to the
discussion of findings from Chapter 2 above, although there were clear group differences
pertaining to specificity and the time of event s occurring, there was a lack of detail
found in relation to future events generated. It might be argued that this may be due to a
lack of belief that such future events are likely to occur in the near future. In view of the
proposal that behaviour is not automatically activated or inhibited through the occurrence
of a positive or negative event, but through the anticipation that such an event will occur
(Andersen, 1990; Andersen & Lyon, 1987; Andersen, Spielman, & Bargh, 1992),
MacLeod and Salaminiou (2001) argued that emotional avoidance can result in reduced
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approach behaviours (Macleod, 1999). This reduction in approach behaviours 
corresponds to the reduced positive future generation observed, and with the postulate 
that expectancy for proximate future would likely be influenced by the current context 
relative to more distant future events (Szpunar & McDermott, 2008). Temporal distance 
could thus be important, and may have some implication in regards to treatment 
approaches and particularly in regards to values following as more distant events may be 
interpreted as more neutral or isolated from affective relations (i.e. negative connotations 
of the events are weakened due to the remoteness of the event). This implies that 
progression towards an overarching personal value, as opposed to more immediate and 
contingent goals, would facilitate the ongoing values process. Future FT-IRAP 
experiments should consider incorporating stimuli that account for such temporal 
relations. For instance, the target stimuli in an IRAP may integrate temporal relations 
such as before/after, I did [not] expect positive (negative) before -  I do [not] expect 
positive (negative) now; or now/then, e.g. ‘I [don’t] expect positive (negative) 
today/next-week/next-year/next 5-10 years.
The mounting appreciation of the link between past and future thinking, along 
with the consideration of implicit processes in depression, holds implications for 
improving assessment and treatment of depression. Continued examination of implicit 
future cognition in depression may provide answers in the following areas: (i) how 
reduced positive future expectancy precipitates depression; (ii) which features in future 
cognitions constitute vulnerability to depression; (iii) the role of emotional avoidance, as 
stemming from past experiences, in future directed cognition, (iv) how reduced positive 
future thinking may facilitate continued depression, (v) and how cognitive vulnerabilities 
may be detected and altered. The recent functional-analytic framework emerging from 
RFT by way of the REC model may offer research in this area greater understanding of 
the behavioral effects accrued from explicit and implicit methods of assessment. This 
framework significantly offers a practical methodology in form of the IRAP which 
specifically targets implicit cognition, i.e. via brief and immediate relational responses. 
The current research is exploratory in its nature and further application of the FT-IRAP is
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needed within clinical samples before any final conclusions can be drawn in relation to 
implicit future thinking and depression.
8.8 Conclusion
The thesis has revealed a significant relationship between reduced positive self- 
referential implicit cognition and depressive status. Emotional avoidance is linked to 
deficits in autobiographical memory which has been linked herein to implicit future 
cognitions. Explicit assessment of future thinking was found to be challenging, though 
positive future expectancy was seen to be more stable and stronger predictor of 
depression relative to the amount of positive thoughts for the future. Although the 
distinction between implicit and explicit processes in future thinking and depression have 
not yet been determined, the current thesis suggests that implicit relations represent 
significant predictors of sub-clinical depression. Additionally, it has been demonstrated 
that psychological inflexibility likely works as a contributing factor in many of the 
problems that lead to suicidality. Given that ACT processes alters such inflexibility - 
these processes could be used in preventative interventions to alter the path known to 
lead to suicidality. Taken together the experimental series reported herein suggests that 
implicit negative cognitions about the past and future can be a predictor of sub clinical 
depression. Additionally, mindfulness and values-based skills can moderate the link 
between past and future cognitions and sub clinical depression. Future work should take 
the short procedures outlined in the current thesis and apply them to clinical populations 
at both the basic (testing implicit cognitions) and applied (employing mindfulness and 
values interventions that target past and future cognitions directly) level.
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